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emacs/lib/file-has-acl.c

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Redo emacsclient socket symlink-attack checking * admin/merge-gnulib (GNULIB_MODULES): Add file-has-acl. * lib/file-has-acl.c: New file, copied from Gnulib. * lib/gnulib.mk.in, m4/gnulib-comp.m4: Regenerate. * lib-src/emacsclient.c: Include acl.h, for file_has_acl. (O_PATH): Default to O_SEARCH, which is good enough here. (union local_sockaddr): New type. (socket_status): Remove, replacing with ... (connect_socket): New function. All callers changed. This function checks for ownership and permissions issues with the parent directory of the socket file, instead of checking the owner of the socket (which does not help security). (socknamesize): Move to file scope. (local_sockname): New arg S. No need to pass socknamesize. UID arg is now uid_t. All callers changed. Get file descriptor of parent directory of socket, to foil some symlink attacks. Do not follow symlinks to that directory. (set_local_socket): Create the socket here instead of on each attempt to connect it. Fall back from XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to /tmp only if the former fails due to ENOENT. Adjust permission-failure diagnostic to match changed behavior. This addresses Bug#33847, which complained about emacsclient in a safer XDG environment not connecting to an Emacs server running in a less-safe enviroment outside XDG. The patch fixes a longstanding issue with emacsclient permission checking. It’s ineffective to look at the permission of the socket file itself; on some platforms, these permissions are ignored anyway. What matters are the permissions on the parent directory of the socket file, as these are what make symlink attacks possible. Change the permissions check accordingly, and also refuse to follow symlinks to that parent directory. These changes make it OK for emacsclient to fall back from XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to the traditionally less-safe /tmp/emacsNNNN directories, since /tmp is universally sticky nowadays.
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/* Test whether a file has a nontrivial ACL. -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
2023-01-01 10:31:12 +00:00
Copyright (C) 2002-2003, 2005-2023 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
Redo emacsclient socket symlink-attack checking * admin/merge-gnulib (GNULIB_MODULES): Add file-has-acl. * lib/file-has-acl.c: New file, copied from Gnulib. * lib/gnulib.mk.in, m4/gnulib-comp.m4: Regenerate. * lib-src/emacsclient.c: Include acl.h, for file_has_acl. (O_PATH): Default to O_SEARCH, which is good enough here. (union local_sockaddr): New type. (socket_status): Remove, replacing with ... (connect_socket): New function. All callers changed. This function checks for ownership and permissions issues with the parent directory of the socket file, instead of checking the owner of the socket (which does not help security). (socknamesize): Move to file scope. (local_sockname): New arg S. No need to pass socknamesize. UID arg is now uid_t. All callers changed. Get file descriptor of parent directory of socket, to foil some symlink attacks. Do not follow symlinks to that directory. (set_local_socket): Create the socket here instead of on each attempt to connect it. Fall back from XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to /tmp only if the former fails due to ENOENT. Adjust permission-failure diagnostic to match changed behavior. This addresses Bug#33847, which complained about emacsclient in a safer XDG environment not connecting to an Emacs server running in a less-safe enviroment outside XDG. The patch fixes a longstanding issue with emacsclient permission checking. It’s ineffective to look at the permission of the socket file itself; on some platforms, these permissions are ignored anyway. What matters are the permissions on the parent directory of the socket file, as these are what make symlink attacks possible. Change the permissions check accordingly, and also refuse to follow symlinks to that parent directory. These changes make it OK for emacsclient to fall back from XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to the traditionally less-safe /tmp/emacsNNNN directories, since /tmp is universally sticky nowadays.
