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/* -> /*- for copyright notices, minor format tweaks as necessary
2005-01-06 23:35:40 +00:00
/*-
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
* Copyright (c) 1999 Poul-Henning Kamp.
* Copyright (c) 2008 Bjoern A. Zeeb.
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
* Copyright (c) 2009 James Gritton.
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
* All rights reserved.
Whitespace/spelling fixes in advance of upcoming functional changes. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-03-27 13:13:59 +00:00
*
With the permissions of phk@ change the license on kern_jail.c to a 2 clause BSD license.
2008-11-28 19:23:46 +00:00
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
Add beer-ware license and $Id$ Noticed by: dillon
1999-04-30 06:51:51 +00:00
*/
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
Use __FBSDID().
2003-06-11 00:56:59 +00:00
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
#include "opt_compat.h"
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#include "opt_ddb.h"
#include "opt_inet.h"
#include "opt_inet6.h"
Add two missing includes and remove two uneeded. This is quite serious fix, because even with MAC framework compiled in, MAC entry points in those two files were simply ignored.
2004-06-27 09:03:22 +00:00
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
#include <sys/osd.h>
Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability of privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9) interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the existing suser(9) interface: suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv) suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags) A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read before doing so. The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine, rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail is now present in kern_jail.c. The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with root privilege. The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier. This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security policy become more feasible. Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed on: arch@ Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri, Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>, Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>, Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:37:19 +00:00
#include <sys/priv.h>
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
#include <sys/proc.h>
Defer the vrele() on a jail's root vnode reference from prison_free() to a new prison_complete() task run by a task queue. This removes a requirement for grabbing Giant in crfree(). Embed the 'struct task' in 'struct prison' so that we don't have to allocate memory from prison_free() (which means we also defer the FREE()). With this change, I believe grabbing Giant from crfree() can now be removed, but need to check the uidinfo code paths. To avoid header pollution, move the definition of 'struct task' to _task.h, and recursively include from taskqueue.h and jail.h; much preferably to all files including jail.h picking up a requirement to include taskqueue.h. Bumped into by: sam Reviewed by: bde, tjr
2004-01-23 20:44:26 +00:00
#include <sys/taskqueue.h>
Add the support for the AT_FDCWD and fd-relative name lookups to the namei(9). Based on the submission by rdivacky, sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007 Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:01:21 +00:00
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
#include <sys/jail.h>
o Introduce pr_mtx into struct prison, providing protection for the mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount, pr_linux, ...) o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/ so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes. o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to use these primitives. o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly accessing struct prison. Reviewed by: jhb
2001-12-03 16:12:27 +00:00
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
Add racct. It's an API to keep per-process, per-jail, per-loginclass and per-loginclass resource accounting information, to be used by the new resource limits code. It's connected to the build, but the code that actually calls the new functions will come later. Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Reviewed by: kib (earlier version)
2011-03-29 17:47:25 +00:00
#include <sys/racct.h>
Change the way rctl interfaces with jails by introducing prison_racct structure, which acts as a proxy between them. This makes jail rules persistent, i.e. they can be added before jail gets created, and they don't disappear when the jail gets destroyed.
2011-05-03 07:32:58 +00:00
#include <sys/refcount.h>
Implement functionality I called 'jail services'. It may be used for external modules to attach some data to jail's in-kernel structure. - Change allprison_mtx mutex to allprison_sx sx(9) lock. We will need to call external functions while holding this lock, which may want to allocate memory. Make use of the fact that this is shared-exclusive lock and use shared version when possible. - Implement the following functions: prison_service_register() - registers a service that wants to be noticed when a jail is created and destroyed prison_service_deregister() - deregisters service prison_service_data_add() - adds service-specific data to the jail structure prison_service_data_get() - takes service-specific data from the jail structure prison_service_data_del() - removes service-specific data from the jail structure Reviewed by: rwatson
2007-04-05 23:19:13 +00:00
#include <sys/sx.h>
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
#include <sys/sysent.h>
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
#include <sys/namei.h>
Rename sysctl security.jail.getfsstatroot_only to security.jail.enforce_statfs and extend its functionality: value policy 0 show all mount-points without any restrictions 1 show only mount-points below jail's chroot and show only part of the mount-point's path (if jail's chroot directory is /jails/foo and mount-point is /jails/foo/usr/home only /usr/home will be shown) 2 show only mount-point where jail's chroot directory is placed. Default value is 2. Discussed with: rwatson
2005-06-09 18:49:19 +00:00
#include <sys/mount.h>
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
#include <sys/queue.h>
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
#include <sys/socket.h>
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
#include <sys/syscallsubr.h>
Yet-another-update: rename ``kern.prison'' to a new sysctl root entry, ``jail'', and move the set_hostname_allowed sysctl there, as well as fixing a bug in the sysctl that resulted in jails being over-limited (preventing them from reading as well as writing the hostname). Also, correct some formatting issues, courtesy bde :-). Reviewed by: phk Approved by: jkh
2000-02-12 13:41:56 +00:00
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
#include <sys/vnode.h>
Merge the remainder of kern_vimage.c and vimage.h into vnet.c and vnet.h, we now use jails (rather than vimages) as the abstraction for virtualization management, and what remained was specific to virtual network stacks. Minor cleanups are done in the process, and comments updated to reflect these changes. Reviewed by: bz Approved by: re (vimage blanket)
2009-08-01 19:26:27 +00:00
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
#include <net/if.h>
Merge the remainder of kern_vimage.c and vimage.h into vnet.c and vnet.h, we now use jails (rather than vimages) as the abstraction for virtualization management, and what remained was specific to virtual network stacks. Minor cleanups are done in the process, and comments updated to reflect these changes. Reviewed by: bz Approved by: re (vimage blanket)
2009-08-01 19:26:27 +00:00
#include <net/vnet.h>
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
#include <netinet/in.h>
Merge the remainder of kern_vimage.c and vimage.h into vnet.c and vnet.h, we now use jails (rather than vimages) as the abstraction for virtualization management, and what remained was specific to virtual network stacks. Minor cleanups are done in the process, and comments updated to reflect these changes. Reviewed by: bz Approved by: re (vimage blanket)
2009-08-01 19:26:27 +00:00
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#ifdef DDB
#include <ddb/ddb.h>
#ifdef INET6
#include <netinet6/in6_var.h>
#endif /* INET6 */
#endif /* DDB */
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
Complete break-out of sys/sys/mac.h into sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h begun with a repo-copy of mac.h to mac_framework.h. sys/mac.h now contains the userspace and user<->kernel API and definitions, with all in-kernel interfaces moved to mac_framework.h, which is now included across most of the kernel instead. This change is the first step in a larger cleanup and sweep of MAC Framework interfaces in the kernel, and will not be MFC'd. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA
2006-10-22 11:52:19 +00:00
#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
Change the default value of the "ip4" and "ip6" jail parameters to "disable", which only allows access to the parent/physical system's IP addresses when specifically directed. Change the default value of "host" to "new", and don't copy the parent host values, to insulate jails from the parent hostname et al. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:41:02 +00:00
#define DEFAULT_HOSTUUID "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PRISON, "prison", "Prison structures");
Mark MALLOC_DEFINEs static that have no corresponding MALLOC_DECLAREs. This means that their use is restricted to a single C file.
2011-11-07 06:44:47 +00:00
static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PRISON_RACCT, "prison_racct", "Prison racct structures");
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
Add ip4.saddrsel/ip4.nosaddrsel (and equivalent for ip6) to control whether to use source address selection (default) or the primary jail address for unbound outgoing connections. This is intended to be used by people upgrading from single-IP jails to multi-IP jails but not having to change firewall rules, application ACLs, ... but to force their connections (unless otherwise changed) to the primry jail IP they had been used for years, as well as for people prefering to implement similar policies. Note that for IPv6, if configured incorrectly, this might lead to scope violations, which single-IPv6 jails could as well, as by the design of jails. [1] Reviewed by: jamie, hrs (ipv6 part) Pointed out by: hrs [1] MFC After: 2 weeks Asked for by: Jase Thew (bazerka beardz.net)
2010-01-17 12:57:11 +00:00
/* Keep struct prison prison0 and some code in kern_jail_set() readable. */
#ifdef INET
#ifdef INET6
#define _PR_IP_SADDRSEL PR_IP4_SADDRSEL|PR_IP6_SADDRSEL
#else
#define _PR_IP_SADDRSEL PR_IP4_SADDRSEL
#endif
#else /* !INET */
#ifdef INET6
#define _PR_IP_SADDRSEL PR_IP6_SADDRSEL
#else
#define _PR_IP_SADDRSEL 0
#endif
#endif
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/* prison0 describes what is "real" about the system. */
struct prison prison0 = {
.pr_id = 0,
.pr_name = "0",
.pr_ref = 1,
.pr_uref = 1,
.pr_path = "/",
.pr_securelevel = -1,
Add a limit for child jails via the "children.cur" and "children.max" parameters. This replaces the simple "allow.jails" permission. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-23 20:35:51 +00:00
.pr_childmax = JAIL_MAX,
Change the default value of the "ip4" and "ip6" jail parameters to "disable", which only allows access to the parent/physical system's IP addresses when specifically directed. Change the default value of "host" to "new", and don't copy the parent host values, to insulate jails from the parent hostname et al. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:41:02 +00:00
.pr_hostuuid = DEFAULT_HOSTUUID,
(S)LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER takes a (S)LIST_HEAD as an argument. Fix some wrong usages. Note: this does not affect generated binaries as this argument is not used. PR: 137213 Submitted by: Eygene Ryabinkin (initial version) MFC after: 1 month
2009-12-28 22:56:30 +00:00
.pr_children = LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(prison0.pr_children),
Make it possible to change the vnet sysctl variables on jails with their own virtual network stack. Jails only inheriting a network stack cannot change anything that cannot be changed from within a prison. Reviewed by: rwatson, zec Approved by: re (kib)
2009-08-13 10:26:34 +00:00
#ifdef VIMAGE
Add ip4.saddrsel/ip4.nosaddrsel (and equivalent for ip6) to control whether to use source address selection (default) or the primary jail address for unbound outgoing connections. This is intended to be used by people upgrading from single-IP jails to multi-IP jails but not having to change firewall rules, application ACLs, ... but to force their connections (unless otherwise changed) to the primry jail IP they had been used for years, as well as for people prefering to implement similar policies. Note that for IPv6, if configured incorrectly, this might lead to scope violations, which single-IPv6 jails could as well, as by the design of jails. [1] Reviewed by: jamie, hrs (ipv6 part) Pointed out by: hrs [1] MFC After: 2 weeks Asked for by: Jase Thew (bazerka beardz.net)
2010-01-17 12:57:11 +00:00
.pr_flags = PR_HOST|PR_VNET|_PR_IP_SADDRSEL,
Make it possible to change the vnet sysctl variables on jails with their own virtual network stack. Jails only inheriting a network stack cannot change anything that cannot be changed from within a prison. Reviewed by: rwatson, zec Approved by: re (kib)
2009-08-13 10:26:34 +00:00
#else
Add ip4.saddrsel/ip4.nosaddrsel (and equivalent for ip6) to control whether to use source address selection (default) or the primary jail address for unbound outgoing connections. This is intended to be used by people upgrading from single-IP jails to multi-IP jails but not having to change firewall rules, application ACLs, ... but to force their connections (unless otherwise changed) to the primry jail IP they had been used for years, as well as for people prefering to implement similar policies. Note that for IPv6, if configured incorrectly, this might lead to scope violations, which single-IPv6 jails could as well, as by the design of jails. [1] Reviewed by: jamie, hrs (ipv6 part) Pointed out by: hrs [1] MFC After: 2 weeks Asked for by: Jase Thew (bazerka beardz.net)
2010-01-17 12:57:11 +00:00
.pr_flags = PR_HOST|_PR_IP_SADDRSEL,
Make it possible to change the vnet sysctl variables on jails with their own virtual network stack. Jails only inheriting a network stack cannot change anything that cannot be changed from within a prison. Reviewed by: rwatson, zec Approved by: re (kib)
2009-08-13 10:26:34 +00:00
#endif
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
.pr_allow = PR_ALLOW_ALL,
};
MTX_SYSINIT(prison0, &prison0.pr_mtx, "jail mutex", MTX_DEF);
Change the way rctl interfaces with jails by introducing prison_racct structure, which acts as a proxy between them. This makes jail rules persistent, i.e. they can be added before jail gets created, and they don't disappear when the jail gets destroyed.
2011-05-03 07:32:58 +00:00
/* allprison, allprison_racct and lastprid are protected by allprison_lock. */
Implement functionality I called 'jail services'. It may be used for external modules to attach some data to jail's in-kernel structure. - Change allprison_mtx mutex to allprison_sx sx(9) lock. We will need to call external functions while holding this lock, which may want to allocate memory. Make use of the fact that this is shared-exclusive lock and use shared version when possible. - Implement the following functions: prison_service_register() - registers a service that wants to be noticed when a jail is created and destroyed prison_service_deregister() - deregisters service prison_service_data_add() - adds service-specific data to the jail structure prison_service_data_get() - takes service-specific data from the jail structure prison_service_data_del() - removes service-specific data from the jail structure Reviewed by: rwatson
2007-04-05 23:19:13 +00:00
struct sx allprison_lock;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
SX_SYSINIT(allprison_lock, &allprison_lock, "allprison");
struct prisonlist allprison = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(allprison);
Change the way rctl interfaces with jails by introducing prison_racct structure, which acts as a proxy between them. This makes jail rules persistent, i.e. they can be added before jail gets created, and they don't disappear when the jail gets destroyed.
2011-05-03 07:32:58 +00:00
LIST_HEAD(, prison_racct) allprison_racct;
Revert rev. 178124 as requested by kris@. Having jail id not being reused too frequently is useful for script controlled environment.
2008-06-19 21:41:57 +00:00
int lastprid = 0;
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
static int do_jail_attach(struct thread *td, struct prison *pr);
Whitespace/spelling fixes in advance of upcoming functional changes. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-03-27 13:13:59 +00:00
static void prison_complete(void *context, int pending);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
static void prison_deref(struct prison *pr, int flags);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
static char *prison_path(struct prison *pr1, struct prison *pr2);
static void prison_remove_one(struct prison *pr);
Change the way rctl interfaces with jails by introducing prison_racct structure, which acts as a proxy between them. This makes jail rules persistent, i.e. they can be added before jail gets created, and they don't disappear when the jail gets destroyed.
2011-05-03 07:32:58 +00:00
#ifdef RACCT
static void prison_racct_attach(struct prison *pr);
static void prison_racct_detach(struct prison *pr);
#endif
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#ifdef INET
Whitespace/spelling fixes in advance of upcoming functional changes. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-03-27 13:13:59 +00:00
static int _prison_check_ip4(struct prison *pr, struct in_addr *ia);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
static int prison_restrict_ip4(struct prison *pr, struct in_addr *newip4);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#endif
#ifdef INET6
Whitespace/spelling fixes in advance of upcoming functional changes. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-03-27 13:13:59 +00:00
static int _prison_check_ip6(struct prison *pr, struct in6_addr *ia6);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
static int prison_restrict_ip6(struct prison *pr, struct in6_addr *newip6);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#endif
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/* Flags for prison_deref */
#define PD_DEREF 0x01
#define PD_DEUREF 0x02
#define PD_LOCKED 0x04
#define PD_LIST_SLOCKED 0x08
#define PD_LIST_XLOCKED 0x10
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/*
Mfp4 CH177924: Add and export constants of array sizes of jail parameters as compiled into the kernel. This is the least intrusive way to allow kvm to read the (sparse) arrays independent of the options the kernel was compiled with. Reviewed by: jhb (originally) MFC after: 1 week Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Sponsored by: CK Software GmbH
2010-12-31 22:49:13 +00:00
* Parameter names corresponding to PR_* flag values. Size values are for kvm
* as we cannot figure out the size of a sparse array, or an array without a
* terminating entry.
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
*/
static char *pr_flag_names[] = {
[0] = "persist",
Add ip4.saddrsel/ip4.nosaddrsel (and equivalent for ip6) to control whether to use source address selection (default) or the primary jail address for unbound outgoing connections. This is intended to be used by people upgrading from single-IP jails to multi-IP jails but not having to change firewall rules, application ACLs, ... but to force their connections (unless otherwise changed) to the primry jail IP they had been used for years, as well as for people prefering to implement similar policies. Note that for IPv6, if configured incorrectly, this might lead to scope violations, which single-IPv6 jails could as well, as by the design of jails. [1] Reviewed by: jamie, hrs (ipv6 part) Pointed out by: hrs [1] MFC After: 2 weeks Asked for by: Jase Thew (bazerka beardz.net)
2010-01-17 12:57:11 +00:00
#ifdef INET
[7] = "ip4.saddrsel",
#endif
#ifdef INET6
[8] = "ip6.saddrsel",
#endif
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
};
Mfp4 CH177924: Add and export constants of array sizes of jail parameters as compiled into the kernel. This is the least intrusive way to allow kvm to read the (sparse) arrays independent of the options the kernel was compiled with. Reviewed by: jhb (originally) MFC after: 1 week Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Sponsored by: CK Software GmbH
2010-12-31 22:49:13 +00:00
const size_t pr_flag_names_size = sizeof(pr_flag_names);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
static char *pr_flag_nonames[] = {
[0] = "nopersist",
Add ip4.saddrsel/ip4.nosaddrsel (and equivalent for ip6) to control whether to use source address selection (default) or the primary jail address for unbound outgoing connections. This is intended to be used by people upgrading from single-IP jails to multi-IP jails but not having to change firewall rules, application ACLs, ... but to force their connections (unless otherwise changed) to the primry jail IP they had been used for years, as well as for people prefering to implement similar policies. Note that for IPv6, if configured incorrectly, this might lead to scope violations, which single-IPv6 jails could as well, as by the design of jails. [1] Reviewed by: jamie, hrs (ipv6 part) Pointed out by: hrs [1] MFC After: 2 weeks Asked for by: Jase Thew (bazerka beardz.net)
2010-01-17 12:57:11 +00:00
#ifdef INET
[7] = "ip4.nosaddrsel",
#endif
#ifdef INET6
[8] = "ip6.nosaddrsel",
#endif
Some jail parameters (in particular, "ip4" and "ip6" for IP address restrictions) were found to be inadequately described by a boolean. Define a new parameter type with three values (disable, new, inherit) to handle these and future cases. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor) Discussed with: rwatson
2009-07-25 14:48:57 +00:00
};
Mfp4 CH177924: Add and export constants of array sizes of jail parameters as compiled into the kernel. This is the least intrusive way to allow kvm to read the (sparse) arrays independent of the options the kernel was compiled with. Reviewed by: jhb (originally) MFC after: 1 week Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Sponsored by: CK Software GmbH
2010-12-31 22:49:13 +00:00
const size_t pr_flag_nonames_size = sizeof(pr_flag_nonames);
Some jail parameters (in particular, "ip4" and "ip6" for IP address restrictions) were found to be inadequately described by a boolean. Define a new parameter type with three values (disable, new, inherit) to handle these and future cases. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor) Discussed with: rwatson
2009-07-25 14:48:57 +00:00
struct jailsys_flags {
const char *name;
unsigned disable;
unsigned new;
} pr_flag_jailsys[] = {
{ "host", 0, PR_HOST },
#ifdef VIMAGE
{ "vnet", 0, PR_VNET },
#endif
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
#ifdef INET
Some jail parameters (in particular, "ip4" and "ip6" for IP address restrictions) were found to be inadequately described by a boolean. Define a new parameter type with three values (disable, new, inherit) to handle these and future cases. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor) Discussed with: rwatson
2009-07-25 14:48:57 +00:00
{ "ip4", PR_IP4_USER | PR_IP4_DISABLE, PR_IP4_USER },
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
#endif
#ifdef INET6
Some jail parameters (in particular, "ip4" and "ip6" for IP address restrictions) were found to be inadequately described by a boolean. Define a new parameter type with three values (disable, new, inherit) to handle these and future cases. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor) Discussed with: rwatson
2009-07-25 14:48:57 +00:00
{ "ip6", PR_IP6_USER | PR_IP6_DISABLE, PR_IP6_USER },
Manage vnets via the jail system. If a jail is given the boolean parameter "vnet" when it is created, a new vnet instance will be created along with the jail. Networks interfaces can be moved between prisons with an ioctl similar to the one that moves them between vimages. For now vnets will co-exist under both jails and vimages, but soon struct vimage will be going away. Reviewed by: zec, julian Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-15 18:59:29 +00:00
#endif
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
};
Mfp4 CH177924: Add and export constants of array sizes of jail parameters as compiled into the kernel. This is the least intrusive way to allow kvm to read the (sparse) arrays independent of the options the kernel was compiled with. Reviewed by: jhb (originally) MFC after: 1 week Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Sponsored by: CK Software GmbH
2010-12-31 22:49:13 +00:00
const size_t pr_flag_jailsys_size = sizeof(pr_flag_jailsys);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
static char *pr_allow_names[] = {
"allow.set_hostname",
"allow.sysvipc",
"allow.raw_sockets",
"allow.chflags",
"allow.mount",
"allow.quotas",
"allow.socket_af",
};
Mfp4 CH177924: Add and export constants of array sizes of jail parameters as compiled into the kernel. This is the least intrusive way to allow kvm to read the (sparse) arrays independent of the options the kernel was compiled with. Reviewed by: jhb (originally) MFC after: 1 week Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Sponsored by: CK Software GmbH
2010-12-31 22:49:13 +00:00
const size_t pr_allow_names_size = sizeof(pr_allow_names);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
static char *pr_allow_nonames[] = {
"allow.noset_hostname",
"allow.nosysvipc",
"allow.noraw_sockets",
"allow.nochflags",
"allow.nomount",
"allow.noquotas",
"allow.nosocket_af",
};
Mfp4 CH177924: Add and export constants of array sizes of jail parameters as compiled into the kernel. This is the least intrusive way to allow kvm to read the (sparse) arrays independent of the options the kernel was compiled with. Reviewed by: jhb (originally) MFC after: 1 week Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Sponsored by: CK Software GmbH
2010-12-31 22:49:13 +00:00
const size_t pr_allow_nonames_size = sizeof(pr_allow_nonames);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
Make the "enforce_statfs" default 2 (most restrictive) in jail_set(2), instead of whatever the parent/system has (which is generally 0). This mirrors the old-style default used for jail(2) in conjunction with the security.jail.enforce_statfs sysctl. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-31 16:00:41 +00:00
#define JAIL_DEFAULT_ALLOW PR_ALLOW_SET_HOSTNAME
#define JAIL_DEFAULT_ENFORCE_STATFS 2
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
static unsigned jail_default_allow = JAIL_DEFAULT_ALLOW;
Make the "enforce_statfs" default 2 (most restrictive) in jail_set(2), instead of whatever the parent/system has (which is generally 0). This mirrors the old-style default used for jail(2) in conjunction with the security.jail.enforce_statfs sysctl. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-31 16:00:41 +00:00
static int jail_default_enforce_statfs = JAIL_DEFAULT_ENFORCE_STATFS;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6)
Fix some overflow errors: a signed allocation and an insufficiant array size. Reported by: pho Tested by: pho Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-09 22:09:29 +00:00
static unsigned jail_max_af_ips = 255;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
#endif
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#ifdef INET
static int
qcmp_v4(const void *ip1, const void *ip2)
{
in_addr_t iaa, iab;
/*
* We need to compare in HBO here to get the list sorted as expected
* by the result of the code. Sorting NBO addresses gives you
* interesting results. If you do not understand, do not try.
*/
iaa = ntohl(((const struct in_addr *)ip1)->s_addr);
iab = ntohl(((const struct in_addr *)ip2)->s_addr);
/*
* Do not simply return the difference of the two numbers, the int is
* not wide enough.
*/
if (iaa > iab)
return (1);
else if (iaa < iab)
return (-1);
else
return (0);
}
#endif
#ifdef INET6
static int
qcmp_v6(const void *ip1, const void *ip2)
{
const struct in6_addr *ia6a, *ia6b;
int i, rc;
ia6a = (const struct in6_addr *)ip1;
ia6b = (const struct in6_addr *)ip2;
rc = 0;
Whitespace/spelling fixes in advance of upcoming functional changes. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-03-27 13:13:59 +00:00
for (i = 0; rc == 0 && i < sizeof(struct in6_addr); i++) {
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
if (ia6a->s6_addr[i] > ia6b->s6_addr[i])
rc = 1;
else if (ia6a->s6_addr[i] < ia6b->s6_addr[i])
rc = -1;
}
return (rc);
}
#endif
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/*
* struct jail_args {
* struct jail *jail;
* };
*/
int
In order to maximize the re-usability of kernel code in user space this patch modifies makesyscalls.sh to prefix all of the non-compatibility calls (e.g. not linux_, freebsd32_) with sys_ and updates the kernel entry points and all places in the code that use them. It also fixes an additional name space collision between the kernel function psignal and the libc function of the same name by renaming the kernel psignal kern_psignal(). By introducing this change now we will ease future MFCs that change syscalls. Reviewed by: rwatson Approved by: re (bz)
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
sys_jail(struct thread *td, struct jail_args *uap)
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
{
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
uint32_t version;
int error;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
struct jail j;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
error = copyin(uap->jail, &version, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (error)
return (error);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
switch (version) {
case 0:
{
struct jail_v0 j0;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/* FreeBSD single IPv4 jails. */
bzero(&j, sizeof(struct jail));
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
error = copyin(uap->jail, &j0, sizeof(struct jail_v0));
if (error)
return (error);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
j.version = j0.version;
j.path = j0.path;
j.hostname = j0.hostname;
j.ip4s = j0.ip_number;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
break;
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
case 1:
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
/*
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
* Version 1 was used by multi-IPv4 jail implementations
* that never made it into the official kernel.
