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638e9e1fdc
* Honor CFLAGS and LDFLAGS and some clean-up. PR: 42359 Submitted by: andrew@ugh.net.au
223 lines
7.4 KiB
Plaintext
223 lines
7.4 KiB
Plaintext
--- poppassd.c.orig Thu Sep 5 11:44:07 2002
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+++ poppassd.c Thu Sep 5 16:07:09 2002
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@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@
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*
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* Doesn't actually change any passwords itself. It simply listens for
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* incoming requests, gathers the required information (user name, old
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- * password, new password) and executes /bin/passwd, talking to it over
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+ * password, new password) and executes /usr/bin/passwd, talking to it over
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* a pseudo-terminal pair. The advantage of this is that we don't need
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* to have any knowledge of either the password file format (which may
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* include dbx files that need to be rebuilt) or of any file locking
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- * protocol /bin/passwd and cohorts may use (and which isn't documented).
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+ * protocol /usr/bin/passwd and cohorts may use (and which isn't documented).
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*
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* The current version has been tested at NU under SunOS release 4.1.2
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* and 4.1.3, and under HP-UX 8.02 and 9.01. We have tested the server
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
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* Note that unencrypted passwords are transmitted over the network. If
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* this bothers you, think hard about whether you want to implement the
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* password changing feature. On the other hand, it's no worse than what
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- * happens when you run /bin/passwd while connected via telnet or rlogin.
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+ * happens when you run /usr/bin/passwd while connected via telnet or rlogin.
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* Well, maybe it is, since the use of a dedicated port makes it slightly
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* easier for a network snooper to snarf passwords off the wire.
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*
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@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
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* (which talks to /bin/password) is directly descended from Smith's
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* version, with changes for SunOS and HP-UX by Norstad (with help from
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* sample code in "Advanced Programming in the UNIX Environment"
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- * by W. Richard Stevens). The code to report /bin/passwd error messages
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+ * by W. Richard Stevens). The code to report /usr/bin/passwd error messages
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* back to the client in the final 500 response, and a new version of the
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* code to find the next free pty, is by Norstad.
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*
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@@ -145,8 +145,9 @@
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static char *P1[] =
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{"Old password:",
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"Changing password for *.\nOld password:",
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+ "Changing local password for *.\nOld password:",
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"Changing password for * on *.\nOld password:",
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- "Changing NIS password for * on *.\nOld password:",
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+ "Changing NIS password for * on *.\nOld Password:",
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"Changing password for *\n*'s Old password:",
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""};
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@@ -165,7 +166,10 @@
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static char *P4[] =
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{"\n",
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+ "\npasswd: rebuilding the database...\npasswd: done\n",
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+ "\npasswd: updating the database...\npasswd: done\n",
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"NIS entry changed on *\n",
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+ "\n\nNIS password has been changed on *.\n",
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""};
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@@ -186,11 +190,7 @@
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*user = *oldpass = *newpass = 0;
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- if (openlog ("poppassd", LOG_PID, LOG_LOCAL2) < 0)
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- {
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- WriteToClient ("500 Can't open syslog.");
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- exit (1);
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- }
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+ openlog ("poppassd", LOG_PID, LOG_LOCAL2);
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WriteToClient ("200 poppassd v%s hello, who are you?", VERSION);
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ReadFromClient (line);
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@@ -212,12 +212,16 @@
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if ((pw = getpwnam (user)) == NULL)
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{
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- WriteToClient ("500 Unknown user, %s.", user);
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+ syslog (LOG_ERR, "Unknown user, %s", user);
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+ sleep (5);
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+ WriteToClient ("500 Old password is incorrect.");
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exit(1);
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}
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if (chkPass (user, oldpass, pw) == FAILURE)
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{
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+ syslog (LOG_ERR, "Incorrect password from %s", user);
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+ sleep (5);
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WriteToClient ("500 Old password is incorrect.");
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exit(1);
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}
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@@ -264,28 +268,28 @@
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if ((wpid = waitpid (pid, &wstat, 0)) < 0)
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{
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- syslog (LOG_ERR, "wait for /bin/passwd child failed: %m");
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+ syslog (LOG_ERR, "wait for /usr/bin/passwd child failed: %m");
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WriteToClient ("500 Server error (wait failed), get help!");
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exit (1);
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}
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if (pid != wpid)
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{
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- syslog (LOG_ERR, "wrong child (/bin/passwd waited for!");
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+ syslog (LOG_ERR, "wrong child (/usr/bin/passwd) waited for!");
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WriteToClient ("500 Server error (wrong child), get help!");
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exit (1);
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}
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if (WIFEXITED (wstat) == 0)
