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1110 lines
42 KiB
EmacsLisp
1110 lines
42 KiB
EmacsLisp
;;; nsm.el --- Network Security Manager -*- lexical-binding:t -*-
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;; Copyright (C) 2014-2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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;; Author: Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen <larsi@gnus.org>
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;; Keywords: encryption, security, network
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;; This file is part of GNU Emacs.
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;; GNU Emacs is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
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;; it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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;; the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
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;; (at your option) any later version.
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;; GNU Emacs is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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;; but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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;; MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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;; GNU General Public License for more details.
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;; You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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;; along with GNU Emacs. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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;;; Commentary:
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;;; Code:
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(require 'cl-lib)
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(require 'rmc) ; read-multiple-choice
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(require 'subr-x)
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(require 'seq)
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(require 'map)
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(defvar nsm-permanent-host-settings nil)
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(defvar nsm-temporary-host-settings nil)
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(defgroup nsm nil
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"Network Security Manager"
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:version "25.1"
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:group 'comm)
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(defcustom network-security-level 'medium
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"How secure the network should be.
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If a potential problem with the security of the network
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connection is found, the user is asked to give input into how the
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connection should be handled.
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The following values are possible:
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`low': No checks are performed: This is extremely insecure.
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`medium': Default. Suitable for most circumstances.
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`high': Warns about additional issues not enabled in `medium' due to
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compatibility concerns.
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`paranoid': On this level, the user is queried for most new connections.
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See the Emacs manual for a description of all things that are
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checked and warned against."
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:version "25.1"
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:type '(choice (const :tag "Low" low)
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(const :tag "Medium" medium)
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(const :tag "High" high)
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(const :tag "Paranoid" paranoid)))
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(defcustom nsm-trust-local-network nil
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"Disable warnings when visiting trusted hosts on local networks.
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The default suite of TLS checks in NSM is designed to follow the
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most current security best practices. Under some situations,
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such as attempting to connect to an email server that do not
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follow these practices inside a school or corporate network, NSM
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may produce warnings for such occasions. Setting this option to
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a non-nil value, or a zero-argument function that returns non-nil
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tells NSM to skip checking for potential TLS vulnerabilities when
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connecting to hosts on a local network.
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Make sure you know what you are doing before enabling this
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option."
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:version "27.1"
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:type '(choice (const :tag "On" t)
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(const :tag "Off" nil)
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(function :tag "Custom function")))
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(defcustom nsm-settings-file (expand-file-name "network-security.data"
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user-emacs-directory)
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"The file the security manager settings will be stored in."
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:version "25.1"
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:type 'file)
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(defcustom nsm-save-host-names nil
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"If non-nil, always save host names in the structures in `nsm-settings-file'.
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By default, only hosts that have exceptions have their names
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stored in plain text."
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:version "25.1"
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:type 'boolean)
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(defvar nsm-noninteractive nil
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"If non-nil, the connection is opened in a non-interactive context.
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This means that no queries should be performed.")
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(declare-function gnutls-peer-status "gnutls.c" (proc))
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(defun nsm-verify-connection (process host port &optional
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save-fingerprint warn-unencrypted)
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"Verify the security status of PROCESS that's connected to HOST:PORT.
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If PROCESS is a gnutls connection, the certificate validity will
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be examined. If it's a non-TLS connection, it may be compared
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against previous connections. If the function determines that
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there is something odd about the connection, the user will be
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queried about what to do about it.
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The process is returned if everything is OK, and otherwise, the
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process will be deleted and nil is returned.
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If SAVE-FINGERPRINT, always save the fingerprint of the
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server (if the connection is a TLS connection). This is useful
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to keep track of the TLS status of STARTTLS servers.
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If WARN-UNENCRYPTED, query the user if the connection is
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unencrypted."
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(let* ((status (gnutls-peer-status process))
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(id (nsm-id host port))
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(settings (nsm-host-settings id)))
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(cond
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((not (process-live-p process))
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nil)
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((not status)
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;; This is a non-TLS connection.
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(nsm-check-plain-connection process host port settings
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warn-unencrypted))
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(t
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(let ((process
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(nsm-check-tls-connection process host port status settings)))
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(when (and process save-fingerprint
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(null (nsm-host-settings id)))
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(nsm-save-host host port status 'fingerprint nil 'always))
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process)))))
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(defcustom network-security-protocol-checks
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'(;; Old Known Weaknesses.
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(version medium)
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(compression medium)
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(renegotiation-info-ext medium)
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(verify-cert medium)
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(same-cert medium)
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(null-suite medium)
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(export-kx medium)
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(anon-kx medium)
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(md5-sig medium)
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(rc4-cipher medium)
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;; Weaknesses made known after 2013.
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(dhe-prime-kx medium)
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(sha1-sig medium)
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(ecdsa-cbc-cipher medium)
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;; Towards TLS 1.3
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(dhe-kx high)
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(rsa-kx high)
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(3des-cipher high)
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(cbc-cipher high))
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"This variable specifies what TLS connection checks to perform.
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It's an alist where the key is the name of the check, and the
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value is the minimum security level the check should begin.
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Each check function is called with the parameters HOST PORT
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STATUS SETTINGS. HOST is the host domain, PORT is a TCP port
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number, STATUS is the peer status returned by
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`gnutls-peer-status', and SETTINGS is the persistent and session
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settings for the host HOST. Please refer to the contents of
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`nsm-setting-file' for details. If a problem is found, the check
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function is required to return an error message, and nil
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otherwise.