2021-07-23 11:33:21 +00:00
This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
Redo emacsclient socket symlink-attack checking * admin/merge-gnulib (GNULIB_MODULES): Add file-has-acl. * lib/file-has-acl.c: New file, copied from Gnulib. * lib/gnulib.mk.in, m4/gnulib-comp.m4: Regenerate. * lib-src/emacsclient.c: Include acl.h, for file_has_acl. (O_PATH): Default to O_SEARCH, which is good enough here. (union local_sockaddr): New type. (socket_status): Remove, replacing with ... (connect_socket): New function. All callers changed. This function checks for ownership and permissions issues with the parent directory of the socket file, instead of checking the owner of the socket (which does not help security). (socknamesize): Move to file scope. (local_sockname): New arg S. No need to pass socknamesize. UID arg is now uid_t. All callers changed. Get file descriptor of parent directory of socket, to foil some symlink attacks. Do not follow symlinks to that directory. (set_local_socket): Create the socket here instead of on each attempt to connect it. Fall back from XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to /tmp only if the former fails due to ENOENT. Adjust permission-failure diagnostic to match changed behavior. This addresses Bug#33847, which complained about emacsclient in a safer XDG environment not connecting to an Emacs server running in a less-safe enviroment outside XDG. The patch fixes a longstanding issue with emacsclient permission checking. It’s ineffective to look at the permission of the socket file itself; on some platforms, these permissions are ignored anyway. What matters are the permissions on the parent directory of the socket file, as these are what make symlink attacks possible. Change the permissions check accordingly, and also refuse to follow symlinks to that parent directory. These changes make it OK for emacsclient to fall back from XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to the traditionally less-safe /tmp/emacsNNNN directories, since /tmp is universally sticky nowadays.
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(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
Written by Paul Eggert, Andreas Grünbacher, and Bruno Haible. */
/* Without this pragma, gcc 4.7.0 20120126 may suggest that the
file_has_acl function might be candidate for attribute 'const' */
#if (__GNUC__ == 4 && 6 <= __GNUC_MINOR__) || 4 < __GNUC__
# pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wsuggest-attribute=const"
#endif
#include <config.h>
#include "acl.h"
#include "acl-internal.h"
#if USE_ACL && GETXATTR_WITH_POSIX_ACLS
# include <string.h>
# include <arpa/inet.h>
Redo emacsclient socket symlink-attack checking * admin/merge-gnulib (GNULIB_MODULES): Add file-has-acl. * lib/file-has-acl.c: New file, copied from Gnulib. * lib/gnulib.mk.in, m4/gnulib-comp.m4: Regenerate. * lib-src/emacsclient.c: Include acl.h, for file_has_acl. (O_PATH): Default to O_SEARCH, which is good enough here. (union local_sockaddr): New type. (socket_status): Remove, replacing with ... (connect_socket): New function. All callers changed. This function checks for ownership and permissions issues with the parent directory of the socket file, instead of checking the owner of the socket (which does not help security). (socknamesize): Move to file scope. (local_sockname): New arg S. No need to pass socknamesize. UID arg is now uid_t. All callers changed. Get file descriptor of parent directory of socket, to foil some symlink attacks. Do not follow symlinks to that directory. (set_local_socket): Create the socket here instead of on each attempt to connect it. Fall back from XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to /tmp only if the former fails due to ENOENT. Adjust permission-failure diagnostic to match changed behavior. This addresses Bug#33847, which complained about emacsclient in a safer XDG environment not connecting to an Emacs server running in a less-safe enviroment outside XDG. The patch fixes a longstanding issue with emacsclient permission checking. It’s ineffective to look at the permission of the socket file itself; on some platforms, these permissions are ignored anyway. What matters are the permissions on the parent directory of the socket file, as these are what make symlink attacks possible. Change the permissions check accordingly, and also refuse to follow symlinks to that parent directory. These changes make it OK for emacsclient to fall back from XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to the traditionally less-safe /tmp/emacsNNNN directories, since /tmp is universally sticky nowadays.
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# include <sys/xattr.h>
# include <linux/xattr.h>
# ifndef XATTR_NAME_NFSV4_ACL
# define XATTR_NAME_NFSV4_ACL "system.nfs4_acl"
# endif
enum {
/* ACE4_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE = 0x00000000, */
ACE4_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE = 0x00000001,
ACE4_IDENTIFIER_GROUP = 0x00000040
};
/* Return 1 if given ACL in XDR format is non-trivial, 0 if it is trivial.
