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mirror of https://git.FreeBSD.org/src.git synced 2024-12-10 09:42:26 +00:00

amd64: centralize definitions of CS_SECURE and EFL_SECURE

Requested by	markj
Reviewed by:	jhb, markj
Tested by:	pho
Sponsored by:	The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after:	1 week
Differential revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D31954
This commit is contained in:
Konstantin Belousov 2021-09-14 19:07:31 +03:00
parent 590d0715b3
commit a42d362bb5
6 changed files with 8 additions and 19 deletions

View File

@ -166,9 +166,6 @@ CTASSERT(PC_PTI_STACK_SZ * sizeof(register_t) >= 2 * sizeof(struct pti_frame) -
extern u_int64_t hammer_time(u_int64_t, u_int64_t);
#define CS_SECURE(cs) (ISPL(cs) == SEL_UPL)
#define EFL_SECURE(ef, oef) ((((ef) ^ (oef)) & ~PSL_USERCHANGE) == 0)
static void cpu_startup(void *);
static void get_fpcontext(struct thread *td, mcontext_t *mcp,
char *xfpusave, size_t xfpusave_len);

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@ -73,9 +73,6 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <machine/pcb.h>
#include <machine/cpufunc.h>
#define CS_SECURE(cs) (ISPL(cs) == SEL_UPL)
#define EFL_SECURE(ef, oef) ((((ef) ^ (oef)) & ~PSL_USERCHANGE) == 0)
int
fill_regs32(struct thread *td, struct reg32 *regs)
{

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@ -85,9 +85,6 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
static void freebsd4_ia32_sendsig(sig_t, ksiginfo_t *, sigset_t *);
#endif
#define CS_SECURE(cs) (ISPL(cs) == SEL_UPL)
#define EFL_SECURE(ef, oef) ((((ef) ^ (oef)) & ~PSL_USERCHANGE) == 0)
static void
ia32_get_fpcontext(struct thread *td, struct ia32_mcontext *mcp,
char *xfpusave, size_t xfpusave_len)

View File

@ -46,4 +46,9 @@ struct pti_frame {
register_t pti_ss;
};
#ifdef _KERNEL
#define CS_SECURE(cs) (ISPL(cs) == SEL_UPL)
#define EFL_SECURE(ef, oef) ((((ef) ^ (oef)) & ~PSL_USERCHANGE) == 0)
#endif
#endif

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@ -555,9 +555,7 @@ linux_rt_sigreturn(struct thread *td, struct linux_rt_sigreturn_args *args)
* Corruption of the PSL_RF bit at worst causes one more or
* one less debugger trap, so allowing it is fairly harmless.
*/
#define RFLAG_SECURE(ef, oef) ((((ef) ^ (oef)) & ~PSL_USERCHANGE) == 0)
if (!RFLAG_SECURE(rflags & ~PSL_RF, regs->tf_rflags & ~PSL_RF)) {
if (!EFL_SECURE(rflags & ~PSL_RF, regs->tf_rflags & ~PSL_RF)) {
printf("linux_rt_sigreturn: rflags = 0x%lx\n", rflags);
return (EINVAL);
}
@ -567,7 +565,6 @@ linux_rt_sigreturn(struct thread *td, struct linux_rt_sigreturn_args *args)
* hardware check for invalid selectors, excess privilege in
* other selectors, invalid %eip's and invalid %esp's.
*/
#define CS_SECURE(cs) (ISPL(cs) == SEL_UPL)
if (!CS_SECURE(context->sc_cs)) {
printf("linux_rt_sigreturn: cs = 0x%x\n", context->sc_cs);
ksiginfo_init_trap(&ksi);

View File

@ -519,9 +519,8 @@ linux_sigreturn(struct thread *td, struct linux_sigreturn_args *args)
return (EFAULT);
/* Check for security violations. */
#define EFLAGS_SECURE(ef, oef) ((((ef) ^ (oef)) & ~PSL_USERCHANGE) == 0)
eflags = frame.sf_sc.sc_eflags;
if (!EFLAGS_SECURE(eflags, regs->tf_rflags))
if (!EFL_SECURE(eflags, regs->tf_rflags))
return(EINVAL);
/*
@ -529,7 +528,6 @@ linux_sigreturn(struct thread *td, struct linux_sigreturn_args *args)
* hardware check for invalid selectors, excess privilege in
* other selectors, invalid %eip's and invalid %esp's.
*/
#define CS_SECURE(cs) (ISPL(cs) == SEL_UPL)
if (!CS_SECURE(frame.sf_sc.sc_cs)) {
ksiginfo_init_trap(&ksi);
ksi.ksi_signo = SIGBUS;
@ -602,9 +600,8 @@ linux_rt_sigreturn(struct thread *td, struct linux_rt_sigreturn_args *args)
context = &uc.uc_mcontext;
/* Check for security violations. */
#define EFLAGS_SECURE(ef, oef) ((((ef) ^ (oef)) & ~PSL_USERCHANGE) == 0)
eflags = context->sc_eflags;
if (!EFLAGS_SECURE(eflags, regs->tf_rflags))
if (!EFL_SECURE(eflags, regs->tf_rflags))
return(EINVAL);
/*
@ -612,7 +609,6 @@ linux_rt_sigreturn(struct thread *td, struct linux_rt_sigreturn_args *args)
* hardware check for invalid selectors, excess privilege in
* other selectors, invalid %eip's and invalid %esp's.
*/
#define CS_SECURE(cs) (ISPL(cs) == SEL_UPL)
if (!CS_SECURE(context->sc_cs)) {
ksiginfo_init_trap(&ksi);
ksi.ksi_signo = SIGBUS;