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See also: `nsm-check-tls-connection', `nsm-save-host-names',
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`nsm-settings-file'"
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:version "27.1"
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:type '(repeat (list (symbol :tag "Check function")
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(choice :tag "Level"
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:value medium
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(const :tag "Low" low)
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(const :tag "Medium" medium)
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(const :tag "High" high)))))
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(defun nsm-save-fingerprint-maybe (host port status &rest _)
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"Save the certificate's fingerprint.
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In order to detect man-in-the-middle attacks, when
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`network-security-level' is `high', this function will save the
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fingerprint of the certificate for check functions to check."
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(when (>= (nsm-level network-security-level) (nsm-level 'high))
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;; Save the host fingerprint so that we can check it the
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;; next time we connect.
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(nsm-save-host host port status 'fingerprint nil 'always)))
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(defvar nsm-tls-post-check-functions '(nsm-save-fingerprint-maybe)
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"Functions to run after checking a TLS session.
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Each function will be run with the parameters HOST PORT STATUS
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SETTINGS and RESULTS. The parameters HOST PORT STATUS and
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SETTINGS are the same as those supplied to each check function.
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RESULTS is an alist where the keys are the checks run and the
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values the results of the checks.")
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(defun nsm-network-same-subnet (local-ip mask ip)
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"Return t if IP is in the same subnet as LOCAL-IP/MASK.
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LOCAL-IP, MASK, and IP are specified as vectors of integers, and
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are expected to have the same length. Works for both IPv4 and
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IPv6 addresses."
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(let ((matches t)
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(ip-length (length ip))
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(local-length (length local-ip)))
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(unless (and (memq ip-length '(4 5 8 9))
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(memq local-length '(4 5 8 9)))
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(error "Unexpected length of IP address %S" local-ip))
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(if (/= ip-length local-length)
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nil
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(dotimes (i local-length)
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(setq matches (and matches
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(=
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(logand (aref local-ip i)
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(aref mask i))
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(logand (aref ip i)
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(aref mask i))))))
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matches)))
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(defun nsm-should-check (host)
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"Determine whether NSM should check for TLS problems for HOST.
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If `nsm-trust-local-network' is or returns non-nil, and if the
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host address is a localhost address, or in the same subnet as one
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of the local interfaces, this function returns nil. Non-nil
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otherwise."
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(let ((addresses (network-lookup-address-info host))
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(network-interface-list (network-interface-list t))
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(off-net t))
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(when
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(or (and (functionp nsm-trust-local-network)
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(funcall nsm-trust-local-network))
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nsm-trust-local-network)
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(mapc
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(lambda (ip)
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(mapc
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(lambda (info)
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(let ((local-ip (nth 1 info))
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(mask (nth 2 info)))
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(when
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(nsm-network-same-subnet (substring local-ip 0 -1)
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(substring mask 0 -1)
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(substring ip 0 -1))
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(setq off-net nil))))
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network-interface-list))
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addresses))
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off-net))
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(defun nsm-check-tls-connection (process host port status settings)
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"Check TLS connection against potential security problems.
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This function runs each test defined in
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`network-security-protocol-checks' in the order specified against
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the TLS connection's peer status STATUS for the host HOST and
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port PORT.
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If one or more problems are found, this function will collect all
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the error messages returned by the check functions, and confirm
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with the user in interactive mode whether to continue with the
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TLS session.
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If the user declines to continue, or problem(s) are found under
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non-interactive mode, the process PROCESS will be deleted, thus
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terminating the connection.
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This function returns the process PROCESS if no problems are
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found, and nil otherwise.
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See also: `network-security-protocol-checks' and `nsm-noninteractive'"
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(when (nsm-should-check host)
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(let* ((results
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(cl-loop
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for check in network-security-protocol-checks
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for type = (intern (format ":%s" (car check)))
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;; Skip the check if the user has already said that this
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;; host is OK for this type of "error".
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for result = (and (not (memq type
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(plist-get settings :conditions)))
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(>= (nsm-level network-security-level)
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(nsm-level (cadr check)))
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(funcall
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(intern (format "nsm-protocol-check--%s"
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(car check)))
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host port status settings))
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when result
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collect (cons type result)))
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(problems (nconc (plist-get status :warnings) (map-keys results))))
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;; We haven't seen this before, and we're paranoid.
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(when (and (eq network-security-level 'paranoid)
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(not (nsm-fingerprint-ok-p status settings)))
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(push '(:not-seen . "Certificate not seen before") results))
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(when (and results
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(not (seq-set-equal-p (plist-get settings :conditions)
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problems))
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(not (nsm-query host port status
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'conditions
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problems
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(format-message
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"The TLS connection to %s:%s is insecure\nfor the following reason%s:\n\n%s"
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host port
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(if (> (length problems) 1)
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"s" "")
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(concat "* " (string-join
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(split-string
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(string-join
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(map-values results)
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"\n")
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"\n")
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"\n* ")))))
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(delete-process process)
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(setq process nil)))
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(run-hook-with-args 'nsm-tls-post-check-functions
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host port status settings results)))
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process)
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;; Certificate checks
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(declare-function gnutls-peer-status-warning-describe "gnutls.c"
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(status-symbol))
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(defun nsm-protocol-check--verify-cert (_host _port status settings)
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"Check for warnings from the certificate verification status.
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This is the most basic security check for a TLS connection. If
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certificate verification fails, it means the server's identity
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cannot be verified by the credentials received."
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(let ((warnings (plist-get status :warnings)))
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(and warnings
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(not (nsm-warnings-ok-p status settings))
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(mapconcat #'gnutls-peer-status-warning-describe warnings "\n"))))
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(defun nsm-protocol-check--same-cert (_host _port status settings)
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"Check for certificate fingerprint mismatch.