-1 upon failure to determine it. Possibly change errno. Assume that
the ACL is valid, except avoid undefined behavior even if invalid.
See <https://linux.die.net/man/5/nfs4_acl>. The NFSv4 acls are
defined in Internet RFC 7530 and as such, every NFSv4 server
supporting ACLs should support NFSv4 ACLs (they differ from from
POSIX draft ACLs). The ACLs can be obtained via the
nfsv4-acl-tools, e.g., the nfs4_getfacl command. Gnulib provides
only basic support of NFSv4 ACLs, i.e., recognize trivial vs
nontrivial ACLs. */
static int
acl_nfs4_nontrivial (uint32_t *xattr, ssize_t nbytes)
{
enum { BYTES_PER_NETWORK_UINT = 4};
/* Grab the number of aces in the acl. */
nbytes -= BYTES_PER_NETWORK_UINT;
if (nbytes < 0)
return -1;
uint32_t num_aces = ntohl (*xattr++);
if (6 < num_aces)
return 1;
int ace_found = 0;
for (int ace_n = 0; ace_n < num_aces; ace_n++)
{
/* Get the acl type and flag. Skip the mask; it's too risky to
test it and it does not seem to be needed. Get the wholen. */
nbytes -= 4 * BYTES_PER_NETWORK_UINT;
if (nbytes < 0)
return -1;
uint32_t type = ntohl (xattr[0]);
uint32_t flag = ntohl (xattr[1]);
uint32_t wholen = ntohl (xattr[3]);
xattr += 4;
int whowords = (wholen / BYTES_PER_NETWORK_UINT
+ (wholen % BYTES_PER_NETWORK_UINT != 0));
int64_t wholen4 = whowords;
wholen4 *= BYTES_PER_NETWORK_UINT;
/* Trivial ACLs have only ACE4_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE or
ACE4_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE. */
if (ACE4_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE < type)
return 1;
/* RFC 7530 says FLAG should be 0, but be generous to NetApp and
also accept the group flag. */
if (flag & ~ACE4_IDENTIFIER_GROUP)
return 1;
/* Get the who string. Check NBYTES - WHOLEN4 before storing
into NBYTES, to avoid truncation on conversion. */
if (nbytes - wholen4 < 0)
return -1;
nbytes -= wholen4;
/* For a trivial ACL, max 6 (typically 3) ACEs, 3 allow, 3 deny.
Check that there is at most one ACE of each TYPE and WHO. */
int who2
= (wholen == 6 && memcmp (xattr, "OWNER@", 6) == 0 ? 0
: wholen == 6 && memcmp (xattr, "GROUP@", 6) == 0 ? 2
: wholen == 9 && memcmp (xattr, "EVERYONE@", 9) == 0 ? 4
: -1);
if (who2 < 0)
return 1;
int ace_found_bit = 1 << (who2 | type);
if (ace_found & ace_found_bit)
return 1;
ace_found |= ace_found_bit;
xattr += whowords;
}
return 0;
}
Redo emacsclient socket symlink-attack checking * admin/merge-gnulib (GNULIB_MODULES): Add file-has-acl. * lib/file-has-acl.c: New file, copied from Gnulib. * lib/gnulib.mk.in, m4/gnulib-comp.m4: Regenerate. * lib-src/emacsclient.c: Include acl.h, for file_has_acl. (O_PATH): Default to O_SEARCH, which is good enough here. (union local_sockaddr): New type. (socket_status): Remove, replacing with ... (connect_socket): New function. All callers changed. This function checks for ownership and permissions issues with the parent directory of the socket file, instead of checking the owner of the socket (which does not help security). (socknamesize): Move to file scope. (local_sockname): New arg S. No need to pass socknamesize. UID arg is now uid_t. All callers changed. Get file descriptor of parent directory of socket, to foil some symlink attacks. Do not follow symlinks to that directory. (set_local_socket): Create the socket here instead of on each attempt to connect it. Fall back from XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to /tmp only if the former fails due to ENOENT. Adjust permission-failure diagnostic to match changed behavior. This addresses Bug#33847, which complained about emacsclient in a safer XDG environment not connecting to an Emacs server running in a less-safe enviroment outside XDG. The patch fixes a longstanding issue with emacsclient permission checking. It’s ineffective to look at the permission of the socket file itself; on some platforms, these permissions are ignored anyway. What matters are the permissions on the parent directory of the socket file, as these are what make symlink attacks possible. Change the permissions check accordingly, and also refuse to follow symlinks to that parent directory. These changes make it OK for emacsclient to fall back from XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to the traditionally less-safe /tmp/emacsNNNN directories, since /tmp is universally sticky nowadays.
