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Code Issues Releases Activity

Improve the input validation and processing of cookies.

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This avoids setting the association in an inconsistent
state, which could result in a use-after-free situation.
This can be triggered by a malicious peer, if the peer
can modify the cookie without the local endpoint recognizing
it.
Thanks to Ned Williamson for reporting the issue.

MFC after:		3 days
This commit is contained in:
Michael Tuexen 2020-09-29 09:36:06 +00:00
parent 822967e7e5
commit b15f541113
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00 
svn path=/head/; revision=366248
2 changed files with 14 additions and 16 deletions
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23
sys/netinet/sctp_input.c
View File

@ -2032,10 +2032,6 @@ sctp_process_cookie_new(struct mbuf *m, int iphlen, int offset,
vrf_id, port);
return (NULL);
}
/* get the correct sctp_nets */
if (netp)
*netp = sctp_findnet(stcb, init_src);
asoc = &stcb->asoc;
/* get scope variables out of cookie */
asoc->scope.ipv4_local_scope = cookie->ipv4_scope;
@ -2074,10 +2070,7 @@ sctp_process_cookie_new(struct mbuf *m, int iphlen, int offset,
asoc->advanced_peer_ack_point = asoc->last_acked_seq;
/* process the INIT info (peer's info) */
if (netp)
retval = sctp_process_init(init_cp, stcb);
else
retval = 0;
retval = sctp_process_init(init_cp, stcb);
if (retval < 0) {
(void)sctp_free_assoc(inp, stcb, SCTP_NORMAL_PROC,
SCTP_FROM_SCTP_INPUT + SCTP_LOC_19);
@ -2191,19 +2184,21 @@ sctp_process_cookie_new(struct mbuf *m, int iphlen, int offset,
*/
;
}
/* since we did not send a HB make sure we don't double things */
if ((netp) && (*netp))
(*netp)->hb_responded = 1;
if (stcb->asoc.sctp_autoclose_ticks &&
sctp_is_feature_on(inp, SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_AUTOCLOSE)) {
sctp_timer_start(SCTP_TIMER_TYPE_AUTOCLOSE, inp, stcb, NULL);
}
(void)SCTP_GETTIME_TIMEVAL(&stcb->asoc.time_entered);
if ((netp != NULL) && (*netp != NULL)) {
*netp = sctp_findnet(stcb, init_src);
if (*netp != NULL) {
struct timeval old;
/* calculate the RTT and set the encaps port */
/*
* Since we did not send a HB, make sure we don't double
* things.
*/
(*netp)->hb_responded = 1;
/* Calculate the RTT. */
old.tv_sec = cookie->time_entered.tv_sec;
old.tv_usec = cookie->time_entered.tv_usec;
sctp_calculate_rto(stcb, asoc, *netp, &old, SCTP_RTT_FROM_NON_DATA);

7
sys/netinet/sctp_pcb.c
View File

@ -4242,7 +4242,9 @@ sctp_aloc_assoc(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, struct sockaddr *firstaddr,
if ((ntohs(sin->sin_port) == 0) ||
(sin->sin_addr.s_addr == INADDR_ANY) ||
(sin->sin_addr.s_addr == INADDR_BROADCAST) ||
IN_MULTICAST(ntohl(sin->sin_addr.s_addr))) {
IN_MULTICAST(ntohl(sin->sin_addr.s_addr)) ||
(((inp->sctp_flags & SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_BOUND_V6) != 0) &&
(SCTP_IPV6_V6ONLY(inp) != 0))) {
/* Invalid address */
SCTP_INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
SCTP_LTRACE_ERR_RET(inp, NULL, NULL, SCTP_FROM_SCTP_PCB, EINVAL);
@ -4261,7 +4263,8 @@ sctp_aloc_assoc(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, struct sockaddr *firstaddr,
sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)firstaddr;
if ((ntohs(sin6->sin6_port) == 0) ||
IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&sin6->sin6_addr) ||
IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&sin6->sin6_addr)) {
IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&sin6->sin6_addr) ||
((inp->sctp_flags & SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_BOUND_V6) == 0)) {
/* Invalid address */
SCTP_INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
SCTP_LTRACE_ERR_RET(inp, NULL, NULL, SCTP_FROM_SCTP_PCB, EINVAL);