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If the fingerprints saved do not match the fingerprint of the
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certificate presented, the TLS session may be under a
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man-in-the-middle attack."
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(and (not (nsm-fingerprint-ok-p status settings))
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(format-message
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"fingerprint has changed")))
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;; Key exchange checks
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(defun nsm-protocol-check--rsa-kx (_host _port status &optional _settings)
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"Check for static RSA key exchange.
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Static RSA key exchange methods do not offer perfect forward
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secrecy, therefore, the security of a TLS session is only as
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secure as the server's private key. Due to TLS' use of RSA key
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exchange to create a session key (the key negotiated between the
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client and the server to encrypt traffic), if the server's
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private key had been compromised, the attacker will be able to
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decrypt any past TLS session recorded, as opposed to just one TLS
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session if the key exchange was conducted via a key exchange
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method that offers perfect forward secrecy, such as ephemeral
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Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
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By default, this check is only enabled when
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`network-security-level' is set to `high' for compatibility
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reasons.
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Reference:
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Sheffer, Holz, Saint-Andre (May 2015). \"Recommendations for Secure
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Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer
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Security (DTLS)\", \"(4.1. General Guidelines)\"
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`https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7525\#section-4.1'"
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(let ((kx (plist-get status :key-exchange)))
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(and (string-match "^\\bRSA\\b" kx)
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(format-message
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"RSA key exchange method (%s) does not offer perfect forward secrecy"
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kx))))
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(defun nsm-protocol-check--dhe-prime-kx (_host _port status &optional _settings)
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"Check for the key strength of DH key exchange based on integer factorization.
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This check is a response to Logjam[1]. Logjam is an attack that
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allows an attacker with sufficient resource, and positioned
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between the user and the server, to downgrade vulnerable TLS
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connections to insecure 512-bit export grade cryptography.
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The Logjam paper suggests using 1024-bit prime on the client to
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mitigate some effects of this attack, and upgrade to 2048-bit as
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soon as server configurations allow. According to SSLLabs' SSL
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Pulse tracker, only about 75% of server support 2048-bit key
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exchange in June 2018[2]. To provide a balance between
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compatibility and security, this function only checks for a
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minimum key strength of 1024-bit.
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See also: `nsm-protocol-check--dhe-kx'
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Reference:
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[1]: Adrian et al (2014). \"Imperfect Forward Secrecy: How
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Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice\", `https://weakdh.org/'
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[2]: SSL Pulse (June 03, 2018). \"Key Exchange Strength\",
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`https://www.ssllabs.com/ssl-pulse/'"
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(let ((prime-bits (plist-get status :diffie-hellman-prime-bits)))
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(if (and (string-match "^\\bDHE\\b" (plist-get status :key-exchange))
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(< prime-bits 1024))
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(format-message
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"Diffie-Hellman key strength (%s bits) too weak (%s bits)"
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prime-bits 1024))))
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(defun nsm-protocol-check--dhe-kx (_host _port status &optional _settings)
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"Check for existence of DH key exchange based on integer factorization.
|
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In the years since the discovery of Logjam, it was discovered
|
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that there were rampant use of small subgroup prime or composite
|
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number for DHE by many servers, and thus allowed themselves to be
|
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vulnerable to backdoors[1]. Given the difficulty in validating
|
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Diffie-Hellman parameters, major browser vendors had started to
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remove DHE since 2016[2]. Emacs stops short of banning DHE and
|
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terminating connection, but prompts the user instead.
|
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|
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References:
|
||
|
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[1]: Dorey, Fong, and Essex (2016). \"Indiscreet Logs: Persistent
|
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Diffie-Hellman Backdoors in TLS.\",
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`https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/999.pdf'
|
||
[2]: Chrome Platform Status (2017). \"Remove DHE-based ciphers\",
|
||
`https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5128908798164992'"
|
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(let ((kx (plist-get status :key-exchange)))
|
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(when (string-match "^\\bDHE\\b" kx)
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(format-message
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"unable to verify Diffie-Hellman key exchange method (%s) parameters"
|
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kx))))
|
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(defun nsm-protocol-check--export-kx (_host _port status &optional _settings)
|
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"Check for RSA-EXPORT key exchange.
|
||
|
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EXPORT cipher suites are a family of 40-bit and 56-bit effective
|
||
security algorithms legally exportable by the United States in
|
||
the early 90s[1]. They can be broken in seconds on 2018 hardware.
|
||
|
||
Prior to 3.2.0, GnuTLS had only supported RSA-EXPORT key
|
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exchange. Since 3.2.0, RSA-EXPORT had been removed, therefore,
|
||
this check has no effect on GnuTLS >= 3.2.0.
|
||
|
||
Reference:
|
||
|
||
[1]: Schneier, Bruce (1996). Applied Cryptography (Second ed.). John
|
||
Wiley & Sons. ISBN 0-471-11709-9.
|
||
[2]: N. Mavrogiannopoulos, FSF (Apr 2015). \"GnuTLS NEWS -- History
|
||
of user-visible changes.\" Version 3.4.0,
|
||
`https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/blob/master/NEWS'"
|
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(when (< libgnutls-version 30200)
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(let ((kx (plist-get status :key-exchange)))
|
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(and (string-match "\\bEXPORT\\b" kx)
|
||
(format-message
|
||
"EXPORT level key exchange (%s) is insecure"
|
||
kx)))))
|
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|
||
(defun nsm-protocol-check--anon-kx (_host _port status &optional _settings)
|
||
"Check for anonymous key exchange.