2021-07-23 11:33:21 +00:00
#endif
/* Return 1 if NAME has a nontrivial access control list,
0 if ACLs are not supported, or if NAME has no or only a base ACL,
and -1 (setting errno) on error. Note callers can determine
if ACLs are not supported as errno is set in that case also.
SB must be set to the stat buffer of NAME,
obtained through stat() or lstat(). */
int
file_has_acl (char const *name, struct stat const *sb)
{
#if USE_ACL
if (! S_ISLNK (sb->st_mode))
{
# if GETXATTR_WITH_POSIX_ACLS
ssize_t ret;
int initial_errno = errno;
Redo emacsclient socket symlink-attack checking * admin/merge-gnulib (GNULIB_MODULES): Add file-has-acl. * lib/file-has-acl.c: New file, copied from Gnulib. * lib/gnulib.mk.in, m4/gnulib-comp.m4: Regenerate. * lib-src/emacsclient.c: Include acl.h, for file_has_acl. (O_PATH): Default to O_SEARCH, which is good enough here. (union local_sockaddr): New type. (socket_status): Remove, replacing with ... (connect_socket): New function. All callers changed. This function checks for ownership and permissions issues with the parent directory of the socket file, instead of checking the owner of the socket (which does not help security). (socknamesize): Move to file scope. (local_sockname): New arg S. No need to pass socknamesize. UID arg is now uid_t. All callers changed. Get file descriptor of parent directory of socket, to foil some symlink attacks. Do not follow symlinks to that directory. (set_local_socket): Create the socket here instead of on each attempt to connect it. Fall back from XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to /tmp only if the former fails due to ENOENT. Adjust permission-failure diagnostic to match changed behavior. This addresses Bug#33847, which complained about emacsclient in a safer XDG environment not connecting to an Emacs server running in a less-safe enviroment outside XDG. The patch fixes a longstanding issue with emacsclient permission checking. It’s ineffective to look at the permission of the socket file itself; on some platforms, these permissions are ignored anyway. What matters are the permissions on the parent directory of the socket file, as these are what make symlink attacks possible. Change the permissions check accordingly, and also refuse to follow symlinks to that parent directory. These changes make it OK for emacsclient to fall back from XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to the traditionally less-safe /tmp/emacsNNNN directories, since /tmp is universally sticky nowadays.
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ret = getxattr (name, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS, NULL, 0);
if (ret < 0 && errno == ENODATA)
ret = 0;
else if (ret > 0)
return 1;
if (ret == 0 && S_ISDIR (sb->st_mode))
{
ret = getxattr (name, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT, NULL, 0);
if (ret < 0 && errno == ENODATA)
ret = 0;
else if (ret > 0)
return 1;
}
if (ret < 0)
{
/* Check for NFSv4 ACLs. The max length of a trivial
ACL is 6 words for owner, 6 for group, 7 for everyone,
all times 2 because there are both allow and deny ACEs.
