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freebsd_amp_hwpstate/sys/fs/procfs/procfs.h

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BSD 4.4 Lite Kernel Sources
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Copyright (c) 1993 Jan-Simon Pendry
* Copyright (c) 1993
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
* Jan-Simon Pendry.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* This product includes software developed by the University of
* California, Berkeley and its contributors.
* 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
This is the kernel Lite/2 commit. There are some requisite userland changes, so don't expect to be able to run the kernel as-is (very well) without the appropriate Lite/2 userland changes. The system boots and can mount UFS filesystems. Untested: ext2fs, msdosfs, NFS Known problems: Incorrect Berkeley ID strings in some files. Mount_std mounts will not work until the getfsent library routine is changed. Reviewed by: various people Submitted by: Jeffery Hsu <hsu@freebsd.org>
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
* @(#)procfs.h 8.9 (Berkeley) 5/14/95
BSD 4.4 Lite Kernel Sources
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*
This is the kernel Lite/2 commit. There are some requisite userland changes, so don't expect to be able to run the kernel as-is (very well) without the appropriate Lite/2 userland changes. The system boots and can mount UFS filesystems. Untested: ext2fs, msdosfs, NFS Known problems: Incorrect Berkeley ID strings in some files. Mount_std mounts will not work until the getfsent library routine is changed. Reviewed by: various people Submitted by: Jeffery Hsu <hsu@freebsd.org>
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
* From:
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
* $Id: procfs.h,v 1.22 1999/04/27 11:16:35 phk Exp $
BSD 4.4 Lite Kernel Sources
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*/
/*
* The different types of node in a procfs filesystem
*/
typedef enum {
Proot, /* the filesystem root */
This is the kernel Lite/2 commit. There are some requisite userland changes, so don't expect to be able to run the kernel as-is (very well) without the appropriate Lite/2 userland changes. The system boots and can mount UFS filesystems. Untested: ext2fs, msdosfs, NFS Known problems: Incorrect Berkeley ID strings in some files. Mount_std mounts will not work until the getfsent library routine is changed. Reviewed by: various people Submitted by: Jeffery Hsu <hsu@freebsd.org>
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
Pcurproc, /* symbolic link for curproc */
BSD 4.4 Lite Kernel Sources
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
Pproc, /* a process-specific sub-directory */
Pfile, /* the executable file */
Pmem, /* the process's memory image */
Pregs, /* the process's register set */
Pfpregs, /* the process's FP register set */
Pctl, /* process control */
Pstatus, /* process status */
Pnote, /* process notifier */
Add a feature to procfs to allow display of the process address map with multiple entries as follows: start address, end address, resident pages in range, private pages in range, RW/RO, COW or not, (vnode/device/swap/default).
1996-06-17 22:43:36 +00:00
Pnotepg, /* process group notifier */
Clean-up the new VM map procfs code, and also add support for executable format file "etype". It contains a description of the binary type for a process.
1996-06-18 05:16:00 +00:00
Pmap, /* memory map */
A partial implementation of the procfs cmdline pseudo-file. This is enough to satisfy things like StarOffice. This is a hack, but doing it properly would be a LOT of work, and would require extensive grovelling around in the user address space to find the argv[]. Obtained from: Mostly from Andrzej Bialecki <abial@nask.pl>.
1999-01-05 03:53:06 +00:00
Ptype, /* executable type */
Pcmdline /* command line */
BSD 4.4 Lite Kernel Sources
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
} pfstype;
/*
* control data for the proc file system.