|
||
|
||
Anonymous key exchange exposes the connection to
|
||
man-in-the-middle attacks.
|
||
|
||
Reference:
|
||
|
||
GnuTLS authors (2018). \"GnuTLS Manual 4.3.3 Anonymous
|
||
authentication\",
|
||
`https://www.gnutls.org/manual/gnutls.html\#Anonymous-authentication'"
|
||
(let ((kx (plist-get status :key-exchange)))
|
||
(and (string-match "\\bANON\\b" kx)
|
||
(format-message
|
||
"anonymous key exchange method (%s) can be unsafe"
|
||
kx))))
|
||
|
||
;; Cipher checks
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-protocol-check--cbc-cipher (_host _port status &optional _settings)
|
||
"Check for CBC mode ciphers.
|
||
|
||
CBC mode cipher in TLS versions earlier than 1.3 are problematic
|
||
because of MAC-then-encrypt. This construction is vulnerable to
|
||
padding oracle attacks[1].
|
||
|
||
Since GnuTLS 3.4.0, the TLS encrypt-then-MAC extension[2] has
|
||
been enabled by default[3]. If encrypt-then-MAC is negotiated,
|
||
this check has no effect.
|
||
|
||
Reference:
|
||
|
||
[1]: Sullivan (Feb 2016). \"Padding oracles and the decline of
|
||
CBC-mode cipher suites\",
|
||
`https://blog.cloudflare.com/padding-oracles-and-the-decline-of-cbc-mode-ciphersuites/'
|
||
[2]: P. Gutmann (Sept 2014). \"Encrypt-then-MAC for Transport Layer
|
||
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)\",
|
||
`https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7366'
|
||
[3]: N. Mavrogiannopoulos (Nov 2015). \"An overview of GnuTLS
|
||
3.4.x\",
|
||
`https://nikmav.blogspot.com/2015/11/an-overview-of-gnutls-34x.html'"
|
||
(when (not (plist-get status :encrypt-then-mac))
|
||
(let ((cipher (plist-get status :cipher)))
|
||
(and (string-match "\\bCBC\\b" cipher)
|
||
(format-message
|
||
"CBC mode cipher (%s) can be insecure"
|
||
cipher)))))
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-protocol-check--ecdsa-cbc-cipher (_host _port status &optional _settings)
|
||
"Check for CBC mode cipher usage under ECDSA key exchange.
|
||
|
||
CBC mode cipher in TLS versions earlier than 1.3 are problematic
|
||
because of MAC-then-encrypt. This construction is vulnerable to
|
||
padding oracle attacks[1].
|
||
|
||
Due to current widespread use of CBC mode ciphers by servers,
|
||
this function only checks for CBC mode cipher usage in
|
||
combination with ECDSA key exchange, which is virtually
|
||
non-existent[2].
|
||
|
||
Since GnuTLS 3.4.0, the TLS encrypt-then-MAC extension[3] has
|
||
been enabled by default[4]. If encrypt-then-MAC is negotiated,
|
||
this check has no effect.
|
||
|
||
References:
|
||
|
||
[1]: Sullivan (Feb 2016). \"Padding oracles and the decline of
|
||
CBC-mode cipher suites\",
|
||
`https://blog.cloudflare.com/padding-oracles-and-the-decline-of-cbc-mode-ciphersuites/'
|
||
[2]: Chrome Platform Status (2017). \"Remove CBC-mode ECDSA ciphers in
|
||
TLS\", `https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5740978103123968'
|
||
[3]: P. Gutmann (Sept 2014). \"Encrypt-then-MAC for Transport Layer
|
||
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)\",
|
||
`https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7366'
|
||
[4]: N. Mavrogiannopoulos (Nov 2015). \"An overview of GnuTLS
|
||
3.4.x\",
|
||
`https://nikmav.blogspot.com/2015/11/an-overview-of-gnutls-34x.html'"
|
||
(when (not (plist-get status :encrypt-then-mac))
|
||
(let ((kx (plist-get status :key-exchange))
|
||
(cipher (plist-get status :cipher)))
|
||
(and (string-match "\\bECDSA\\b" kx)
|
||
(string-match "\\bCBC\\b" cipher)
|
||
(format-message
|
||
"CBC mode cipher (%s) can be insecure"
|
||
cipher)))))
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-protocol-check--3des-cipher (_host _port status &optional _settings)
|
||
"Check for 3DES ciphers.
|
||
|
||
Due to its use of 64-bit block size, it is known that a
|
||
ciphertext collision is highly likely when 2^32 blocks are
|
||
encrypted with the same key bundle under 3-key 3DES. Practical
|
||
birthday attacks of this kind have been demonstrated by Sweet32[1].
|
||
As such, NIST is in the process of disallowing its use in TLS[2].
|
||
|
||
[1]: Bhargavan, Leurent (2016). \"On the Practical (In-)Security of
|
||
64-bit Block Ciphers — Collision Attacks on HTTP over TLS and
|
||
OpenVPN\", `https://sweet32.info/'
|
||
[2]: NIST Information Technology Laboratory (Jul 2017). \"Update to
|
||
Current Use and Deprecation of TDEA\",
|
||
`https://csrc.nist.gov/News/2017/Update-to-Current-Use-and-Deprecation-of-TDEA'"
|
||
(let ((cipher (plist-get status :cipher)))
|
||
(and (string-match "\\b3DES\\b" cipher)
|
||
(format-message
|
||
"3DES cipher (%s) is weak"
|
||
cipher))))
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-protocol-check--rc4-cipher (_host _port status &optional _settings)
|
||
"Check for RC4 ciphers.