There are 6 words for owner because of type, flag, mask,
wholen, "OWNER@"+pad and similarly for group; everyone is
another word to hold "EVERYONE@". */
uint32_t xattr[2 * (6 + 6 + 7)];
ret = getxattr (name, XATTR_NAME_NFSV4_ACL, xattr, sizeof xattr);
if (ret < 0)
switch (errno)
{
case ENODATA: return 0;
case ERANGE : return 1; /* ACL must be nontrivial. */
}
else
{
/* It looks like a trivial ACL, but investigate further. */
ret = acl_nfs4_nontrivial (xattr, ret);
if (ret < 0)
{
errno = EINVAL;
return ret;
}
errno = initial_errno;
}
}
Redo emacsclient socket symlink-attack checking * admin/merge-gnulib (GNULIB_MODULES): Add file-has-acl. * lib/file-has-acl.c: New file, copied from Gnulib. * lib/gnulib.mk.in, m4/gnulib-comp.m4: Regenerate. * lib-src/emacsclient.c: Include acl.h, for file_has_acl. (O_PATH): Default to O_SEARCH, which is good enough here. (union local_sockaddr): New type. (socket_status): Remove, replacing with ... (connect_socket): New function. All callers changed. This function checks for ownership and permissions issues with the parent directory of the socket file, instead of checking the owner of the socket (which does not help security). (socknamesize): Move to file scope. (local_sockname): New arg S. No need to pass socknamesize. UID arg is now uid_t. All callers changed. Get file descriptor of parent directory of socket, to foil some symlink attacks. Do not follow symlinks to that directory. (set_local_socket): Create the socket here instead of on each attempt to connect it. Fall back from XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to /tmp only if the former fails due to ENOENT. Adjust permission-failure diagnostic to match changed behavior. This addresses Bug#33847, which complained about emacsclient in a safer XDG environment not connecting to an Emacs server running in a less-safe enviroment outside XDG. The patch fixes a longstanding issue with emacsclient permission checking. It’s ineffective to look at the permission of the socket file itself; on some platforms, these permissions are ignored anyway. What matters are the permissions on the parent directory of the socket file, as these are what make symlink attacks possible. Change the permissions check accordingly, and also refuse to follow symlinks to that parent directory. These changes make it OK for emacsclient to fall back from XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to the traditionally less-safe /tmp/emacsNNNN directories, since /tmp is universally sticky nowadays.
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if (ret < 0)
return - acl_errno_valid (errno);
return ret;
# elif HAVE_ACL_GET_FILE
/* POSIX 1003.1e (draft 17 -- abandoned) specific version. */
/* Linux, FreeBSD, Mac OS X, IRIX, Tru64, Cygwin >= 2.5 */
int ret;
if (HAVE_ACL_EXTENDED_FILE) /* Linux */
{
/* On Linux, acl_extended_file is an optimized function: It only
makes two calls to getxattr(), one for ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, one for
ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT. */
ret = acl_extended_file (name);
}
else /* FreeBSD, Mac OS X, IRIX, Tru64, Cygwin >= 2.5 */
{
# if HAVE_ACL_TYPE_EXTENDED /* Mac OS X */
/* On Mac OS X, acl_get_file (name, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS)
and acl_get_file (name, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT)
always return NULL / EINVAL. There is no point in making
these two useless calls. The real ACL is retrieved through
acl_get_file (name, ACL_TYPE_EXTENDED). */
acl_t acl = acl_get_file (name, ACL_TYPE_EXTENDED);
if (acl)
{
ret = acl_extended_nontrivial (acl);
acl_free (acl);
}
else
ret = -1;
# else /* FreeBSD, IRIX, Tru64, Cygwin >= 2.5 */
acl_t acl = acl_get_file (name, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
if (acl)
{
int saved_errno;
ret = acl_access_nontrivial (acl);
saved_errno = errno;
acl_free (acl);
errno = saved_errno;
# if HAVE_ACL_FREE_TEXT /* Tru64 */
/* On OSF/1, acl_get_file (name, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT) always
returns NULL with errno not set. There is no point in
making this call. */
# else /* FreeBSD, IRIX, Cygwin >= 2.5 */
/* On Linux, FreeBSD, IRIX, acl_get_file (name, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS)
and acl_get_file (name, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT) on a directory
either both succeed or both fail; it depends on the
file system. Therefore there is no point in making the second
call if the first one already failed. */
if (ret == 0 && S_ISDIR (sb->st_mode))
{
acl = acl_get_file (name, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
if (acl)
{
# ifdef __CYGWIN__ /* Cygwin >= 2.5 */
ret = acl_access_nontrivial (acl);
saved_errno = errno;
acl_free (acl);
errno = saved_errno;
# else
ret = (0 < acl_entries (acl));
acl_free (acl);
# endif
}
else
ret = -1;
}
# endif
}
else
ret = -1;
# endif
}
if (ret < 0)
return - acl_errno_valid (errno);
return ret;
# elif HAVE_FACL && defined GETACL /* Solaris, Cygwin < 2.5, not HP-UX */
# if defined ACL_NO_TRIVIAL
/* Solaris 10 (newer version), which has additional API declared in
<sys/acl.h> (acl_t) and implemented in libsec (acl_set, acl_trivial,
acl_fromtext, ...). */
return acl_trivial (name);
# else /* Solaris, Cygwin, general case */
/* Solaris 2.5 through Solaris 10, Cygwin, and contemporaneous versions
of Unixware. The acl() call returns the access and default ACL both
at once. */
{
/* Initially, try to read the entries into a stack-allocated buffer.
