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freebsd/share/man/man4/mac_seeotheruids.4
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.\" Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
.\" All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Chris Costello
.\" at Safeport Network Services and Network Associates Laboratories, the
.\" Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under
.\" DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
.\" DARPA CHATS research program.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
.\" SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
.\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
.Dd October 6, 2005
.Os
.Dt MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS 4
.Sh NAME
.Nm mac_seeotheruids
.Nd "simple policy controlling whether users see other users"
.Sh SYNOPSIS
To compile the
policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel
configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC"
.Cd "options MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS"
.Ed
.Pp
Alternately, to load the module at boot time, place the following line
in your kernel configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC"
.Ed
.Pp
and in
.Xr loader.conf 5 :
.Bd -literal -offset indent
mac_seeotheruids_load="YES"
.Ed
.Sh DESCRIPTION
The
.Nm
policy module, when enabled, denies users to see processes or sockets owned
by other users.
.Pp
To enable
.Nm ,
set the sysctl OID
.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.enabled
to 1.
To permit superuser awareness of other credentials by virtue of privilege,
set the sysctl OID
.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.suser_privileged
to 1.
.Pp
To allow users to see processes and sockets owned by the same primary group,
set the sysctl OID
.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.primarygroup_enabled
to 1.
.Pp
To allow processes with a specific group ID to be exempt from the policy,
set the sysctl OID
.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid_enabled
to 1, and
.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid
to the group ID to be exempted.
.Ss Label Format
No labels are defined for
.Nm .
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr mac 4 ,
.Xr mac_biba 4 ,
.Xr mac_bsdextended 4 ,
.Xr mac_ifoff 4 ,
.Xr mac_lomac 4 ,
.Xr mac_mls 4 ,
.Xr mac_none 4 ,
.Xr mac_partition 4 ,
.Xr mac_portacl 4 ,
.Xr mac_test 4 ,
.Xr mac 9
.Sh HISTORY
The
.Nm
policy module first appeared in
.Fx 5.0
and was developed by the
.Tn TrustedBSD
Project.
.Sh AUTHORS
This software was contributed to the
.Fx
Project by Network Associates Labs,
the Security Research Division of Network Associates
Inc.
under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
.Pq Dq CBOSS ,
as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
.Sh BUGS
See
.Xr mac 9
concerning appropriateness for production use.
The
.Tn TrustedBSD
MAC Framework is considered experimental in
.Fx .
.Pp
While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of
the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry
point checks.
As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation,
to protect against a malicious privileged user.