*/
struct pfsnode {
struct pfsnode *pfs_next; /* next on list */
struct vnode *pfs_vnode; /* vnode associated with this pfsnode */
pfstype pfs_type; /* type of procfs node */
pid_t pfs_pid; /* associated process */
u_short pfs_mode; /* mode bits for stat() */
u_long pfs_flags; /* open flags */
u_long pfs_fileno; /* unique file id */
Implement locking for pfs nodes, when at the leaf. Concurrent access to information from a single process causes hangs. Specifically, this fixes problems (hangs) with concurrent ps commands, when the system is under heavy memory load. Reviewed by: davidg
1996-07-02 13:38:10 +00:00
pid_t pfs_lockowner; /* pfs lock owner */
BSD 4.4 Lite Kernel Sources
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
};
#define PROCFS_NOTELEN 64 /* max length of a note (/proc/$pid/note) */
#define PROCFS_CTLLEN 8 /* max length of a ctl msg (/proc/$pid/ctl */
/*
* Kernel stuff follows
*/
#ifdef KERNEL
#define CNEQ(cnp, s, len) \
((cnp)->cn_namelen == (len) && \
(bcmp((s), (cnp)->cn_nameptr, (len)) == 0))
Made /proc/n/mem file group kmem and group readable. Needed to fix ps so that it doesn't need to be setuid root.
1995-04-15 02:30:17 +00:00
#define KMEM_GROUP 2
Fix procfs security hole -- check permissions on meaningful I/Os (namely, reading/writing of mem and regs). Also have to check for the requesting process being group KMEM -- this is a bit of a hack, but ps et al need it. Reviewed by: davidg
1997-08-12 04:34:30 +00:00
/*
* Check to see whether access to target process is allowed
* Evaluates to 1 if access is allowed.
*/
#define CHECKIO(p1, p2) \
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
(PRISON_CHECK(p1, p2) && \
(((p1)->p_cred->pc_ucred->cr_uid == (p2)->p_cred->p_ruid) && \
Fix procfs security hole -- check permissions on meaningful I/Os (namely, reading/writing of mem and regs). Also have to check for the requesting process being group KMEM -- this is a bit of a hack, but ps et al need it. Reviewed by: davidg
1997-08-12 04:34:30 +00:00
((p1)->p_cred->p_ruid == (p2)->p_cred->p_ruid) && \
((p1)->p_cred->p_svuid == (p2)->p_cred->p_ruid) && \
Suser() simplification: 1: s/suser/suser_xxx/ 2: Add new function: suser(struct proc *), prototyped in <sys/proc.h>. 3: s/suser_xxx(\([a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)->p_ucred, \&\1->p_acflag)/suser(\1)/ The remaining suser_xxx() calls will be scrutinized and dealt with later. There may be some unneeded #include <sys/cred.h>, but they are left as an exercise for Bruce. More changes to the suser() API will come along with the "jail" code.
1999-04-27 11:18:52 +00:00
((p2)->p_flag & P_SUGID) == 0) || (suser((p1)) == 0))
Fix procfs security hole -- check permissions on meaningful I/Os (namely, reading/writing of mem and regs). Also have to check for the requesting process being group KMEM -- this is a bit of a hack, but ps et al need it. Reviewed by: davidg
1997-08-12 04:34:30 +00:00
BSD 4.4 Lite Kernel Sources
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Format of a directory entry in /proc, ...
* This must map onto struct dirent (see <dirent.h>)
*/
#define PROCFS_NAMELEN 8
struct pfsdent {
Quick fix for type mismatches which were fatal if longs aren't 32 bits. We used a private, wrong, version of `struct dirent' to help break getdirentries(), and we use a silly check that the size of this struct is a power of 2 to help break mount() if getdirentries() would not work. This fix just changes the struct to match `struct dirent' (except for the name length).