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
*/
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
return (EINVAL);
case 2: /* JAIL_API_VERSION */
/* FreeBSD multi-IPv4/IPv6,noIP jails. */
error = copyin(uap->jail, &j, sizeof(struct jail));
if (error)
return (error);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
break;
default:
/* Sci-Fi jails are not supported, sorry. */
return (EINVAL);
}
return (kern_jail(td, &j));
}
int
kern_jail(struct thread *td, struct jail *j)
{
Fix some overflow errors: a signed allocation and an insufficiant array size. Reported by: pho Tested by: pho Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-09 22:09:29 +00:00
struct iovec optiov[2 * (4
+ sizeof(pr_allow_names) / sizeof(pr_allow_names[0])
#ifdef INET
+ 1
#endif
#ifdef INET6
+ 1
#endif
)];
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
struct uio opt;
char *u_path, *u_hostname, *u_name;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#ifdef INET
Fix some overflow errors: a signed allocation and an insufficiant array size. Reported by: pho Tested by: pho Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-09 22:09:29 +00:00
uint32_t ip4s;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
struct in_addr *u_ip4;
#endif
#ifdef INET6
struct in6_addr *u_ip6;
#endif
size_t tmplen;
int error, enforce_statfs, fi;
bzero(&optiov, sizeof(optiov));
opt.uio_iov = optiov;
opt.uio_iovcnt = 0;
opt.uio_offset = -1;
opt.uio_resid = -1;
opt.uio_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE;
opt.uio_rw = UIO_READ;
opt.uio_td = td;
/* Set permissions for top-level jails from sysctls. */
if (!jailed(td->td_ucred)) {
for (fi = 0; fi < sizeof(pr_allow_names) /
sizeof(pr_allow_names[0]); fi++) {
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base =
(jail_default_allow & (1 << fi))
? pr_allow_names[fi] : pr_allow_nonames[fi];
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len =
strlen(optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base) + 1;
opt.uio_iovcnt += 2;
}
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = "enforce_statfs";
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = sizeof("enforce_statfs");
opt.uio_iovcnt++;
enforce_statfs = jail_default_enforce_statfs;
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = &enforce_statfs;
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = sizeof(enforce_statfs);
opt.uio_iovcnt++;
}
tmplen = MAXPATHLEN + MAXHOSTNAMELEN + MAXHOSTNAMELEN;
#ifdef INET
ip4s = (j->version == 0) ? 1 : j->ip4s;
if (ip4s > jail_max_af_ips)
return (EINVAL);
tmplen += ip4s * sizeof(struct in_addr);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
#else
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (j->ip4s > 0)
return (EINVAL);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
#endif
#ifdef INET6
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (j->ip6s > jail_max_af_ips)
return (EINVAL);
tmplen += j->ip6s * sizeof(struct in6_addr);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
#else
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (j->ip6s > 0)
return (EINVAL);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
#endif
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
u_path = malloc(tmplen, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
u_hostname = u_path + MAXPATHLEN;
u_name = u_hostname + MAXHOSTNAMELEN;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
#ifdef INET
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
u_ip4 = (struct in_addr *)(u_name + MAXHOSTNAMELEN);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
#endif
#ifdef INET6
#ifdef INET
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
u_ip6 = (struct in6_addr *)(u_ip4 + ip4s);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
#else
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
u_ip6 = (struct in6_addr *)(u_name + MAXHOSTNAMELEN);
#endif
#endif
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = "path";
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = sizeof("path");
opt.uio_iovcnt++;
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = u_path;
error = copyinstr(j->path, u_path, MAXPATHLEN,
&optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len);
if (error) {
free(u_path, M_TEMP);
return (error);
}
opt.uio_iovcnt++;
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = "host.hostname";
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = sizeof("host.hostname");
opt.uio_iovcnt++;
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = u_hostname;
error = copyinstr(j->hostname, u_hostname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN,
&optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len);
if (error) {
free(u_path, M_TEMP);
return (error);
}
opt.uio_iovcnt++;
if (j->jailname != NULL) {
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = "name";
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = sizeof("name");
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
opt.uio_iovcnt++;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = u_name;
error = copyinstr(j->jailname, u_name, MAXHOSTNAMELEN,
&optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (error) {
free(u_path, M_TEMP);
return (error);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
opt.uio_iovcnt++;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
}
#ifdef INET
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = "ip4.addr";
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = sizeof("ip4.addr");
opt.uio_iovcnt++;
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = u_ip4;
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = ip4s * sizeof(struct in_addr);
if (j->version == 0)
u_ip4->s_addr = j->ip4s;
else {
error = copyin(j->ip4, u_ip4, optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (error) {
free(u_path, M_TEMP);
return (error);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
opt.uio_iovcnt++;
#endif
#ifdef INET6
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = "ip6.addr";
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = sizeof("ip6.addr");
opt.uio_iovcnt++;
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = u_ip6;
optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = j->ip6s * sizeof(struct in6_addr);
error = copyin(j->ip6, u_ip6, optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len);
if (error) {
free(u_path, M_TEMP);
return (error);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
opt.uio_iovcnt++;
#endif
KASSERT(opt.uio_iovcnt <= sizeof(optiov) / sizeof(optiov[0]),
("kern_jail: too many iovecs (%d)", opt.uio_iovcnt));
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
error = kern_jail_set(td, &opt, JAIL_CREATE | JAIL_ATTACH);
free(u_path, M_TEMP);
return (error);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/*
* struct jail_set_args {
* struct iovec *iovp;
* unsigned int iovcnt;
* int flags;
* };
*/
int
In order to maximize the re-usability of kernel code in user space this patch modifies makesyscalls.sh to prefix all of the non-compatibility calls (e.g. not linux_, freebsd32_) with sys_ and updates the kernel entry points and all places in the code that use them. It also fixes an additional name space collision between the kernel function psignal and the libc function of the same name by renaming the kernel psignal kern_psignal(). By introducing this change now we will ease future MFCs that change syscalls. Reviewed by: rwatson Approved by: re (bz)
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
sys_jail_set(struct thread *td, struct jail_set_args *uap)
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
{
struct uio *auio;
int error;
/* Check that we have an even number of iovecs. */
if (uap->iovcnt & 1)
return (EINVAL);
error = copyinuio(uap->iovp, uap->iovcnt, &auio);
if (error)
return (error);
error = kern_jail_set(td, auio, uap->flags);
free(auio, M_IOV);
return (error);
}
int
kern_jail_set(struct thread *td, struct uio *optuio, int flags)
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
{
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
struct nameidata nd;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#ifdef INET
Whitespace/spelling fixes in advance of upcoming functional changes. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-03-27 13:13:59 +00:00
struct in_addr *ip4;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#endif
#ifdef INET6
struct in6_addr *ip6;
#endif
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
struct vfsopt *opt;
struct vfsoptlist *opts;
Make the kernel compile without IP networking by moving a variable under a proper #ifdef. Approved by: re (rwatson)
2009-08-12 12:12:23 +00:00
struct prison *pr, *deadpr, *mypr, *ppr, *tpr;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
struct vnode *root;
Allow a jail's name to be the same as its jid (which is the default if no name is specified), but still disallow other numeric names. Reviewed by: zec Approved by: bz (mentor) MFC after: 3 days
2009-09-04 19:00:48 +00:00
char *domain, *errmsg, *host, *name, *namelc, *p, *path, *uuid;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6)
Make the kernel compile without IP networking by moving a variable under a proper #ifdef. Approved by: re (rwatson)
2009-08-12 12:12:23 +00:00
struct prison *tppr;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
void *op;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
#endif
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
unsigned long hid;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
size_t namelen, onamelen;
int created, cuflags, descend, enforce, error, errmsg_len, errmsg_pos;
Some jail parameters (in particular, "ip4" and "ip6" for IP address restrictions) were found to be inadequately described by a boolean. Define a new parameter type with three values (disable, new, inherit) to handle these and future cases. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor) Discussed with: rwatson
2009-07-25 14:48:57 +00:00
int gotchildmax, gotenforce, gothid, gotslevel;
int fi, jid, jsys, len, level;
Add a limit for child jails via the "children.cur" and "children.max" parameters. This replaces the simple "allow.jails" permission. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-23 20:35:51 +00:00
int childmax, slevel, vfslocked;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6)
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
int ii, ij;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
#endif
#ifdef INET
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
int ip4s, redo_ip4;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
#endif
#ifdef INET6
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
int ip6s, redo_ip6;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
#endif
This update changes the mnt_flag field in the mount structure from 32 bits to 64 bits and eliminates the unused mnt_xflag field. The existing mnt_flag field is completely out of bits, so this update gives us room to expand. Note that the f_flags field in the statfs structure is already 64 bits, so the expanded mnt_flag field can be exported without having to make any changes in the statfs structure. Approved by: re (bz)
2011-07-24 17:43:09 +00:00
uint64_t pr_allow, ch_allow, pr_flags, ch_flags;
unsigned tallow;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
char numbuf[12];
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_JAIL_SET);
if (!error && (flags & JAIL_ATTACH))
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_JAIL_ATTACH);
if (error)
return (error);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
mypr = ppr = td->td_ucred->cr_prison;
Add a limit for child jails via the "children.cur" and "children.max" parameters. This replaces the simple "allow.jails" permission. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-23 20:35:51 +00:00
if ((flags & JAIL_CREATE) && mypr->pr_childmax == 0)
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
return (EPERM);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (flags & ~JAIL_SET_MASK)
return (EINVAL);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
/*
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
* Check all the parameters before committing to anything. Not all
* errors can be caught early, but we may as well try. Also, this
* takes care of some expensive stuff (path lookup) before getting
* the allprison lock.
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
*
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
* XXX Jails are not filesystems, and jail parameters are not mount
* options. But it makes more sense to re-use the vfsopt code
* than duplicate it under a different name.
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
*/
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
error = vfs_buildopts(optuio, &opts);
if (error)
return (error);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#ifdef INET
ip4 = NULL;
#endif
#ifdef INET6
ip6 = NULL;
#endif
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "jid", &jid, sizeof(jid));
if (error == ENOENT)
jid = 0;
else if (error != 0)
goto done_free;
error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "securelevel", &slevel, sizeof(slevel));
if (error == ENOENT)
gotslevel = 0;
else if (error != 0)
goto done_free;
else
gotslevel = 1;
Add a limit for child jails via the "children.cur" and "children.max" parameters. This replaces the simple "allow.jails" permission. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-23 20:35:51 +00:00
error =
vfs_copyopt(opts, "children.max", &childmax, sizeof(childmax));
if (error == ENOENT)
gotchildmax = 0;
else if (error != 0)
goto done_free;
else
gotchildmax = 1;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "enforce_statfs", &enforce, sizeof(enforce));
Don't exit kern_jail_set without freeing options when enforce_statfs has an illegal value. MFC after: 3 days
2010-09-10 21:45:42 +00:00
if (error == ENOENT)
gotenforce = 0;
else if (error != 0)
goto done_free;
else if (enforce < 0 || enforce > 2) {
error = EINVAL;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
goto done_free;
Don't exit kern_jail_set without freeing options when enforce_statfs has an illegal value. MFC after: 3 days
2010-09-10 21:45:42 +00:00
} else
gotenforce = 1;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
pr_flags = ch_flags = 0;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
for (fi = 0; fi < sizeof(pr_flag_names) / sizeof(pr_flag_names[0]);
fi++) {
if (pr_flag_names[fi] == NULL)
continue;
vfs_flagopt(opts, pr_flag_names[fi], &pr_flags, 1 << fi);
vfs_flagopt(opts, pr_flag_nonames[fi], &ch_flags, 1 << fi);
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
ch_flags |= pr_flags;
Some jail parameters (in particular, "ip4" and "ip6" for IP address restrictions) were found to be inadequately described by a boolean. Define a new parameter type with three values (disable, new, inherit) to handle these and future cases. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor) Discussed with: rwatson
2009-07-25 14:48:57 +00:00
for (fi = 0; fi < sizeof(pr_flag_jailsys) / sizeof(pr_flag_jailsys[0]);
fi++) {
error = vfs_copyopt(opts, pr_flag_jailsys[fi].name, &jsys,
sizeof(jsys));
if (error == ENOENT)
continue;
if (error != 0)
goto done_free;
switch (jsys) {
case JAIL_SYS_DISABLE:
if (!pr_flag_jailsys[fi].disable) {
error = EINVAL;
goto done_free;
}
pr_flags |= pr_flag_jailsys[fi].disable;
break;
case JAIL_SYS_NEW:
pr_flags |= pr_flag_jailsys[fi].new;
break;
case JAIL_SYS_INHERIT:
break;
default:
error = EINVAL;
goto done_free;
}
ch_flags |=
pr_flag_jailsys[fi].new | pr_flag_jailsys[fi].disable;
}
Back out r210974. Any convenience of not typing "persist" is outweighed by the possibility of unintended partially-formed jails.
2010-08-08 23:22:55 +00:00
if ((flags & (JAIL_CREATE | JAIL_UPDATE | JAIL_ATTACH)) == JAIL_CREATE
&& !(pr_flags & PR_PERSIST)) {
error = EINVAL;
vfs_opterror(opts, "new jail must persist or attach");
goto done_errmsg;
}
Manage vnets via the jail system. If a jail is given the boolean parameter "vnet" when it is created, a new vnet instance will be created along with the jail. Networks interfaces can be moved between prisons with an ioctl similar to the one that moves them between vimages. For now vnets will co-exist under both jails and vimages, but soon struct vimage will be going away. Reviewed by: zec, julian Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-15 18:59:29 +00:00
#ifdef VIMAGE
if ((flags & JAIL_UPDATE) && (ch_flags & PR_VNET)) {
error = EINVAL;
vfs_opterror(opts, "vnet cannot be changed after creation");
goto done_errmsg;
}
#endif
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
#ifdef INET
if ((flags & JAIL_UPDATE) && (ch_flags & PR_IP4_USER)) {
error = EINVAL;
vfs_opterror(opts, "ip4 cannot be changed after creation");
goto done_errmsg;
}
#endif
#ifdef INET6
if ((flags & JAIL_UPDATE) && (ch_flags & PR_IP6_USER)) {
error = EINVAL;
vfs_opterror(opts, "ip6 cannot be changed after creation");
goto done_errmsg;
}
#endif
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
pr_allow = ch_allow = 0;
for (fi = 0; fi < sizeof(pr_allow_names) / sizeof(pr_allow_names[0]);
fi++) {
vfs_flagopt(opts, pr_allow_names[fi], &pr_allow, 1 << fi);
vfs_flagopt(opts, pr_allow_nonames[fi], &ch_allow, 1 << fi);
}
ch_allow |= pr_allow;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
error = vfs_getopt(opts, "name", (void **)&name, &len);
if (error == ENOENT)
name = NULL;
else if (error != 0)
goto done_free;
else {
if (len == 0 || name[len - 1] != '\0') {
error = EINVAL;
goto done_free;
}
if (len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) {
error = ENAMETOOLONG;
goto done_free;
}
}
error = vfs_getopt(opts, "host.hostname", (void **)&host, &len);
if (error == ENOENT)
host = NULL;
else if (error != 0)
goto done_free;
else {
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
ch_flags |= PR_HOST;
pr_flags |= PR_HOST;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (len == 0 || host[len - 1] != '\0') {
error = EINVAL;
goto done_free;
}
if (len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) {
error = ENAMETOOLONG;
goto done_free;
}
}
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
error = vfs_getopt(opts, "host.domainname", (void **)&domain, &len);
if (error == ENOENT)
domain = NULL;
else if (error != 0)
goto done_free;
else {
ch_flags |= PR_HOST;
pr_flags |= PR_HOST;
if (len == 0 || domain[len - 1] != '\0') {
error = EINVAL;
goto done_free;
}
if (len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) {
error = ENAMETOOLONG;
goto done_free;
}
}
error = vfs_getopt(opts, "host.hostuuid", (void **)&uuid, &len);
if (error == ENOENT)
uuid = NULL;
else if (error != 0)
goto done_free;
else {
ch_flags |= PR_HOST;
pr_flags |= PR_HOST;
if (len == 0 || uuid[len - 1] != '\0') {
error = EINVAL;
goto done_free;
}
if (len > HOSTUUIDLEN) {
error = ENAMETOOLONG;
goto done_free;
}
}
Provide groundwork for 32-bit binary compatibility on non-x86 platforms, for upcoming 64-bit PowerPC and MIPS support. This renames the COMPAT_IA32 option to COMPAT_FREEBSD32, removes some IA32-specific code from MI parts of the kernel and enhances the freebsd32 compatibility code to support big-endian platforms. Reviewed by: kib, jhb
2010-03-11 14:49:06 +00:00
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
Add macro to test the sv_flags of any process. Change some places to test the flags instead of explicit comparing with address of known sysentvec structures. MFC after: 1 month
2011-01-26 20:03:58 +00:00
if (SV_PROC_FLAG(td->td_proc, SV_ILP32)) {
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
uint32_t hid32;
error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "host.hostid", &hid32, sizeof(hid32));
hid = hid32;
} else
#endif
error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "host.hostid", &hid, sizeof(hid));
if (error == ENOENT)
gothid = 0;
else if (error != 0)
goto done_free;
else {
gothid = 1;
ch_flags |= PR_HOST;
pr_flags |= PR_HOST;
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
#ifdef INET
error = vfs_getopt(opts, "ip4.addr", &op, &ip4s);
if (error == ENOENT)
Some jail parameters (in particular, "ip4" and "ip6" for IP address restrictions) were found to be inadequately described by a boolean. Define a new parameter type with three values (disable, new, inherit) to handle these and future cases. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor) Discussed with: rwatson
2009-07-25 14:48:57 +00:00
ip4s = (pr_flags & PR_IP4_DISABLE) ? 0 : -1;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
else if (error != 0)
goto done_free;
else if (ip4s & (sizeof(*ip4) - 1)) {
error = EINVAL;
goto done_free;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
} else {
Some jail parameters (in particular, "ip4" and "ip6" for IP address restrictions) were found to be inadequately described by a boolean. Define a new parameter type with three values (disable, new, inherit) to handle these and future cases. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor) Discussed with: rwatson
2009-07-25 14:48:57 +00:00
ch_flags |= PR_IP4_USER | PR_IP4_DISABLE;
if (ip4s == 0)
pr_flags |= PR_IP4_USER | PR_IP4_DISABLE;
else {
pr_flags = (pr_flags & ~PR_IP4_DISABLE) | PR_IP4_USER;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
ip4s /= sizeof(*ip4);
if (ip4s > jail_max_af_ips) {
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
error = EINVAL;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
vfs_opterror(opts, "too many IPv4 addresses");
goto done_errmsg;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
ip4 = malloc(ip4s * sizeof(*ip4), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
bcopy(op, ip4, ip4s * sizeof(*ip4));
/*
* IP addresses are all sorted but ip[0] to preserve
* the primary IP address as given from userland.
* This special IP is used for unbound outgoing
Adjust a comment to reflect reality, as we have proper source address selection, even for IPv4, since r183571. Pointed out by: Jase Thew (bazerka beardz.net) MFC after: 3 days
2010-01-11 21:21:30 +00:00
* connections as well for "loopback" traffic in case
* source address selection cannot find any more fitting
* address to connect from.
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
*/
if (ip4s > 1)
qsort(ip4 + 1, ip4s - 1, sizeof(*ip4), qcmp_v4);
/*
* Check for duplicate addresses and do some simple
* zero and broadcast checks. If users give other bogus
* addresses it is their problem.
*
* We do not have to care about byte order for these
* checks so we will do them in NBO.
*/
for (ii = 0; ii < ip4s; ii++) {
if (ip4[ii].s_addr == INADDR_ANY ||
ip4[ii].s_addr == INADDR_BROADCAST) {
error = EINVAL;
goto done_free;
}
if ((ii+1) < ip4s &&
(ip4[0].s_addr == ip4[ii+1].s_addr ||
ip4[ii].s_addr == ip4[ii+1].s_addr)) {
error = EINVAL;
goto done_free;
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#endif
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#ifdef INET6
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
error = vfs_getopt(opts, "ip6.addr", &op, &ip6s);
if (error == ENOENT)
Some jail parameters (in particular, "ip4" and "ip6" for IP address restrictions) were found to be inadequately described by a boolean. Define a new parameter type with three values (disable, new, inherit) to handle these and future cases. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor) Discussed with: rwatson
2009-07-25 14:48:57 +00:00
ip6s = (pr_flags & PR_IP6_DISABLE) ? 0 : -1;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
else if (error != 0)
goto done_free;
else if (ip6s & (sizeof(*ip6) - 1)) {
error = EINVAL;
goto done_free;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
} else {
Some jail parameters (in particular, "ip4" and "ip6" for IP address restrictions) were found to be inadequately described by a boolean. Define a new parameter type with three values (disable, new, inherit) to handle these and future cases. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor) Discussed with: rwatson
2009-07-25 14:48:57 +00:00
ch_flags |= PR_IP6_USER | PR_IP6_DISABLE;
if (ip6s == 0)
pr_flags |= PR_IP6_USER | PR_IP6_DISABLE;
else {
pr_flags = (pr_flags & ~PR_IP6_DISABLE) | PR_IP6_USER;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
ip6s /= sizeof(*ip6);
if (ip6s > jail_max_af_ips) {
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
error = EINVAL;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
vfs_opterror(opts, "too many IPv6 addresses");
goto done_errmsg;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
ip6 = malloc(ip6s * sizeof(*ip6), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
bcopy(op, ip6, ip6s * sizeof(*ip6));
if (ip6s > 1)
qsort(ip6 + 1, ip6s - 1, sizeof(*ip6), qcmp_v6);
for (ii = 0; ii < ip6s; ii++) {
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&ip6[ii])) {
error = EINVAL;
goto done_free;
}
if ((ii+1) < ip6s &&
(IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ip6[0], &ip6[ii+1]) ||
IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ip6[ii], &ip6[ii+1])))
{
error = EINVAL;
goto done_free;
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#endif
Don't allow mixing the "vnet" and "ip4/6" jail parameters, since vnet jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:46:59 +00:00
#if defined(VIMAGE) && (defined(INET) || defined(INET6))
if ((ch_flags & PR_VNET) && (ch_flags & (PR_IP4_USER | PR_IP6_USER))) {
error = EINVAL;
vfs_opterror(opts,
"vnet jails cannot have IP address restrictions");
goto done_errmsg;
}
#endif
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
root = NULL;
error = vfs_getopt(opts, "path", (void **)&path, &len);
if (error == ENOENT)
path = NULL;
else if (error != 0)
goto done_free;
else {
if (flags & JAIL_UPDATE) {
error = EINVAL;
vfs_opterror(opts,
"path cannot be changed after creation");
goto done_errmsg;
}
if (len == 0 || path[len - 1] != '\0') {
error = EINVAL;
goto done_free;
}
if (len < 2 || (len == 2 && path[0] == '/'))
path = NULL;
else {
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/* Leave room for a real-root full pathname. */
if (len + (path[0] == '/' && strcmp(mypr->pr_path, "/")
? strlen(mypr->pr_path) : 0) > MAXPATHLEN) {
error = ENAMETOOLONG;
goto done_free;
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, MPSAFE | FOLLOW, UIO_SYSSPACE,
path, td);
error = namei(&nd);
if (error)
goto done_free;
vfslocked = NDHASGIANT(&nd);
root = nd.ni_vp;
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
if (root->v_type != VDIR) {
error = ENOTDIR;
vrele(root);
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
goto done_free;
}
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
}
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/*
* Grab the allprison lock before letting modules check their
* parameters. Once we have it, do not let go so we'll have a
* consistent view of the OSD list.
*/
sx_xlock(&allprison_lock);
error = osd_jail_call(NULL, PR_METHOD_CHECK, opts);
if (error)
goto done_unlock_list;
/* By now, all parameters should have been noted. */
TAILQ_FOREACH(opt, opts, link) {
if (!opt->seen && strcmp(opt->name, "errmsg")) {
error = EINVAL;
vfs_opterror(opts, "unknown parameter: %s", opt->name);
goto done_unlock_list;
}
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
/*
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
* See if we are creating a new record or updating an existing one.
* This abuses the file error codes ENOENT and EEXIST.
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
*/
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
cuflags = flags & (JAIL_CREATE | JAIL_UPDATE);
if (!cuflags) {
error = EINVAL;
vfs_opterror(opts, "no valid operation (create or update)");
goto done_unlock_list;
}
pr = NULL;
Allow a jail's name to be the same as its jid (which is the default if no name is specified), but still disallow other numeric names. Reviewed by: zec Approved by: bz (mentor) MFC after: 3 days
2009-09-04 19:00:48 +00:00
namelc = NULL;
if (cuflags == JAIL_CREATE && jid == 0 && name != NULL) {
namelc = strrchr(name, '.');
jid = strtoul(namelc != NULL ? namelc + 1 : name, &p, 10);
if (*p != '\0')
jid = 0;
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (jid != 0) {
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/*
* See if a requested jid already exists. There is an
* information leak here if the jid exists but is not within
* the caller's jail hierarchy. Jail creators will get EEXIST
* even though they cannot see the jail, and CREATE | UPDATE
* will return ENOENT which is not normally a valid error.
*/
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (jid < 0) {
error = EINVAL;
vfs_opterror(opts, "negative jid");
goto done_unlock_list;
}
pr = prison_find(jid);
if (pr != NULL) {
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
ppr = pr->pr_parent;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/* Create: jid must not exist. */
if (cuflags == JAIL_CREATE) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
error = EEXIST;
vfs_opterror(opts, "jail %d already exists",
jid);
goto done_unlock_list;
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (!prison_ischild(mypr, pr)) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
pr = NULL;
} else if (pr->pr_uref == 0) {
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (!(flags & JAIL_DYING)) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
error = ENOENT;
vfs_opterror(opts, "jail %d is dying",
jid);
goto done_unlock_list;
} else if ((flags & JAIL_ATTACH) ||
(pr_flags & PR_PERSIST)) {
/*
* A dying jail might be resurrected
* (via attach or persist), but first
* it must determine if another jail
* has claimed its name. Accomplish
* this by implicitly re-setting the
* name.
*/
if (name == NULL)
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
name = prison_name(mypr, pr);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
}
}
if (pr == NULL) {
/* Update: jid must exist. */
if (cuflags == JAIL_UPDATE) {
error = ENOENT;
vfs_opterror(opts, "jail %d not found", jid);
goto done_unlock_list;
}
}
}
/*
* If the caller provided a name, look for a jail by that name.
* This has different semantics for creates and updates keyed by jid
* (where the name must not already exist in a different jail),
* and updates keyed by the name itself (where the name must exist
* because that is the jail being updated).
*/
if (name != NULL) {
Allow a jail's name to be the same as its jid (which is the default if no name is specified), but still disallow other numeric names. Reviewed by: zec Approved by: bz (mentor) MFC after: 3 days
2009-09-04 19:00:48 +00:00
namelc = strrchr(name, '.');
if (namelc == NULL)
namelc = name;
else {
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/*
* This is a hierarchical name. Split it into the
* parent and child names, and make sure the parent
* exists or matches an already found jail.
*/
Allow a jail's name to be the same as its jid (which is the default if no name is specified), but still disallow other numeric names. Reviewed by: zec Approved by: bz (mentor) MFC after: 3 days
2009-09-04 19:00:48 +00:00
*namelc = '\0';
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (pr != NULL) {
Allow a jail's name to be the same as its jid (which is the default if no name is specified), but still disallow other numeric names. Reviewed by: zec Approved by: bz (mentor) MFC after: 3 days
2009-09-04 19:00:48 +00:00
if (strncmp(name, ppr->pr_name, namelc - name)
|| ppr->pr_name[namelc - name] != '\0') {
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
error = EINVAL;
vfs_opterror(opts,
"cannot change jail's parent");
goto done_unlock_list;
}
} else {
ppr = prison_find_name(mypr, name);
if (ppr == NULL) {
error = ENOENT;
vfs_opterror(opts,
"jail \"%s\" not found", name);
goto done_unlock_list;
}
mtx_unlock(&ppr->pr_mtx);
}
Allow a jail's name to be the same as its jid (which is the default if no name is specified), but still disallow other numeric names. Reviewed by: zec Approved by: bz (mentor) MFC after: 3 days
2009-09-04 19:00:48 +00:00
name = ++namelc;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (name[0] != '\0') {
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
namelen =
(ppr == &prison0) ? 0 : strlen(ppr->pr_name) + 1;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
name_again:
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
deadpr = NULL;
FOREACH_PRISON_CHILD(ppr, tpr) {
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (tpr != pr && tpr->pr_ref > 0 &&
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
!strcmp(tpr->pr_name + namelen, name)) {
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (pr == NULL &&
cuflags != JAIL_CREATE) {
mtx_lock(&tpr->pr_mtx);
if (tpr->pr_ref > 0) {
/*
* Use this jail
* for updates.
