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Code Issues Releases Activity

Document two fetchmail vulnerabilities.

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See also:	http://fetchmail.berlios.de/fetchmail-SA-2006-02.txt
		http://fetchmail.berlios.de/fetchmail-SA-2006-03.txt

Reported by:	Matthias Andree (upstream author)
This commit is contained in:
Simon Barner 2007-01-06 14:15:44 +00:00
parent 0db9d44de7
commit e9f291f162
Notes: svn2git 2021-03-31 03:12:20 +00:00 
svn path=/head/; revision=181628
1 changed files with 75 additions and 0 deletions
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75
security/vuxml/vuln.xml
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@ -34,6 +34,81 @@ Note: Please add new entries to the beginning of this file.
-->
<vuxml xmlns="http://www.vuxml.org/apps/vuxml-1">
<vuln vid="37e30313-9d8c-11db-858b-0060084a00e5">
<topic>fetchmail -- crashes when refusing a message bound for an MDA</topic>
<affects>
<package>
<name>fetchmail</name>
<range><ge>6.3.5</ge><lt>6.3.6</lt></range>
</package>
</affects>
<description>
<body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<p>Matthias Andree reports:</p>
<blockquote cite="http://fetchmail.berlios.de/fetchmail-SA-2006-03.txt">
<p>When delivering messages to a message delivery agent by means
of the &quot;mda&quot; option, fetchmail can crash (by passing
a NULL pointer to ferror() and fflush()) when refusing a message.
SMTP and LMTP delivery modes aren't affected.</p>
</blockquote>
</body>
</description>
<references>
<cvename>CVE-2006-5974</cvename>
<url>http://fetchmail.berlios.de/fetchmail-SA-2006-03.txt</url>
</references>
<dates>
<discovery>2007-01-04</discovery>
<entry>2007-01-06</entry>
</dates>
</vuln>
<vuln vid="5238ac45-9d8c-11db-858b-0060084a00e5">
<topic>fetchmail -- TLS enforcement problem/MITM attack/password exposure</topic>
<affects>
<package>
<name>fetchmail</name>
<range><lt>6.3.6</lt></range>
</package>
</affects>
<description>
<body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<p>Matthias Andree reports:</p>
<blockquote cite="http://fetchmail.berlios.de/fetchmail-SA-2006-02.txt">
<p>Fetchmail has had several longstanding password disclosure
vulnerabilities.</p>
<ul>
<li>sslcertck/sslfingerprint options should have implied
&quot;sslproto tls1&quot; in order to enforce TLS negotiation,
but did not.</li>
<li>Even with &quot;sslproto tls1&quot; in the config, fetches
would go ahead in plain text if STLS/STARTTLS wasn't available
(not advertised, or advertised but rejected).</li>
<li>POP3 fetches could completely ignore all TLS options
whether available or not because it didn't reliably issue
CAPA before checking for STLS support - but CAPA is a
requisite for STLS. Whether or not CAPAbilities were probed,
depended on the &quot;auth&quot; option. (Fetchmail only
tried CAPA if the auth option was not set at all, was set
to gssapi, kerberos, kerberos_v4, otp, or cram-md5.)</li>
<li>POP3 could fall back to using plain text passwords, even
if strong authentication had been configured.</li>
<li>POP2 would not complain if strong authentication or TLS
had been requested.</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
</body>
</description>
<references>
<cvename>CVE-2006-5867</cvename>
<url>http://fetchmail.berlios.de/fetchmail-SA-2006-02.txt</url>
</references>
<dates>
<discovery>2007-01-04</discovery>
<entry>2007-01-06</entry>
</dates>
</vuln>
<vuln vid="78ad2525-9d0c-11db-a5f6-000c6ec775d9">
<topic>opera -- multiple vulnerabilities</topic>
<affects>