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Code Issues Releases Activity

Fix build on -CURRENT by conditionalizing S/Key support and adding OPIE

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support.

Reported by:	bento
This commit is contained in:
Joe Marcus Clarke 2002-12-08 20:33:48 +00:00
parent cbb3e83c08
commit 92df255ffd
Notes: svn2git 2021-03-31 03:12:20 +00:00 
svn path=/head/; revision=71433
8 changed files with 377 additions and 53 deletions
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9
net/tac_plus4/Makefile
View File

@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
PORTNAME= tac_plus PORTNAME= tac_plus
PORTVERSION= F4.0.4 PORTVERSION= F4.0.4
PORTREVISION= 1
CATEGORIES= net CATEGORIES= net
MASTER_SITES= ftp://ftp-eng.cisco.com/pub/tacacs/ MASTER_SITES= ftp://ftp-eng.cisco.com/pub/tacacs/
DISTNAME= tac_plus.F4.0.4.alpha DISTNAME= tac_plus.F4.0.4.alpha
@ -38,6 +39,14 @@ CFLAGS+= -DTAC_IOS_VERSION=${TAC_IOS_VERSION}
CFLAGS+= -DTAC_IOS_VERSION=11 CFLAGS+= -DTAC_IOS_VERSION=11
.endif .endif
.if exists(/usr/include/skey.h) && !defined(WITHOUT_SKEY)
MAKE_ENV+= WITH_SKEY=1
.endif
.if exists(/usr/include/opie.h) && !defined(WITHOUT_OPIE)
MAKE_ENV+= WITH_OPIE=1
.endif
do-install: do-install:
${INSTALL_PROGRAM} ${WRKSRC}/tac_plus ${PREFIX}/sbin ${INSTALL_PROGRAM} ${WRKSRC}/tac_plus ${PREFIX}/sbin
${INSTALL_MAN} ${WRKSRC}/tac_plus.1 ${PREFIX}/man/man1/tac_plus.1 ${INSTALL_MAN} ${WRKSRC}/tac_plus.1 ${PREFIX}/man/man1/tac_plus.1

26
net/tac_plus4/files/patch-aa
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
--- Makefile.orig Sun Jun 18 19:26:54 2000 --- Makefile.orig Sun Jun 18 13:26:54 2000
+++ Makefile Mon Jan 22 20:22:57 2001 +++ Makefile Sun Dec 8 15:18:58 2002
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
# LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS # LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
# FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. # FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
@ -27,15 +27,22 @@
# NOTE: If you want your password encryption to be compatible with # NOTE: If you want your password encryption to be compatible with
# e.g. SunOS, you may need to instead use: # e.g. SunOS, you may need to instead use:
# OSLIBS=-ldescrypt # OSLIBS=-ldescrypt
@@ -64,12 +64,12 @@ @@ -64,12 +64,19 @@
# FLAGS = -DTAC_PLUS_USERID=$(USERID) -DTAC_PLUS_GROUPID=$(GROUPID) # FLAGS = -DTAC_PLUS_USERID=$(USERID) -DTAC_PLUS_GROUPID=$(GROUPID)
# Definitions for SKEY functionality # Definitions for SKEY functionality
-# DEFINES = -DSKEY -# DEFINES = -DSKEY
-# LIBS = ../crimelab/skey/src/libskey.a -# LIBS = ../crimelab/skey/src/libskey.a
+.if defined(WITH_SKEY)
+DEFINES = -DSKEY +DEFINES = -DSKEY
+LIBS = -lskey -lmd +LIBS = -lskey -lmd
# INCLUDES = -I../crimelab/skey/src # INCLUDES = -I../crimelab/skey/src
+.endif
+
+.if defined(WITH_OPIE)
+DEFINES += -DOPIE
+LIBS += -lopie -lmd
+.endif
# Debugging flags # Debugging flags
-DEBUG = -g -DEBUG = -g
@ -43,7 +50,7 @@
# Enforce a limit on maximum sessions per user. See the user's guide # Enforce a limit on maximum sessions per user. See the user's guide
# for more information. # for more information.
@@ -85,13 +85,13 @@ @@ -85,13 +92,13 @@
# possible), containing its process id. Uncomment and modify the # possible), containing its process id. Uncomment and modify the
# following line to change this filename # following line to change this filename
@ -59,7 +66,16 @@
HFILES = expire.h parse.h regmagic.h md5.h regexp.h tac_plus.h HFILES = expire.h parse.h regmagic.h md5.h regexp.h tac_plus.h
@@ -130,8 +130,8 @@ @@ -99,7 +106,7 @@
do_author.c dump.c encrypt.c expire.c $(MSCHAP_MD4_SRC) md5.c \
packet.c report.c sendauth.c tac_plus.c utils.c pw.c hash.c \
parse.c regexp.c programs.c enable.c pwlib.c default_fn.c \
- skey_fn.c default_v0_fn.c sendpass.c maxsess.c
+ skey_fn.c opie_fn.c default_v0_fn.c sendpass.c maxsess.c
OBJS = $(SRCS:.c=.o)
@@ -130,8 +137,8 @@
-rm -f *.o *~ *.BAK tac_plus generate_passwd -rm -f *.o *~ *.BAK tac_plus generate_passwd
install: install:

46
net/tac_plus4/files/patch-ab
View File

@ -1,28 +1,18 @@
*** skey_fn.c.orig Sat Jul 29 02:49:18 1995 --- tac_plus.h.orig Sun Jun 18 13:26:54 2000
--- skey_fn.c Mon Mar 3 17:33:57 1997 +++ tac_plus.h Sun Dec 8 15:24:27 2002
*************** @@ -137,6 +137,7 @@
*** 153,158 **** #ifdef FREEBSD
--- 153,163 ---- #define CONST_SYSERRLIST
char buf[256]; #define STDLIB_MALLOC
sprintf(buf, "%s\nPassword: ", skeyprompt); +#define NO_PWAGE
data->server_msg = tac_strdup(buf); #define VOIDSIG
+ #define NO_PWAGE
+ /* We try to make it in accordance of standard FreeBSD #endif
+ * behaviour in order to avoid surprises for user */ @@ -701,6 +702,7 @@
+ data->flags = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_FLAG_NOECHO; extern int default_fn();
+ extern int default_v0_fn();
data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_GETPASS; extern int skey_fn();
p->state = STATE_AUTHEN_GETPASS; +extern int opie_fn();
return (0); #ifdef MSCHAP
*** tac_plus.h.orig Sat Jul 29 02:49:19 1995 extern void mschap_lmchallengeresponse();
--- tac_plus.h Mon Mar 3 17:35:51 1997 extern void mschap_ntchallengeresponse();
***************
*** 91,96 ****
--- 91,97 ----
#ifdef FREEBSD
#define CONST_SYSERRLIST
#define STDLIB_MALLOC
+ #define NO_PWAGE
#define VOIDSIG
#endif

20
net/tac_plus4/files/patch-ac
View File

@ -27,23 +27,3 @@
contains the process id of the currently running daemon. The port contains the process id of the currently running daemon. The port
number is appended to the filename only if the port being used is not number is appended to the filename only if the port being used is not
the default one of 49. the default one of 49.
--- users_guide.orig Sat Apr 3 08:03:48 1999
+++ users_guide Tue Nov 9 21:57:03 1999
@@ -1368,7 +1368,7 @@
and then send the daemon a SIGUSR1. This will cause it to reinitialize
itself and re-read the configuration file.
-On startup, tac_plus creates the file /etc/tac_plus.pid , if possible,
+On startup, tac_plus creates the file /var/run/tac_plus.pid , if possible,
containing its process id. If you invoke the daemon so that it listens
on a non-standard port, the file created is /etc/tac_plus.pid.<port>
instead, where <port> is the port number the daemon is listening on.
@@ -1376,7 +1376,7 @@
Assuming you are listening on the default port 49, something like the
following should work:
-# kill -USR1 `cat /etc/tac_plus.pid`
+# kill -USR1 `cat /var/run/tac_plus.pid`
It's a good idea to check that the daemon is still running after
sending it a SIGUSR1, since a syntactically incorrect configuration

32
net/tac_plus4/files/patch-choose_authen.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
--- choose_authen.c.orig Sun Jun 18 13:26:53 2000
+++ choose_authen.c Sun Dec 8 15:26:08 2002
@@ -118,10 +118,27 @@
#else /* SKEY */
report(LOG_ERR,
"%s %s: user %s s/key support has not been compiled in",
- name ? name : "<unknown>",
- session.peer, session.port);
+ session.peer, session.port,
+ name ? name : "<unknown>");
return(CHOOSE_FAILED);
#endif /* SKEY */
+ }
+
+ if (cfg_passwd && STREQ(cfg_passwd, "opie")) {
+ if (debug & DEBUG_PASSWD_FLAG)
+ report(LOG_DEBUG, "%s %s: user %s requires opie",
+ session.peer, session.port, name);
+#ifdef OPIE
+ type->authen_func = opie_fn;
+ strcpy(type->authen_name, "opie_fn");
+ return (CHOOSE_OK);
+#else /* OPIE */
+ report(LOG_ERR,
+ "%s %s: user %s opie support has not been compiled in",
+ session.peer, session.port,
+ name ? name : "<unknown>");
+ return(CHOOSE_FAILED);
+#endif /* OPIE */
}
/* Not an skey user. Must be none, des, cleartext or file password */