*/
if (tpr->pr_uref > 0) {
pr = tpr;
break;
}
deadpr = tpr;
}
mtx_unlock(&tpr->pr_mtx);
} else if (tpr->pr_uref > 0) {
/*
* Create, or update(jid):
* name must not exist in an
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
* active sibling jail.
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
*/
error = EEXIST;
if (pr != NULL)
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
vfs_opterror(opts,
"jail \"%s\" already exists",
name);
goto done_unlock_list;
}
}
}
/* If no active jail is found, use a dying one. */
if (deadpr != NULL && pr == NULL) {
if (flags & JAIL_DYING) {
mtx_lock(&deadpr->pr_mtx);
if (deadpr->pr_ref == 0) {
mtx_unlock(&deadpr->pr_mtx);
goto name_again;
}
pr = deadpr;
} else if (cuflags == JAIL_UPDATE) {
error = ENOENT;
vfs_opterror(opts,
"jail \"%s\" is dying", name);
goto done_unlock_list;
}
}
/* Update: name must exist if no jid. */
else if (cuflags == JAIL_UPDATE && pr == NULL) {
error = ENOENT;
vfs_opterror(opts, "jail \"%s\" not found",
name);
goto done_unlock_list;
}
}
}
/* Update: must provide a jid or name. */
else if (cuflags == JAIL_UPDATE && pr == NULL) {
error = ENOENT;
vfs_opterror(opts, "update specified no jail");
goto done_unlock_list;
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/* If there's no prison to update, create a new one and link it in. */
if (pr == NULL) {
Add a limit for child jails via the "children.cur" and "children.max" parameters. This replaces the simple "allow.jails" permission. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-23 20:35:51 +00:00
for (tpr = mypr; tpr != NULL; tpr = tpr->pr_parent)
if (tpr->pr_childcount >= tpr->pr_childmax) {
error = EPERM;
vfs_opterror(opts, "prison limit exceeded");
goto done_unlock_list;
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
created = 1;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
mtx_lock(&ppr->pr_mtx);
if (ppr->pr_ref == 0 || (ppr->pr_flags & PR_REMOVE)) {
mtx_unlock(&ppr->pr_mtx);
error = ENOENT;
vfs_opterror(opts, "parent jail went away!");
goto done_unlock_list;
}
ppr->pr_ref++;
ppr->pr_uref++;
mtx_unlock(&ppr->pr_mtx);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
pr = malloc(sizeof(*pr), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
if (jid == 0) {
/* Find the next free jid. */
jid = lastprid + 1;
findnext:
if (jid == JAIL_MAX)
jid = 1;
TAILQ_FOREACH(tpr, &allprison, pr_list) {
if (tpr->pr_id < jid)
continue;
if (tpr->pr_id > jid || tpr->pr_ref == 0) {
TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE(tpr, pr, pr_list);
break;
}
if (jid == lastprid) {
error = EAGAIN;
vfs_opterror(opts,
"no available jail IDs");
free(pr, M_PRISON);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
prison_deref(ppr, PD_DEREF |
PD_DEUREF | PD_LIST_XLOCKED);
goto done_releroot;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
jid++;
goto findnext;
}
lastprid = jid;
} else {
/*
* The jail already has a jid (that did not yet exist),
* so just find where to insert it.
*/
TAILQ_FOREACH(tpr, &allprison, pr_list)
if (tpr->pr_id >= jid) {
TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE(tpr, pr, pr_list);
break;
}
}
if (tpr == NULL)
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&allprison, pr, pr_list);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&ppr->pr_children, pr, pr_sibling);
for (tpr = ppr; tpr != NULL; tpr = tpr->pr_parent)
Add a limit for child jails via the "children.cur" and "children.max" parameters. This replaces the simple "allow.jails" permission. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-23 20:35:51 +00:00
tpr->pr_childcount++;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
pr->pr_parent = ppr;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
pr->pr_id = jid;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/* Set some default values, and inherit some from the parent. */
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (name == NULL)
name = "";
if (path == NULL) {
path = "/";
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
root = mypr->pr_root;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
vref(root);
}
Change the default value of the "ip4" and "ip6" jail parameters to "disable", which only allows access to the parent/physical system's IP addresses when specifically directed. Change the default value of "host" to "new", and don't copy the parent host values, to insulate jails from the parent hostname et al. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:41:02 +00:00
strlcpy(pr->pr_hostuuid, DEFAULT_HOSTUUID, HOSTUUIDLEN);
pr->pr_flags |= PR_HOST;
Don't allow mixing the "vnet" and "ip4/6" jail parameters, since vnet jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:46:59 +00:00
#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6)
#ifdef VIMAGE
if (!(pr_flags & PR_VNET))
#endif
{
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
#ifdef INET
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
if (!(ch_flags & PR_IP4_USER))
pr->pr_flags |=
PR_IP4 | PR_IP4_USER | PR_IP4_DISABLE;
else if (!(pr_flags & PR_IP4_USER)) {
pr->pr_flags |= ppr->pr_flags & PR_IP4;
if (ppr->pr_ip4 != NULL) {
pr->pr_ip4s = ppr->pr_ip4s;
pr->pr_ip4 = malloc(pr->pr_ip4s *
sizeof(struct in_addr), M_PRISON,
M_WAITOK);
bcopy(ppr->pr_ip4, pr->pr_ip4,
pr->pr_ip4s * sizeof(*pr->pr_ip4));
}
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
#endif
#ifdef INET6
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
if (!(ch_flags & PR_IP6_USER))
pr->pr_flags |=
PR_IP6 | PR_IP6_USER | PR_IP6_DISABLE;
else if (!(pr_flags & PR_IP6_USER)) {
pr->pr_flags |= ppr->pr_flags & PR_IP6;
if (ppr->pr_ip6 != NULL) {
pr->pr_ip6s = ppr->pr_ip6s;
pr->pr_ip6 = malloc(pr->pr_ip6s *
sizeof(struct in6_addr), M_PRISON,
M_WAITOK);
bcopy(ppr->pr_ip6, pr->pr_ip6,
pr->pr_ip6s * sizeof(*pr->pr_ip6));
}
}
Don't allow mixing the "vnet" and "ip4/6" jail parameters, since vnet jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:46:59 +00:00
#endif
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
#endif
Add ip4.saddrsel/ip4.nosaddrsel (and equivalent for ip6) to control whether to use source address selection (default) or the primary jail address for unbound outgoing connections. This is intended to be used by people upgrading from single-IP jails to multi-IP jails but not having to change firewall rules, application ACLs, ... but to force their connections (unless otherwise changed) to the primry jail IP they had been used for years, as well as for people prefering to implement similar policies. Note that for IPv6, if configured incorrectly, this might lead to scope violations, which single-IPv6 jails could as well, as by the design of jails. [1] Reviewed by: jamie, hrs (ipv6 part) Pointed out by: hrs [1] MFC After: 2 weeks Asked for by: Jase Thew (bazerka beardz.net)
2010-01-17 12:57:11 +00:00
/* Source address selection is always on by default. */
pr->pr_flags |= _PR_IP_SADDRSEL;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
pr->pr_securelevel = ppr->pr_securelevel;
pr->pr_allow = JAIL_DEFAULT_ALLOW & ppr->pr_allow;
Make the "enforce_statfs" default 2 (most restrictive) in jail_set(2), instead of whatever the parent/system has (which is generally 0). This mirrors the old-style default used for jail(2) in conjunction with the security.jail.enforce_statfs sysctl. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-31 16:00:41 +00:00
pr->pr_enforce_statfs = JAIL_DEFAULT_ENFORCE_STATFS;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
LIST_INIT(&pr->pr_children);
mtx_init(&pr->pr_mtx, "jail mutex", NULL, MTX_DEF | MTX_DUPOK);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Manage vnets via the jail system. If a jail is given the boolean parameter "vnet" when it is created, a new vnet instance will be created along with the jail. Networks interfaces can be moved between prisons with an ioctl similar to the one that moves them between vimages. For now vnets will co-exist under both jails and vimages, but soon struct vimage will be going away. Reviewed by: zec, julian Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-15 18:59:29 +00:00
#ifdef VIMAGE
/* Allocate a new vnet if specified. */
pr->pr_vnet = (pr_flags & PR_VNET)
? vnet_alloc() : ppr->pr_vnet;
#endif
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
/*
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
* Allocate a dedicated cpuset for each jail.
* Unlike other initial settings, this may return an erorr.
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
*/
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
error = cpuset_create_root(ppr, &pr->pr_cpuset);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (error) {
prison_deref(pr, PD_LIST_XLOCKED);
goto done_releroot;
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
/*
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
* New prisons do not yet have a reference, because we do not
* want other to see the incomplete prison once the
* allprison_lock is downgraded.
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
*/
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
} else {
created = 0;
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
/*
* Grab a reference for existing prisons, to ensure they
* continue to exist for the duration of the call.
*/
pr->pr_ref++;
Don't allow mixing the "vnet" and "ip4/6" jail parameters, since vnet jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:46:59 +00:00
#if defined(VIMAGE) && (defined(INET) || defined(INET6))
if ((pr->pr_flags & PR_VNET) &&
(ch_flags & (PR_IP4_USER | PR_IP6_USER))) {
error = EINVAL;
vfs_opterror(opts,
"vnet jails cannot have IP address restrictions");
goto done_deref_locked;
}
#endif
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
#ifdef INET
if (PR_IP4_USER & ch_flags & (pr_flags ^ pr->pr_flags)) {
error = EINVAL;
vfs_opterror(opts,
"ip4 cannot be changed after creation");
goto done_deref_locked;
}
#endif
#ifdef INET6
if (PR_IP6_USER & ch_flags & (pr_flags ^ pr->pr_flags)) {
error = EINVAL;
vfs_opterror(opts,
"ip6 cannot be changed after creation");
goto done_deref_locked;
}
#endif
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/* Do final error checking before setting anything. */
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (gotslevel) {
if (slevel < ppr->pr_securelevel) {
error = EPERM;
goto done_deref_locked;
}
}
Add a limit for child jails via the "children.cur" and "children.max" parameters. This replaces the simple "allow.jails" permission. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-23 20:35:51 +00:00
if (gotchildmax) {
if (childmax >= ppr->pr_childmax) {
error = EPERM;
goto done_deref_locked;
}
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (gotenforce) {
if (enforce < ppr->pr_enforce_statfs) {
error = EPERM;
goto done_deref_locked;
}
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
#ifdef INET
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
if (ip4s > 0) {
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (ppr->pr_flags & PR_IP4) {
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
/*
* Make sure the new set of IP addresses is a
* subset of the parent's list. Don't worry
* about the parent being unlocked, as any
* setting is done with allprison_lock held.
*/
for (ij = 0; ij < ppr->pr_ip4s; ij++)
if (ip4[0].s_addr == ppr->pr_ip4[ij].s_addr)
break;
if (ij == ppr->pr_ip4s) {
error = EPERM;
goto done_deref_locked;
}
if (ip4s > 1) {
for (ii = ij = 1; ii < ip4s; ii++) {
if (ip4[ii].s_addr ==
ppr->pr_ip4[0].s_addr)
continue;
for (; ij < ppr->pr_ip4s; ij++)
if (ip4[ii].s_addr ==
ppr->pr_ip4[ij].s_addr)
break;
if (ij == ppr->pr_ip4s)
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
break;
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (ij == ppr->pr_ip4s) {
error = EPERM;
goto done_deref_locked;
}
}
}
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
/*
* Check for conflicting IP addresses. We permit them
* if there is no more than one IP on each jail. If
* there is a duplicate on a jail with more than one
* IP stop checking and return error.
*/
tppr = ppr;
Don't allow mixing the "vnet" and "ip4/6" jail parameters, since vnet jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:46:59 +00:00
#ifdef VIMAGE
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
for (; tppr != &prison0; tppr = tppr->pr_parent)
if (tppr->pr_flags & PR_VNET)
break;
Don't allow mixing the "vnet" and "ip4/6" jail parameters, since vnet jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:46:59 +00:00
#endif
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT(tppr, tpr, descend) {
if (tpr == pr ||
Don't allow mixing the "vnet" and "ip4/6" jail parameters, since vnet jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:46:59 +00:00
#ifdef VIMAGE
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
(tpr != tppr && (tpr->pr_flags & PR_VNET)) ||
Don't allow mixing the "vnet" and "ip4/6" jail parameters, since vnet jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:46:59 +00:00
#endif
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
tpr->pr_uref == 0) {
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
descend = 0;
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
continue;
}
if (!(tpr->pr_flags & PR_IP4_USER))
continue;
descend = 0;
if (tpr->pr_ip4 == NULL ||
(ip4s == 1 && tpr->pr_ip4s == 1))
continue;
for (ii = 0; ii < ip4s; ii++) {
if (_prison_check_ip4(tpr, &ip4[ii]) == 0) {
error = EADDRINUSE;
vfs_opterror(opts,
"IPv4 addresses clash");
goto done_deref_locked;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
}
}
}
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#endif
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
#ifdef INET6
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
if (ip6s > 0) {
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (ppr->pr_flags & PR_IP6) {
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
/*
* Make sure the new set of IP addresses is a
* subset of the parent's list.
*/
for (ij = 0; ij < ppr->pr_ip6s; ij++)
if (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ip6[0],
&ppr->pr_ip6[ij]))
break;
if (ij == ppr->pr_ip6s) {
error = EPERM;
goto done_deref_locked;
}
if (ip6s > 1) {
for (ii = ij = 1; ii < ip6s; ii++) {
if (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ip6[ii],
&ppr->pr_ip6[0]))
continue;
for (; ij < ppr->pr_ip6s; ij++)
if (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(
&ip6[ii], &ppr->pr_ip6[ij]))
break;
if (ij == ppr->pr_ip6s)
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
break;
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (ij == ppr->pr_ip6s) {
error = EPERM;
goto done_deref_locked;
}
}
}
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
/* Check for conflicting IP addresses. */
tppr = ppr;
Don't allow mixing the "vnet" and "ip4/6" jail parameters, since vnet jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:46:59 +00:00
#ifdef VIMAGE
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
for (; tppr != &prison0; tppr = tppr->pr_parent)
if (tppr->pr_flags & PR_VNET)
break;
Don't allow mixing the "vnet" and "ip4/6" jail parameters, since vnet jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:46:59 +00:00
#endif
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT(tppr, tpr, descend) {
if (tpr == pr ||
Don't allow mixing the "vnet" and "ip4/6" jail parameters, since vnet jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:46:59 +00:00
#ifdef VIMAGE
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
(tpr != tppr && (tpr->pr_flags & PR_VNET)) ||
Don't allow mixing the "vnet" and "ip4/6" jail parameters, since vnet jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:46:59 +00:00
#endif
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
tpr->pr_uref == 0) {
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
descend = 0;
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
continue;
}
if (!(tpr->pr_flags & PR_IP6_USER))
continue;
descend = 0;
if (tpr->pr_ip6 == NULL ||
(ip6s == 1 && tpr->pr_ip6s == 1))
continue;
for (ii = 0; ii < ip6s; ii++) {
if (_prison_check_ip6(tpr, &ip6[ii]) == 0) {
error = EADDRINUSE;
vfs_opterror(opts,
"IPv6 addresses clash");
goto done_deref_locked;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
}
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
#endif
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
onamelen = namelen = 0;
if (name != NULL) {
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/* Give a default name of the jid. */
if (name[0] == '\0')
snprintf(name = numbuf, sizeof(numbuf), "%d", jid);
Allow a jail's name to be the same as its jid (which is the default if no name is specified), but still disallow other numeric names. Reviewed by: zec Approved by: bz (mentor) MFC after: 3 days
2009-09-04 19:00:48 +00:00
else if (*namelc == '0' || (strtoul(namelc, &p, 10) != jid &&
*p == '\0')) {
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
error = EINVAL;
Allow a jail's name to be the same as its jid (which is the default if no name is specified), but still disallow other numeric names. Reviewed by: zec Approved by: bz (mentor) MFC after: 3 days
2009-09-04 19:00:48 +00:00
vfs_opterror(opts,
"name cannot be numeric (unless it is the jid)");
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
goto done_deref_locked;
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/*
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
* Make sure the name isn't too long for the prison or its
* children.
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
*/
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
onamelen = strlen(pr->pr_name);
namelen = strlen(name);
if (strlen(ppr->pr_name) + namelen + 2 > sizeof(pr->pr_name)) {
error = ENAMETOOLONG;
goto done_deref_locked;
}
FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT(pr, tpr, descend) {
if (strlen(tpr->pr_name) + (namelen - onamelen) >=
sizeof(pr->pr_name)) {
error = ENAMETOOLONG;
goto done_deref_locked;
}
}
}
if (pr_allow & ~ppr->pr_allow) {
error = EPERM;
goto done_deref_locked;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/* Set the parameters of the prison. */
#ifdef INET
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
redo_ip4 = 0;
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
if (pr_flags & PR_IP4_USER) {
pr->pr_flags |= PR_IP4;
free(pr->pr_ip4, M_PRISON);
pr->pr_ip4s = ip4s;
pr->pr_ip4 = ip4;
ip4 = NULL;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) {
Don't allow mixing the "vnet" and "ip4/6" jail parameters, since vnet jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:46:59 +00:00
#ifdef VIMAGE
if (tpr->pr_flags & PR_VNET) {
descend = 0;
continue;
}
#endif
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (prison_restrict_ip4(tpr, NULL)) {
redo_ip4 = 1;
descend = 0;
}
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
#endif
#ifdef INET6
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
redo_ip6 = 0;
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
if (pr_flags & PR_IP6_USER) {
pr->pr_flags |= PR_IP6;
free(pr->pr_ip6, M_PRISON);
pr->pr_ip6s = ip6s;
pr->pr_ip6 = ip6;
ip6 = NULL;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) {
Don't allow mixing the "vnet" and "ip4/6" jail parameters, since vnet jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:46:59 +00:00
#ifdef VIMAGE
if (tpr->pr_flags & PR_VNET) {
descend = 0;
continue;
}
#endif
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (prison_restrict_ip6(tpr, NULL)) {
redo_ip6 = 1;
descend = 0;
}
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
#endif
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (gotslevel) {
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
pr->pr_securelevel = slevel;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/* Set all child jails to be at least this level. */
FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend)
if (tpr->pr_securelevel < slevel)
tpr->pr_securelevel = slevel;
}
Add a limit for child jails via the "children.cur" and "children.max" parameters. This replaces the simple "allow.jails" permission. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-23 20:35:51 +00:00
if (gotchildmax) {
pr->pr_childmax = childmax;
/* Set all child jails to under this limit. */
FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED_LEVEL(pr, tpr, descend, level)
if (tpr->pr_childmax > childmax - level)
tpr->pr_childmax = childmax > level
? childmax - level : 0;
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (gotenforce) {
pr->pr_enforce_statfs = enforce;
/* Pass this restriction on to the children. */
FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend)
if (tpr->pr_enforce_statfs < enforce)
tpr->pr_enforce_statfs = enforce;
}
if (name != NULL) {
if (ppr == &prison0)
strlcpy(pr->pr_name, name, sizeof(pr->pr_name));
else
snprintf(pr->pr_name, sizeof(pr->pr_name), "%s.%s",
ppr->pr_name, name);
/* Change this component of child names. */
FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) {
bcopy(tpr->pr_name + onamelen, tpr->pr_name + namelen,
strlen(tpr->pr_name + onamelen) + 1);
bcopy(pr->pr_name, tpr->pr_name, namelen);
}
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (path != NULL) {
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/* Try to keep a real-rooted full pathname. */
if (path[0] == '/' && strcmp(mypr->pr_path, "/"))
snprintf(pr->pr_path, sizeof(pr->pr_path), "%s%s",
mypr->pr_path, path);
else
strlcpy(pr->pr_path, path, sizeof(pr->pr_path));
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
pr->pr_root = root;
}
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
if (PR_HOST & ch_flags & ~pr_flags) {
if (pr->pr_flags & PR_HOST) {
/*
* Copy the parent's host info. As with pr_ip4 above,
* the lack of a lock on the parent is not a problem;
* it is always set with allprison_lock at least
* shared, and is held exclusively here.
*/
Rename the host-related prison fields to be the same as the host.* parameters they represent, and the variables they replaced, instead of abbreviated versions of them. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-13 15:39:12 +00:00
strlcpy(pr->pr_hostname, pr->pr_parent->pr_hostname,
sizeof(pr->pr_hostname));
strlcpy(pr->pr_domainname, pr->pr_parent->pr_domainname,
sizeof(pr->pr_domainname));
strlcpy(pr->pr_hostuuid, pr->pr_parent->pr_hostuuid,
sizeof(pr->pr_hostuuid));
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
pr->pr_hostid = pr->pr_parent->pr_hostid;
}
} else if (host != NULL || domain != NULL || uuid != NULL || gothid) {
/* Set this prison, and any descendants without PR_HOST. */
if (host != NULL)
Rename the host-related prison fields to be the same as the host.* parameters they represent, and the variables they replaced, instead of abbreviated versions of them. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-13 15:39:12 +00:00
strlcpy(pr->pr_hostname, host, sizeof(pr->pr_hostname));
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
if (domain != NULL)
Rename the host-related prison fields to be the same as the host.* parameters they represent, and the variables they replaced, instead of abbreviated versions of them. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-13 15:39:12 +00:00
strlcpy(pr->pr_domainname, domain,
sizeof(pr->pr_domainname));
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
if (uuid != NULL)
Rename the host-related prison fields to be the same as the host.* parameters they represent, and the variables they replaced, instead of abbreviated versions of them. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-13 15:39:12 +00:00
strlcpy(pr->pr_hostuuid, uuid, sizeof(pr->pr_hostuuid));
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
if (gothid)
pr->pr_hostid = hid;
FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) {
if (tpr->pr_flags & PR_HOST)
descend = 0;
else {
if (host != NULL)
Rename the host-related prison fields to be the same as the host.* parameters they represent, and the variables they replaced, instead of abbreviated versions of them. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-13 15:39:12 +00:00
strlcpy(tpr->pr_hostname,
pr->pr_hostname,
sizeof(tpr->pr_hostname));
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
if (domain != NULL)
Rename the host-related prison fields to be the same as the host.* parameters they represent, and the variables they replaced, instead of abbreviated versions of them. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-13 15:39:12 +00:00
strlcpy(tpr->pr_domainname,
pr->pr_domainname,
sizeof(tpr->pr_domainname));
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
if (uuid != NULL)
Rename the host-related prison fields to be the same as the host.* parameters they represent, and the variables they replaced, instead of abbreviated versions of them. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-13 15:39:12 +00:00
strlcpy(tpr->pr_hostuuid,
pr->pr_hostuuid,
sizeof(tpr->pr_hostuuid));
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
if (gothid)
tpr->pr_hostid = hid;
}
}
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if ((tallow = ch_allow & ~pr_allow)) {
/* Clear allow bits in all children. */
FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend)
tpr->pr_allow &= ~tallow;
}
pr->pr_allow = (pr->pr_allow & ~ch_allow) | pr_allow;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/*
* Persistent prisons get an extra reference, and prisons losing their
* persist flag lose that reference. Only do this for existing prisons
* for now, so new ones will remain unseen until after the module
* handlers have completed.
*/
if (!created && (ch_flags & PR_PERSIST & (pr_flags ^ pr->pr_flags))) {
if (pr_flags & PR_PERSIST) {
pr->pr_ref++;
pr->pr_uref++;
} else {
pr->pr_ref--;
pr->pr_uref--;
}
}
pr->pr_flags = (pr->pr_flags & ~ch_flags) | pr_flags;
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Change the way rctl interfaces with jails by introducing prison_racct structure, which acts as a proxy between them. This makes jail rules persistent, i.e. they can be added before jail gets created, and they don't disappear when the jail gets destroyed.
2011-05-03 07:32:58 +00:00
#ifdef RACCT
if (created)
prison_racct_attach(pr);
#endif
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/* Locks may have prevented a complete restriction of child IP
* addresses. If so, allocate some more memory and try again.
*/
#ifdef INET
while (redo_ip4) {
ip4s = pr->pr_ip4s;
ip4 = malloc(ip4s * sizeof(*ip4), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK);
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
redo_ip4 = 0;
FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) {
Don't allow mixing the "vnet" and "ip4/6" jail parameters, since vnet jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:46:59 +00:00
#ifdef VIMAGE
if (tpr->pr_flags & PR_VNET) {
descend = 0;
continue;
}
#endif
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (prison_restrict_ip4(tpr, ip4)) {
if (ip4 != NULL)
ip4 = NULL;
else
redo_ip4 = 1;
}
}
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
}
#endif
#ifdef INET6
while (redo_ip6) {
ip6s = pr->pr_ip6s;
ip6 = malloc(ip6s * sizeof(*ip6), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK);
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
redo_ip6 = 0;
FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) {
Don't allow mixing the "vnet" and "ip4/6" jail parameters, since vnet jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:46:59 +00:00
#ifdef VIMAGE
if (tpr->pr_flags & PR_VNET) {
descend = 0;
continue;
}
#endif
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (prison_restrict_ip6(tpr, ip6)) {
if (ip6 != NULL)
ip6 = NULL;
else
redo_ip6 = 1;
}
}
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
}
#endif
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/* Let the modules do their work. */
sx_downgrade(&allprison_lock);
if (created) {
error = osd_jail_call(pr, PR_METHOD_CREATE, opts);
if (error) {
prison_deref(pr, PD_LIST_SLOCKED);
goto done_errmsg;
}
}
error = osd_jail_call(pr, PR_METHOD_SET, opts);
if (error) {
prison_deref(pr, created
? PD_LIST_SLOCKED
: PD_DEREF | PD_LIST_SLOCKED);
goto done_errmsg;
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/* Attach this process to the prison if requested. */
if (flags & JAIL_ATTACH) {
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
error = do_jail_attach(td, pr);
if (error) {
vfs_opterror(opts, "attach failed");
if (!created)
prison_deref(pr, PD_DEREF);
goto done_errmsg;
}
}
/*
* Now that it is all there, drop the temporary reference from existing
* prisons. Or add a reference to newly created persistent prisons
* (which was not done earlier so that the prison would not be publicly
* visible).