Use malloc if it does not fit. */
enum
{
alloc_init = 4000 / sizeof (aclent_t), /* >= 3 */
alloc_max = MIN (INT_MAX, SIZE_MAX / sizeof (aclent_t))
};
aclent_t buf[alloc_init];
size_t alloc = alloc_init;
aclent_t *entries = buf;
aclent_t *malloced = NULL;
int count;
for (;;)
{
count = acl (name, GETACL, alloc, entries);
if (count < 0 && errno == ENOSPC)
{
/* Increase the size of the buffer. */
free (malloced);
if (alloc > alloc_max / 2)
{
errno = ENOMEM;
return -1;
}
alloc = 2 * alloc; /* <= alloc_max */
entries = malloced =
(aclent_t *) malloc (alloc * sizeof (aclent_t));
if (entries == NULL)
{
errno = ENOMEM;
return -1;
}
continue;
}
break;
}
if (count < 0)
{
if (errno == ENOSYS || errno == ENOTSUP)
;
else
{
free (malloced);
return -1;
}
}
else if (count == 0)
;
else
{
/* Don't use MIN_ACL_ENTRIES: It's set to 4 on Cygwin, but Cygwin
returns only 3 entries for files with no ACL. But this is safe:
If there are more than 4 entries, there cannot be only the
"user::", "group::", "other:", and "mask:" entries. */
if (count > 4)
{
free (malloced);
return 1;
}
if (acl_nontrivial (count, entries))
{
free (malloced);
return 1;
}
}
free (malloced);
}
# ifdef ACE_GETACL
/* Solaris also has a different variant of ACLs, used in ZFS and NFSv4
file systems (whereas the other ones are used in UFS file systems). */
{
/* Initially, try to read the entries into a stack-allocated buffer.
Use malloc if it does not fit. */
enum
{
alloc_init = 4000 / sizeof (ace_t), /* >= 3 */
alloc_max = MIN (INT_MAX, SIZE_MAX / sizeof (ace_t))
};
ace_t buf[alloc_init];
size_t alloc = alloc_init;
ace_t *entries = buf;
ace_t *malloced = NULL;
int count;
for (;;)
{
count = acl (name, ACE_GETACL, alloc, entries);
if (count < 0 && errno == ENOSPC)
{
/* Increase the size of the buffer. */
free (malloced);
if (alloc > alloc_max / 2)
{
errno = ENOMEM;
return -1;
}
alloc = 2 * alloc; /* <= alloc_max */
entries = malloced = (ace_t *) malloc (alloc * sizeof (ace_t));
if (entries == NULL)
{
errno = ENOMEM;
return -1;
}
continue;
}
break;
}
if (count < 0)
{
if (errno == ENOSYS || errno == EINVAL)
;
else
{
free (malloced);
return -1;
}
}
else if (count == 0)
;
else
{
/* In the old (original Solaris 10) convention:
If there are more than 3 entries, there cannot be only the
ACE_OWNER, ACE_GROUP, ACE_OTHER entries.
