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Code Issues Releases Activity

net/hostapd: Address 3 latest security advisories

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These are combined upstream patches 2015-2, 2015-3, 2015-4
They address the following security advisories:

  * CVE-2015-4141
  * CVE-2015-4142
  * CVE-2015-4143
  * CVE-2015-4144
  * CVE-2015-4145
  * CVE-2015-4146

These advisories also apply to security/wpa_supplicant

PR:		200567
Submitted by:	Jason Unovitch
Approved by:	maintainer (Craig Leres)
This commit is contained in:
John Marino 2015-06-02 09:52:01 +00:00
parent a81958dcf7
commit dca0df99ed
Notes: svn2git 2021-03-31 03:12:20 +00:00 
svn path=/head/; revision=388314
5 changed files with 166 additions and 0 deletions
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1
net/hostapd/Makefile
View File

@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
PORTNAME= hostapd
PORTVERSION= 2.4
PORTREVISION= 1
CATEGORIES= net
MASTER_SITES= http://w1.fi/releases/

12
net/hostapd/files/patch-src_ap_wmm.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
--- src/ap/wmm.c.orig 2015-03-15 17:30:39 UTC
+++ src/ap/wmm.c
@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_d
return;
}
+ if (left < 0)
+ return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */
+
/* extract the tspec info element */
if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) {
hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,

77
net/hostapd/files/patch-src_eap__peer_eap__pwd.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
--- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c.orig 2015-03-15 17:30:39 UTC
+++ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
@@ -301,6 +301,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct e
BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
u16 offset;
u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
+ size_t prime_len, order_len;
+
+ if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) {
+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
+ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
+ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
+
+ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
+ (unsigned int) payload_len,
+ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
+ goto fin;
+ }
if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
@@ -500,6 +517,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct
u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
int offset;
+ if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) {
+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
+ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
+ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
/*
* first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function |
* prf
@@ -783,11 +812,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void
* if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field
*/
if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
+ if (len < 2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
+ return NULL;
+ }
tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose "
"total length = %d", tot_len);
if (tot_len > 15000)
return NULL;
+ if (data->inbuf) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
+ return NULL;
+ }
data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer "
@@ -873,6 +914,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void
/*
* we have output! Do we need to fragment it?
*/
+ lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch);
len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf);
if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) {
resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu,

60
net/hostapd/files/patch-src_eap__server_eap__server__pwd.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
--- src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c.orig 2015-03-15 17:30:39 UTC
+++ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
@@ -634,9 +634,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_s
BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
int res = 0;
+ size_t prime_len, order_len;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response");
+ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
+ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
+
+ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
+ (unsigned int) payload_len,
+ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
@@ -752,6 +764,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_
u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
int offset;
+ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
+ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
/* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
grp = htons(data->group_num);
ptr = (u8 *) &cs;
@@ -901,11 +920,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_s
* the first fragment has a total length
*/
if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
+ if (len < 2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
+ return;
+ }
tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total "
"length = %d", tot_len);
if (tot_len > 15000)
return;
+ if (data->inbuf) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
+ return;
+ }
data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to "

16
net/hostapd/files/patch-src_wps_httpread.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
--- src/wps/httpread.c.orig 2015-03-15 17:30:39 UTC
+++ src/wps/httpread.c
@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd
if (!isxdigit(*cbp))
goto bad;
h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16);
+ if (h->chunk_size < 0 ||
+ h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d",
+ h->chunk_size);
+ goto bad;
+ }
/* throw away chunk header
* so we have only real data
*/