*/
if (!created) {
prison_deref(pr, (flags & JAIL_ATTACH)
? PD_DEREF
: PD_DEREF | PD_LIST_SLOCKED);
} else {
if (pr_flags & PR_PERSIST) {
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
pr->pr_ref++;
pr->pr_uref++;
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
}
if (!(flags & JAIL_ATTACH))
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
}
td->td_retval[0] = pr->pr_id;
goto done_errmsg;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
done_deref_locked:
prison_deref(pr, created
? PD_LOCKED | PD_LIST_XLOCKED
: PD_DEREF | PD_LOCKED | PD_LIST_XLOCKED);
goto done_releroot;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
done_unlock_list:
sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock);
done_releroot:
if (root != NULL) {
vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(root->v_mount);
vrele(root);
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
}
done_errmsg:
if (error) {
vfs_getopt(opts, "errmsg", (void **)&errmsg, &errmsg_len);
if (errmsg_len > 0) {
errmsg_pos = 2 * vfs_getopt_pos(opts, "errmsg") + 1;
if (errmsg_pos > 0) {
if (optuio->uio_segflg == UIO_SYSSPACE)
bcopy(errmsg,
optuio->uio_iov[errmsg_pos].iov_base,
errmsg_len);
else
copyout(errmsg,
optuio->uio_iov[errmsg_pos].iov_base,
errmsg_len);
}
}
}
done_free:
#ifdef INET
free(ip4, M_PRISON);
#endif
#ifdef INET6
free(ip6, M_PRISON);
#endif
vfs_freeopts(opts);
return (error);
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/*
* struct jail_get_args {
* struct iovec *iovp;
* unsigned int iovcnt;
* int flags;
* };
*/
int
In order to maximize the re-usability of kernel code in user space this patch modifies makesyscalls.sh to prefix all of the non-compatibility calls (e.g. not linux_, freebsd32_) with sys_ and updates the kernel entry points and all places in the code that use them. It also fixes an additional name space collision between the kernel function psignal and the libc function of the same name by renaming the kernel psignal kern_psignal(). By introducing this change now we will ease future MFCs that change syscalls. Reviewed by: rwatson Approved by: re (bz)
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
sys_jail_get(struct thread *td, struct jail_get_args *uap)
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
{
struct uio *auio;
int error;
/* Check that we have an even number of iovecs. */
if (uap->iovcnt & 1)
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
return (EINVAL);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
error = copyinuio(uap->iovp, uap->iovcnt, &auio);
if (error)
return (error);
error = kern_jail_get(td, auio, uap->flags);
if (error == 0)
error = copyout(auio->uio_iov, uap->iovp,
uap->iovcnt * sizeof (struct iovec));
free(auio, M_IOV);
return (error);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
int
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
kern_jail_get(struct thread *td, struct uio *optuio, int flags)
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
{
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
struct prison *pr, *mypr;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
struct vfsopt *opt;
struct vfsoptlist *opts;
char *errmsg, *name;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
int error, errmsg_len, errmsg_pos, fi, i, jid, len, locked, pos;
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (flags & ~JAIL_GET_MASK)
return (EINVAL);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/* Get the parameter list. */
error = vfs_buildopts(optuio, &opts);
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
if (error)
- Catch up to the new ucred API. - Add proc locking to the jail() syscall. This mostly involved shuffling a few things around so that blockable things like malloc and copyin were performed before acquiring the lock and checking the existing ucred and then updating the ucred as one "atomic" change under the proc lock.
2001-10-11 23:39:43 +00:00
return (error);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
errmsg_pos = vfs_getopt_pos(opts, "errmsg");
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
mypr = td->td_ucred->cr_prison;
Delay an error message until the variable it uses gets initialized. Found with: Coverity Prevent(tm) CID: 4316 Reported by: trasz Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-23 16:13:26 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/*
* Find the prison specified by one of: lastjid, jid, name.
*/
sx_slock(&allprison_lock);
error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "lastjid", &jid, sizeof(jid));
if (error == 0) {
TAILQ_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) {
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (pr->pr_id > jid && prison_ischild(mypr, pr)) {
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
if (pr->pr_ref > 0 &&
(pr->pr_uref > 0 || (flags & JAIL_DYING)))
break;
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
}
}
if (pr != NULL)
goto found_prison;
error = ENOENT;
vfs_opterror(opts, "no jail after %d", jid);
goto done_unlock_list;
} else if (error != ENOENT)
goto done_unlock_list;
error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "jid", &jid, sizeof(jid));
if (error == 0) {
if (jid != 0) {
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
pr = prison_find_child(mypr, jid);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (pr != NULL) {
if (pr->pr_uref == 0 && !(flags & JAIL_DYING)) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
error = ENOENT;
vfs_opterror(opts, "jail %d is dying",
jid);
goto done_unlock_list;
}
goto found_prison;
}
error = ENOENT;
vfs_opterror(opts, "jail %d not found", jid);
goto done_unlock_list;
}
} else if (error != ENOENT)
goto done_unlock_list;
error = vfs_getopt(opts, "name", (void **)&name, &len);
if (error == 0) {
if (len == 0 || name[len - 1] != '\0') {
error = EINVAL;
goto done_unlock_list;
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
pr = prison_find_name(mypr, name);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (pr != NULL) {
if (pr->pr_uref == 0 && !(flags & JAIL_DYING)) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
error = ENOENT;
vfs_opterror(opts, "jail \"%s\" is dying",
name);
goto done_unlock_list;
}
goto found_prison;
}
error = ENOENT;
vfs_opterror(opts, "jail \"%s\" not found", name);
goto done_unlock_list;
} else if (error != ENOENT)
goto done_unlock_list;
vfs_opterror(opts, "no jail specified");
error = ENOENT;
goto done_unlock_list;
found_prison:
/* Get the parameters of the prison. */
pr->pr_ref++;
locked = PD_LOCKED;
td->td_retval[0] = pr->pr_id;
error = vfs_setopt(opts, "jid", &pr->pr_id, sizeof(pr->pr_id));
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
i = (pr->pr_parent == mypr) ? 0 : pr->pr_parent->pr_id;
error = vfs_setopt(opts, "parent", &i, sizeof(i));
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
error = vfs_setopts(opts, "name", prison_name(mypr, pr));
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
error = vfs_setopt(opts, "cpuset.id", &pr->pr_cpuset->cs_id,
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
sizeof(pr->pr_cpuset->cs_id));
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
error = vfs_setopts(opts, "path", prison_path(mypr, pr));
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
#ifdef INET
error = vfs_setopt_part(opts, "ip4.addr", pr->pr_ip4,
pr->pr_ip4s * sizeof(*pr->pr_ip4));
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
#endif
#ifdef INET6
error = vfs_setopt_part(opts, "ip6.addr", pr->pr_ip6,
pr->pr_ip6s * sizeof(*pr->pr_ip6));
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
#endif
error = vfs_setopt(opts, "securelevel", &pr->pr_securelevel,
sizeof(pr->pr_securelevel));
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
Add a limit for child jails via the "children.cur" and "children.max" parameters. This replaces the simple "allow.jails" permission. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-23 20:35:51 +00:00
error = vfs_setopt(opts, "children.cur", &pr->pr_childcount,
sizeof(pr->pr_childcount));
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
error = vfs_setopt(opts, "children.max", &pr->pr_childmax,
sizeof(pr->pr_childmax));
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
Rename the host-related prison fields to be the same as the host.* parameters they represent, and the variables they replaced, instead of abbreviated versions of them. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-13 15:39:12 +00:00
error = vfs_setopts(opts, "host.hostname", pr->pr_hostname);
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
Rename the host-related prison fields to be the same as the host.* parameters they represent, and the variables they replaced, instead of abbreviated versions of them. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-13 15:39:12 +00:00
error = vfs_setopts(opts, "host.domainname", pr->pr_domainname);
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
Rename the host-related prison fields to be the same as the host.* parameters they represent, and the variables they replaced, instead of abbreviated versions of them. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-13 15:39:12 +00:00
error = vfs_setopts(opts, "host.hostuuid", pr->pr_hostuuid);
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
Provide groundwork for 32-bit binary compatibility on non-x86 platforms, for upcoming 64-bit PowerPC and MIPS support. This renames the COMPAT_IA32 option to COMPAT_FREEBSD32, removes some IA32-specific code from MI parts of the kernel and enhances the freebsd32 compatibility code to support big-endian platforms. Reviewed by: kib, jhb
2010-03-11 14:49:06 +00:00
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
Add macro to test the sv_flags of any process. Change some places to test the flags instead of explicit comparing with address of known sysentvec structures. MFC after: 1 month
2011-01-26 20:03:58 +00:00
if (SV_PROC_FLAG(td->td_proc, SV_ILP32)) {
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
uint32_t hid32 = pr->pr_hostid;
error = vfs_setopt(opts, "host.hostid", &hid32, sizeof(hid32));
} else
#endif
error = vfs_setopt(opts, "host.hostid", &pr->pr_hostid,
sizeof(pr->pr_hostid));
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
error = vfs_setopt(opts, "enforce_statfs", &pr->pr_enforce_statfs,
sizeof(pr->pr_enforce_statfs));
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
for (fi = 0; fi < sizeof(pr_flag_names) / sizeof(pr_flag_names[0]);
fi++) {
if (pr_flag_names[fi] == NULL)
continue;
i = (pr->pr_flags & (1 << fi)) ? 1 : 0;
error = vfs_setopt(opts, pr_flag_names[fi], &i, sizeof(i));
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
i = !i;
error = vfs_setopt(opts, pr_flag_nonames[fi], &i, sizeof(i));
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
}
Some jail parameters (in particular, "ip4" and "ip6" for IP address restrictions) were found to be inadequately described by a boolean. Define a new parameter type with three values (disable, new, inherit) to handle these and future cases. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor) Discussed with: rwatson
2009-07-25 14:48:57 +00:00
for (fi = 0; fi < sizeof(pr_flag_jailsys) / sizeof(pr_flag_jailsys[0]);
fi++) {
i = pr->pr_flags &
(pr_flag_jailsys[fi].disable | pr_flag_jailsys[fi].new);
i = pr_flag_jailsys[fi].disable &&
(i == pr_flag_jailsys[fi].disable) ? JAIL_SYS_DISABLE
: (i == pr_flag_jailsys[fi].new) ? JAIL_SYS_NEW
: JAIL_SYS_INHERIT;
error =
vfs_setopt(opts, pr_flag_jailsys[fi].name, &i, sizeof(i));
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
for (fi = 0; fi < sizeof(pr_allow_names) / sizeof(pr_allow_names[0]);
fi++) {
if (pr_allow_names[fi] == NULL)
continue;
i = (pr->pr_allow & (1 << fi)) ? 1 : 0;
error = vfs_setopt(opts, pr_allow_names[fi], &i, sizeof(i));
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
i = !i;
error = vfs_setopt(opts, pr_allow_nonames[fi], &i, sizeof(i));
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
i = (pr->pr_uref == 0);
error = vfs_setopt(opts, "dying", &i, sizeof(i));
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
i = !i;
error = vfs_setopt(opts, "nodying", &i, sizeof(i));
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done_deref;
/* Get the module parameters. */
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
locked = 0;
error = osd_jail_call(pr, PR_METHOD_GET, opts);
- Catch up to the new ucred API. - Add proc locking to the jail() syscall. This mostly involved shuffling a few things around so that blockable things like malloc and copyin were performed before acquiring the lock and checking the existing ucred and then updating the ucred as one "atomic" change under the proc lock.
2001-10-11 23:39:43 +00:00
if (error)
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
goto done_deref;
prison_deref(pr, PD_DEREF | PD_LIST_SLOCKED);
/* By now, all parameters should have been noted. */
TAILQ_FOREACH(opt, opts, link) {
if (!opt->seen && strcmp(opt->name, "errmsg")) {
error = EINVAL;
vfs_opterror(opts, "unknown parameter: %s", opt->name);
goto done_errmsg;
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/* Write the fetched parameters back to userspace. */
error = 0;
TAILQ_FOREACH(opt, opts, link) {
if (opt->pos >= 0 && opt->pos != errmsg_pos) {
pos = 2 * opt->pos + 1;
optuio->uio_iov[pos].iov_len = opt->len;
if (opt->value != NULL) {
if (optuio->uio_segflg == UIO_SYSSPACE) {
bcopy(opt->value,
optuio->uio_iov[pos].iov_base,
opt->len);
} else {
error = copyout(opt->value,
optuio->uio_iov[pos].iov_base,
opt->len);
if (error)
break;
}
}
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
goto done_errmsg;
done_deref:
prison_deref(pr, locked | PD_DEREF | PD_LIST_SLOCKED);
goto done_errmsg;
done_unlock_list:
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
done_errmsg:
if (error && errmsg_pos >= 0) {
vfs_getopt(opts, "errmsg", (void **)&errmsg, &errmsg_len);
errmsg_pos = 2 * errmsg_pos + 1;
if (errmsg_len > 0) {
if (optuio->uio_segflg == UIO_SYSSPACE)
bcopy(errmsg,
optuio->uio_iov[errmsg_pos].iov_base,
errmsg_len);
else
copyout(errmsg,
optuio->uio_iov[errmsg_pos].iov_base,
errmsg_len);
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
vfs_freeopts(opts);
return (error);
}
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/*
* struct jail_remove_args {
* int jid;
* };
*/
int
In order to maximize the re-usability of kernel code in user space this patch modifies makesyscalls.sh to prefix all of the non-compatibility calls (e.g. not linux_, freebsd32_) with sys_ and updates the kernel entry points and all places in the code that use them. It also fixes an additional name space collision between the kernel function psignal and the libc function of the same name by renaming the kernel psignal kern_psignal(). By introducing this change now we will ease future MFCs that change syscalls. Reviewed by: rwatson Approved by: re (bz)
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
sys_jail_remove(struct thread *td, struct jail_remove_args *uap)
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
{
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
struct prison *pr, *cpr, *lpr, *tpr;
int descend, error;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_JAIL_REMOVE);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
if (error)
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
return (error);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Implement functionality I called 'jail services'. It may be used for external modules to attach some data to jail's in-kernel structure. - Change allprison_mtx mutex to allprison_sx sx(9) lock. We will need to call external functions while holding this lock, which may want to allocate memory. Make use of the fact that this is shared-exclusive lock and use shared version when possible. - Implement the following functions: prison_service_register() - registers a service that wants to be noticed when a jail is created and destroyed prison_service_deregister() - deregisters service prison_service_data_add() - adds service-specific data to the jail structure prison_service_data_get() - takes service-specific data from the jail structure prison_service_data_del() - removes service-specific data from the jail structure Reviewed by: rwatson
2007-04-05 23:19:13 +00:00
sx_xlock(&allprison_lock);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
pr = prison_find_child(td->td_ucred->cr_prison, uap->jid);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (pr == NULL) {
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
return (EINVAL);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/* Remove all descendants of this prison, then remove this prison. */
pr->pr_ref++;
pr->pr_flags |= PR_REMOVE;
if (!LIST_EMPTY(&pr->pr_children)) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
lpr = NULL;
FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT(pr, cpr, descend) {
mtx_lock(&cpr->pr_mtx);
if (cpr->pr_ref > 0) {
tpr = cpr;
cpr->pr_ref++;
cpr->pr_flags |= PR_REMOVE;
} else {
/* Already removed - do not do it again. */
tpr = NULL;
}
mtx_unlock(&cpr->pr_mtx);
if (lpr != NULL) {
mtx_lock(&lpr->pr_mtx);
prison_remove_one(lpr);
sx_xlock(&allprison_lock);
}
lpr = tpr;
}
if (lpr != NULL) {
mtx_lock(&lpr->pr_mtx);
prison_remove_one(lpr);
sx_xlock(&allprison_lock);
}
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
}
prison_remove_one(pr);
return (0);
}
static void
prison_remove_one(struct prison *pr)
{
struct proc *p;
int deuref;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/* If the prison was persistent, it is not anymore. */
deuref = 0;
if (pr->pr_flags & PR_PERSIST) {
pr->pr_ref--;
deuref = PD_DEUREF;
pr->pr_flags &= ~PR_PERSIST;
Revert rev. 178124 as requested by kris@. Having jail id not being reused too frequently is useful for script controlled environment.
2008-06-19 21:41:57 +00:00
}
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/*
* jail_remove added a reference. If that's the only one, remove
* the prison now.
*/
KASSERT(pr->pr_ref > 0,
("prison_remove_one removing a dead prison (jid=%d)", pr->pr_id));
if (pr->pr_ref == 1) {
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
prison_deref(pr,
deuref | PD_DEREF | PD_LOCKED | PD_LIST_XLOCKED);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
return;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Update ZFS from version 6 to 13 and bring some FreeBSD-specific changes. This bring huge amount of changes, I'll enumerate only user-visible changes: - Delegated Administration Allows regular users to perform ZFS operations, like file system creation, snapshot creation, etc. - L2ARC Level 2 cache for ZFS - allows to use additional disks for cache. Huge performance improvements mostly for random read of mostly static content. - slog Allow to use additional disks for ZFS Intent Log to speed up operations like fsync(2). - vfs.zfs.super_owner Allows regular users to perform privileged operations on files stored on ZFS file systems owned by him. Very careful with this one. - chflags(2) Not all the flags are supported. This still needs work. - ZFSBoot Support to boot off of ZFS pool. Not finished, AFAIK. Submitted by: dfr - Snapshot properties - New failure modes Before if write requested failed, system paniced. Now one can select from one of three failure modes: - panic - panic on write error - wait - wait for disk to reappear - continue - serve read requests if possible, block write requests - Refquota, refreservation properties Just quota and reservation properties, but don't count space consumed by children file systems, clones and snapshots. - Sparse volumes ZVOLs that don't reserve space in the pool. - External attributes Compatible with extattr(2). - NFSv4-ACLs Not sure about the status, might not be complete yet. Submitted by: trasz - Creation-time properties - Regression tests for zpool(8) command. Obtained from: OpenSolaris
2008-11-17 20:49:29 +00:00
sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/*
* Kill all processes unfortunate enough to be attached to this prison.
*/
sx_slock(&allproc_lock);
LIST_FOREACH(p, &allproc, p_list) {
PROC_LOCK(p);
if (p->p_state != PRS_NEW && p->p_ucred &&
p->p_ucred->cr_prison == pr)
In order to maximize the re-usability of kernel code in user space this patch modifies makesyscalls.sh to prefix all of the non-compatibility calls (e.g. not linux_, freebsd32_) with sys_ and updates the kernel entry points and all places in the code that use them. It also fixes an additional name space collision between the kernel function psignal and the libc function of the same name by renaming the kernel psignal kern_psignal(). By introducing this change now we will ease future MFCs that change syscalls. Reviewed by: rwatson Approved by: re (bz)
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
kern_psignal(p, SIGKILL);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
}
sx_sunlock(&allproc_lock);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/* Remove the temporary reference added by jail_remove. */
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
prison_deref(pr, deuref | PD_DEREF);
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
}
Whitespace/spelling fixes in advance of upcoming functional changes. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-03-27 13:13:59 +00:00
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
/*
style(9)
2003-04-28 18:32:19 +00:00
* struct jail_attach_args {
* int jid;
* };
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
*/
int
In order to maximize the re-usability of kernel code in user space this patch modifies makesyscalls.sh to prefix all of the non-compatibility calls (e.g. not linux_, freebsd32_) with sys_ and updates the kernel entry points and all places in the code that use them. It also fixes an additional name space collision between the kernel function psignal and the libc function of the same name by renaming the kernel psignal kern_psignal(). By introducing this change now we will ease future MFCs that change syscalls. Reviewed by: rwatson Approved by: re (bz)
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
sys_jail_attach(struct thread *td, struct jail_attach_args *uap)
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
{
struct prison *pr;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
int error;
White space nits.
2007-03-07 21:24:51 +00:00
Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability of privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9) interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the existing suser(9) interface: suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv) suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags) A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read before doing so. The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine, rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail is now present in kern_jail.c. The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with root privilege. The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier. This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security policy become more feasible. Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed on: arch@ Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri, Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>, Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>, Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:37:19 +00:00
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_JAIL_ATTACH);
Rework jail_attach(2) so that an already jailed process cannot hop to another jail. Submitted by: rwatson
2004-02-19 21:03:20 +00:00
if (error)
return (error);
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
Implement functionality I called 'jail services'. It may be used for external modules to attach some data to jail's in-kernel structure. - Change allprison_mtx mutex to allprison_sx sx(9) lock. We will need to call external functions while holding this lock, which may want to allocate memory. Make use of the fact that this is shared-exclusive lock and use shared version when possible. - Implement the following functions: prison_service_register() - registers a service that wants to be noticed when a jail is created and destroyed prison_service_deregister() - deregisters service prison_service_data_add() - adds service-specific data to the jail structure prison_service_data_get() - takes service-specific data from the jail structure prison_service_data_del() - removes service-specific data from the jail structure Reviewed by: rwatson
2007-04-05 23:19:13 +00:00
sx_slock(&allprison_lock);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
pr = prison_find_child(td->td_ucred->cr_prison, uap->jid);
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
if (pr == NULL) {
Implement functionality I called 'jail services'. It may be used for external modules to attach some data to jail's in-kernel structure. - Change allprison_mtx mutex to allprison_sx sx(9) lock. We will need to call external functions while holding this lock, which may want to allocate memory. Make use of the fact that this is shared-exclusive lock and use shared version when possible. - Implement the following functions: prison_service_register() - registers a service that wants to be noticed when a jail is created and destroyed prison_service_deregister() - deregisters service prison_service_data_add() - adds service-specific data to the jail structure prison_service_data_get() - takes service-specific data from the jail structure prison_service_data_del() - removes service-specific data from the jail structure Reviewed by: rwatson
2007-04-05 23:19:13 +00:00
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
return (EINVAL);
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
/*
* Do not allow a process to attach to a prison that is not
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
* considered to be "alive".
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
*/
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (pr->pr_uref == 0) {
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
return (EINVAL);
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
return (do_jail_attach(td, pr));
}
static int
do_jail_attach(struct thread *td, struct prison *pr)
{
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
struct prison *ppr;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
struct proc *p;
struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
int vfslocked, error;
/*
* XXX: Note that there is a slight race here if two threads
* in the same privileged process attempt to attach to two
* different jails at the same time. It is important for
* user processes not to do this, or they might end up with
* a process root from one prison, but attached to the jail
* of another.
*/
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
pr->pr_ref++;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
pr->pr_uref++;
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/* Let modules do whatever they need to prepare for attaching. */
error = osd_jail_call(pr, PR_METHOD_ATTACH, td);
if (error) {
prison_deref(pr, PD_DEREF | PD_DEUREF | PD_LIST_SLOCKED);
return (error);
}
Implement functionality I called 'jail services'. It may be used for external modules to attach some data to jail's in-kernel structure. - Change allprison_mtx mutex to allprison_sx sx(9) lock. We will need to call external functions while holding this lock, which may want to allocate memory. Make use of the fact that this is shared-exclusive lock and use shared version when possible. - Implement the following functions: prison_service_register() - registers a service that wants to be noticed when a jail is created and destroyed prison_service_deregister() - deregisters service prison_service_data_add() - adds service-specific data to the jail structure prison_service_data_get() - takes service-specific data from the jail structure prison_service_data_del() - removes service-specific data from the jail structure Reviewed by: rwatson
2007-04-05 23:19:13 +00:00
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
/*
* Reparent the newly attached process to this jail.
*/
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
ppr = td->td_ucred->cr_prison;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
p = td->td_proc;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
error = cpuset_setproc_update_set(p, pr->pr_cpuset);
if (error)
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
goto e_revert_osd;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Push Giant down in jails. Pass the MPSAFE flag to NDINIT, and keep track of whether or not Giant was picked up by the filesystem. Add VFS_LOCK_GIANT macros around vrele as it's possible that this can call in the VOP_INACTIVE filesystem specific code. Also while we are here, remove the Giant assertion. from the sysctl handler, we do not actually require Giant here so we shouldn't assert it. Doing so will just complicate things when Giant is removed from the sysctl framework.
2005-09-28 00:30:56 +00:00
vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(pr->pr_root->v_mount);
vn_lock() is currently only used with the 'curthread' passed as argument. Remove this argument and pass curthread directly to underlying VOP_LOCK1() VFS method. This modify makes the code cleaner and in particular remove an annoying dependence helping next lockmgr() cleanup. KPI results, obviously, changed. Manpage and FreeBSD_version will be updated through further commits. As a side note, would be valuable to say that next commits will address a similar cleanup about VFS methods, in particular vop_lock1 and vop_unlock. Tested by: Diego Sardina <siarodx at gmail dot com>, Andrea Di Pasquale <whyx dot it at gmail dot com>
2008-01-10 01:10:58 +00:00
vn_lock(pr->pr_root, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
if ((error = change_dir(pr->pr_root, td)) != 0)
goto e_unlock;
#ifdef MAC
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
if ((error = mac_vnode_check_chroot(td->td_ucred, pr->pr_root)))
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
goto e_unlock;
#endif
VOP_LOCK1() (and so VOP_LOCK()) and VOP_UNLOCK() are only used in conjuction with 'thread' argument passing which is always curthread. Remove the unuseful extra-argument and pass explicitly curthread to lower layer functions, when necessary. KPI results broken by this change, which should affect several ports, so version bumping and manpage update will be further committed. Tested by: kris, pho, Diego Sardina <siarodx at gmail dot com>
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
VOP_UNLOCK(pr->pr_root, 0);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if ((error = change_root(pr->pr_root, td)))
goto e_unlock_giant;
Push Giant down in jails. Pass the MPSAFE flag to NDINIT, and keep track of whether or not Giant was picked up by the filesystem. Add VFS_LOCK_GIANT macros around vrele as it's possible that this can call in the VOP_INACTIVE filesystem specific code. Also while we are here, remove the Giant assertion. from the sysctl handler, we do not actually require Giant here so we shouldn't assert it. Doing so will just complicate things when Giant is removed from the sysctl framework.
2005-09-28 00:30:56 +00:00
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
- Catch up to the new ucred API. - Add proc locking to the jail() syscall. This mostly involved shuffling a few things around so that blockable things like malloc and copyin were performed before acquiring the lock and checking the existing ucred and then updating the ucred as one "atomic" change under the proc lock.
2001-10-11 23:39:43 +00:00
newcred = crget();
PROC_LOCK(p);
oldcred = p->p_ucred;
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
setsugid(p);
- Catch up to the new ucred API. - Add proc locking to the jail() syscall. This mostly involved shuffling a few things around so that blockable things like malloc and copyin were performed before acquiring the lock and checking the existing ucred and then updating the ucred as one "atomic" change under the proc lock.
2001-10-11 23:39:43 +00:00
crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
- The prison mutex cannot possibly protect pointers to the prison it protects, so don't bother locking it while we assign it to a ucred's cr_prison. - Fully construct the new credential for a process before assigning it to p_ucred.
