Upgrade PuTTY to new 0.63 beta upstream release, adding vulnerability info.

Quoting the upstream's change log:

- Security fix: prevent a nefarious SSH server or network attacker from
  crashing PuTTY at startup in three different ways by presenting a maliciously
  constructed public key and signature.
- Security fix: PuTTY no longer retains the private half of users' keys in
  memory by mistake after authenticating with them.
- Revamped the internal configuration storage system to remove all fixed
  arbitrary limits on string lengths. In particular, there should now no longer
  be an unreasonably small limit on the number of port forwardings PuTTY can
  store.
- Port-forwarded TCP connections which close one direction before the other
  should now be reliably supported, with EOF propagated independently in the
  two directions. This also fixes some instances of port-forwarding data
  corruption (if the corruption consisted of losing data from the very end of
  the connection) and some instances of PuTTY failing to close when the session
  is over (because it wrongly thought a forwarding channel was still active
  when it was not).
- The terminal emulation now supports xterm's bracketed paste mode (allowing
  aware applications to tell the difference between typed and pasted text, so
  that e.g. editors need not apply inappropriate auto-indent).
- You can now choose to display bold text by both brightening the foreground
  colour and changing the font, not just one or the other.  - PuTTYgen will now
  never generate a 2047-bit key when asked for 2048 (or more generally n−1 bits
  when asked for n).
- Some updates to default settings: PuTTYgen now generates 2048-bit keys by
  default (rather than 1024), and PuTTY defaults to UTF-8 encoding and 2000
  lines of scrollback (rather than ISO 8859-1 and 200).
- Unix: PSCP and PSFTP now preserve the Unix file permissions, on copies in
  both directions.
- Unix: dead keys and compose-character sequences are now supported.
- Unix: PuTTY and pterm now permit font fallback (where glyphs not present in
  your selected font are automatically filled in from other fonts on the
  system) even if you are using a server-side X11 font rather than a Pango
  client-side one.
- Bug fixes too numerous to list, mostly resulting from running the code
  through Coverity Scan which spotted an assortment of memory and resource
  leaks, logic errors, and crashes in various circumstances.

Security:	4b448a96-ff73-11e2-b28d-080027ef73ec
Security:	CVE-2013-4206
Security:	CVE-2013-4207
Security:	CVE-2013-4208
Security:	CVE-2013-4852

security/putty/Makefile

@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
 # $FreeBSD$
 
 PORTNAME=	putty
-PORTVERSION=	0.62
-PORTREVISION=	3
+PORTVERSION=	0.63
 CATEGORIES=	security ipv6
 MASTER_SITES=	http://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/%SUBDIR%/ \
 		ftp://ftp.chiark.greenend.org.uk/users/sgtatham/putty-latest/

security/putty/distinfo

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-SHA256 (putty-0.62.tar.gz) = 8d187e86ee18c839895d263607b61788778564e3720e8d85c5305a04f9da0573
-SIZE (putty-0.62.tar.gz) = 1783106
+SHA256 (putty-0.63.tar.gz) = 81e8eaaf31be7d9a46b4f3fb80d1d9540776f142cd89d0a11f2f8082dc68f8b5
+SIZE (putty-0.63.tar.gz) = 1887913

security/putty/files/patch-timing.c

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
---- ../timing.c.orig	2011-07-17 13:40:59.000000000 +0200
-+++ ../timing.c	2011-07-17 13:41:13.000000000 +0200
-@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
-      * Failing that, compare on the other two fields, just so that
-      * we don't get unwanted equality.
-      */
--#ifdef __LCC__
-+#if defined(__LCC__) || defined(__clang__)
-     /* lcc won't let us compare function pointers. Legal, but annoying. */
-     {
- 	int c = memcmp(&a->fn, &b->fn, sizeof(a->fn));

security/vuxml/vuln.xml

@@ -51,6 +51,48 @@ Note:  Please add new entries to the beginning of this file.
 
 -->
 <vuxml xmlns="http://www.vuxml.org/apps/vuxml-1">
+  <vuln vid="4b448a96-ff73-11e2-b28d-080027ef73ec">
+    <topic>PuTTY -- Four security holes in versions before 0.63</topic>
+    <affects>
+      <package>
+	<name>putty</name>
+	<range><lt>0.63</lt></range>
+      </package>
+    </affects>
+    <description>
+      <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+	<p>Simon Tatham reports:</p>
+	<blockquote cite="http://lists.tartarus.org/pipermail/putty-announce/2013/000018.html">
+	  <p>This [0.63] release fixes multiple security holes in previous versions of
+	    PuTTY, which can allow an SSH-2 server to make PuTTY overrun or
+	    underrun buffers and crash. [...]
+	  </p><p>
+	    These vulnerabilities can be triggered before host key verification,
+	    which means that you are not even safe if you trust the server you
+	    <em>think</em> you're connecting to, since it could be spoofed over the
+	    network and the host key check would not detect this before the attack
+	    could take place.
+	  </p><p>
+	    Additionally, when PuTTY authenticated with a user's private key, the
+	    private key or information equivalent to it was accidentally kept in
+	    PuTTY's memory for the rest of its run, where it could be retrieved by
+	    other processes reading PuTTY's memory, or written out to swap files
+	    or crash dumps. This release fixes that as well.</p>
+	</blockquote>
+      </body>
+    </description>
+    <references>
+      <cvename>CVE-2013-4206</cvename>
+      <cvename>CVE-2013-4207</cvename>
+      <cvename>CVE-2013-4208</cvename>
+      <cvename>CVE-2013-4852</cvename>
+    </references>
+    <dates>
+      <discovery>2013-07-08</discovery>
+      <entry>2013-08-07</entry>
+    </dates>
+  </vuln>
+
   <vuln vid="e6839625-fdfa-11e2-9430-20cf30e32f6d">
     <topic>typo3 -- Multiple vulnerabilities in TYPO3 Core</topic>
     <affects>