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emacs/lib-src/seccomp-filter.c
Paul Eggert b6ed79b71c Be more systematic about parens in C source code 
Be more systematic about putting space before paren in calls,
and in avoiding unnecessary parentheses in macros.
This was partly inspired by my wading through gcc -E output
while debugging something else, and seeing too many parens.

This patch does not change the generated .o files on my platform.
2024-01-20 17:28:53 -08:00

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/* Generate a Secure Computing filter definition file.
Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This file is part of GNU Emacs.
GNU Emacs is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or (at your
option) any later version.
GNU Emacs is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with GNU Emacs. If not, see
<https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */
/* This program creates a small Secure Computing filter usable for a
typical minimal Emacs sandbox. See the man page for `seccomp' for
details about Secure Computing filters. This program requires the
`libseccomp' library. However, the resulting filter file requires
only a Linux kernel supporting the Secure Computing extension.
Usage:
seccomp-filter out.bpf out.pfc out-exec.bpf out-exec.pfc
This writes the raw `struct sock_filter' array to out.bpf and a
human-readable representation to out.pfc. Additionally, it writes
variants of those files that can be used to sandbox Emacs before
'execve' to out-exec.bpf and out-exec.pfc. */
#include "config.h"
#include <assert.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <asm/prctl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <linux/futex.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <seccomp.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <attribute.h>
#ifndef ARCH_CET_STATUS
#define ARCH_CET_STATUS 0x3001
#endif
static ATTRIBUTE_FORMAT_PRINTF (2, 3) _Noreturn void
fail (int error, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list ap;
va_start (ap, format);
vfprintf (stderr, format, ap);
va_end (ap);
if (error == 0)
fputc ('\n', stderr);
else
{
fputs (": ", stderr);
errno = error;
perror (NULL);
}
fflush (NULL);
exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/* This binary is trivial, so we use a single global filter context
object that we release using `atexit'. */
static scmp_filter_ctx ctx;
static void
release_context (void)
{
seccomp_release (ctx);
}
/* Wrapper functions and macros for libseccomp functions. We exit
immediately upon any error to avoid error checking noise. */
static void
set_attribute (enum scmp_filter_attr attr, uint32_t value)
{
int status = seccomp_attr_set (ctx, attr, value);
if (status < 0)
fail (-status, "seccomp_attr_set (ctx, %u, %u)", attr, value);
}
/* Like `seccomp_rule_add (ACTION, SYSCALL, ...)', except that you
don't have to specify the number of comparator arguments, and any
failure will exit the process. */
#define RULE(action, syscall, ...) \
do \
{ \
const struct scmp_arg_cmp arg_array[] = {__VA_ARGS__}; \
enum { arg_cnt = sizeof arg_array / sizeof *arg_array }; \
int status = seccomp_rule_add_array (ctx, action, syscall, \
arg_cnt, arg_array); \
if (status < 0) \
fail (-status, "seccomp_rule_add_array (%s, %s, %d, {%s})", \
#action, #syscall, arg_cnt, #__VA_ARGS__); \
} \
while (false)
static void
export_filter (const char *file,
int (*function) (const scmp_filter_ctx, int),
const char *name)
{
int fd;
do
fd = open (file,
O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_BINARY | O_CLOEXEC,
0644);
while (fd < 0 && errno == EINTR);
if (fd < 0)
fail (errno, "open %s", file);
int status = function (ctx, fd);
if (status < 0)
fail (-status, "%s", name);
if (close (fd) != 0)
fail (errno, "close");
}
#define EXPORT_FILTER(file, function) \
export_filter (file, function, #function)
int
main (int argc, char **argv)
{
if (argc != 5)
fail (0, "usage: %s out.bpf out.pfc out-exec.bpf out-exec.pfc",
argv[0]);
/* Any unhandled syscall should abort the Emacs process. */
ctx = seccomp_init (SCMP_ACT_KILL_PROCESS);
if (ctx == NULL)
fail (0, "seccomp_init");
atexit (release_context);
/* We want to abort immediately if the architecture is unknown. */
set_attribute (SCMP_FLTATR_ACT_BADARCH, SCMP_ACT_KILL_PROCESS);
set_attribute (SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 1);
set_attribute (SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_TSYNC, 1);
static_assert (CHAR_BIT == 8);
static_assert (sizeof (int) == 4 && INT_MIN == INT32_MIN
&& INT_MAX == INT32_MAX);
static_assert (sizeof (long) == 8 && LONG_MIN == INT64_MIN
&& LONG_MAX == INT64_MAX);
static_assert (sizeof (void *) == 8);
assert ((uintptr_t) NULL == 0);
/* Allow a clean exit. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (exit));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (exit_group));
/* Allow `mmap' and friends. This is necessary for dynamic loading,
reading the portable dump file, and thread creation. We don't
allow pages to be both writable and executable. */
static_assert (MAP_PRIVATE != 0);
static_assert (MAP_SHARED != 0);
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (mmap),
SCMP_A2_32 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ,
~(PROT_NONE | PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE)),
/* Only support known flags. MAP_DENYWRITE is ignored, but
some versions of the dynamic loader still use it. Also
allow allocating thread stacks. */
SCMP_A3_32 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ,
~(MAP_SHARED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FILE
| MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED | MAP_DENYWRITE
| MAP_STACK | MAP_NORESERVE),
0));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (mmap),
SCMP_A2_32 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ,
~(PROT_NONE | PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)),
/* Only support known flags. MAP_DENYWRITE is ignored, but
some versions of the dynamic loader still use it. */
SCMP_A3_32 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ,
~(MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED
| MAP_DENYWRITE),
0));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (munmap));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (mprotect),
/* Don't allow making pages executable. */
SCMP_A2_32 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ,
~(PROT_NONE | PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE), 0));
/* Allow restartable sequences. The dynamic linker uses them. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (rseq));
/* Futexes are used everywhere. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (futex),
SCMP_A1_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE));
/* Allow basic dynamic memory management. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (brk));
/* Allow some status inquiries. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (uname));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (getuid));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (geteuid));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (getpid));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (gettid));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (getpgrp));
/* Allow operations on open file descriptors. File descriptors are
capabilities, and operating on them shouldn't cause security
issues. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (read));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (pread64));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (write));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (close));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (lseek));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (dup));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (dup2));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (fstat));