2003-04-17 22:26:53 +00:00
newcred->cr_prison = pr;
- Catch up to the new ucred API. - Add proc locking to the jail() syscall. This mostly involved shuffling a few things around so that blockable things like malloc and copyin were performed before acquiring the lock and checking the existing ucred and then updating the ucred as one "atomic" change under the proc lock.
2001-10-11 23:39:43 +00:00
p->p_ucred = newcred;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
Add racct. It's an API to keep per-process, per-jail, per-loginclass and per-loginclass resource accounting information, to be used by the new resource limits code. It's connected to the build, but the code that actually calls the new functions will come later. Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Reviewed by: kib (earlier version)
2011-03-29 17:47:25 +00:00
#ifdef RACCT
racct_proc_ucred_changed(p, oldcred, newcred);
#endif
- Catch up to the new ucred API. - Add proc locking to the jail() syscall. This mostly involved shuffling a few things around so that blockable things like malloc and copyin were performed before acquiring the lock and checking the existing ucred and then updating the ucred as one "atomic" change under the proc lock.
2001-10-11 23:39:43 +00:00
crfree(oldcred);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
prison_deref(ppr, PD_DEREF | PD_DEUREF);
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
return (0);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
e_unlock:
VOP_LOCK1() (and so VOP_LOCK()) and VOP_UNLOCK() are only used in conjuction with 'thread' argument passing which is always curthread. Remove the unuseful extra-argument and pass explicitly curthread to lower layer functions, when necessary. KPI results broken by this change, which should affect several ports, so version bumping and manpage update will be further committed. Tested by: kris, pho, Diego Sardina <siarodx at gmail dot com>
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
VOP_UNLOCK(pr->pr_root, 0);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
e_unlock_giant:
Push Giant down in jails. Pass the MPSAFE flag to NDINIT, and keep track of whether or not Giant was picked up by the filesystem. Add VFS_LOCK_GIANT macros around vrele as it's possible that this can call in the VOP_INACTIVE filesystem specific code. Also while we are here, remove the Giant assertion. from the sysctl handler, we do not actually require Giant here so we shouldn't assert it. Doing so will just complicate things when Giant is removed from the sysctl framework.
2005-09-28 00:30:56 +00:00
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
e_revert_osd:
/* Tell modules this thread is still in its old jail after all. */
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
(void)osd_jail_call(ppr, PR_METHOD_ATTACH, td);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
prison_deref(pr, PD_DEREF | PD_DEUREF);
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
return (error);
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
/*
* Returns a locked prison instance, or NULL on failure.
*/
Make prison_find() globally accessible.
2007-04-05 21:34:54 +00:00
struct prison *
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
prison_find(int prid)
{
struct prison *pr;
Implement functionality I called 'jail services'. It may be used for external modules to attach some data to jail's in-kernel structure. - Change allprison_mtx mutex to allprison_sx sx(9) lock. We will need to call external functions while holding this lock, which may want to allocate memory. Make use of the fact that this is shared-exclusive lock and use shared version when possible. - Implement the following functions: prison_service_register() - registers a service that wants to be noticed when a jail is created and destroyed prison_service_deregister() - deregisters service prison_service_data_add() - adds service-specific data to the jail structure prison_service_data_get() - takes service-specific data from the jail structure prison_service_data_del() - removes service-specific data from the jail structure Reviewed by: rwatson
2007-04-05 23:19:13 +00:00
sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SX_LOCKED);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
TAILQ_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) {
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
if (pr->pr_id == prid) {
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (pr->pr_ref > 0)
return (pr);
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
}
}
return (NULL);
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/*
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
* Find a prison that is a descendant of mypr. Returns a locked prison or NULL.
*/
struct prison *
prison_find_child(struct prison *mypr, int prid)
{
struct prison *pr;
int descend;
sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SX_LOCKED);
FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT(mypr, pr, descend) {
if (pr->pr_id == prid) {
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
if (pr->pr_ref > 0)
return (pr);
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
}
}
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Look for the name relative to mypr. Returns a locked prison or NULL.
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
*/
struct prison *
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
prison_find_name(struct prison *mypr, const char *name)
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
{
struct prison *pr, *deadpr;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
size_t mylen;
int descend;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SX_LOCKED);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
mylen = (mypr == &prison0) ? 0 : strlen(mypr->pr_name) + 1;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
again:
deadpr = NULL;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT(mypr, pr, descend) {
if (!strcmp(pr->pr_name + mylen, name)) {
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
if (pr->pr_ref > 0) {
if (pr->pr_uref > 0)
return (pr);
deadpr = pr;
}
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
}
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/* There was no valid prison - perhaps there was a dying one. */
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (deadpr != NULL) {
mtx_lock(&deadpr->pr_mtx);
if (deadpr->pr_ref == 0) {
mtx_unlock(&deadpr->pr_mtx);
goto again;
}
}
return (deadpr);
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/*
* See if a prison has the specific flag set.
*/
int
prison_flag(struct ucred *cred, unsigned flag)
{
/* This is an atomic read, so no locking is necessary. */
return (cred->cr_prison->pr_flags & flag);
}
int
prison_allow(struct ucred *cred, unsigned flag)
{
/* This is an atomic read, so no locking is necessary. */
return (cred->cr_prison->pr_allow & flag);
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/*
* Remove a prison reference. If that was the last reference, remove the
* prison itself - but not in this context in case there are locks held.
*/
o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison). o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence. o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code. o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead of struct proc arguments. o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed, rather than directly checking pointers all over the place. o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function. o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h. o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the flag in the process flags field itself. o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect mutex use. Notes: o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required. o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code. o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the structure. Reviewed by: freebsd-arch Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-02-21 06:39:57 +00:00
void
Update ZFS from version 6 to 13 and bring some FreeBSD-specific changes. This bring huge amount of changes, I'll enumerate only user-visible changes: - Delegated Administration Allows regular users to perform ZFS operations, like file system creation, snapshot creation, etc. - L2ARC Level 2 cache for ZFS - allows to use additional disks for cache. Huge performance improvements mostly for random read of mostly static content. - slog Allow to use additional disks for ZFS Intent Log to speed up operations like fsync(2). - vfs.zfs.super_owner Allows regular users to perform privileged operations on files stored on ZFS file systems owned by him. Very careful with this one. - chflags(2) Not all the flags are supported. This still needs work. - ZFSBoot Support to boot off of ZFS pool. Not finished, AFAIK. Submitted by: dfr - Snapshot properties - New failure modes Before if write requested failed, system paniced. Now one can select from one of three failure modes: - panic - panic on write error - wait - wait for disk to reappear - continue - serve read requests if possible, block write requests - Refquota, refreservation properties Just quota and reservation properties, but don't count space consumed by children file systems, clones and snapshots. - Sparse volumes ZVOLs that don't reserve space in the pool. - External attributes Compatible with extattr(2). - NFSv4-ACLs Not sure about the status, might not be complete yet. Submitted by: trasz - Creation-time properties - Regression tests for zpool(8) command. Obtained from: OpenSolaris
2008-11-17 20:49:29 +00:00
prison_free_locked(struct prison *pr)
o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison). o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence. o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code. o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead of struct proc arguments. o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed, rather than directly checking pointers all over the place. o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function. o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h. o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the flag in the process flags field itself. o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect mutex use. Notes: o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required. o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code. o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the structure. Reviewed by: freebsd-arch Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-02-21 06:39:57 +00:00
{
Update ZFS from version 6 to 13 and bring some FreeBSD-specific changes. This bring huge amount of changes, I'll enumerate only user-visible changes: - Delegated Administration Allows regular users to perform ZFS operations, like file system creation, snapshot creation, etc. - L2ARC Level 2 cache for ZFS - allows to use additional disks for cache. Huge performance improvements mostly for random read of mostly static content. - slog Allow to use additional disks for ZFS Intent Log to speed up operations like fsync(2). - vfs.zfs.super_owner Allows regular users to perform privileged operations on files stored on ZFS file systems owned by him. Very careful with this one. - chflags(2) Not all the flags are supported. This still needs work. - ZFSBoot Support to boot off of ZFS pool. Not finished, AFAIK. Submitted by: dfr - Snapshot properties - New failure modes Before if write requested failed, system paniced. Now one can select from one of three failure modes: - panic - panic on write error - wait - wait for disk to reappear - continue - serve read requests if possible, block write requests - Refquota, refreservation properties Just quota and reservation properties, but don't count space consumed by children file systems, clones and snapshots. - Sparse volumes ZVOLs that don't reserve space in the pool. - External attributes Compatible with extattr(2). - NFSv4-ACLs Not sure about the status, might not be complete yet. Submitted by: trasz - Creation-time properties - Regression tests for zpool(8) command. Obtained from: OpenSolaris
2008-11-17 20:49:29 +00:00
mtx_assert(&pr->pr_mtx, MA_OWNED);
o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison). o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence. o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code. o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead of struct proc arguments. o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed, rather than directly checking pointers all over the place. o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function. o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h. o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the flag in the process flags field itself. o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect mutex use. Notes: o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required. o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code. o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the structure. Reviewed by: freebsd-arch Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-02-21 06:39:57 +00:00
pr->pr_ref--;
if (pr->pr_ref == 0) {
o Introduce pr_mtx into struct prison, providing protection for the mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount, pr_linux, ...) o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/ so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes. o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to use these primitives. o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly accessing struct prison. Reviewed by: jhb
2001-12-03 16:12:27 +00:00
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Defer the vrele() on a jail's root vnode reference from prison_free() to a new prison_complete() task run by a task queue. This removes a requirement for grabbing Giant in crfree(). Embed the 'struct task' in 'struct prison' so that we don't have to allocate memory from prison_free() (which means we also defer the FREE()). With this change, I believe grabbing Giant from crfree() can now be removed, but need to check the uidinfo code paths. To avoid header pollution, move the definition of 'struct task' to _task.h, and recursively include from taskqueue.h and jail.h; much preferably to all files including jail.h picking up a requirement to include taskqueue.h. Bumped into by: sam Reviewed by: bde, tjr
2004-01-23 20:44:26 +00:00
TASK_INIT(&pr->pr_task, 0, prison_complete, pr);
- Use taskqueue_thread rather than taskqueue_swi since our task is going to vrele, which may vop lock. This is not safe in a software interrupt context.
2005-04-05 08:51:45 +00:00
taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &pr->pr_task);
o Introduce pr_mtx into struct prison, providing protection for the mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount, pr_linux, ...) o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/ so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes. o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to use these primitives. o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly accessing struct prison. Reviewed by: jhb
2001-12-03 16:12:27 +00:00
return;
o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison). o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence. o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code. o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead of struct proc arguments. o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed, rather than directly checking pointers all over the place. o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function. o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h. o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the flag in the process flags field itself. o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect mutex use. Notes: o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required. o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code. o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the structure. Reviewed by: freebsd-arch Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-02-21 06:39:57 +00:00
}
o Introduce pr_mtx into struct prison, providing protection for the mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount, pr_linux, ...) o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/ so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes. o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to use these primitives. o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly accessing struct prison. Reviewed by: jhb
2001-12-03 16:12:27 +00:00
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison). o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence. o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code. o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead of struct proc arguments. o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed, rather than directly checking pointers all over the place. o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function. o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h. o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the flag in the process flags field itself. o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect mutex use. Notes: o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required. o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code. o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the structure. Reviewed by: freebsd-arch Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-02-21 06:39:57 +00:00
}
Update ZFS from version 6 to 13 and bring some FreeBSD-specific changes. This bring huge amount of changes, I'll enumerate only user-visible changes: - Delegated Administration Allows regular users to perform ZFS operations, like file system creation, snapshot creation, etc. - L2ARC Level 2 cache for ZFS - allows to use additional disks for cache. Huge performance improvements mostly for random read of mostly static content. - slog Allow to use additional disks for ZFS Intent Log to speed up operations like fsync(2). - vfs.zfs.super_owner Allows regular users to perform privileged operations on files stored on ZFS file systems owned by him. Very careful with this one. - chflags(2) Not all the flags are supported. This still needs work. - ZFSBoot Support to boot off of ZFS pool. Not finished, AFAIK. Submitted by: dfr - Snapshot properties - New failure modes Before if write requested failed, system paniced. Now one can select from one of three failure modes: - panic - panic on write error - wait - wait for disk to reappear - continue - serve read requests if possible, block write requests - Refquota, refreservation properties Just quota and reservation properties, but don't count space consumed by children file systems, clones and snapshots. - Sparse volumes ZVOLs that don't reserve space in the pool. - External attributes Compatible with extattr(2). - NFSv4-ACLs Not sure about the status, might not be complete yet. Submitted by: trasz - Creation-time properties - Regression tests for zpool(8) command. Obtained from: OpenSolaris
2008-11-17 20:49:29 +00:00
void
prison_free(struct prison *pr)
{
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
prison_free_locked(pr);
}
Defer the vrele() on a jail's root vnode reference from prison_free() to a new prison_complete() task run by a task queue. This removes a requirement for grabbing Giant in crfree(). Embed the 'struct task' in 'struct prison' so that we don't have to allocate memory from prison_free() (which means we also defer the FREE()). With this change, I believe grabbing Giant from crfree() can now be removed, but need to check the uidinfo code paths. To avoid header pollution, move the definition of 'struct task' to _task.h, and recursively include from taskqueue.h and jail.h; much preferably to all files including jail.h picking up a requirement to include taskqueue.h. Bumped into by: sam Reviewed by: bde, tjr
2004-01-23 20:44:26 +00:00
static void
prison_complete(void *context, int pending)
{
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
prison_deref((struct prison *)context, 0);
}
Defer the vrele() on a jail's root vnode reference from prison_free() to a new prison_complete() task run by a task queue. This removes a requirement for grabbing Giant in crfree(). Embed the 'struct task' in 'struct prison' so that we don't have to allocate memory from prison_free() (which means we also defer the FREE()). With this change, I believe grabbing Giant from crfree() can now be removed, but need to check the uidinfo code paths. To avoid header pollution, move the definition of 'struct task' to _task.h, and recursively include from taskqueue.h and jail.h; much preferably to all files including jail.h picking up a requirement to include taskqueue.h. Bumped into by: sam Reviewed by: bde, tjr
2004-01-23 20:44:26 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
/*
* Remove a prison reference (usually). This internal version assumes no
* mutexes are held, except perhaps the prison itself. If there are no more
* references, release and delist the prison. On completion, the prison lock
* and the allprison lock are both unlocked.
*/
static void
prison_deref(struct prison *pr, int flags)
{
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
struct prison *ppr, *tpr;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
int vfslocked;
Update ZFS from version 6 to 13 and bring some FreeBSD-specific changes. This bring huge amount of changes, I'll enumerate only user-visible changes: - Delegated Administration Allows regular users to perform ZFS operations, like file system creation, snapshot creation, etc. - L2ARC Level 2 cache for ZFS - allows to use additional disks for cache. Huge performance improvements mostly for random read of mostly static content. - slog Allow to use additional disks for ZFS Intent Log to speed up operations like fsync(2). - vfs.zfs.super_owner Allows regular users to perform privileged operations on files stored on ZFS file systems owned by him. Very careful with this one. - chflags(2) Not all the flags are supported. This still needs work. - ZFSBoot Support to boot off of ZFS pool. Not finished, AFAIK. Submitted by: dfr - Snapshot properties - New failure modes Before if write requested failed, system paniced. Now one can select from one of three failure modes: - panic - panic on write error - wait - wait for disk to reappear - continue - serve read requests if possible, block write requests - Refquota, refreservation properties Just quota and reservation properties, but don't count space consumed by children file systems, clones and snapshots. - Sparse volumes ZVOLs that don't reserve space in the pool. - External attributes Compatible with extattr(2). - NFSv4-ACLs Not sure about the status, might not be complete yet. Submitted by: trasz - Creation-time properties - Regression tests for zpool(8) command. Obtained from: OpenSolaris
2008-11-17 20:49:29 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (!(flags & PD_LOCKED))
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
for (;;) {
Delay the recursive decrement of pr_uref when jails are made invisible but not removed; decrement it instead when the child jail actually goes away. This avoids letting the counter go below zero in the case where dying (pr_uref==0) jails are "resurrected", and an associated KASSERT panic. Submitted by: Steven Hartland Approved by: re (bz) MFC after: 1 week
2011-08-26 16:03:34 +00:00
if (flags & PD_DEUREF) {
pr->pr_uref--;
KASSERT(prison0.pr_uref != 0, ("prison0 pr_uref=0"));
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (flags & PD_DEREF)
pr->pr_ref--;
/* If the prison still has references, nothing else to do. */
if (pr->pr_ref > 0) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
if (flags & PD_LIST_SLOCKED)
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
else if (flags & PD_LIST_XLOCKED)
sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock);
return;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
prison_free() can be called with a mutex held. This wasn't a problem until I converted allprison_mtx mutex to allprison_lock sx lock. To fix this LOR, move prison removal to prison_complete() entirely. To ensure that noone will reference this prison before it's beeing removed from the list skip prisons with 'pr_ref == 0' in prison_find() and assert that pr_ref has to greater than 0 in prison_hold(). Reported by: kris OK'ed by: rwatson
2007-04-08 10:46:23 +00:00
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
if (flags & PD_LIST_SLOCKED) {
if (!sx_try_upgrade(&allprison_lock)) {
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
sx_xlock(&allprison_lock);
}
} else if (!(flags & PD_LIST_XLOCKED))
sx_xlock(&allprison_lock);
Defer the vrele() on a jail's root vnode reference from prison_free() to a new prison_complete() task run by a task queue. This removes a requirement for grabbing Giant in crfree(). Embed the 'struct task' in 'struct prison' so that we don't have to allocate memory from prison_free() (which means we also defer the FREE()). With this change, I believe grabbing Giant from crfree() can now be removed, but need to check the uidinfo code paths. To avoid header pollution, move the definition of 'struct task' to _task.h, and recursively include from taskqueue.h and jail.h; much preferably to all files including jail.h picking up a requirement to include taskqueue.h. Bumped into by: sam Reviewed by: bde, tjr
2004-01-23 20:44:26 +00:00
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
TAILQ_REMOVE(&allprison, pr, pr_list);
LIST_REMOVE(pr, pr_sibling);
ppr = pr->pr_parent;
for (tpr = ppr; tpr != NULL; tpr = tpr->pr_parent)
Add a limit for child jails via the "children.cur" and "children.max" parameters. This replaces the simple "allow.jails" permission. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-23 20:35:51 +00:00
tpr->pr_childcount--;
Fix a LOR between allprison_lock and vnode locks by releasing allprison_lock before releasing a prison's root vnode. PR: kern/138004 Reviewed by: kib Approved by: bz (mentor) MFC after: 3 days
2009-08-27 16:15:51 +00:00
sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
Manage vnets via the jail system. If a jail is given the boolean parameter "vnet" when it is created, a new vnet instance will be created along with the jail. Networks interfaces can be moved between prisons with an ioctl similar to the one that moves them between vimages. For now vnets will co-exist under both jails and vimages, but soon struct vimage will be going away. Reviewed by: zec, julian Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-15 18:59:29 +00:00
#ifdef VIMAGE
When "jail -c vnet" request fails, the current code actually creates and leaves behind an orphaned vnet. This change ensures that such vnets get released. This change affects only options VIMAGE builds. Submitted by: jamie Discussed with: bz Approved by: re (rwatson), julian (mentor) MFC after: 3 days
2009-08-24 10:16:19 +00:00
if (pr->pr_vnet != ppr->pr_vnet)
Manage vnets via the jail system. If a jail is given the boolean parameter "vnet" when it is created, a new vnet instance will be created along with the jail. Networks interfaces can be moved between prisons with an ioctl similar to the one that moves them between vimages. For now vnets will co-exist under both jails and vimages, but soon struct vimage will be going away. Reviewed by: zec, julian Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-15 18:59:29 +00:00
vnet_destroy(pr->pr_vnet);
#endif
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (pr->pr_root != NULL) {
vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(pr->pr_root->v_mount);
vrele(pr->pr_root);
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
}
mtx_destroy(&pr->pr_mtx);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#ifdef INET
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
free(pr->pr_ip4, M_PRISON);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#endif
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
#ifdef INET6
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
free(pr->pr_ip6, M_PRISON);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
#endif
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (pr->pr_cpuset != NULL)
cpuset_rel(pr->pr_cpuset);
osd_jail_exit(pr);
Change the way rctl interfaces with jails by introducing prison_racct structure, which acts as a proxy between them. This makes jail rules persistent, i.e. they can be added before jail gets created, and they don't disappear when the jail gets destroyed.
2011-05-03 07:32:58 +00:00
#ifdef RACCT
prison_racct_detach(pr);
Add rctl. It's used by racct to take user-configurable actions based on the set of rules it maintains and the current resource usage. It also privides userland API to manage that ruleset. Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Reviewed by: kib (earlier version)
2011-03-30 17:48:15 +00:00
#endif
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
free(pr, M_PRISON);
/* Removing a prison frees a reference on its parent. */
pr = ppr;
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Delay the recursive decrement of pr_uref when jails are made invisible but not removed; decrement it instead when the child jail actually goes away. This avoids letting the counter go below zero in the case where dying (pr_uref==0) jails are "resurrected", and an associated KASSERT panic. Submitted by: Steven Hartland Approved by: re (bz) MFC after: 1 week
2011-08-26 16:03:34 +00:00
flags = PD_DEREF | PD_DEUREF;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
}
Defer the vrele() on a jail's root vnode reference from prison_free() to a new prison_complete() task run by a task queue. This removes a requirement for grabbing Giant in crfree(). Embed the 'struct task' in 'struct prison' so that we don't have to allocate memory from prison_free() (which means we also defer the FREE()). With this change, I believe grabbing Giant from crfree() can now be removed, but need to check the uidinfo code paths. To avoid header pollution, move the definition of 'struct task' to _task.h, and recursively include from taskqueue.h and jail.h; much preferably to all files including jail.h picking up a requirement to include taskqueue.h. Bumped into by: sam Reviewed by: bde, tjr
2004-01-23 20:44:26 +00:00
}
o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison). o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence. o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code. o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead of struct proc arguments. o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed, rather than directly checking pointers all over the place. o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function. o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h. o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the flag in the process flags field itself. o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect mutex use. Notes: o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required. o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code. o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the structure. Reviewed by: freebsd-arch Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-02-21 06:39:57 +00:00
void
Update ZFS from version 6 to 13 and bring some FreeBSD-specific changes. This bring huge amount of changes, I'll enumerate only user-visible changes: - Delegated Administration Allows regular users to perform ZFS operations, like file system creation, snapshot creation, etc. - L2ARC Level 2 cache for ZFS - allows to use additional disks for cache. Huge performance improvements mostly for random read of mostly static content. - slog Allow to use additional disks for ZFS Intent Log to speed up operations like fsync(2). - vfs.zfs.super_owner Allows regular users to perform privileged operations on files stored on ZFS file systems owned by him. Very careful with this one. - chflags(2) Not all the flags are supported. This still needs work. - ZFSBoot Support to boot off of ZFS pool. Not finished, AFAIK. Submitted by: dfr - Snapshot properties - New failure modes Before if write requested failed, system paniced. Now one can select from one of three failure modes: - panic - panic on write error - wait - wait for disk to reappear - continue - serve read requests if possible, block write requests - Refquota, refreservation properties Just quota and reservation properties, but don't count space consumed by children file systems, clones and snapshots. - Sparse volumes ZVOLs that don't reserve space in the pool. - External attributes Compatible with extattr(2). - NFSv4-ACLs Not sure about the status, might not be complete yet. Submitted by: trasz - Creation-time properties - Regression tests for zpool(8) command. Obtained from: OpenSolaris
2008-11-17 20:49:29 +00:00
prison_hold_locked(struct prison *pr)
o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison). o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence. o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code. o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead of struct proc arguments. o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed, rather than directly checking pointers all over the place. o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function. o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h. o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the flag in the process flags field itself. o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect mutex use. Notes: o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required. o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code. o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the structure. Reviewed by: freebsd-arch Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-02-21 06:39:57 +00:00
{
Update ZFS from version 6 to 13 and bring some FreeBSD-specific changes. This bring huge amount of changes, I'll enumerate only user-visible changes: - Delegated Administration Allows regular users to perform ZFS operations, like file system creation, snapshot creation, etc. - L2ARC Level 2 cache for ZFS - allows to use additional disks for cache. Huge performance improvements mostly for random read of mostly static content. - slog Allow to use additional disks for ZFS Intent Log to speed up operations like fsync(2). - vfs.zfs.super_owner Allows regular users to perform privileged operations on files stored on ZFS file systems owned by him. Very careful with this one. - chflags(2) Not all the flags are supported. This still needs work. - ZFSBoot Support to boot off of ZFS pool. Not finished, AFAIK. Submitted by: dfr - Snapshot properties - New failure modes Before if write requested failed, system paniced. Now one can select from one of three failure modes: - panic - panic on write error - wait - wait for disk to reappear - continue - serve read requests if possible, block write requests - Refquota, refreservation properties Just quota and reservation properties, but don't count space consumed by children file systems, clones and snapshots. - Sparse volumes ZVOLs that don't reserve space in the pool. - External attributes Compatible with extattr(2). - NFSv4-ACLs Not sure about the status, might not be complete yet. Submitted by: trasz - Creation-time properties - Regression tests for zpool(8) command. Obtained from: OpenSolaris
2008-11-17 20:49:29 +00:00
mtx_assert(&pr->pr_mtx, MA_OWNED);
prison_free() can be called with a mutex held. This wasn't a problem until I converted allprison_mtx mutex to allprison_lock sx lock. To fix this LOR, move prison removal to prison_complete() entirely. To ensure that noone will reference this prison before it's beeing removed from the list skip prisons with 'pr_ref == 0' in prison_find() and assert that pr_ref has to greater than 0 in prison_hold(). Reported by: kris OK'ed by: rwatson
2007-04-08 10:46:23 +00:00
KASSERT(pr->pr_ref > 0,
Some non-functional changes: whitespace, KASSERT strings, declaration order. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 18:41:08 +00:00
("Trying to hold dead prison (jid=%d).", pr->pr_id));
o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison). o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence. o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code. o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead of struct proc arguments. o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed, rather than directly checking pointers all over the place. o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function. o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h. o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the flag in the process flags field itself. o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect mutex use. Notes: o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required. o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code. o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the structure. Reviewed by: freebsd-arch Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-02-21 06:39:57 +00:00
pr->pr_ref++;
Update ZFS from version 6 to 13 and bring some FreeBSD-specific changes. This bring huge amount of changes, I'll enumerate only user-visible changes: - Delegated Administration Allows regular users to perform ZFS operations, like file system creation, snapshot creation, etc. - L2ARC Level 2 cache for ZFS - allows to use additional disks for cache. Huge performance improvements mostly for random read of mostly static content. - slog Allow to use additional disks for ZFS Intent Log to speed up operations like fsync(2). - vfs.zfs.super_owner Allows regular users to perform privileged operations on files stored on ZFS file systems owned by him. Very careful with this one. - chflags(2) Not all the flags are supported. This still needs work. - ZFSBoot Support to boot off of ZFS pool. Not finished, AFAIK. Submitted by: dfr - Snapshot properties - New failure modes Before if write requested failed, system paniced. Now one can select from one of three failure modes: - panic - panic on write error - wait - wait for disk to reappear - continue - serve read requests if possible, block write requests - Refquota, refreservation properties Just quota and reservation properties, but don't count space consumed by children file systems, clones and snapshots. - Sparse volumes ZVOLs that don't reserve space in the pool. - External attributes Compatible with extattr(2). - NFSv4-ACLs Not sure about the status, might not be complete yet. Submitted by: trasz - Creation-time properties - Regression tests for zpool(8) command. Obtained from: OpenSolaris
2008-11-17 20:49:29 +00:00
}
void
prison_hold(struct prison *pr)
{
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
prison_hold_locked(pr);
o Introduce pr_mtx into struct prison, providing protection for the mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount, pr_linux, ...) o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/ so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes. o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to use these primitives. o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly accessing struct prison. Reviewed by: jhb
2001-12-03 16:12:27 +00:00
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
void
prison_proc_hold(struct prison *pr)
o Introduce pr_mtx into struct prison, providing protection for the mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount, pr_linux, ...) o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/ so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes. o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to use these primitives. o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly accessing struct prison. Reviewed by: jhb
2001-12-03 16:12:27 +00:00
{
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
KASSERT(pr->pr_uref > 0,
("Cannot add a process to a non-alive prison (jid=%d)", pr->pr_id));
pr->pr_uref++;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison). o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence. o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code. o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead of struct proc arguments. o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed, rather than directly checking pointers all over the place. o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function. o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h. o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the flag in the process flags field itself. o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect mutex use. Notes: o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required. o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code. o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the structure. Reviewed by: freebsd-arch Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-02-21 06:39:57 +00:00
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
void
prison_proc_free(struct prison *pr)
{
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
KASSERT(pr->pr_uref > 0,
("Trying to kill a process in a dead prison (jid=%d)", pr->pr_id));
prison_deref(pr, PD_DEUREF | PD_LOCKED);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
#ifdef INET
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/*
* Restrict a prison's IP address list with its parent's, possibly replacing
* it. Return true if the replacement buffer was used (or would have been).