|
||
|
||
RC4 cipher has been prohibited by RFC 7465[1].
|
||
|
||
Since GnuTLS 3.4.0, RC4 is not enabled by default[2], but can be
|
||
enabled if requested. This check is mainly provided to secure
|
||
Emacs built with older version of GnuTLS.
|
||
|
||
Reference:
|
||
|
||
[1]: Popov A (Feb 2015). \"Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites\",
|
||
`https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7465'
|
||
[2]: N. Mavrogiannopoulos (Nov 2015). \"An overview of GnuTLS
|
||
3.4.x\",
|
||
`https://nikmav.blogspot.com/2015/11/an-overview-of-gnutls-34x.html'"
|
||
(let ((cipher (plist-get status :cipher)))
|
||
(and (string-match "\\bARCFOUR\\b" cipher)
|
||
(format-message
|
||
"RC4 cipher (%s) is insecure"
|
||
cipher))))
|
||
|
||
;; Signature checks
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-protocol-check--sha1-sig (_host _port status &optional _settings)
|
||
"Check for SHA1 signatures on certificates.
|
||
|
||
The first SHA1 collision was found in 2017[1], as a precaution
|
||
against the events following the discovery of cheap collisions in
|
||
MD5, major browsers[2][3][4][5] have removed the use of SHA1
|
||
signatures in certificates.
|
||
|
||
References:
|
||
|
||
[1]: Stevens M, Karpman P et al (2017). \"The first collision for
|
||
full SHA-1\", `https://shattered.io/static/shattered.pdf'
|
||
[2]: Chromium Security Education TLS/SSL. \"Deprecated and Removed
|
||
Features (SHA-1 Certificate Signatures)\",
|
||
`https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/education/tls\#TOC-SHA-1-Certificate-Signatures'
|
||
[3]: Jones J.C (2017). \"The end of SHA-1 on the Public Web\",
|
||
`https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2017/02/23/the-end-of-sha-1-on-the-public-web/'
|
||
[4]: Apple Support (2017). \"Move to SHA-256 signed certificates to
|
||
avoid connection failures\",
|
||
`https://support.apple.com/en-gb/HT207459'
|
||
[5]: Microsoft Security Advisory 4010323 (2017). \"Deprecation of
|
||
SHA-1 for SSL/TLS Certificates in Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer
|
||
11\",
|
||
`https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2017/4010323'"
|
||
(cl-loop for certificate in (plist-get status :certificates)
|
||
for algo = (plist-get certificate :signature-algorithm)
|
||
;; Don't check root certificates -- root is always trusted.
|
||
if (and (not (equal (plist-get certificate :issuer)
|
||
(plist-get certificate :subject)))
|
||
(string-match "\\bSHA1\\b" algo))
|
||
return (format-message
|
||
"SHA1 signature (%s) is prone to collisions"
|
||
algo)
|
||
end))
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-protocol-check--md5-sig (_host _port status &optional _settings)
|
||
"Check for MD5 signatures on certificates.
|
||
|
||
In 2008, a group of researchers were able to forge an
|
||
intermediate CA certificate that appeared to be legitimate when
|
||
checked by MD5[1]. RFC 6151[2] has recommended against the usage
|
||
of MD5 for digital signatures, which includes TLS certificate
|
||
signatures.
|
||
|
||
Since GnuTLS 3.3.0, MD5 has been disabled by default, but can be
|
||
enabled if requested.
|
||
|
||
References:
|
||
|
||
[1]: Sotirov A, Stevens M et al (2008). \"MD5 considered harmful today
|
||
- Creating a rogue CA certificate\",
|
||
`http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/'
|
||
[2]: Turner S, Chen L (2011). \"Updated Security Considerations for
|
||
the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms\",
|
||
`https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6151'"
|
||
(cl-loop for certificate in (plist-get status :certificates)
|
||
for algo = (plist-get certificate :signature-algorithm)
|
||
;; Don't check root certificates -- root is always trusted.
|
||
if (and (not (equal (plist-get certificate :issuer)
|
||
(plist-get certificate :subject)))
|
||
(string-match "\\bMD5\\b" algo))
|
||
return (format-message
|
||
"MD5 signature (%s) is very prone to collisions"
|
||
algo)
|
||
end))
|
||
|
||
;; Extension checks
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-protocol-check--renegotiation-info-ext (_host _port status
|
||
&optional _settings)
|
||
"Check for renegotiation_info TLS extension status.
|
||
|
||
If this TLS extension is not used, the connection established is
|
||
vulnerable to an attack in which an impersonator can extract
|
||
sensitive information such as HTTP session ID cookies or login
|
||
passwords. Renegotiation was removed in TLS1.3, so this is only
|
||
checked for earlier protocol versions.
|
||
|
||
Reference:
|
||
|
||
E. Rescorla, M. Ray, S. Dispensa, N. Oskov (Feb 2010). \"Transport
|
||
Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension\",
|
||
`https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746'"
|
||
(when (plist-member status :safe-renegotiation)
|
||
(let ((unsafe-renegotiation (not (plist-get status :safe-renegotiation))))
|
||
(and unsafe-renegotiation
|
||
(format-message
|
||
"safe renegotiation is not supported, connection not protected from impersonators")))))
|
||
|
||
;; Compression checks
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-protocol-check--compression (_host _port status &optional _settings)
|
||
"Check for TLS compression.
|
||
|
||
TLS compression attacks such as CRIME would allow an attacker to
|
||
decrypt ciphertext. As a result, RFC 7525 has recommended its
|
||
disablement.