/* Allow read operations on the filesystem. If necessary, these
should be further restricted using mount namespaces. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (access));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (faccessat));
#ifdef __NR_faccessat2
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (faccessat2));
#endif
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (stat));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (stat64));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (lstat));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (lstat64));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (fstatat64));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (newfstatat));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (readlink));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (readlinkat));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (getcwd));
/* Allow opening files, assuming they are only opened for
reading. */
static_assert (O_WRONLY != 0);
static_assert (O_RDWR != 0);
static_assert (O_CREAT != 0);
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (open),
SCMP_A1_32 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ,
~(O_RDONLY | O_BINARY | O_CLOEXEC | O_PATH
| O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW),
0));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (openat),
SCMP_A2_32 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ,
~(O_RDONLY | O_BINARY | O_CLOEXEC | O_PATH
| O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW),
0));
/* Allow `tcgetpgrp'. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (ioctl),
SCMP_A0_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, STDIN_FILENO),
SCMP_A1_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, TIOCGPGRP));
/* Allow reading (but not setting) file flags. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (fcntl),
SCMP_A1_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, F_GETFL));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (fcntl64),
SCMP_A1_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, F_GETFL));
/* Allow reading random numbers from the kernel. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (getrandom));
/* Changing the umask is uncritical. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (umask));
/* Allow creation of pipes. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (pipe));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (pipe2));
/* Allow reading (but not changing) resource limits. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (getrlimit));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (prlimit64),
SCMP_A0_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, 0) /* pid == 0 (current process) */,
SCMP_A2_64 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, 0) /* new_limit == NULL */);
/* Block changing resource limits, but don't crash. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EPERM), SCMP_SYS (prlimit64),
SCMP_A0_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, 0) /* pid == 0 (current process) */,
SCMP_A2_64 (SCMP_CMP_NE, 0) /* new_limit != NULL */);
/* Emacs installs signal handlers, which is harmless. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (sigaction));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (rt_sigaction));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (sigprocmask));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (rt_sigprocmask));
/* Allow reading the current time. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (clock_gettime),
SCMP_A0_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, CLOCK_REALTIME));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (time));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (gettimeofday));
/* Allow timer support. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (timer_create));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (timerfd_create));
/* Allow thread creation. See the NOTES section in the manual page
for the `clone' function. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (clone),
SCMP_A0_64 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ,
/* Flags needed to create threads. See
create_thread in libc. */
~(CLONE_VM | CLONE_FS | CLONE_FILES
| CLONE_SYSVSEM | CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_THREAD
| CLONE_SETTLS | CLONE_PARENT_SETTID
| CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID),
0));
/* glibc 2.34+ pthread_create uses clone3. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (clone3));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (sigaltstack));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (set_robust_list));
/* Allow setting the process name for new threads. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (prctl),
SCMP_A0_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, PR_SET_NAME));
/* Allow some event handling functions used by glib. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (eventfd));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (eventfd2));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (wait4));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (poll));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (pidfd_open),
SCMP_A1_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, 0));
/* Don't allow creating sockets (network access would be extremely
dangerous), but also don't crash. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EACCES), SCMP_SYS (socket));
EXPORT_FILTER (argv[1], seccomp_export_bpf);
EXPORT_FILTER (argv[2], seccomp_export_pfc);
/* When applying a Seccomp filter before executing the Emacs binary
(e.g. using the `bwrap' program), we need to allow further system
calls. Firstly, the wrapper binary will need to `execve' the
Emacs binary. Furthermore, the C library requires some system
calls at startup time to set up thread-local storage. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (execve));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (set_tid_address));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EINVAL), SCMP_SYS (prctl),
SCMP_A0_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, PR_CAPBSET_READ));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (arch_prctl),
SCMP_A0_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, ARCH_SET_FS));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EINVAL), SCMP_SYS (arch_prctl),
SCMP_A0_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, ARCH_CET_STATUS));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (statfs));
/* We want to allow starting the Emacs binary itself with the
--seccomp flag, so we need to allow the `prctl' and `seccomp'
system calls. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (prctl),
SCMP_A0_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS),
SCMP_A1_64 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, 1), SCMP_A2_64 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, 0),
SCMP_A3_64 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, 0), SCMP_A4_64 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, 0));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (seccomp),
SCMP_A0_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER),
SCMP_A1_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC));
EXPORT_FILTER (argv[3], seccomp_export_bpf);
EXPORT_FILTER (argv[4], seccomp_export_pfc);
}
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