*/
static int
prison_restrict_ip4(struct prison *pr, struct in_addr *newip4)
{
int ii, ij, used;
struct prison *ppr;
ppr = pr->pr_parent;
if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4_USER)) {
/* This has no user settings, so just copy the parent's list. */
if (pr->pr_ip4s < ppr->pr_ip4s) {
/*
* There's no room for the parent's list. Use the
* new list buffer, which is assumed to be big enough
* (if it was passed). If there's no buffer, try to
* allocate one.
*/
used = 1;
if (newip4 == NULL) {
newip4 = malloc(ppr->pr_ip4s * sizeof(*newip4),
M_PRISON, M_NOWAIT);
if (newip4 != NULL)
used = 0;
}
if (newip4 != NULL) {
bcopy(ppr->pr_ip4, newip4,
ppr->pr_ip4s * sizeof(*newip4));
free(pr->pr_ip4, M_PRISON);
pr->pr_ip4 = newip4;
pr->pr_ip4s = ppr->pr_ip4s;
}
return (used);
}
pr->pr_ip4s = ppr->pr_ip4s;
if (pr->pr_ip4s > 0)
bcopy(ppr->pr_ip4, pr->pr_ip4,
pr->pr_ip4s * sizeof(*newip4));
else if (pr->pr_ip4 != NULL) {
free(pr->pr_ip4, M_PRISON);
pr->pr_ip4 = NULL;
}
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
} else if (pr->pr_ip4s > 0) {
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/* Remove addresses that aren't in the parent. */
for (ij = 0; ij < ppr->pr_ip4s; ij++)
if (pr->pr_ip4[0].s_addr == ppr->pr_ip4[ij].s_addr)
break;
if (ij < ppr->pr_ip4s)
ii = 1;
else {
bcopy(pr->pr_ip4 + 1, pr->pr_ip4,
--pr->pr_ip4s * sizeof(*pr->pr_ip4));
ii = 0;
}
for (ij = 1; ii < pr->pr_ip4s; ) {
if (pr->pr_ip4[ii].s_addr == ppr->pr_ip4[0].s_addr) {
ii++;
continue;
}
switch (ij >= ppr->pr_ip4s ? -1 :
qcmp_v4(&pr->pr_ip4[ii], &ppr->pr_ip4[ij])) {
case -1:
bcopy(pr->pr_ip4 + ii + 1, pr->pr_ip4 + ii,
(--pr->pr_ip4s - ii) * sizeof(*pr->pr_ip4));
break;
case 0:
ii++;
ij++;
break;
case 1:
ij++;
break;
}
}
if (pr->pr_ip4s == 0) {
Some jail parameters (in particular, "ip4" and "ip6" for IP address restrictions) were found to be inadequately described by a boolean. Define a new parameter type with three values (disable, new, inherit) to handle these and future cases. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor) Discussed with: rwatson
2009-07-25 14:48:57 +00:00
pr->pr_flags |= PR_IP4_DISABLE;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
free(pr->pr_ip4, M_PRISON);
pr->pr_ip4 = NULL;
}
}
return (0);
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
/*
* Pass back primary IPv4 address of this jail.
*
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
* If not restricted return success but do not alter the address. Caller has
* to make sure to initialize it correctly (e.g. INADDR_ANY).
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
*
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
* Returns 0 on success, EAFNOSUPPORT if the jail doesn't allow IPv4.
* Address returned in NBO.
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
*/
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
int
For consistency with prison_{local,remote,check}_ipN rename prison_getipN to prison_get_ipN. Submitted by: jamie (as part of a larger patch) MFC after: 1 week
2009-01-25 10:11:58 +00:00
prison_get_ip4(struct ucred *cred, struct in_addr *ia)
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
{
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
struct prison *pr;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__));
KASSERT(ia != NULL, ("%s: ia is NULL", __func__));
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
pr = cred->cr_prison;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4))
return (0);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4)) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
return (0);
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (pr->pr_ip4 == NULL) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
return (EAFNOSUPPORT);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
ia->s_addr = pr->pr_ip4[0].s_addr;
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
return (0);
}
Add ip4.saddrsel/ip4.nosaddrsel (and equivalent for ip6) to control whether to use source address selection (default) or the primary jail address for unbound outgoing connections. This is intended to be used by people upgrading from single-IP jails to multi-IP jails but not having to change firewall rules, application ACLs, ... but to force their connections (unless otherwise changed) to the primry jail IP they had been used for years, as well as for people prefering to implement similar policies. Note that for IPv6, if configured incorrectly, this might lead to scope violations, which single-IPv6 jails could as well, as by the design of jails. [1] Reviewed by: jamie, hrs (ipv6 part) Pointed out by: hrs [1] MFC After: 2 weeks Asked for by: Jase Thew (bazerka beardz.net)
2010-01-17 12:57:11 +00:00
/*
* Return 1 if we should do proper source address selection or are not jailed.
* We will return 0 if we should bypass source address selection in favour
* of the primary jail IPv4 address. Only in this case *ia will be updated and
* returned in NBO.
* Return EAFNOSUPPORT, in case this jail does not allow IPv4.
*/
int
prison_saddrsel_ip4(struct ucred *cred, struct in_addr *ia)
{
struct prison *pr;
struct in_addr lia;
int error;
KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__));
KASSERT(ia != NULL, ("%s: ia is NULL", __func__));
if (!jailed(cred))
return (1);
pr = cred->cr_prison;
if (pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4_SADDRSEL)
return (1);
lia.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
error = prison_get_ip4(cred, &lia);
if (error)
return (error);
if (lia.s_addr == INADDR_ANY)
return (1);
ia->s_addr = lia.s_addr;
return (0);
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/*
* Return true if pr1 and pr2 have the same IPv4 address restrictions.
*/
int
prison_equal_ip4(struct prison *pr1, struct prison *pr2)
{
if (pr1 == pr2)
return (1);
/*
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
* No need to lock since the PR_IP4_USER flag can't be altered for
* existing prisons.
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
*/
Don't allow mixing the "vnet" and "ip4/6" jail parameters, since vnet jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:46:59 +00:00
while (pr1 != &prison0 &&
#ifdef VIMAGE
!(pr1->pr_flags & PR_VNET) &&
#endif
!(pr1->pr_flags & PR_IP4_USER))
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
pr1 = pr1->pr_parent;
Don't allow mixing the "vnet" and "ip4/6" jail parameters, since vnet jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:46:59 +00:00
while (pr2 != &prison0 &&
#ifdef VIMAGE
!(pr2->pr_flags & PR_VNET) &&
#endif
!(pr2->pr_flags & PR_IP4_USER))
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
pr2 = pr2->pr_parent;
return (pr1 == pr2);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
/*
* Make sure our (source) address is set to something meaningful to this
* jail.
*
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
* Returns 0 if jail doesn't restrict IPv4 or if address belongs to jail,
* EADDRNOTAVAIL if the address doesn't belong, or EAFNOSUPPORT if the jail
* doesn't allow IPv4. Address passed in in NBO and returned in NBO.
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
*/
int
prison_local_ip4(struct ucred *cred, struct in_addr *ia)
{
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
struct prison *pr;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
struct in_addr ia0;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
int error;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__));
KASSERT(ia != NULL, ("%s: ia is NULL", __func__));
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
pr = cred->cr_prison;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4))
return (0);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4)) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
return (0);
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (pr->pr_ip4 == NULL) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
return (EAFNOSUPPORT);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
ia0.s_addr = ntohl(ia->s_addr);
if (ia0.s_addr == INADDR_LOOPBACK) {
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
ia->s_addr = pr->pr_ip4[0].s_addr;
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
return (0);
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
if (ia0.s_addr == INADDR_ANY) {
/*
* In case there is only 1 IPv4 address, bind directly.
*/
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (pr->pr_ip4s == 1)
ia->s_addr = pr->pr_ip4[0].s_addr;
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Anton kindly pointed out (and fixed) a bug in the Jail handling of the bind() call on IPv4 sockets: Currently, if one tries to bind a socket using INADDR_LOOPBACK inside a jail, it will fail because prison_ip() does not take this possibility into account. On the other hand, when one tries to connect(), for example, to localhost, prison_remote_ip() will silently convert INADDR_LOOPBACK to the jail's IP address. Therefore, it is desirable to make bind() to do this implicit conversion as well. Apart from this, the patch also replaces 0x7f000001 in prison_remote_ip() to a more correct INADDR_LOOPBACK. This is a 4.4-RELEASE "during the freeze, thanks" MFC candidate. Submitted by: Anton Berezin <tobez@FreeBSD.org> Discussed with at some point: phk MFC after: 3 days
2001-08-03 18:21:06 +00:00
return (0);
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
error = _prison_check_ip4(pr, ia);
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
return (error);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
/*
* Rewrite destination address in case we will connect to loopback address.
*
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
* Returns 0 on success, EAFNOSUPPORT if the jail doesn't allow IPv4.
* Address passed in in NBO and returned in NBO.
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
*/
int
prison_remote_ip4(struct ucred *cred, struct in_addr *ia)
{
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
struct prison *pr;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__));
KASSERT(ia != NULL, ("%s: ia is NULL", __func__));
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
pr = cred->cr_prison;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4))
return (0);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4)) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
return (0);
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (pr->pr_ip4 == NULL) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
return (EAFNOSUPPORT);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
if (ntohl(ia->s_addr) == INADDR_LOOPBACK) {
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
ia->s_addr = pr->pr_ip4[0].s_addr;
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
return (0);
}
/*
* Return success because nothing had to be changed.
*/
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
return (0);
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
/*
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
* Check if given address belongs to the jail referenced by cred/prison.
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
*
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
* Returns 0 if jail doesn't restrict IPv4 or if address belongs to jail,
* EADDRNOTAVAIL if the address doesn't belong, or EAFNOSUPPORT if the jail
* doesn't allow IPv4. Address passed in in NBO.
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
*/
static int
_prison_check_ip4(struct prison *pr, struct in_addr *ia)
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
{
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
int i, a, z, d;
/*
* Check the primary IP.
*/
if (pr->pr_ip4[0].s_addr == ia->s_addr)
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
return (0);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
/*
* All the other IPs are sorted so we can do a binary search.
*/
a = 0;
z = pr->pr_ip4s - 2;
while (a <= z) {
i = (a + z) / 2;
d = qcmp_v4(&pr->pr_ip4[i+1], ia);
if (d > 0)
z = i - 1;
else if (d < 0)
a = i + 1;
else
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
return (0);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
return (EADDRNOTAVAIL);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
int
prison_check_ip4(struct ucred *cred, struct in_addr *ia)
{
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
struct prison *pr;
int error;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__));
KASSERT(ia != NULL, ("%s: ia is NULL", __func__));
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
pr = cred->cr_prison;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4))
return (0);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4)) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
return (0);
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (pr->pr_ip4 == NULL) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
return (EAFNOSUPPORT);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
error = _prison_check_ip4(pr, ia);
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
return (error);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
#endif
#ifdef INET6
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
static int
prison_restrict_ip6(struct prison *pr, struct in6_addr *newip6)
{
int ii, ij, used;
struct prison *ppr;
ppr = pr->pr_parent;
if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6_USER)) {
/* This has no user settings, so just copy the parent's list. */
if (pr->pr_ip6s < ppr->pr_ip6s) {
/*
* There's no room for the parent's list. Use the
* new list buffer, which is assumed to be big enough
* (if it was passed). If there's no buffer, try to
* allocate one.
*/
used = 1;
if (newip6 == NULL) {
newip6 = malloc(ppr->pr_ip6s * sizeof(*newip6),
M_PRISON, M_NOWAIT);
if (newip6 != NULL)
used = 0;
}
if (newip6 != NULL) {
bcopy(ppr->pr_ip6, newip6,
ppr->pr_ip6s * sizeof(*newip6));
free(pr->pr_ip6, M_PRISON);
pr->pr_ip6 = newip6;
pr->pr_ip6s = ppr->pr_ip6s;
}
return (used);
}
pr->pr_ip6s = ppr->pr_ip6s;
if (pr->pr_ip6s > 0)
bcopy(ppr->pr_ip6, pr->pr_ip6,
pr->pr_ip6s * sizeof(*newip6));
else if (pr->pr_ip6 != NULL) {
free(pr->pr_ip6, M_PRISON);
pr->pr_ip6 = NULL;
}
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
} else if (pr->pr_ip6s > 0) {
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/* Remove addresses that aren't in the parent. */
for (ij = 0; ij < ppr->pr_ip6s; ij++)
if (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&pr->pr_ip6[0],
&ppr->pr_ip6[ij]))
break;
if (ij < ppr->pr_ip6s)
ii = 1;
else {
bcopy(pr->pr_ip6 + 1, pr->pr_ip6,
--pr->pr_ip6s * sizeof(*pr->pr_ip6));
ii = 0;
}
for (ij = 1; ii < pr->pr_ip6s; ) {
if (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&pr->pr_ip6[ii],
&ppr->pr_ip6[0])) {
ii++;
continue;
}
switch (ij >= ppr->pr_ip4s ? -1 :
qcmp_v6(&pr->pr_ip6[ii], &ppr->pr_ip6[ij])) {
case -1:
bcopy(pr->pr_ip6 + ii + 1, pr->pr_ip6 + ii,
(--pr->pr_ip6s - ii) * sizeof(*pr->pr_ip6));
break;
case 0:
ii++;
ij++;
break;
case 1:
ij++;
break;
}
}
if (pr->pr_ip6s == 0) {
Some jail parameters (in particular, "ip4" and "ip6" for IP address restrictions) were found to be inadequately described by a boolean. Define a new parameter type with three values (disable, new, inherit) to handle these and future cases. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor) Discussed with: rwatson
2009-07-25 14:48:57 +00:00
pr->pr_flags |= PR_IP6_DISABLE;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
free(pr->pr_ip6, M_PRISON);
pr->pr_ip6 = NULL;
}
}
return 0;
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
/*
* Pass back primary IPv6 address for this jail.
*
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
* If not restricted return success but do not alter the address. Caller has
* to make sure to initialize it correctly (e.g. IN6ADDR_ANY_INIT).
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
*
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
* Returns 0 on success, EAFNOSUPPORT if the jail doesn't allow IPv6.
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
*/
int
For consistency with prison_{local,remote,check}_ipN rename prison_getipN to prison_get_ipN. Submitted by: jamie (as part of a larger patch) MFC after: 1 week
2009-01-25 10:11:58 +00:00
prison_get_ip6(struct ucred *cred, struct in6_addr *ia6)
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
{
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
struct prison *pr;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__));
KASSERT(ia6 != NULL, ("%s: ia6 is NULL", __func__));
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
pr = cred->cr_prison;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6))
return (0);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6)) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
return (0);
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (pr->pr_ip6 == NULL) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
return (EAFNOSUPPORT);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
bcopy(&pr->pr_ip6[0], ia6, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
return (0);
}
Add ip4.saddrsel/ip4.nosaddrsel (and equivalent for ip6) to control whether to use source address selection (default) or the primary jail address for unbound outgoing connections. This is intended to be used by people upgrading from single-IP jails to multi-IP jails but not having to change firewall rules, application ACLs, ... but to force their connections (unless otherwise changed) to the primry jail IP they had been used for years, as well as for people prefering to implement similar policies. Note that for IPv6, if configured incorrectly, this might lead to scope violations, which single-IPv6 jails could as well, as by the design of jails. [1] Reviewed by: jamie, hrs (ipv6 part) Pointed out by: hrs [1] MFC After: 2 weeks Asked for by: Jase Thew (bazerka beardz.net)
2010-01-17 12:57:11 +00:00
/*
* Return 1 if we should do proper source address selection or are not jailed.
* We will return 0 if we should bypass source address selection in favour
* of the primary jail IPv6 address. Only in this case *ia will be updated and
* returned in NBO.
* Return EAFNOSUPPORT, in case this jail does not allow IPv6.
*/
int
prison_saddrsel_ip6(struct ucred *cred, struct in6_addr *ia6)
{
struct prison *pr;
struct in6_addr lia6;
int error;
KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__));
KASSERT(ia6 != NULL, ("%s: ia6 is NULL", __func__));
if (!jailed(cred))
return (1);
pr = cred->cr_prison;
if (pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6_SADDRSEL)
return (1);
lia6 = in6addr_any;
error = prison_get_ip6(cred, &lia6);
if (error)
return (error);
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&lia6))
return (1);
bcopy(&lia6, ia6, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
return (0);
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/*
* Return true if pr1 and pr2 have the same IPv6 address restrictions.
*/
int
prison_equal_ip6(struct prison *pr1, struct prison *pr2)
{
if (pr1 == pr2)
return (1);
Don't allow mixing the "vnet" and "ip4/6" jail parameters, since vnet jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:46:59 +00:00
while (pr1 != &prison0 &&
#ifdef VIMAGE
!(pr1->pr_flags & PR_VNET) &&
#endif
!(pr1->pr_flags & PR_IP6_USER))
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
pr1 = pr1->pr_parent;
Don't allow mixing the "vnet" and "ip4/6" jail parameters, since vnet jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-29 16:46:59 +00:00
while (pr2 != &prison0 &&
#ifdef VIMAGE
!(pr2->pr_flags & PR_VNET) &&
#endif
!(pr2->pr_flags & PR_IP6_USER))
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
pr2 = pr2->pr_parent;
return (pr1 == pr2);
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
/*
* Make sure our (source) address is set to something meaningful to this jail.
*
* v6only should be set based on (inp->inp_flags & IN6P_IPV6_V6ONLY != 0)
* when needed while binding.
*
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
* Returns 0 if jail doesn't restrict IPv6 or if address belongs to jail,
* EADDRNOTAVAIL if the address doesn't belong, or EAFNOSUPPORT if the jail
* doesn't allow IPv6.
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
*/
int
prison_local_ip6(struct ucred *cred, struct in6_addr *ia6, int v6only)
{
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
struct prison *pr;
int error;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__));
KASSERT(ia6 != NULL, ("%s: ia6 is NULL", __func__));
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
pr = cred->cr_prison;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6))
return (0);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6)) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
return (0);
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (pr->pr_ip6 == NULL) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
return (EAFNOSUPPORT);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(ia6)) {
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
bcopy(&pr->pr_ip6[0], ia6, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
return (0);
}
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(ia6)) {
/*
* In case there is only 1 IPv6 address, and v6only is true,
* then bind directly.
*/
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (v6only != 0 && pr->pr_ip6s == 1)
bcopy(&pr->pr_ip6[0], ia6, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
return (0);
}
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
error = _prison_check_ip6(pr, ia6);
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
return (error);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
/*
* Rewrite destination address in case we will connect to loopback address.
*
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
* Returns 0 on success, EAFNOSUPPORT if the jail doesn't allow IPv6.
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
*/
int
prison_remote_ip6(struct ucred *cred, struct in6_addr *ia6)
{
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
struct prison *pr;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__));
KASSERT(ia6 != NULL, ("%s: ia6 is NULL", __func__));
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
pr = cred->cr_prison;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6))
return (0);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6)) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
return (0);
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (pr->pr_ip6 == NULL) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
return (EAFNOSUPPORT);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(ia6)) {
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
bcopy(&pr->pr_ip6[0], ia6, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
return (0);
}
/*
* Return success because nothing had to be changed.
*/
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
return (0);
}
/*
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
* Check if given address belongs to the jail referenced by cred/prison.
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
*
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
* Returns 0 if jail doesn't restrict IPv6 or if address belongs to jail,
* EADDRNOTAVAIL if the address doesn't belong, or EAFNOSUPPORT if the jail
* doesn't allow IPv6.
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
*/
static int
_prison_check_ip6(struct prison *pr, struct in6_addr *ia6)
{
int i, a, z, d;
/*
* Check the primary IP.
*/
if (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&pr->pr_ip6[0], ia6))
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
return (0);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
/*
* All the other IPs are sorted so we can do a binary search.
*/
a = 0;
z = pr->pr_ip6s - 2;
while (a <= z) {
i = (a + z) / 2;
d = qcmp_v6(&pr->pr_ip6[i+1], ia6);
if (d > 0)
z = i - 1;
else if (d < 0)
a = i + 1;
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
else
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
return (0);
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
}
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
return (EADDRNOTAVAIL);
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
int
prison_check_ip6(struct ucred *cred, struct in6_addr *ia6)
{
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
struct prison *pr;
int error;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__));
KASSERT(ia6 != NULL, ("%s: ia6 is NULL", __func__));
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
pr = cred->cr_prison;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6))
return (0);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6)) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
return (0);
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (pr->pr_ip6 == NULL) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
return (EAFNOSUPPORT);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
error = _prison_check_ip6(pr, ia6);
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
return (error);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
#endif
Don't allow creating a socket with a protocol family that the current jail doesn't support. This involves a new function prison_check_af, like prison_check_ip[46] but that checks only the family. With this change, most of the errors generated by jailed sockets shouldn't ever occur, at least until jails are changeable. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:15:18 +00:00
/*
* Check if a jail supports the given address family.
*
* Returns 0 if not jailed or the address family is supported, EAFNOSUPPORT
* if not.
*/
int
prison_check_af(struct ucred *cred, int af)
{
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
struct prison *pr;
Don't allow creating a socket with a protocol family that the current jail doesn't support. This involves a new function prison_check_af, like prison_check_ip[46] but that checks only the family. With this change, most of the errors generated by jailed sockets shouldn't ever occur, at least until jails are changeable. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:15:18 +00:00
int error;
KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__));
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
pr = cred->cr_prison;
Wrap a PR_VNET inside "#ifdef VIMAGE" since that the only place it applies. bz wants the blame for this. Noticed by: rwatson Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-24 22:06:56 +00:00
#ifdef VIMAGE
In case of prisons with their own network stack, permit additional privileges as well as not restricting the type of sockets a user can open. Note: the VIMAGE/vnet fetaure of of jails is still considered experimental and cannot guarantee that privileged users can be kept imprisoned if enabled. Reviewed by: rwatson Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-24 21:39:50 +00:00
/* Prisons with their own network stack are not limited. */
Throughout the network stack we have a few places of if (jailed(cred)) left. If you are running with a vnet (virtual network stack) those will return true and defer you to classic IP-jails handling and thus things will be "denied" or returned with an error. Work around this problem by introducing another "jailed()" function, jailed_without_vnet(), that also takes vnets into account, and permits the calls, should the jail from the given cred have its own virtual network stack. We cannot change the classic jailed() call to do that, as it is used outside the network stack as well. Discussed with: julian, zec, jamie, rwatson (back in Sept) MFC after: 5 days
2009-12-13 13:57:32 +00:00
if (prison_owns_vnet(cred))
In case of prisons with their own network stack, permit additional privileges as well as not restricting the type of sockets a user can open. Note: the VIMAGE/vnet fetaure of of jails is still considered experimental and cannot guarantee that privileged users can be kept imprisoned if enabled. Reviewed by: rwatson Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-24 21:39:50 +00:00
return (0);
Wrap a PR_VNET inside "#ifdef VIMAGE" since that the only place it applies. bz wants the blame for this. Noticed by: rwatson Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-24 22:06:56 +00:00
#endif
In case of prisons with their own network stack, permit additional privileges as well as not restricting the type of sockets a user can open. Note: the VIMAGE/vnet fetaure of of jails is still considered experimental and cannot guarantee that privileged users can be kept imprisoned if enabled. Reviewed by: rwatson Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-24 21:39:50 +00:00
Don't allow creating a socket with a protocol family that the current jail doesn't support. This involves a new function prison_check_af, like prison_check_ip[46] but that checks only the family. With this change, most of the errors generated by jailed sockets shouldn't ever occur, at least until jails are changeable. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:15:18 +00:00
error = 0;
switch (af)
{
#ifdef INET
case AF_INET:
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4)
{
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
if ((pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4) && pr->pr_ip4 == NULL)
error = EAFNOSUPPORT;
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
}
Don't allow creating a socket with a protocol family that the current jail doesn't support. This involves a new function prison_check_af, like prison_check_ip[46] but that checks only the family. With this change, most of the errors generated by jailed sockets shouldn't ever occur, at least until jails are changeable. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:15:18 +00:00
break;
#endif
#ifdef INET6
case AF_INET6:
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6)
{
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
if ((pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6) && pr->pr_ip6 == NULL)
error = EAFNOSUPPORT;
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
}
Don't allow creating a socket with a protocol family that the current jail doesn't support. This involves a new function prison_check_af, like prison_check_ip[46] but that checks only the family. With this change, most of the errors generated by jailed sockets shouldn't ever occur, at least until jails are changeable. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:15:18 +00:00
break;
#endif
case AF_LOCAL:
case AF_ROUTE:
break;
default:
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (!(pr->pr_allow & PR_ALLOW_SOCKET_AF))
Don't allow creating a socket with a protocol family that the current jail doesn't support. This involves a new function prison_check_af, like prison_check_ip[46] but that checks only the family. With this change, most of the errors generated by jailed sockets shouldn't ever occur, at least until jails are changeable. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:15:18 +00:00
error = EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
return (error);
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
/*
* Check if given address belongs to the jail referenced by cred (wrapper to
* prison_check_ip[46]).