In the newer Solaris 10 and Solaris 11 convention:
If there are more than 6 entries, there cannot be only the
ACE_OWNER, ACE_GROUP, ACE_EVERYONE entries, each once with
NEW_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE and once with
NEW_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE. */
if (count > 6)
{
free (malloced);
return 1;
}
if (acl_ace_nontrivial (count, entries))
{
free (malloced);
return 1;
}
}
free (malloced);
}
# endif
return 0;
# endif
# elif HAVE_GETACL /* HP-UX */
{
struct acl_entry entries[NACLENTRIES];
int count;
count = getacl (name, NACLENTRIES, entries);
if (count < 0)
{
/* ENOSYS is seen on newer HP-UX versions.
EOPNOTSUPP is typically seen on NFS mounts.
ENOTSUP was seen on Quantum StorNext file systems (cvfs). */
if (errno == ENOSYS || errno == EOPNOTSUPP || errno == ENOTSUP)
;
else
return -1;
}
else if (count == 0)
return 0;
else /* count > 0 */
{
if (count > NACLENTRIES)
/* If NACLENTRIES cannot be trusted, use dynamic memory
allocation. */
abort ();
/* If there are more than 3 entries, there cannot be only the
(uid,%), (%,gid), (%,%) entries. */
if (count > 3)
return 1;
{
struct stat statbuf;
if (stat (name, &statbuf) == -1 && errno != EOVERFLOW)
Redo emacsclient socket symlink-attack checking * admin/merge-gnulib (GNULIB_MODULES): Add file-has-acl. * lib/file-has-acl.c: New file, copied from Gnulib. * lib/gnulib.mk.in, m4/gnulib-comp.m4: Regenerate. * lib-src/emacsclient.c: Include acl.h, for file_has_acl. (O_PATH): Default to O_SEARCH, which is good enough here. (union local_sockaddr): New type. (socket_status): Remove, replacing with ... (connect_socket): New function. All callers changed. This function checks for ownership and permissions issues with the parent directory of the socket file, instead of checking the owner of the socket (which does not help security). (socknamesize): Move to file scope. (local_sockname): New arg S. No need to pass socknamesize. UID arg is now uid_t. All callers changed. Get file descriptor of parent directory of socket, to foil some symlink attacks. Do not follow symlinks to that directory. (set_local_socket): Create the socket here instead of on each attempt to connect it. Fall back from XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to /tmp only if the former fails due to ENOENT. Adjust permission-failure diagnostic to match changed behavior. This addresses Bug#33847, which complained about emacsclient in a safer XDG environment not connecting to an Emacs server running in a less-safe enviroment outside XDG. The patch fixes a longstanding issue with emacsclient permission checking. It’s ineffective to look at the permission of the socket file itself; on some platforms, these permissions are ignored anyway. What matters are the permissions on the parent directory of the socket file, as these are what make symlink attacks possible. Change the permissions check accordingly, and also refuse to follow symlinks to that parent directory. These changes make it OK for emacsclient to fall back from XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to the traditionally less-safe /tmp/emacsNNNN directories, since /tmp is universally sticky nowadays.
2021-07-23 11:33:21 +00:00
return -1;
return acl_nontrivial (count, entries);
}
}
}
# if HAVE_ACLV_H /* HP-UX >= 11.11 */
{
struct acl entries[NACLVENTRIES];
int count;
count = acl ((char *) name, ACL_GET, NACLVENTRIES, entries);
if (count < 0)
{
/* EOPNOTSUPP is seen on NFS in HP-UX 11.11, 11.23.