242
net/tac_plus4/files/patch-opie_fn.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
--- opie_fn.c.orig Sun Dec 8 15:26:20 2002
+++ opie_fn.c Sun Dec 8 15:27:01 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+/*
+ Copyright (c) 1995-2000 by Cisco systems, Inc.
+
+ Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute modified and
+ unmodified copies of this software for any purpose and without fee is
+ hereby granted, provided that (a) this copyright and permission notice
+ appear on all copies of the software and supporting documentation, (b)
+ the name of Cisco Systems, Inc. not be used in advertising or
+ publicity pertaining to distribution of the program without specific
+ prior permission, and (c) notice be given in supporting documentation
+ that use, modification, copying and distribution is by permission of
+ Cisco Systems, Inc.
+
+ Cisco Systems, Inc. makes no representations about the suitability
+ of this software for any purpose. THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS
+ IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING,
+ WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND
+ FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+*/
+
+#ifdef OPIE
+#include "tac_plus.h"
+#include "expire.h"
+
+/* internal state variables */
+#define STATE_AUTHEN_START 0 /* no requests issued */
+#define STATE_AUTHEN_GETUSER 1 /* username has been requested */
+#define STATE_AUTHEN_GETPASS 2 /* password has been requested */
+
+#include <opie.h>
+
+struct private_data {
+ struct opie opiedata;
+ char password[MAX_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
+ int state;
+};
+
+/* Use s/key to verify a supplied password using state set up earlier
+when the username was supplied */
+
+static int
+opie_verify(passwd, data)
+char *passwd;
+struct authen_data *data;
+{
+ struct private_data *p = data->method_data;
+ struct opie *opiep = &p->opiedata;
+
+ data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_FAIL;
+
+ if (opieverify(opiep, passwd) == 0) {
+ /* S/Key authentication succeeded */
+ data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_PASS;
+ if (opiep->opie_n < 5) {
+ data->server_msg = tac_strdup("Password will expire soon");
+ return (1);
+ }
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Skey tacacs login authentication function. Wants a username
+ * and a password, and tries to verify them via opie.
+ *
+ * Choose_authen will ensure that we already have a username before this
+ * gets called.
+ *
+ * We will query for a password and keep it in the method_data.
+ *
+ * Any strings returned via pointers in authen_data must come from the
+ * heap. They will get freed by the caller.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if data->status is valid, otherwise 1
+ */
+
+int
+opie_fn(data)
+struct authen_data *data;
+{
+ char *name, *passwd;
+ struct private_data *p;
+ char *prompt;
+ int pwlen;
+
+ p = (struct private_data *) data->method_data;
+
+ /* An abort has been received. Clean up and return */
+ if (data->flags & TAC_PLUS_CONTINUE_FLAG_ABORT) {
+ if (data->method_data)
+ free(data->method_data);
+ data->method_data = NULL;
+ return (1);
+ }
+ /* Initialise method_data if first time through */
+ if (!p) {
+ p = (struct private_data *) tac_malloc(sizeof(struct private_data));
+ bzero(p, sizeof(struct private_data));
+ data->method_data = p;
+ p->state = STATE_AUTHEN_START;
+ }
+
+ /* Unless we're enabling, we need a username */
+ if (data->service != TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_SVC_ENABLE &&
+ !(char) data->NAS_id->username[0]) {
+ switch (p->state) {
+
+ case STATE_AUTHEN_GETUSER:
+ /* we have previously asked for a username but none came back.
+ * This is a gross error */
+ data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_ERROR;
+ report(LOG_ERR, "%s: No username supplied after GETUSER",
+ session.peer);
+ return (0);
+
+ case STATE_AUTHEN_START:
+ /* No username. Try requesting one */
+ data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_GETUSER;
+ if (data->service == TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_SVC_LOGIN) {
+ prompt = "\nUser Access Verification\n\nUsername: ";
+ } else {
+ prompt = "Username: ";
+ }
+ data->server_msg = tac_strdup(prompt);
+ p->state = STATE_AUTHEN_GETUSER;
+ return (0);
+
+ default:
+ /* something awful has happened. Give up and die */
+ report(LOG_ERR, "%s: opie_fn bad state %d",
+ session.peer, p->state);
+ return (1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* we now have a username if we needed one */
+ name = data->NAS_id->username;
+
+ /* Do we have a password? */
+ passwd = p->password;
+
+ if (!passwd[0]) {
+ char opieprompt[80];
+
+ /* no password yet. Either we need to ask for one and expect to get
+ * called again, or we asked but nothing came back, which is fatal */
+
+ switch (p->state) {
+ case STATE_AUTHEN_GETPASS:
+ /* We already asked for a password. This should be the reply */
+ if (data->client_msg) {
+ pwlen = MIN(strlen(data->client_msg), MAX_PASSWD_LEN);
+ } else {
+ pwlen = 0;
+ }
+ strncpy(passwd, data->client_msg, pwlen);
+ passwd[pwlen] = '\0';
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /* Request a password */
+ passwd = cfg_get_login_secret(name, TAC_PLUS_RECURSE);
+ if (!passwd && !STREQ(passwd, "opie")) {
+ report(LOG_ERR, "Cannot find opie password declaration for %s",
+ name);
+ data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_ERROR;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+ if (opiechallenge(&p->opiedata, name, opieprompt) == 0) {
+ char buf[256];
+ sprintf(buf, "%s\nPassword: ", opieprompt);
+ data->server_msg = tac_strdup(buf);
+
+ /* We try to make it in accordance of standard FreeBSD
+ * behaviour in order to avoid surprises for user */
+ data->flags = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_FLAG_NOECHO;
+
+ data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_GETPASS;
+ p->state = STATE_AUTHEN_GETPASS;
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_ERROR;
+ report(LOG_ERR, "Cannot generate opie prompt for %s", name);
+ return(1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* We have a username and password. Try validating */
+
+ /* Assume the worst */
+ data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_FAIL;
+
+ switch (data->service) {
+ case TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_SVC_LOGIN:
+ opie_verify(passwd, data);
+ if (debug)
+ report(LOG_INFO, "login query for '%s' %s from %s %s",
+ name && name[0] ? name : "unknown",
+ data->NAS_id->NAS_port && data->NAS_id->NAS_port[0] ?
+ data->NAS_id->NAS_port : "unknown",
+ session.peer,
+ (data->status == TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_PASS) ?
+ "accepted" : "rejected");
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_ERROR;
+ report(LOG_ERR, "%s: Bogus service value %d from packet",
+ session.peer, data->service);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (data->method_data)
+ free(data->method_data);
+ data->method_data = NULL;
+
+ switch (data->status) {
+ case TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_ERROR:
+ case TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_FAIL:
+ case TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_PASS:
+ return (0);
+ default:
+ report(LOG_ERR, "%s: opie_fn couldn't set recognizable status %d",
+ session.peer, data->status);
+ data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_ERROR;
+ return (1);
+ }
+}
+#else /* OPIE */
+
+/* The following code is not needed or used. It exists solely to
+ prevent compilers from "helpfully" complaining that this source
+ file is empty, which upsets novices building the software */
+
+static int dummy = 0;
+
+#endif /* OPIE */