|
||
|
||
Reference:
|
||
|
||
Sheffer, Holz, Saint-Andre (May 2015). \"Recommendations for Secure
|
||
Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer
|
||
Security (DTLS)\", `https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7525'"
|
||
(let ((compression (plist-get status :compression)))
|
||
(and compression
|
||
(string-match "^\\bDEFLATE\\b" compression)
|
||
(format-message
|
||
"compression method (%s) may lead to leakage of sensitive information"
|
||
compression))))
|
||
|
||
;; Protocol version checks
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-protocol-check--version (_host _port status &optional _settings)
|
||
"Check for SSL/TLS protocol version.
|
||
|
||
This function guards against the usage of SSL3.0, which has been
|
||
deprecated by RFC7568[1], and TLS 1.0, which has been deprecated
|
||
by PCI DSS[2].
|
||
|
||
References:
|
||
|
||
[1]: Barnes, Thomson, Pironti, Langley (2015). \"Deprecating Secure
|
||
Sockets Layer Version 3.0\", `https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7568'
|
||
[2]: PCI Security Standards Council (2016). \"Migrating from SSL and
|
||
Early TLS\"
|
||
`https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/Migrating-from-SSL-Early-TLS-Info-Supp-v1_1.pdf'"
|
||
(let ((protocol (plist-get status :protocol)))
|
||
(and protocol
|
||
(or (string-match "SSL" protocol)
|
||
(and (string-match "TLS1.\\([0-9]+\\)" protocol)
|
||
(< (string-to-number (match-string 1 protocol)) 1)))
|
||
(format-message
|
||
"%s protocol is deprecated by standard bodies"
|
||
protocol))))
|
||
|
||
;; Full suite checks
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-protocol-check--null-suite (_host _port status &optional _settings)
|
||
"Check for NULL cipher suites.
|
||
|
||
This function checks for NULL key exchange, cipher and message
|
||
authentication code key derivation function. As the name
|
||
suggests, a NULL assigned for any of the above disables an
|
||
integral part of the security properties that makes up the TLS
|
||
protocol."
|
||
(let ((suite (nsm-cipher-suite status)))
|
||
(and (string-match "\\bNULL\\b" suite)
|
||
(format-message
|
||
"NULL cipher suite (%s) violates authenticity, integrity, or confidentiality guarantees"
|
||
suite))))
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-fingerprint (status)
|
||
(plist-get (plist-get status :certificate) :public-key-id))
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-fingerprint-ok-p (status settings)
|
||
(let ((saved-fingerprints (plist-get settings :fingerprints)))
|
||
;; Haven't seen this host before or not pinning cert.
|
||
(or (null saved-fingerprints)
|
||
;; Plain connection allowed.
|
||
(memq :none saved-fingerprints)
|
||
;; We are pinning certs, and we have seen this host before,
|
||
;; but the credentials for this host differs from the last
|
||
;; times we saw it.
|
||
(member (nsm-fingerprint status) saved-fingerprints))))
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-check-plain-connection (process host port settings warn-unencrypted)
|
||
(if (nsm-should-check host)
|
||
;; If this connection used to be TLS, but is now plain, then it's
|
||
;; possible that we're being Man-In-The-Middled by a proxy that's
|
||
;; stripping out STARTTLS announcements.
|
||
(let ((fingerprints (plist-get settings :fingerprints)))
|
||
(cond
|
||
((and fingerprints
|
||
(not (memq :none fingerprints))
|
||
(not
|
||
(nsm-query
|
||
host port nil 'conditions '(:unencrypted)
|
||
(format-message
|
||
"The connection to %s:%s used to be an encrypted connection, but is now unencrypted. This might mean that there's a man-in-the-middle tapping this connection."
|
||
host port))))
|
||
(delete-process process)
|
||
nil)
|
||
((and warn-unencrypted
|
||
(not (memq :unencrypted (plist-get settings :conditions)))
|
||
(not (nsm-query
|
||
host port nil 'conditions '(:unencrypted)
|
||
(format-message
|
||
"The connection to %s:%s is unencrypted."
|
||
host port))))
|
||
(delete-process process)
|
||
nil)
|
||
(t
|
||
process)))
|
||
process))
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-query (host port status what problems message)
|
||
;; If there is no user to answer queries, then say `no' to everything.
|
||
(if (or noninteractive
|
||
nsm-noninteractive)
|
||
nil
|
||
(let ((response
|
||
(condition-case nil
|
||
(intern
|
||
(car (split-string (nsm-query-user message status))))
|
||
;; Make sure we manage to close the process if the user hits
|
||
;; `C-g'.
|
||
(quit 'no)
|
||
(error 'no))))
|
||
(if (eq response 'no)
|
||
(progn
|
||
(message "Aborting connection to %s:%s" host port)
|
||
nil)
|
||
(message (if (eq response 'session)
|
||
"Accepting certificate for %s:%s this session only"
|
||
"Permanently accepting certificate for %s:%s")
|
||
host port)
|
||
(nsm-save-host host port status what problems response)
|
||
t))))
|
||
|
||
(declare-function gnutls-format-certificate "gnutls.c" (cert))
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-query-user (message status)
|
||
(let ((buffer (get-buffer-create "*Network Security Manager*"))
|
||
(cert-buffer (get-buffer-create "*Certificate Details*"))
|
||
(certs (plist-get status :certificates))
|
||
(accept-choices
|
||
'((?a "always" "Accept this certificate this session and for all future sessions.")
|
||
(?s "session only" "Accept this certificate this session only.")
|
||
(?n "no" "Refuse to use this certificate, and close the connection.")