*
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
* Returns 0 if jail doesn't restrict the address family or if address belongs
* to jail, EADDRNOTAVAIL if the address doesn't belong, or EAFNOSUPPORT if
* the jail doesn't allow the address family. IPv4 Address passed in in NBO.
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
*/
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
int
o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison). o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence. o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code. o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead of struct proc arguments. o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed, rather than directly checking pointers all over the place. o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function. o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h. o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the flag in the process flags field itself. o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect mutex use. Notes: o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required. o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code. o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the structure. Reviewed by: freebsd-arch Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-02-21 06:39:57 +00:00
prison_if(struct ucred *cred, struct sockaddr *sa)
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
{
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#ifdef INET
style(9)
2003-04-28 18:32:19 +00:00
struct sockaddr_in *sai;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#endif
#ifdef INET6
struct sockaddr_in6 *sai6;
#endif
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
int error;
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__));
KASSERT(sa != NULL, ("%s: sa is NULL", __func__));
Throughout the network stack we have a few places of if (jailed(cred)) left. If you are running with a vnet (virtual network stack) those will return true and defer you to classic IP-jails handling and thus things will be "denied" or returned with an error. Work around this problem by introducing another "jailed()" function, jailed_without_vnet(), that also takes vnets into account, and permits the calls, should the jail from the given cred have its own virtual network stack. We cannot change the classic jailed() call to do that, as it is used outside the network stack as well. Discussed with: julian, zec, jamie, rwatson (back in Sept) MFC after: 5 days
2009-12-13 13:57:32 +00:00
#ifdef VIMAGE
if (prison_owns_vnet(cred))
return (0);
#endif
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
error = 0;
switch (sa->sa_family)
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
{
#ifdef INET
case AF_INET:
sai = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
error = prison_check_ip4(cred, &sai->sin_addr);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
break;
#endif
#ifdef INET6
case AF_INET6:
sai6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
error = prison_check_ip6(cred, &sai6->sin6_addr);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
break;
#endif
default:
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (!(cred->cr_prison->pr_allow & PR_ALLOW_SOCKET_AF))
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
error = EAFNOSUPPORT;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or EINVAL. Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-02-05 14:06:09 +00:00
return (error);
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
}
o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison). o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence. o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code. o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead of struct proc arguments. o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed, rather than directly checking pointers all over the place. o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function. o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h. o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the flag in the process flags field itself. o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect mutex use. Notes: o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required. o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code. o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the structure. Reviewed by: freebsd-arch Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-02-21 06:39:57 +00:00
/*
* Return 0 if jails permit p1 to frob p2, otherwise ESRCH.
*/
int
style(9)
2003-04-28 18:32:19 +00:00
prison_check(struct ucred *cred1, struct ucred *cred2)
o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison). o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence. o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code. o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead of struct proc arguments. o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed, rather than directly checking pointers all over the place. o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function. o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h. o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the flag in the process flags field itself. o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect mutex use. Notes: o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required. o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code. o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the structure. Reviewed by: freebsd-arch Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-02-21 06:39:57 +00:00
{
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
return ((cred1->cr_prison == cred2->cr_prison ||
prison_ischild(cred1->cr_prison, cred2->cr_prison)) ? 0 : ESRCH);
}
/*
* Return 1 if p2 is a child of p1, otherwise 0.
*/
int
prison_ischild(struct prison *pr1, struct prison *pr2)
{
o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison). o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence. o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code. o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead of struct proc arguments. o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed, rather than directly checking pointers all over the place. o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function. o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h. o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the flag in the process flags field itself. o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect mutex use. Notes: o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required. o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code. o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the structure. Reviewed by: freebsd-arch Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-02-21 06:39:57 +00:00
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
for (pr2 = pr2->pr_parent; pr2 != NULL; pr2 = pr2->pr_parent)
if (pr1 == pr2)
return (1);
o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison). o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence. o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code. o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead of struct proc arguments. o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed, rather than directly checking pointers all over the place. o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function. o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h. o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the flag in the process flags field itself. o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect mutex use. Notes: o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required. o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code. o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the structure. Reviewed by: freebsd-arch Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-02-21 06:39:57 +00:00
return (0);
}
/*
* Return 1 if the passed credential is in a jail, otherwise 0.
*/
int
style(9)
2003-04-28 18:32:19 +00:00
jailed(struct ucred *cred)
o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison). o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence. o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code. o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead of struct proc arguments. o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed, rather than directly checking pointers all over the place. o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function. o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h. o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the flag in the process flags field itself. o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect mutex use. Notes: o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required. o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code. o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the structure. Reviewed by: freebsd-arch Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-02-21 06:39:57 +00:00
{
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
return (cred->cr_prison != &prison0);
o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison). o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence. o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code. o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead of struct proc arguments. o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed, rather than directly checking pointers all over the place. o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function. o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h. o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the flag in the process flags field itself. o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect mutex use. Notes: o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required. o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code. o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the structure. Reviewed by: freebsd-arch Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-02-21 06:39:57 +00:00
}
Add a function which returns the correct hostname for a given credential. Reviewed by: phk
2002-02-27 14:58:32 +00:00
Throughout the network stack we have a few places of if (jailed(cred)) left. If you are running with a vnet (virtual network stack) those will return true and defer you to classic IP-jails handling and thus things will be "denied" or returned with an error. Work around this problem by introducing another "jailed()" function, jailed_without_vnet(), that also takes vnets into account, and permits the calls, should the jail from the given cred have its own virtual network stack. We cannot change the classic jailed() call to do that, as it is used outside the network stack as well. Discussed with: julian, zec, jamie, rwatson (back in Sept) MFC after: 5 days
2009-12-13 13:57:32 +00:00
/*
* Return 1 if the passed credential is in a jail and that jail does not
* have its own virtual network stack, otherwise 0.
*/
int
jailed_without_vnet(struct ucred *cred)
{
if (!jailed(cred))
return (0);
#ifdef VIMAGE
if (prison_owns_vnet(cred))
return (0);
#endif
return (1);
}
Add a function which returns the correct hostname for a given credential. Reviewed by: phk
2002-02-27 14:58:32 +00:00
/*
Add counterparts to getcredhostname: getcreddomainname, getcredhostuuid, getcredhostid Suggested by: rmacklem Approved by: bz
2009-06-13 00:12:02 +00:00
* Return the correct hostname (domainname, et al) for the passed credential.
Add a function which returns the correct hostname for a given credential. Reviewed by: phk
2002-02-27 14:58:32 +00:00
*/
Make getcredhostname() take a buffer and the buffer's size as arguments. The correct hostname is copied into the buffer while having the prison's lock acquired in a jailed process' case. Reviewed by: jhb, rwatson
2002-02-27 16:43:20 +00:00
void
style(9)
2003-04-28 18:32:19 +00:00
getcredhostname(struct ucred *cred, char *buf, size_t size)
Add a function which returns the correct hostname for a given credential. Reviewed by: phk
2002-02-27 14:58:32 +00:00
{
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
struct prison *pr;
Add a function which returns the correct hostname for a given credential. Reviewed by: phk
2002-02-27 14:58:32 +00:00
Add counterparts to getcredhostname: getcreddomainname, getcredhostuuid, getcredhostid Suggested by: rmacklem Approved by: bz
2009-06-13 00:12:02 +00:00
/*
* A NULL credential can be used to shortcut to the physical
* system's hostname.
*/
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
pr = (cred != NULL) ? cred->cr_prison : &prison0;
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Rename the host-related prison fields to be the same as the host.* parameters they represent, and the variables they replaced, instead of abbreviated versions of them. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-13 15:39:12 +00:00
strlcpy(buf, pr->pr_hostname, size);
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
Add a function which returns the correct hostname for a given credential. Reviewed by: phk
2002-02-27 14:58:32 +00:00
}
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
Add counterparts to getcredhostname: getcreddomainname, getcredhostuuid, getcredhostid Suggested by: rmacklem Approved by: bz
2009-06-13 00:12:02 +00:00
void
getcreddomainname(struct ucred *cred, char *buf, size_t size)
{
mtx_lock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx);
Rename the host-related prison fields to be the same as the host.* parameters they represent, and the variables they replaced, instead of abbreviated versions of them. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-13 15:39:12 +00:00
strlcpy(buf, cred->cr_prison->pr_domainname, size);
Add counterparts to getcredhostname: getcreddomainname, getcredhostuuid, getcredhostid Suggested by: rmacklem Approved by: bz
2009-06-13 00:12:02 +00:00
mtx_unlock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx);
}
void
getcredhostuuid(struct ucred *cred, char *buf, size_t size)
{
mtx_lock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx);
Rename the host-related prison fields to be the same as the host.* parameters they represent, and the variables they replaced, instead of abbreviated versions of them. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-13 15:39:12 +00:00
strlcpy(buf, cred->cr_prison->pr_hostuuid, size);
Add counterparts to getcredhostname: getcreddomainname, getcredhostuuid, getcredhostid Suggested by: rmacklem Approved by: bz
2009-06-13 00:12:02 +00:00
mtx_unlock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx);
}
void
getcredhostid(struct ucred *cred, unsigned long *hostid)
{
mtx_lock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx);
*hostid = cred->cr_prison->pr_hostid;
mtx_unlock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx);
}
Make it possible to change the vnet sysctl variables on jails with their own virtual network stack. Jails only inheriting a network stack cannot change anything that cannot be changed from within a prison. Reviewed by: rwatson, zec Approved by: re (kib)
2009-08-13 10:26:34 +00:00
#ifdef VIMAGE
/*
* Determine whether the prison represented by cred owns
* its vnet rather than having it inherited.
*
* Returns 1 in case the prison owns the vnet, 0 otherwise.
*/
int
prison_owns_vnet(struct ucred *cred)
{
/*
* vnets cannot be added/removed after jail creation,
* so no need to lock here.
*/
return (cred->cr_prison->pr_flags & PR_VNET ? 1 : 0);
}
#endif
By default, when a process in jail calls getfsstat(), only return the data for the file system on which the jail's root vnode is located. Previous behavior (show data for all mountpoints) can be restored by setting security.jail.getfsstatroot_only to 0. Note: this also has the effect of hiding other mounts inside a jail, such as /dev, /tmp, and /proc, but errs on the side of leaking less information.
2004-02-14 18:31:11 +00:00
/*
Rename sysctl security.jail.getfsstatroot_only to security.jail.enforce_statfs and extend its functionality: value policy 0 show all mount-points without any restrictions 1 show only mount-points below jail's chroot and show only part of the mount-point's path (if jail's chroot directory is /jails/foo and mount-point is /jails/foo/usr/home only /usr/home will be shown) 2 show only mount-point where jail's chroot directory is placed. Default value is 2. Discussed with: rwatson
2005-06-09 18:49:19 +00:00
* Determine whether the subject represented by cred can "see"
* status of a mount point.
* Returns: 0 for permitted, ENOENT otherwise.
* XXX: This function should be called cr_canseemount() and should be
* placed in kern_prot.c.
By default, when a process in jail calls getfsstat(), only return the data for the file system on which the jail's root vnode is located. Previous behavior (show data for all mountpoints) can be restored by setting security.jail.getfsstatroot_only to 0. Note: this also has the effect of hiding other mounts inside a jail, such as /dev, /tmp, and /proc, but errs on the side of leaking less information.
2004-02-14 18:31:11 +00:00
*/
int
Rename sysctl security.jail.getfsstatroot_only to security.jail.enforce_statfs and extend its functionality: value policy 0 show all mount-points without any restrictions 1 show only mount-points below jail's chroot and show only part of the mount-point's path (if jail's chroot directory is /jails/foo and mount-point is /jails/foo/usr/home only /usr/home will be shown) 2 show only mount-point where jail's chroot directory is placed. Default value is 2. Discussed with: rwatson
2005-06-09 18:49:19 +00:00
prison_canseemount(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp)
By default, when a process in jail calls getfsstat(), only return the data for the file system on which the jail's root vnode is located. Previous behavior (show data for all mountpoints) can be restored by setting security.jail.getfsstatroot_only to 0. Note: this also has the effect of hiding other mounts inside a jail, such as /dev, /tmp, and /proc, but errs on the side of leaking less information.
2004-02-14 18:31:11 +00:00
{
Rename sysctl security.jail.getfsstatroot_only to security.jail.enforce_statfs and extend its functionality: value policy 0 show all mount-points without any restrictions 1 show only mount-points below jail's chroot and show only part of the mount-point's path (if jail's chroot directory is /jails/foo and mount-point is /jails/foo/usr/home only /usr/home will be shown) 2 show only mount-point where jail's chroot directory is placed. Default value is 2. Discussed with: rwatson
2005-06-09 18:49:19 +00:00
struct prison *pr;
struct statfs *sp;
size_t len;
By default, when a process in jail calls getfsstat(), only return the data for the file system on which the jail's root vnode is located. Previous behavior (show data for all mountpoints) can be restored by setting security.jail.getfsstatroot_only to 0. Note: this also has the effect of hiding other mounts inside a jail, such as /dev, /tmp, and /proc, but errs on the side of leaking less information.
2004-02-14 18:31:11 +00:00
Rename sysctl security.jail.getfsstatroot_only to security.jail.enforce_statfs and extend its functionality: value policy 0 show all mount-points without any restrictions 1 show only mount-points below jail's chroot and show only part of the mount-point's path (if jail's chroot directory is /jails/foo and mount-point is /jails/foo/usr/home only /usr/home will be shown) 2 show only mount-point where jail's chroot directory is placed. Default value is 2. Discussed with: rwatson
2005-06-09 18:49:19 +00:00
pr = cred->cr_prison;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (pr->pr_enforce_statfs == 0)
return (0);
Rename sysctl security.jail.getfsstatroot_only to security.jail.enforce_statfs and extend its functionality: value policy 0 show all mount-points without any restrictions 1 show only mount-points below jail's chroot and show only part of the mount-point's path (if jail's chroot directory is /jails/foo and mount-point is /jails/foo/usr/home only /usr/home will be shown) 2 show only mount-point where jail's chroot directory is placed. Default value is 2. Discussed with: rwatson
2005-06-09 18:49:19 +00:00
if (pr->pr_root->v_mount == mp)
return (0);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (pr->pr_enforce_statfs == 2)
Rename sysctl security.jail.getfsstatroot_only to security.jail.enforce_statfs and extend its functionality: value policy 0 show all mount-points without any restrictions 1 show only mount-points below jail's chroot and show only part of the mount-point's path (if jail's chroot directory is /jails/foo and mount-point is /jails/foo/usr/home only /usr/home will be shown) 2 show only mount-point where jail's chroot directory is placed. Default value is 2. Discussed with: rwatson
2005-06-09 18:49:19 +00:00
return (ENOENT);
/*
* If jail's chroot directory is set to "/" we should be able to see
* all mount-points from inside a jail.
* This is ugly check, but this is the only situation when jail's
* directory ends with '/'.
*/
if (strcmp(pr->pr_path, "/") == 0)
return (0);
len = strlen(pr->pr_path);
sp = &mp->mnt_stat;
if (strncmp(pr->pr_path, sp->f_mntonname, len) != 0)
return (ENOENT);
/*
* Be sure that we don't have situation where jail's root directory
* is "/some/path" and mount point is "/some/pathpath".
*/
if (sp->f_mntonname[len] != '\0' && sp->f_mntonname[len] != '/')
return (ENOENT);
return (0);
}
void
prison_enforce_statfs(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp, struct statfs *sp)
{
char jpath[MAXPATHLEN];
struct prison *pr;
size_t len;
pr = cred->cr_prison;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (pr->pr_enforce_statfs == 0)
return;
Rename sysctl security.jail.getfsstatroot_only to security.jail.enforce_statfs and extend its functionality: value policy 0 show all mount-points without any restrictions 1 show only mount-points below jail's chroot and show only part of the mount-point's path (if jail's chroot directory is /jails/foo and mount-point is /jails/foo/usr/home only /usr/home will be shown) 2 show only mount-point where jail's chroot directory is placed. Default value is 2. Discussed with: rwatson
2005-06-09 18:49:19 +00:00
if (prison_canseemount(cred, mp) != 0) {
bzero(sp->f_mntonname, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
strlcpy(sp->f_mntonname, "[restricted]",
sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
return;
}
if (pr->pr_root->v_mount == mp) {
/*
* Clear current buffer data, so we are sure nothing from
* the valid path left there.
*/
bzero(sp->f_mntonname, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
*sp->f_mntonname = '/';
return;
}
/*
* If jail's chroot directory is set to "/" we should be able to see
* all mount-points from inside a jail.
*/
if (strcmp(pr->pr_path, "/") == 0)
return;
len = strlen(pr->pr_path);
strlcpy(jpath, sp->f_mntonname + len, sizeof(jpath));
/*
* Clear current buffer data, so we are sure nothing from
* the valid path left there.
*/
bzero(sp->f_mntonname, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
if (*jpath == '\0') {
/* Should never happen. */
*sp->f_mntonname = '/';
} else {
strlcpy(sp->f_mntonname, jpath, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
By default, when a process in jail calls getfsstat(), only return the data for the file system on which the jail's root vnode is located. Previous behavior (show data for all mountpoints) can be restored by setting security.jail.getfsstatroot_only to 0. Note: this also has the effect of hiding other mounts inside a jail, such as /dev, /tmp, and /proc, but errs on the side of leaking less information.
2004-02-14 18:31:11 +00:00
}
}
Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability of privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9) interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the existing suser(9) interface: suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv) suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags) A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read before doing so. The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine, rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail is now present in kern_jail.c. The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with root privilege. The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier. This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security policy become more feasible. Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed on: arch@ Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri, Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>, Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>, Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:37:19 +00:00
/*
* Check with permission for a specific privilege is granted within jail. We
* have a specific list of accepted privileges; the rest are denied.
*/
int
prison_priv_check(struct ucred *cred, int priv)
{
if (!jailed(cred))
return (0);
In case of prisons with their own network stack, permit additional privileges as well as not restricting the type of sockets a user can open. Note: the VIMAGE/vnet fetaure of of jails is still considered experimental and cannot guarantee that privileged users can be kept imprisoned if enabled. Reviewed by: rwatson Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-24 21:39:50 +00:00
#ifdef VIMAGE
/*
* Privileges specific to prisons with a virtual network stack.
* There might be a duplicate entry here in case the privilege
* is only granted conditionally in the legacy jail case.
*/
switch (priv) {
#ifdef notyet
/*
* NFS-specific privileges.
*/
case PRIV_NFS_DAEMON:
case PRIV_NFS_LOCKD:
#endif
/*
* Network stack privileges.
*/
case PRIV_NET_BRIDGE:
case PRIV_NET_GRE:
case PRIV_NET_BPF:
case PRIV_NET_RAW: /* Dup, cond. in legacy jail case. */
case PRIV_NET_ROUTE:
case PRIV_NET_TAP:
case PRIV_NET_SETIFMTU:
case PRIV_NET_SETIFFLAGS:
case PRIV_NET_SETIFCAP:
Revised revision 199201 (add interface description capability as inspired by OpenBSD), based on comments from many, including rwatson, jhb, brooks and others. Sponsored by: iXsystems, Inc. MFC after: 1 month
2010-01-27 00:30:07 +00:00
case PRIV_NET_SETIFDESCR:
In case of prisons with their own network stack, permit additional privileges as well as not restricting the type of sockets a user can open. Note: the VIMAGE/vnet fetaure of of jails is still considered experimental and cannot guarantee that privileged users can be kept imprisoned if enabled. Reviewed by: rwatson Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-24 21:39:50 +00:00
case PRIV_NET_SETIFNAME :
case PRIV_NET_SETIFMETRIC:
case PRIV_NET_SETIFPHYS:
case PRIV_NET_SETIFMAC:
case PRIV_NET_ADDMULTI:
case PRIV_NET_DELMULTI:
case PRIV_NET_HWIOCTL:
case PRIV_NET_SETLLADDR:
case PRIV_NET_ADDIFGROUP:
case PRIV_NET_DELIFGROUP:
case PRIV_NET_IFCREATE:
case PRIV_NET_IFDESTROY:
case PRIV_NET_ADDIFADDR:
case PRIV_NET_DELIFADDR:
case PRIV_NET_LAGG:
case PRIV_NET_GIF:
case PRIV_NET_SETIFVNET:
Add infrastructure to allow all frames/packets received on an interface to be assigned to a non-default FIB instance. You may need to recompile world or ports due to the change of struct ifnet. Submitted by: cjsp Submitted by: Alexander V. Chernikov (melifaro ipfw.ru) (original versions) Reviewed by: julian Reviewed by: Alexander V. Chernikov (melifaro ipfw.ru) MFC after: 2 weeks X-MFC: use spare in struct ifnet
2011-07-03 12:22:02 +00:00
case PRIV_NET_SETIFFIB:
In case of prisons with their own network stack, permit additional privileges as well as not restricting the type of sockets a user can open. Note: the VIMAGE/vnet fetaure of of jails is still considered experimental and cannot guarantee that privileged users can be kept imprisoned if enabled. Reviewed by: rwatson Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-24 21:39:50 +00:00
/*
* 802.11-related privileges.
*/
case PRIV_NET80211_GETKEY:
#ifdef notyet
case PRIV_NET80211_MANAGE: /* XXX-BZ discuss with sam@ */
#endif
#ifdef notyet
/*
* AppleTalk privileges.
*/
case PRIV_NETATALK_RESERVEDPORT:
/*
* ATM privileges.
*/
case PRIV_NETATM_CFG:
case PRIV_NETATM_ADD:
case PRIV_NETATM_DEL:
case PRIV_NETATM_SET:
/*
* Bluetooth privileges.
*/
case PRIV_NETBLUETOOTH_RAW:
#endif
/*
* Netgraph and netgraph module privileges.
*/
case PRIV_NETGRAPH_CONTROL:
#ifdef notyet
case PRIV_NETGRAPH_TTY:
#endif
/*
* IPv4 and IPv6 privileges.
*/
case PRIV_NETINET_IPFW:
case PRIV_NETINET_DIVERT:
case PRIV_NETINET_PF:
case PRIV_NETINET_DUMMYNET:
case PRIV_NETINET_CARP:
case PRIV_NETINET_MROUTE:
case PRIV_NETINET_RAW:
case PRIV_NETINET_ADDRCTRL6:
case PRIV_NETINET_ND6:
case PRIV_NETINET_SCOPE6:
case PRIV_NETINET_ALIFETIME6:
case PRIV_NETINET_IPSEC:
case PRIV_NETINET_BINDANY:
#ifdef notyet
/*
* IPX/SPX privileges.
*/
case PRIV_NETIPX_RESERVEDPORT:
case PRIV_NETIPX_RAW:
/*
* NCP privileges.
*/
case PRIV_NETNCP:
/*
* SMB privileges.
*/
case PRIV_NETSMB:
#endif
/*
* No default: or deny here.
* In case of no permit fall through to next switch().
*/
if (cred->cr_prison->pr_flags & PR_VNET)
return (0);
}
#endif /* VIMAGE */
Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability of privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9) interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the existing suser(9) interface: suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv) suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags) A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read before doing so. The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine, rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail is now present in kern_jail.c. The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with root privilege. The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier. This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security policy become more feasible. Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed on: arch@ Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri, Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>, Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>, Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:37:19 +00:00
switch (priv) {
/*
* Allow ktrace privileges for root in jail.
*/
case PRIV_KTRACE:
For now, reflect practical reality that Audit system calls aren't allowed in Jail: return a privilege error.
2007-02-19 13:10:29 +00:00
#if 0
Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability of privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9) interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the existing suser(9) interface: suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv) suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags) A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read before doing so. The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine, rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail is now present in kern_jail.c. The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with root privilege. The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier. This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security policy become more feasible. Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed on: arch@ Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri, Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>, Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>, Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:37:19 +00:00
/*
* Allow jailed processes to configure audit identity and
* submit audit records (login, etc). In the future we may
* want to further refine the relationship between audit and
* jail.
*/
case PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT:
case PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT:
case PRIV_AUDIT_SUBMIT:
For now, reflect practical reality that Audit system calls aren't allowed in Jail: return a privilege error.
2007-02-19 13:10:29 +00:00
#endif
Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability of privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9) interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the existing suser(9) interface: suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv) suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags) A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read before doing so. The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine, rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail is now present in kern_jail.c. The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with root privilege. The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier. This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security policy become more feasible. Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed on: arch@ Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri, Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>, Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>, Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:37:19 +00:00
/*
* Allow jailed processes to manipulate process UNIX
* credentials in any way they see fit.
*/
case PRIV_CRED_SETUID:
case PRIV_CRED_SETEUID:
case PRIV_CRED_SETGID:
case PRIV_CRED_SETEGID:
case PRIV_CRED_SETGROUPS:
case PRIV_CRED_SETREUID:
case PRIV_CRED_SETREGID:
case PRIV_CRED_SETRESUID:
case PRIV_CRED_SETRESGID:
/*
* Jail implements visibility constraints already, so allow
* jailed root to override uid/gid-based constraints.
*/
case PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS:
case PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS:
/*
* Jail implements inter-process debugging limits already, so
* allow jailed root various debugging privileges.
*/
case PRIV_DEBUG_DIFFCRED:
case PRIV_DEBUG_SUGID:
case PRIV_DEBUG_UNPRIV:
/*
* Allow jail to set various resource limits and login
* properties, and for now, exceed process resource limits.
*/
case PRIV_PROC_LIMIT:
case PRIV_PROC_SETLOGIN:
case PRIV_PROC_SETRLIMIT:
/*
* System V and POSIX IPC privileges are granted in jail.
*/
case PRIV_IPC_READ:
case PRIV_IPC_WRITE:
case PRIV_IPC_ADMIN:
case PRIV_IPC_MSGSIZE:
case PRIV_MQ_ADMIN:
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/*
* Jail operations within a jail work on child jails.
*/
case PRIV_JAIL_ATTACH:
case PRIV_JAIL_SET:
case PRIV_JAIL_REMOVE:
Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability of privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9) interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the existing suser(9) interface: suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv) suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags) A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read before doing so. The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine, rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail is now present in kern_jail.c. The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with root privilege. The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier. This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security policy become more feasible. Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed on: arch@ Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri, Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>, Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>, Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:37:19 +00:00
/*
* Jail implements its own inter-process limits, so allow
* root processes in jail to change scheduling on other
* processes in the same jail. Likewise for signalling.