7
net/tac_plus4/files/patch-parse.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
--- parse.h.orig Sun Dec 8 15:22:51 2002
+++ parse.h Sun Dec 8 15:23:26 2002
@@ -76,3 +76,4 @@
#ifdef MSCHAP
#define S_mschap 42
#endif /* MSCHAP */
+#define S_opie 43

48
net/tac_plus4/files/patch-users_guide Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
--- users_guide.orig Sun Jun 18 13:26:54 2000
+++ users_guide Sun Dec 8 15:14:01 2002
@@ -166,7 +166,10 @@
crimelab.com but now it appears the only source is ftp.bellcore.com. I
suggest you try a web search for s/key source code.
-Note: S/KEY is a trademark of Bell Communications Research (Bellcore).
+To use OPIE, you must have built tac_plus with the -DWITH_OPIE flag.
+
+Note: S/KEY and OPIE are a trademark of Bell Communications Research
+(Bellcore).
Should you need them, there are routines for accessing password files
(getpwnam,setpwent,endpwent,setpwfile) in pw.c.
@@ -436,6 +439,15 @@
login = skey
}
+4. Authentication using opie.
+
+If you have successfully built tac_plus with opie support, you can specify
+a user be authenticated via opie, as follows:
+
+ user = marcus {
+ login = opie
+ }
+
RECURSIVE PASSWORD LOOKUPS
---------------------------
@@ -1370,7 +1382,7 @@
and then send the daemon a SIGUSR1. This will cause it to reinitialize
itself and re-read the configuration file.
-On startup, tac_plus creates the file /etc/tac_plus.pid , if possible,
+On startup, tac_plus creates the file /var/run/tac_plus.pid , if possible,
containing its process id. If you invoke the daemon so that it listens
on a non-standard port, the file created is /etc/tac_plus.pid.<port>
instead, where <port> is the port number the daemon is listening on.
@@ -1378,7 +1390,7 @@
Assuming you are listening on the default port 49, something like the
following should work:
-# kill -USR1 `cat /etc/tac_plus.pid`
+# kill -USR1 `cat /var/run/tac_plus.pid`
It's a good idea to check that the daemon is still running after
sending it a SIGUSR1, since a syntactically incorrect configuration