|
||
(?d "details" "See certificate details")))
|
||
(details-choices
|
||
'((?b "backward page" "See previous page")
|
||
(?f "forward page" "See next page")
|
||
(?n "next" "Next certificate")
|
||
(?p "previous" "Previous certificate")
|
||
(?q "quit" "Quit details view")))
|
||
(done nil))
|
||
(save-window-excursion
|
||
;; First format the certificate and warnings.
|
||
(pop-to-buffer buffer)
|
||
(erase-buffer)
|
||
(let ((inhibit-read-only t))
|
||
(when status
|
||
(insert (nsm-format-certificate status)))
|
||
(insert message)
|
||
(goto-char (point-min))
|
||
;; Fill the first line of the message, which usually
|
||
;; contains lots of explanatory text.
|
||
(fill-region (point) (line-end-position))
|
||
;; If the window is too small, add navigation options.
|
||
(when (> (line-number-at-pos (point-max)) (window-height))
|
||
(setq accept-choices
|
||
(append accept-choices
|
||
'((?b "backward page" "See previous page")
|
||
(?f "forward page" "See next page"))))))
|
||
;; Then ask the user what to do about it.
|
||
(unwind-protect
|
||
(let* ((pems (cl-loop for cert in certs
|
||
collect (gnutls-format-certificate
|
||
(plist-get cert :pem))))
|
||
(cert-index 0)
|
||
show-details answer buf)
|
||
(while (not done)
|
||
(setq answer (if show-details
|
||
(read-multiple-choice "Viewing certificate:"
|
||
details-choices)
|
||
(read-multiple-choice "Continue connecting?"
|
||
accept-choices)))
|
||
(setq buf (if show-details cert-buffer buffer))
|
||
|
||
(cl-case (car answer)
|
||
(?q
|
||
;; Exit the details window.
|
||
(set-window-buffer (get-buffer-window cert-buffer) buffer)
|
||
(setq show-details nil))
|
||
|
||
(?d
|
||
;; Enter the details window.
|
||
(set-window-buffer (get-buffer-window buffer) cert-buffer)
|
||
(with-current-buffer cert-buffer
|
||
(read-only-mode -1)
|
||
(insert (nth cert-index pems))
|
||
(goto-char (point-min))
|
||
(read-only-mode))
|
||
(setq show-details t))
|
||
|
||
(?b
|
||
;; Scroll down.
|
||
(with-selected-window (get-buffer-window buf)
|
||
(with-current-buffer buf
|
||
(ignore-errors (scroll-down)))))
|
||
|
||
(?f
|
||
;; Scroll up.
|
||
(with-selected-window (get-buffer-window buf)
|
||
(with-current-buffer buf
|
||
(ignore-errors (scroll-up)))))
|
||
|
||
(?n
|
||
;; "No" or "next certificate".
|
||
(if show-details
|
||
(with-current-buffer cert-buffer
|
||
(read-only-mode -1)
|
||
(erase-buffer)
|
||
(setq cert-index (mod (1+ cert-index) (length pems)))
|
||
(insert (nth cert-index pems))
|
||
(goto-char (point-min))
|
||
(read-only-mode))
|
||
(setq done t)))
|
||
|
||
(?a
|
||
;; "Always"
|
||
(setq done t))
|
||
|
||
(?s
|
||
;; "Session only"
|
||
(setq done t))
|
||
|
||
(?p
|
||
;; Previous certificate.
|
||
(with-current-buffer cert-buffer
|
||
(read-only-mode -1)
|
||
(erase-buffer)
|
||
(setq cert-index (mod (1- cert-index) (length pems)))
|
||
(insert (nth cert-index pems))
|
||
(goto-char (point-min))
|
||
(read-only-mode)))))
|
||
;; Return the answer.
|
||
(cadr answer))
|
||
(kill-buffer cert-buffer)
|
||
(kill-buffer buffer)))))
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-save-host (host port status what problems permanency)
|
||
(let* ((id (nsm-id host port))
|
||
(saved-fingerprints (plist-get (nsm-host-settings id) :fingerprints))
|
||
(fingerprints (cl-delete-duplicates
|
||
(append saved-fingerprints
|
||
(list (or (nsm-fingerprint status)
|
||
;; Plain connection.
|
||
:none)))
|
||
:test #'string=))
|
||
(saved (list :id id :fingerprints fingerprints)))
|
||
(when (or (eq what 'conditions)
|
||
nsm-save-host-names)
|
||
(nconc saved (list :host (format "%s:%s" host port))))
|
||
;; We either want to save/update the fingerprint or the conditions
|
||
;; of the certificate/unencrypted connection.
|
||
(cond
|
||
((eq what 'conditions)
|
||
(plist-put saved :conditions problems))
|
||
;; Make sure the conditions are not erased when we save a
|
||
;; fingerprint
|
||
((eq what 'fingerprint)
|
||
;; Store additional protocol settings.