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{
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- syslog (LOG_ERR, "child (/bin/passwd) killed?");
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+ syslog (LOG_ERR, "child (/usr/bin/passwd) killed?");
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WriteToClient ("500 Server error (funny wstat), get help!");
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exit (1);
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}
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if (WEXITSTATUS (wstat) != 0)
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{
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- syslog (LOG_ERR, "child (/bin/passwd) exited abnormally");
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+ syslog (LOG_ERR, "child (/usr/bin/passwd) exited abnormally");
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WriteToClient ("500 Server error (abnormal exit), get help!");
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exit (1);
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}
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@@ -304,17 +308,19 @@
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}
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else /* Child */
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{
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- /*
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- * Become the user trying who's password is being changed. We're
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- * about to exec /bin/passwd with is setuid root anyway, but this
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- * way it looks to the child completely like it's being run by
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- * the normal user, which makes it do its own password verification
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- * before doing any thing. In theory, we've already verified the
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- * password, but this extra level of checking doesn't hurt. Besides,
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- * the way I do it here, if somebody manages to change somebody
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- * else's password, you can complain to your vendor about security
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- * holes, not to me!
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- */
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+ /* Start new session - gets rid of controlling terminal. */
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+
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+ if (setsid() < 0) {
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+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "setsid failed: %m");
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+ return(0);
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+ }
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+
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+ /* Set login name */
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+
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+ if (setlogin(user) < 0) {
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+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "setlogin failed: %m");
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+ return(0);
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+ }
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setuid (pw->pw_uid);
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setgid (pw->pw_gid);
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dochild (master, slavedev, user);
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@@ -324,7 +330,7 @@
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/*
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* dochild
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*
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- * Do child stuff - set up slave pty and execl /bin/passwd.
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+ * Do child stuff - set up slave pty and execl /usr/bin/passwd.
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*
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* Code adapted from "Advanced Programming in the UNIX Environment"
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* by W. Richard Stevens.
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@@ -338,13 +344,6 @@
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int slave;
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struct termios stermios;
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- /* Start new session - gets rid of controlling terminal. */
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-
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- if (setsid() < 0) {
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- syslog(LOG_ERR, "setsid failed: %m");
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- return(0);
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- }
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-
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/* Open slave pty and acquire as new controlling terminal. */
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if ((slave = open(slavedev, O_RDWR)) < 0) {
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@@ -387,10 +386,10 @@
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return(0);
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}
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- /* Fork /bin/passwd. */
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+ /* Fork /usr/bin/passwd. */
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- if (execl("/bin/passwd", "passwd", user, (char*)0) < 0) {
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- syslog(LOG_ERR, "can't exec /bin/passwd: %m");
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+ if (execl("/usr/bin/passwd", "passwd", user, (char*)0) < 0) {
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+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "can't exec /usr/bin/passwd: %m");
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return(0);
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}
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}
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@@ -408,15 +407,20 @@
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*
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* Modified by Norstad to remove assumptions about number of pty's allocated
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* on this UNIX box.
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+ *
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+ * Modified by Stephen Melvin to allocate local space for static character
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+ * array, rather than local space to pointer to constant string, which is
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+ * not kosher and was crashing FreeBSD 1.1.5.1.
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*/
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findpty (slave)
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char **slave;
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{
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int master;
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- static char *line = "/dev/ptyXX";
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+ static char line[11];
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DIR *dirp;
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struct dirent *dp;
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+ strcpy(line,"/dev/ptyXX");
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dirp = opendir("/dev");
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while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
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if (strncmp(dp->d_name, "pty", 3) == 0 && strlen(dp->d_name) == 5) {
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@@ -485,8 +489,10 @@
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}
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writestring(master, pswd);
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-
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+ sleep(2);
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if (!expect(master, P4, buf)) return FAILURE;
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+
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+ close(master);
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return SUCCESS;
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}
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