1998-07-07 04:08:44 +00:00
u_int32_t d_fileno;
u_int16_t d_reclen;
u_int8_t d_type;
u_int8_t d_namlen;
BSD 4.4 Lite Kernel Sources
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
char d_name[PROCFS_NAMELEN];
};
#define UIO_MX sizeof(struct pfsdent)
#define PROCFS_FILENO(pid, type) \
This is the kernel Lite/2 commit. There are some requisite userland changes, so don't expect to be able to run the kernel as-is (very well) without the appropriate Lite/2 userland changes. The system boots and can mount UFS filesystems. Untested: ext2fs, msdosfs, NFS Known problems: Incorrect Berkeley ID strings in some files. Mount_std mounts will not work until the getfsent library routine is changed. Reviewed by: various people Submitted by: Jeffery Hsu <hsu@freebsd.org>
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
(((type) < Pproc) ? \
((type) + 2) : \
((((pid)+1) << 4) + ((int) (type))))
BSD 4.4 Lite Kernel Sources
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Convert between pfsnode vnode
*/
#define VTOPFS(vp) ((struct pfsnode *)(vp)->v_data)
#define PFSTOV(pfs) ((pfs)->pfs_vnode)
typedef struct vfs_namemap vfs_namemap_t;
struct vfs_namemap {
const char *nm_name;
int nm_val;
};
This is the kernel Lite/2 commit. There are some requisite userland changes, so don't expect to be able to run the kernel as-is (very well) without the appropriate Lite/2 userland changes. The system boots and can mount UFS filesystems. Untested: ext2fs, msdosfs, NFS Known problems: Incorrect Berkeley ID strings in some files. Mount_std mounts will not work until the getfsent library routine is changed. Reviewed by: various people Submitted by: Jeffery Hsu <hsu@freebsd.org>
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
int vfs_getuserstr __P((struct uio *, char *, int *));
vfs_namemap_t *vfs_findname __P((vfs_namemap_t *, char *, int));
BSD 4.4 Lite Kernel Sources
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/* <machine/reg.h> */
struct reg;
struct fpreg;
#define PFIND(pid) ((pid) ? pfind(pid) : &proc0)
Fixed a missing/misplaced/misstyled prototype.
1997-12-30 08:46:44 +00:00
void procfs_exit __P((struct proc *));
This is the kernel Lite/2 commit. There are some requisite userland changes, so don't expect to be able to run the kernel as-is (very well) without the appropriate Lite/2 userland changes. The system boots and can mount UFS filesystems. Untested: ext2fs, msdosfs, NFS Known problems: Incorrect Berkeley ID strings in some files. Mount_std mounts will not work until the getfsent library routine is changed. Reviewed by: various people Submitted by: Jeffery Hsu <hsu@freebsd.org>
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
int procfs_freevp __P((struct vnode *));
int procfs_allocvp __P((struct mount *, struct vnode **, long, pfstype));
struct vnode *procfs_findtextvp __P((struct proc *));
int procfs_sstep __P((struct proc *));
void procfs_fix_sstep __P((struct proc *));
int procfs_read_regs __P((struct proc *, struct reg *));
int procfs_write_regs __P((struct proc *, struct reg *));
int procfs_read_fpregs __P((struct proc *, struct fpreg *));
int procfs_write_fpregs __P((struct proc *, struct fpreg *));
int procfs_donote __P((struct proc *, struct proc *, struct pfsnode *pfsp, struct uio *uio));
int procfs_doregs __P((struct proc *, struct proc *, struct pfsnode *pfsp, struct uio *uio));
int procfs_dofpregs __P((struct proc *, struct proc *, struct pfsnode *pfsp, struct uio *uio));
int procfs_domem __P((struct proc *, struct proc *, struct pfsnode *pfsp, struct uio *uio));
int procfs_doctl __P((struct proc *, struct proc *, struct pfsnode *pfsp, struct uio *uio));
int procfs_dostatus __P((struct proc *, struct proc *, struct pfsnode *pfsp, struct uio *uio));
int procfs_domap __P((struct proc *, struct proc *, struct pfsnode *pfsp, struct uio *uio));
int procfs_dotype __P((struct proc *, struct proc *, struct pfsnode *pfsp, struct uio *uio));
A partial implementation of the procfs cmdline pseudo-file. This is enough to satisfy things like StarOffice. This is a hack, but doing it properly would be a LOT of work, and would require extensive grovelling around in the user address space to find the argv[]. Obtained from: Mostly from Andrzej Bialecki <abial@nask.pl>.