|
||
(let ((settings (nsm-host-settings id)))
|
||
(when settings
|
||
(setq saved settings))
|
||
(if (plist-get saved :conditions)
|
||
(plist-put saved :conditions
|
||
(cl-delete-duplicates
|
||
(nconc (plist-get saved :conditions) problems)))
|
||
(plist-put saved :conditions problems)))))
|
||
(if (eq permanency 'always)
|
||
(progn
|
||
(nsm-remove-temporary-setting id)
|
||
(nsm-remove-permanent-setting id)
|
||
(push saved nsm-permanent-host-settings)
|
||
(nsm-write-settings))
|
||
(nsm-remove-temporary-setting id)
|
||
(push saved nsm-temporary-host-settings))))
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-write-settings ()
|
||
(with-temp-file nsm-settings-file
|
||
(insert "(\n")
|
||
(dolist (setting nsm-permanent-host-settings)
|
||
(insert " ")
|
||
(prin1 setting (current-buffer))
|
||
(insert "\n"))
|
||
(insert ")\n")))
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-read-settings ()
|
||
(setq nsm-permanent-host-settings
|
||
(with-temp-buffer
|
||
(insert-file-contents nsm-settings-file)
|
||
(goto-char (point-min))
|
||
(ignore-errors (read (current-buffer))))))
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-id (host port)
|
||
(concat "sha1:" (sha1 (format "%s:%s" host port))))
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-host-settings (id)
|
||
(when (and (not nsm-permanent-host-settings)
|
||
(file-exists-p nsm-settings-file))
|
||
(nsm-read-settings))
|
||
(let ((result nil))
|
||
(dolist (elem (append nsm-temporary-host-settings
|
||
nsm-permanent-host-settings))
|
||
(when (and (not result)
|
||
(equal (plist-get elem :id) id))
|
||
(setq result elem)))
|
||
result))
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-warnings-ok-p (status settings)
|
||
(let ((ok t)
|
||
(conditions (plist-get settings :conditions)))
|
||
(dolist (warning (plist-get status :warnings))
|
||
(unless (memq warning conditions)
|
||
(setq ok nil)))
|
||
ok))
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-remove-permanent-setting (id)
|
||
(setq nsm-permanent-host-settings
|
||
(cl-delete-if
|
||
(lambda (elem)
|
||
(equal (plist-get elem :id) id))
|
||
nsm-permanent-host-settings)))
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-remove-temporary-setting (id)
|
||
(setq nsm-temporary-host-settings
|
||
(cl-delete-if
|
||
(lambda (elem)
|
||
(equal (plist-get elem :id) id))
|
||
nsm-temporary-host-settings)))
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-format-certificate (status)
|
||
(let ((cert (plist-get status :certificate)))
|
||
(when cert
|
||
(with-temp-buffer
|
||
(insert
|
||
(propertize "Certificate information" 'face 'underline) "\n"
|
||
" Issued by:"
|
||
(nsm-certificate-part (plist-get cert :issuer) "CN" t) "\n"
|
||
" Issued to:"
|
||
(or (nsm-certificate-part (plist-get cert :subject) "O")
|
||
(nsm-certificate-part (plist-get cert :subject) "OU" t))
|
||
"\n"
|
||
" Hostname:"
|
||
(nsm-certificate-part (plist-get cert :subject) "CN" t) "\n")
|
||
(when (and (plist-get cert :public-key-algorithm)
|
||
(plist-get cert :signature-algorithm))
|
||
(insert
|
||
" Public key:" (plist-get cert :public-key-algorithm)
|
||
", signature: " (plist-get cert :signature-algorithm) "\n"))
|
||
(when (and (plist-get status :key-exchange)
|
||
(plist-get status :cipher)
|
||
(plist-get status :mac)
|
||
(plist-get status :protocol))
|
||
(insert
|
||
" Session:" (plist-get status :protocol)
|
||
", key: " (plist-get status :key-exchange)
|
||
", cipher: " (plist-get status :cipher)
|
||
", mac: " (plist-get status :mac) "\n"))
|
||
(when (plist-get cert :certificate-security-level)
|
||
(insert
|
||
" Security level:"
|
||
(propertize (plist-get cert :certificate-security-level)
|
||
'face 'bold)
|
||
"\n"))
|
||
(insert
|
||
" Valid:From " (plist-get cert :valid-from)
|
||
" to " (plist-get cert :valid-to) "\n")
|
||
(insert "\n")
|
||
(goto-char (point-min))
|
||
(while (re-search-forward "^[^:]+:" nil t)
|
||
(insert (make-string (- 22 (current-column)) ? )))
|
||
(buffer-string)))))
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-level (symbol)
|
||
"Return a numerical level for SYMBOL for easier comparison."
|
||
(cond
|
||
((eq symbol 'low) 0)
|
||
((eq symbol 'medium) 1)
|
||
(t 2)))
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-cipher-suite (status)
|
||
(format "%s-%s-%s"
|
||
(plist-get status :key-exchange)
|
||
(plist-get status :cipher)
|
||
(plist-get status :mac)))
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-certificate-part (string part &optional full)
|
||
(let ((part (cadr (assoc part (nsm-parse-subject string)))))
|
||
(cond
|
||
(part part)
|
||
(full string)
|
||
(t nil))))
|
||
|
||
(defun nsm-parse-subject (string)
|
||
(with-temp-buffer
|
||
(insert string)
|
||
(goto-char (point-min))
|
||
(let ((start (point))
|
||
(result nil))
|
||
(while (not (eobp))
|
||
(push (replace-regexp-in-string
|
||
"[\\]\\(.\\)" "\\1"
|
||
(buffer-substring start
|
||
(if (re-search-forward "[^\\]," nil 'move)
|
||
(1- (point))
|
||
(point))))
|
||
result)
|
||
(setq start (point)))
|
||
(mapcar
|
||
(lambda (elem)
|
||
(let ((pos (cl-position ?= elem)))
|
||
(if pos
|
||
(list (substring elem 0 pos)
|
||
(substring elem (1+ pos)))
|
||
elem)))
|
||
(nreverse result)))))
|
||
|
||
(define-obsolete-function-alias 'nsm--encryption #'nsm-cipher-suite "27.1")
|
||
|
||
(provide 'nsm)
|
||
|
||
;;; nsm.el ends here
|