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mirror of https://git.FreeBSD.org/ports.git synced 2025-01-04 06:15:24 +00:00

security/openssl111: Security hardening update to 1.1.1c

MFH:		2019Q2
This commit is contained in:
Bernard Spil 2019-05-28 19:52:07 +00:00
parent b3f4ad283a
commit 062934f899
Notes: svn2git 2021-03-31 03:12:20 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=502908
4 changed files with 7 additions and 71 deletions

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@ -2,8 +2,7 @@
# $FreeBSD$
PORTNAME= openssl
PORTVERSION= 1.1.1b
PORTREVISION= 1
PORTVERSION= 1.1.1c
CATEGORIES= security devel
MASTER_SITES= https://www.openssl.org/source/ \
ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/openssl/source/

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@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
TIMESTAMP = 1551251313
SHA256 (openssl-1.1.1b.tar.gz) = 5c557b023230413dfb0756f3137a13e6d726838ccd1430888ad15bfb2b43ea4b
SIZE (openssl-1.1.1b.tar.gz) = 8213737
TIMESTAMP = 1559070548
SHA256 (openssl-1.1.1c.tar.gz) = f6fb3079ad15076154eda9413fed42877d668e7069d9b87396d0804fdb3f4c90
SIZE (openssl-1.1.1c.tar.gz) = 8864262

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@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
From f426625b6ae9a7831010750490a5f0ad689c5ba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 14:39:15 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305
ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for
every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV)
should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and
front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it
also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case
only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are
ignored.
It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique.
Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious
confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the
default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to
the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique
nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a
reused nonce.
Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the
integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the
integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further
affected.
Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe
because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user
applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce
length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.
CVE-2019-1543
Fixes #8345
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406)
(cherry picked from commit 2a3d0ee9d59156c48973592331404471aca886d6)
---
crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c b/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c
index c1917bb86a6..d3e2c622a1b 100644
--- crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c.orig
+++ crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ typedef struct {
#define data(ctx) ((EVP_CHACHA_KEY *)(ctx)->cipher_data)
+#define CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN 12
+
static int chacha_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char user_key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE],
const unsigned char iv[CHACHA_CTR_SIZE], int enc)
@@ -533,7 +535,7 @@ static int chacha20_poly1305_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
- if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA_CTR_SIZE)
+ if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN)
return 0;
actx->nonce_len = arg;
return 1;

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@ -1546,6 +1546,7 @@ man/man1/x509.1.gz
%%MAN3%%man/man3/EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY.3.gz
%%MAN3%%man/man3/EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA.3.gz
%%MAN3%%man/man3/EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1.3.gz
%%MAN3%%man/man3/EVP_PKEY_get0_engine.3.gz
%%MAN3%%man/man3/EVP_PKEY_get0_hmac.3.gz
%%MAN3%%man/man3/EVP_PKEY_get0_poly1305.3.gz
%%MAN3%%man/man3/EVP_PKEY_get0_siphash.3.gz
@ -2455,11 +2456,13 @@ man/man1/x509.1.gz
%%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_new.3.gz
%%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_new_method.3.gz
%%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP.3.gz
%%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1.3.gz
%%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.3.gz
%%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2.3.gz
%%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_add_SSLv23.3.gz
%%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_add_none.3.gz
%%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP.3.gz
%%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1.3.gz
%%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1.3.gz
%%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2.3.gz
%%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_check_SSLv23.3.gz