EINVAL is seen on NFS in HP-UX 11.31. */
if (errno == ENOSYS || errno == EOPNOTSUPP || errno == EINVAL)
;
else
return -1;
}
else if (count == 0)
return 0;
else /* count > 0 */
{
if (count > NACLVENTRIES)
/* If NACLVENTRIES cannot be trusted, use dynamic memory
allocation. */
abort ();
/* If there are more than 4 entries, there cannot be only the
four base ACL entries. */
if (count > 4)
return 1;
return aclv_nontrivial (count, entries);
}
}
# endif
# elif HAVE_ACLX_GET && defined ACL_AIX_WIP /* AIX */
acl_type_t type;
char aclbuf[1024];
void *acl = aclbuf;
size_t aclsize = sizeof (aclbuf);
mode_t mode;
for (;;)
{
/* The docs say that type being 0 is equivalent to ACL_ANY, but it
is not true, in AIX 5.3. */
type.u64 = ACL_ANY;
if (aclx_get (name, 0, &type, aclbuf, &aclsize, &mode) >= 0)
break;
if (errno == ENOSYS)
return 0;
if (errno != ENOSPC)
{
if (acl != aclbuf)
free (acl);
Redo emacsclient socket symlink-attack checking * admin/merge-gnulib (GNULIB_MODULES): Add file-has-acl. * lib/file-has-acl.c: New file, copied from Gnulib. * lib/gnulib.mk.in, m4/gnulib-comp.m4: Regenerate. * lib-src/emacsclient.c: Include acl.h, for file_has_acl. (O_PATH): Default to O_SEARCH, which is good enough here. (union local_sockaddr): New type. (socket_status): Remove, replacing with ... (connect_socket): New function. All callers changed. This function checks for ownership and permissions issues with the parent directory of the socket file, instead of checking the owner of the socket (which does not help security). (socknamesize): Move to file scope. (local_sockname): New arg S. No need to pass socknamesize. UID arg is now uid_t. All callers changed. Get file descriptor of parent directory of socket, to foil some symlink attacks. Do not follow symlinks to that directory. (set_local_socket): Create the socket here instead of on each attempt to connect it. Fall back from XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to /tmp only if the former fails due to ENOENT. Adjust permission-failure diagnostic to match changed behavior. This addresses Bug#33847, which complained about emacsclient in a safer XDG environment not connecting to an Emacs server running in a less-safe enviroment outside XDG. The patch fixes a longstanding issue with emacsclient permission checking. It’s ineffective to look at the permission of the socket file itself; on some platforms, these permissions are ignored anyway. What matters are the permissions on the parent directory of the socket file, as these are what make symlink attacks possible. Change the permissions check accordingly, and also refuse to follow symlinks to that parent directory. These changes make it OK for emacsclient to fall back from XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to the traditionally less-safe /tmp/emacsNNNN directories, since /tmp is universally sticky nowadays.
2021-07-23 11:33:21 +00:00
return -1;
}
aclsize = 2 * aclsize;
if (acl != aclbuf)
free (acl);
acl = malloc (aclsize);
if (acl == NULL)
{
errno = ENOMEM;
return -1;
}
}
if (type.u64 == ACL_AIXC)
{
int result = acl_nontrivial ((struct acl *) acl);
if (acl != aclbuf)
free (acl);
return result;
}
else if (type.u64 == ACL_NFS4)
{
int result = acl_nfs4_nontrivial ((nfs4_acl_int_t *) acl);
if (acl != aclbuf)
free (acl);
return result;
}
else
{
/* A newer type of ACL has been introduced in the system.
We should better support it. */
if (acl != aclbuf)
free (acl);
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
# elif HAVE_STATACL /* older AIX */
union { struct acl a; char room[4096]; } u;
if (statacl ((char *) name, STX_NORMAL, &u.a, sizeof (u)) < 0)
return -1;
return acl_nontrivial (&u.a);
# elif HAVE_ACLSORT /* NonStop Kernel */
{
struct acl entries[NACLENTRIES];
int count;
count = acl ((char *) name, ACL_GET, NACLENTRIES, entries);
if (count < 0)
{
if (errno == ENOSYS || errno == ENOTSUP)
;
else
return -1;
}
else if (count == 0)
return 0;
else /* count > 0 */
{
if (count > NACLENTRIES)
/* If NACLENTRIES cannot be trusted, use dynamic memory
allocation. */
abort ();
/* If there are more than 4 entries, there cannot be only the
four base ACL entries. */
if (count > 4)
return 1;
return acl_nontrivial (count, entries);
}
}
# endif
}
#endif
return 0;
}