1999-01-05 03:53:06 +00:00
int procfs_docmdline __P((struct proc *, struct proc *, struct pfsnode *pfsp, struct uio *uio));
BSD 4.4 Lite Kernel Sources
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
Disallow reading the current kernel stack. Only the user structure and the current registers should be accessible. Reviewed by: David Greenman <dg@root.com>
1998-05-19 00:00:14 +00:00
/* Return 1 if process has special kernel digging privileges */
int procfs_kmemaccess __P((struct proc *));
This is the kernel Lite/2 commit. There are some requisite userland changes, so don't expect to be able to run the kernel as-is (very well) without the appropriate Lite/2 userland changes. The system boots and can mount UFS filesystems. Untested: ext2fs, msdosfs, NFS Known problems: Incorrect Berkeley ID strings in some files. Mount_std mounts will not work until the getfsent library routine is changed. Reviewed by: various people Submitted by: Jeffery Hsu <hsu@freebsd.org>
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
/* functions to check whether or not files should be displayed */
Major fixes for procfs.. Implement a "variable" directory structure. Files that do not make sense for the given process do not "appear" and cannot be opened. For example, "system" processes do not have "file", "regs" or "fpregs", because they do not have a user area. "attempt" to fill in the user area of a given process when it is being accessed via /proc/pid/mem (the user struct is just after VM_MAXUSER_ADDRESS in the process address space.) Dont do IO to the U area while it's swapped, hold it in place if possible. Lock off access to the "ctl" file if it's done a setuid like the other pseudo-files in there.
1996-01-24 18:41:41 +00:00
int procfs_validfile __P((struct proc *));
int procfs_validfpregs __P((struct proc *));
int procfs_validregs __P((struct proc *));
Clean-up the new VM map procfs code, and also add support for executable format file "etype". It contains a description of the binary type for a process.
1996-06-18 05:16:00 +00:00
int procfs_validmap __P((struct proc *));
int procfs_validtype __P((struct proc *));
Major fixes for procfs.. Implement a "variable" directory structure. Files that do not make sense for the given process do not "appear" and cannot be opened. For example, "system" processes do not have "file", "regs" or "fpregs", because they do not have a user area. "attempt" to fill in the user area of a given process when it is being accessed via /proc/pid/mem (the user struct is just after VM_MAXUSER_ADDRESS in the process address space.) Dont do IO to the U area while it's swapped, hold it in place if possible. Lock off access to the "ctl" file if it's done a setuid like the other pseudo-files in there.
1996-01-24 18:41:41 +00:00
BSD 4.4 Lite Kernel Sources
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
#define PROCFS_LOCKED 0x01
#define PROCFS_WANT 0x02
Introduced a type `vop_t' for vnode operation functions and used it 1138 times (:-() in casts and a few more times in declarations. This change is null for the i386. The type has to be `typedef int vop_t(void *)' and not `typedef int vop_t()' because `gcc -Wstrict-prototypes' warns about the latter. Since vnode op functions are called with args of different (struct pointer) types, neither of these function types is any use for type checking of the arg, so it would be preferable not to use the complete function type, especially since using the complete type requires adding 1138 casts to avoid compiler warnings and another 40+ casts to reverse the function pointer conversions before calling the functions.
1995-11-09 08:17:23 +00:00
extern vop_t **procfs_vnodeop_p;
BSD 4.4 Lite Kernel Sources
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
Add and move declarations to fix all of the warnings from `gcc -Wimplicit' (except in netccitt, netiso and netns) and most of the warnings from `gcc -Wnested-externs'. Fix all the bugs found. There were no serious ones.
1995-03-16 18:17:34 +00:00
int procfs_root __P((struct mount *, struct vnode **));
BSD 4.4 Lite Kernel Sources
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
int procfs_rw __P((struct vop_read_args *));
#endif /* KERNEL */