*/
case PRIV_SCHED_DIFFCRED:
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
case PRIV_SCHED_CPUSET:
Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability of privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9) interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the existing suser(9) interface: suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv) suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags) A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read before doing so. The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine, rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail is now present in kern_jail.c. The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with root privilege. The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier. This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security policy become more feasible. Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed on: arch@ Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri, Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>, Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>, Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:37:19 +00:00
case PRIV_SIGNAL_DIFFCRED:
case PRIV_SIGNAL_SUGID:
/*
* Allow jailed processes to write to sysctls marked as jail
* writable.
*/
case PRIV_SYSCTL_WRITEJAIL:
/*
* Allow root in jail to manage a variety of quota
Limit quota privileges in jail to PRIV_UFS_GETQUOTA and PRIV_UFS_SETQUOTA.
2007-02-19 13:26:39 +00:00
* properties. These should likely be conditional on a
* configuration option.
Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability of privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9) interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the existing suser(9) interface: suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv) suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags) A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read before doing so. The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine, rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail is now present in kern_jail.c. The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with root privilege. The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier. This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security policy become more feasible. Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed on: arch@ Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri, Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>, Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>, Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:37:19 +00:00
*/
Rename three quota privileges from the UFS privilege namespace to the VFS privilege namespace: exceedquota, getquota, and setquota. Leave UFS-specific quota configuration privileges in the UFS name space. This renumbers VFS and UFS privileges, so requires rebuilding modules if you are using security policies aware of privilege identifiers. This is likely no one at this point since none of the committed MAC policies use the privilege checks.
2007-02-19 13:33:10 +00:00
case PRIV_VFS_GETQUOTA:
case PRIV_VFS_SETQUOTA:
Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability of privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9) interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the existing suser(9) interface: suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv) suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags) A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read before doing so. The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine, rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail is now present in kern_jail.c. The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with root privilege. The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier. This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security policy become more feasible. Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed on: arch@ Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri, Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>, Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>, Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:37:19 +00:00
/*
* Since Jail relies on chroot() to implement file system
* protections, grant many VFS privileges to root in jail.
* Be careful to exclude mount-related and NFS-related
* privileges.
*/
case PRIV_VFS_READ:
case PRIV_VFS_WRITE:
case PRIV_VFS_ADMIN:
case PRIV_VFS_EXEC:
case PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP:
case PRIV_VFS_BLOCKRESERVE: /* XXXRW: Slightly surprising. */
case PRIV_VFS_CHFLAGS_DEV:
case PRIV_VFS_CHOWN:
case PRIV_VFS_CHROOT:
Rename PRIV_VFS_CLEARSUGID to PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID, which seems to better describe the privilege. OK'ed by: rwatson
2007-03-01 20:47:42 +00:00
case PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID:
Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability of privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9) interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the existing suser(9) interface: suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv) suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags) A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read before doing so. The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine, rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail is now present in kern_jail.c. The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with root privilege. The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier. This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security policy become more feasible. Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed on: arch@ Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri, Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>, Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>, Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:37:19 +00:00
case PRIV_VFS_FCHROOT:
case PRIV_VFS_LINK:
case PRIV_VFS_SETGID:
Add PRIV_VFS_STAT privilege, which will allow overriding policy limits on the right to stat() a file, such as in mac_bsdextended. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 3 months
2007-10-21 22:50:11 +00:00
case PRIV_VFS_STAT:
Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability of privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9) interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the existing suser(9) interface: suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv) suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags) A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read before doing so. The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine, rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail is now present in kern_jail.c. The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with root privilege. The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier. This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security policy become more feasible. Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed on: arch@ Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri, Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>, Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>, Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:37:19 +00:00
case PRIV_VFS_STICKYFILE:
return (0);
/*
* Depending on the global setting, allow privilege of
* setting system flags.
*/
case PRIV_VFS_SYSFLAGS:
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (cred->cr_prison->pr_allow & PR_ALLOW_CHFLAGS)
Add security.jail.mount_allowed sysctl, which allows to mount and unmount jail-friendly file systems from within a jail. Precisely it grants PRIV_VFS_MOUNT, PRIV_VFS_UNMOUNT and PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_NONUSER privileges for a jailed super-user. It is turned off by default. A jail-friendly file system is a file system which driver registers itself with VFCF_JAIL flag via VFS_SET(9) API. The lsvfs(1) command can be used to see which file systems are jail-friendly ones. There currently no jail-friendly file systems, ZFS will be the first one. In the future we may consider marking file systems like nullfs as jail-friendly. Reviewed by: rwatson
2007-04-05 21:03:05 +00:00
return (0);
else
return (EPERM);
/*
* Depending on the global setting, allow privilege of
* mounting/unmounting file systems.
*/
case PRIV_VFS_MOUNT:
case PRIV_VFS_UNMOUNT:
case PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_NONUSER:
Fix jails and jail-friendly file systems handling: - We need to allow for PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_OWNER inside a jail. - Move security checks to vfs_suser() and deny unmounting and updating for jailed root from different jails, etc. OK'ed by: rwatson
2007-04-13 23:54:22 +00:00
case PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_OWNER:
Always disable mount and unmount for jails with enforce_statfs==2. A working statfs(2) is required for umount(8) in jail. Reviewed by: pjd, kib Approved by: re (kib) MFC after: 2 weeks
2011-08-02 19:44:40 +00:00
if (cred->cr_prison->pr_allow & PR_ALLOW_MOUNT &&
cred->cr_prison->pr_enforce_statfs < 2)
Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability of privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9) interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the existing suser(9) interface: suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv) suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags) A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read before doing so. The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine, rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail is now present in kern_jail.c. The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with root privilege. The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier. This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security policy become more feasible. Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed on: arch@ Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri, Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>, Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>, Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:37:19 +00:00
return (0);
else
return (EPERM);
/*
Allow PRIV_NETINET_REUSEPORT in jail.
2007-04-10 15:59:49 +00:00
* Allow jailed root to bind reserved ports and reuse in-use
* ports.
Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability of privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9) interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the existing suser(9) interface: suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv) suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags) A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read before doing so. The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine, rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail is now present in kern_jail.c. The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with root privilege. The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier. This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security policy become more feasible. Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed on: arch@ Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri, Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>, Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>, Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:37:19 +00:00
*/
case PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT:
Allow PRIV_NETINET_REUSEPORT in jail.
2007-04-10 15:59:49 +00:00
case PRIV_NETINET_REUSEPORT:
Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability of privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9) interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the existing suser(9) interface: suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv) suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags) A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read before doing so. The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine, rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail is now present in kern_jail.c. The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with root privilege. The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier. This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security policy become more feasible. Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed on: arch@ Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri, Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>, Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>, Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:37:19 +00:00
return (0);
Replace the last susers calls in netinet6/ with privilege checks. Introduce a new privilege allowing to set certain IP header options (hop-by-hop, routing headers). Leave a few comments to be addressed later. Reviewed by: rwatson (older version, before addressing his comments)
2008-01-24 08:25:59 +00:00
/*
* Allow jailed root to set certian IPv4/6 (option) headers.
*/
case PRIV_NETINET_SETHDROPTS:
return (0);
Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability of privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9) interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the existing suser(9) interface: suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv) suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags) A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read before doing so. The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine, rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail is now present in kern_jail.c. The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with root privilege. The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier. This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security policy become more feasible. Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed on: arch@ Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri, Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>, Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>, Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:37:19 +00:00
/*
* Conditionally allow creating raw sockets in jail.
*/
case PRIV_NETINET_RAW:
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (cred->cr_prison->pr_allow & PR_ALLOW_RAW_SOCKETS)
Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability of privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9) interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the existing suser(9) interface: suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv) suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags) A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read before doing so. The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine, rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail is now present in kern_jail.c. The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with root privilege. The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier. This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security policy become more feasible. Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed on: arch@ Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri, Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>, Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>, Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:37:19 +00:00
return (0);
else
return (EPERM);
/*
* Since jail implements its own visibility limits on netstat
* sysctls, allow getcred. This allows identd to work in
* jail.
*/
case PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED:
return (0);
Add two new system calls, setloginclass(2) and getloginclass(2). This makes it possible for the kernel to track login class the process is assigned to, which is required for RCTL. This change also make setusercontext(3) call setloginclass(2) and makes it possible to retrieve current login class using id(1). Reviewed by: kib (as part of a larger patch)
2011-03-05 12:40:35 +00:00
/*
* Allow jailed root to set loginclass.
*/
case PRIV_PROC_SETLOGINCLASS:
return (0);
Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability of privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9) interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the existing suser(9) interface: suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv) suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags) A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read before doing so. The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine, rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail is now present in kern_jail.c. The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with root privilege. The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier. This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security policy become more feasible. Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed on: arch@ Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri, Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>, Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>, Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:37:19 +00:00
default:
/*
* In all remaining cases, deny the privilege request. This
* includes almost all network privileges, many system
* configuration privileges.
*/
return (EPERM);
}
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/*
* Return the part of pr2's name that is relative to pr1, or the whole name
* if it does not directly follow.
*/
char *
prison_name(struct prison *pr1, struct prison *pr2)
{
char *name;
/* Jails see themselves as "0" (if they see themselves at all). */
if (pr1 == pr2)
return "0";
name = pr2->pr_name;
if (prison_ischild(pr1, pr2)) {
/*
* pr1 isn't locked (and allprison_lock may not be either)
* so its length can't be counted on. But the number of dots
* can be counted on - and counted.
*/
for (; pr1 != &prison0; pr1 = pr1->pr_parent)
name = strchr(name, '.') + 1;
}
return (name);
}
/*
* Return the part of pr2's path that is relative to pr1, or the whole path
* if it does not directly follow.
*/
static char *
prison_path(struct prison *pr1, struct prison *pr2)
{
char *path1, *path2;
int len1;
path1 = pr1->pr_path;
path2 = pr2->pr_path;
if (!strcmp(path1, "/"))
return (path2);
len1 = strlen(path1);
if (strncmp(path1, path2, len1))
return (path2);
if (path2[len1] == '\0')
return "/";
if (path2[len1] == '/')
return (path2 + len1);
return (path2);
}
/*
* Jail-related sysctls.
*/
Mark all SYSCTL_NODEs static that have no corresponding SYSCTL_DECLs. The SYSCTL_NODE macro defines a list that stores all child-elements of that node. If there's no SYSCTL_DECL macro anywhere else, there's no reason why it shouldn't be static.
2011-11-07 15:43:11 +00:00
static SYSCTL_NODE(_security, OID_AUTO, jail, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
"Jails");
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
static int
sysctl_jail_list(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
struct xprison *xp;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
struct prison *pr, *cpr;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
#ifdef INET
struct in_addr *ip4 = NULL;
int ip4s = 0;
#endif
#ifdef INET6
Declare ip6 as (struct in6_addr *) instead of (struct in_addr *). This is a harmless bug since we never actually use ip6 as anything other than an opaque pointer. Found with: Coverty Prevent(tm) CID: 4319 MFC after: 1 month
2010-06-04 14:38:24 +00:00
struct in6_addr *ip6 = NULL;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
int ip6s = 0;
#endif
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
int descend, error;
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
xp = malloc(sizeof(*xp), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
pr = req->td->td_ucred->cr_prison;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
error = 0;
Implement functionality I called 'jail services'. It may be used for external modules to attach some data to jail's in-kernel structure. - Change allprison_mtx mutex to allprison_sx sx(9) lock. We will need to call external functions while holding this lock, which may want to allocate memory. Make use of the fact that this is shared-exclusive lock and use shared version when possible. - Implement the following functions: prison_service_register() - registers a service that wants to be noticed when a jail is created and destroyed prison_service_deregister() - deregisters service prison_service_data_add() - adds service-specific data to the jail structure prison_service_data_get() - takes service-specific data from the jail structure prison_service_data_del() - removes service-specific data from the jail structure Reviewed by: rwatson
2007-04-05 23:19:13 +00:00
sx_slock(&allprison_lock);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT(pr, cpr, descend) {
#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6)
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
again:
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
#endif
mtx_lock(&cpr->pr_mtx);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#ifdef INET
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (cpr->pr_ip4s > 0) {
if (ip4s < cpr->pr_ip4s) {
ip4s = cpr->pr_ip4s;
mtx_unlock(&cpr->pr_mtx);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
ip4 = realloc(ip4, ip4s *
sizeof(struct in_addr), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
goto again;
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
bcopy(cpr->pr_ip4, ip4,
cpr->pr_ip4s * sizeof(struct in_addr));
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#endif
#ifdef INET6
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (cpr->pr_ip6s > 0) {
if (ip6s < cpr->pr_ip6s) {
ip6s = cpr->pr_ip6s;
mtx_unlock(&cpr->pr_mtx);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
ip6 = realloc(ip6, ip6s *
sizeof(struct in6_addr), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
goto again;
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
bcopy(cpr->pr_ip6, ip6,
cpr->pr_ip6s * sizeof(struct in6_addr));
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#endif
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (cpr->pr_ref == 0) {
mtx_unlock(&cpr->pr_mtx);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
continue;
}
bzero(xp, sizeof(*xp));
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
xp->pr_version = XPRISON_VERSION;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
xp->pr_id = cpr->pr_id;
xp->pr_state = cpr->pr_uref > 0
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
? PRISON_STATE_ALIVE : PRISON_STATE_DYING;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
strlcpy(xp->pr_path, prison_path(pr, cpr), sizeof(xp->pr_path));
Rename the host-related prison fields to be the same as the host.* parameters they represent, and the variables they replaced, instead of abbreviated versions of them. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-13 15:39:12 +00:00
strlcpy(xp->pr_host, cpr->pr_hostname, sizeof(xp->pr_host));
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
strlcpy(xp->pr_name, prison_name(pr, cpr), sizeof(xp->pr_name));
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#ifdef INET
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
xp->pr_ip4s = cpr->pr_ip4s;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#endif
#ifdef INET6
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
xp->pr_ip6s = cpr->pr_ip6s;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#endif
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
mtx_unlock(&cpr->pr_mtx);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, xp, sizeof(*xp));
if (error)
break;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#ifdef INET
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (xp->pr_ip4s > 0) {
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, ip4,
xp->pr_ip4s * sizeof(struct in_addr));
if (error)
break;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
#endif
#ifdef INET6
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
if (xp->pr_ip6s > 0) {
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, ip6,
xp->pr_ip6s * sizeof(struct in6_addr));
if (error)
break;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
#endif
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
}
Implement functionality I called 'jail services'. It may be used for external modules to attach some data to jail's in-kernel structure. - Change allprison_mtx mutex to allprison_sx sx(9) lock. We will need to call external functions while holding this lock, which may want to allocate memory. Make use of the fact that this is shared-exclusive lock and use shared version when possible. - Implement the following functions: prison_service_register() - registers a service that wants to be noticed when a jail is created and destroyed prison_service_deregister() - deregisters service prison_service_data_add() - adds service-specific data to the jail structure prison_service_data_get() - takes service-specific data from the jail structure prison_service_data_del() - removes service-specific data from the jail structure Reviewed by: rwatson
2007-04-05 23:19:13 +00:00
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
free(xp, M_TEMP);
#ifdef INET
free(ip4, M_TEMP);
#endif
#ifdef INET6
free(ip6, M_TEMP);
#endif
Minor simplification.
2007-03-09 05:22:10 +00:00
return (error);
o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store the chroot() point of each jail. o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail. o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified vnode. o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls to callers of change_dir(). o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails. Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
}
Mark most often used sysctl's as MPSAFE. After running a `make buildkernel', I noticed most of the Giant locks in sysctl are only caused by a very small amount of sysctl's: - sysctl.name2oid. This one is locked by SYSCTL_LOCK, just like sysctl.oidfmt. - kern.ident, kern.osrelease, kern.version, etc. These are just constant strings. - kern.arandom, used by the stack protector. It is already protected by arc4_mtx. I also saw the following sysctl's show up. Not as often as the ones above, but still quite often: - security.jail.jailed. Also mark security.jail.list as MPSAFE. They don't need locking or already use allprison_lock. - kern.devname, used by devname(3), ttyname(3), etc. This seems to reduce Giant locking inside sysctl by ~75% in my primitive test setup.
2009-01-28 19:58:05 +00:00
SYSCTL_OID(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, list,
CTLTYPE_STRUCT | CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, 0,
sysctl_jail_list, "S", "List of active jails");
Added sysctl security.jail.jailed. It returns 1 is process is inside of jail and 0 if it is not. Information if we are in jail or not is not a secret, there is plenty of ways to discover it. Many people are using own hack to check this and this will be a legal way from now on. It will be great if our starting scripts will take advantage of this sysctl to allow clean "boot" inside jail. Approved by: rwatson, scottl (mentor)
2004-02-19 14:29:14 +00:00
static int
sysctl_jail_jailed(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
int error, injail;
injail = jailed(req->td->td_ucred);
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &injail, sizeof(injail));
return (error);
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
Mark most often used sysctl's as MPSAFE. After running a `make buildkernel', I noticed most of the Giant locks in sysctl are only caused by a very small amount of sysctl's: - sysctl.name2oid. This one is locked by SYSCTL_LOCK, just like sysctl.oidfmt. - kern.ident, kern.osrelease, kern.version, etc. These are just constant strings. - kern.arandom, used by the stack protector. It is already protected by arc4_mtx. I also saw the following sysctl's show up. Not as often as the ones above, but still quite often: - security.jail.jailed. Also mark security.jail.list as MPSAFE. They don't need locking or already use allprison_lock. - kern.devname, used by devname(3), ttyname(3), etc. This seems to reduce Giant locking inside sysctl by ~75% in my primitive test setup.
2009-01-28 19:58:05 +00:00
SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, jailed,
CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, 0,
sysctl_jail_jailed, "I", "Process in jail?");
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6)
Fix some overflow errors: a signed allocation and an insufficiant array size. Reported by: pho Tested by: pho Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-09 22:09:29 +00:00
SYSCTL_UINT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, jail_max_af_ips, CTLFLAG_RW,
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
&jail_max_af_ips, 0,
"Number of IP addresses a jail may have at most per address family");
#endif
/*
* Default parameters for jail(2) compatability. For historical reasons,
* the sysctl names have varying similarity to the parameter names. Prisons
* just see their own parameters, and can't change them.
*/
static int
sysctl_jail_default_allow(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
struct prison *pr;
int allow, error, i;
pr = req->td->td_ucred->cr_prison;
allow = (pr == &prison0) ? jail_default_allow : pr->pr_allow;
/* Get the current flag value, and convert it to a boolean. */
i = (allow & arg2) ? 1 : 0;
if (arg1 != NULL)
i = !i;
error = sysctl_handle_int(oidp, &i, 0, req);
if (error || !req->newptr)
return (error);
i = i ? arg2 : 0;
if (arg1 != NULL)
i ^= arg2;
/*
* The sysctls don't have CTLFLAGS_PRISON, so assume prison0
* for writing.
*/
mtx_lock(&prison0.pr_mtx);
jail_default_allow = (jail_default_allow & ~arg2) | i;
mtx_unlock(&prison0.pr_mtx);
return (0);
}
SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, set_hostname_allowed,
CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
NULL, PR_ALLOW_SET_HOSTNAME, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I",
"Processes in jail can set their hostnames");
SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, socket_unixiproute_only,
CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
(void *)1, PR_ALLOW_SOCKET_AF, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I",
"Processes in jail are limited to creating UNIX/IP/route sockets only");
SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, sysvipc_allowed,
CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
NULL, PR_ALLOW_SYSVIPC, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I",
"Processes in jail can use System V IPC primitives");
SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, allow_raw_sockets,
CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
NULL, PR_ALLOW_RAW_SOCKETS, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I",
"Prison root can create raw sockets");
SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, chflags_allowed,
CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
NULL, PR_ALLOW_CHFLAGS, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I",
"Processes in jail can alter system file flags");
SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, mount_allowed,
CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
NULL, PR_ALLOW_MOUNT, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I",
"Processes in jail can mount/unmount jail-friendly file systems");
static int
sysctl_jail_default_level(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
struct prison *pr;
int level, error;
pr = req->td->td_ucred->cr_prison;
level = (pr == &prison0) ? *(int *)arg1 : *(int *)((char *)pr + arg2);
error = sysctl_handle_int(oidp, &level, 0, req);
if (error || !req->newptr)
return (error);
*(int *)arg1 = level;
return (0);
}
SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, enforce_statfs,
CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
&jail_default_enforce_statfs, offsetof(struct prison, pr_enforce_statfs),
sysctl_jail_default_level, "I",
"Processes in jail cannot see all mounted file systems");
/*
* Nodes to describe jail parameters. Maximum length of string parameters
* is returned in the string itself, and the other parameters exist merely
* to make themselves and their types known.
*/
SYSCTL_NODE(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, param, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
"Jail parameters");
int
sysctl_jail_param(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
int i;
long l;
size_t s;
char numbuf[12];
switch (oidp->oid_kind & CTLTYPE)
{
case CTLTYPE_LONG:
case CTLTYPE_ULONG:
l = 0;
#ifdef SCTL_MASK32
if (!(req->flags & SCTL_MASK32))
#endif
return (SYSCTL_OUT(req, &l, sizeof(l)));
case CTLTYPE_INT:
case CTLTYPE_UINT:
i = 0;
return (SYSCTL_OUT(req, &i, sizeof(i)));
case CTLTYPE_STRING:
- Merge changes to the base system to support OFED. These include a wider arg2 for sysctl, updates to vlan code, IFT_INFINIBAND, and other miscellaneous small features.
2011-03-21 09:40:01 +00:00
snprintf(numbuf, sizeof(numbuf), "%jd", (intmax_t)arg2);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
return
(sysctl_handle_string(oidp, numbuf, sizeof(numbuf), req));
case CTLTYPE_STRUCT:
s = (size_t)arg2;
return (SYSCTL_OUT(req, &s, sizeof(s)));
}
return (0);
}
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, jid, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RDTUN, "I", "Jail ID");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, parent, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RD, "I", "Jail parent ID");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(, name, CTLFLAG_RW, MAXHOSTNAMELEN, "Jail name");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(, path, CTLFLAG_RDTUN, MAXPATHLEN, "Jail root path");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, securelevel, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW,
"I", "Jail secure level");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, enforce_statfs, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW,
"I", "Jail cannot see all mounted file systems");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, persist, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW,
"B", "Jail persistence");
Manage vnets via the jail system. If a jail is given the boolean parameter "vnet" when it is created, a new vnet instance will be created along with the jail. Networks interfaces can be moved between prisons with an ioctl similar to the one that moves them between vimages. For now vnets will co-exist under both jails and vimages, but soon struct vimage will be going away. Reviewed by: zec, julian Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-15 18:59:29 +00:00
#ifdef VIMAGE
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, vnet, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
Some jail parameters (in particular, "ip4" and "ip6" for IP address restrictions) were found to be inadequately described by a boolean. Define a new parameter type with three values (disable, new, inherit) to handle these and future cases. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor) Discussed with: rwatson
2009-07-25 14:48:57 +00:00
"E,jailsys", "Virtual network stack");
Manage vnets via the jail system. If a jail is given the boolean parameter "vnet" when it is created, a new vnet instance will be created along with the jail. Networks interfaces can be moved between prisons with an ioctl similar to the one that moves them between vimages. For now vnets will co-exist under both jails and vimages, but soon struct vimage will be going away. Reviewed by: zec, julian Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-15 18:59:29 +00:00
#endif
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, dying, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RD,
"B", "Jail is in the process of shutting down");
Add a limit for child jails via the "children.cur" and "children.max" parameters. This replaces the simple "allow.jails" permission. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-23 20:35:51 +00:00
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_NODE(children, "Number of child jails");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_children, cur, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RD,
"I", "Current number of child jails");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_children, max, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW,
"I", "Maximum number of child jails");
Some jail parameters (in particular, "ip4" and "ip6" for IP address restrictions) were found to be inadequately described by a boolean. Define a new parameter type with three values (disable, new, inherit) to handle these and future cases. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor) Discussed with: rwatson
2009-07-25 14:48:57 +00:00
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_SYS_NODE(host, CTLFLAG_RW, "Jail host info");
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(_host, hostname, CTLFLAG_RW, MAXHOSTNAMELEN,
"Jail hostname");
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(_host, domainname, CTLFLAG_RW, MAXHOSTNAMELEN,
"Jail NIS domainname");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(_host, hostuuid, CTLFLAG_RW, HOSTUUIDLEN,
"Jail host UUID");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_host, hostid, CTLTYPE_ULONG | CTLFLAG_RW,
"LU", "Jail host ID");
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_NODE(cpuset, "Jail cpuset");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_cpuset, id, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RD, "I", "Jail cpuset ID");
#ifdef INET
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_SYS_NODE(ip4, CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
"Jail IPv4 address virtualization");
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRUCT(_ip4, addr, CTLFLAG_RW, sizeof(struct in_addr),
"S,in_addr,a", "Jail IPv4 addresses");
Add ip4.saddrsel/ip4.nosaddrsel (and equivalent for ip6) to control whether to use source address selection (default) or the primary jail address for unbound outgoing connections. This is intended to be used by people upgrading from single-IP jails to multi-IP jails but not having to change firewall rules, application ACLs, ... but to force their connections (unless otherwise changed) to the primry jail IP they had been used for years, as well as for people prefering to implement similar policies. Note that for IPv6, if configured incorrectly, this might lead to scope violations, which single-IPv6 jails could as well, as by the design of jails. [1] Reviewed by: jamie, hrs (ipv6 part) Pointed out by: hrs [1] MFC After: 2 weeks Asked for by: Jase Thew (bazerka beardz.net)
2010-01-17 12:57:11 +00:00
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_ip4, saddrsel, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW,
"B", "Do (not) use IPv4 source address selection rather than the "
"primary jail IPv4 address.");
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
#endif
#ifdef INET6
Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with jails: Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed, but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question (PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked without locking. This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list. PR: kern/136899 Reported by: Dirk Meyer Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
2009-07-30 14:28:56 +00:00
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_SYS_NODE(ip6, CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
"Jail IPv6 address virtualization");
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRUCT(_ip6, addr, CTLFLAG_RW, sizeof(struct in6_addr),
"S,in6_addr,a", "Jail IPv6 addresses");
Add ip4.saddrsel/ip4.nosaddrsel (and equivalent for ip6) to control whether to use source address selection (default) or the primary jail address for unbound outgoing connections. This is intended to be used by people upgrading from single-IP jails to multi-IP jails but not having to change firewall rules, application ACLs, ... but to force their connections (unless otherwise changed) to the primry jail IP they had been used for years, as well as for people prefering to implement similar policies. Note that for IPv6, if configured incorrectly, this might lead to scope violations, which single-IPv6 jails could as well, as by the design of jails. [1] Reviewed by: jamie, hrs (ipv6 part) Pointed out by: hrs [1] MFC After: 2 weeks Asked for by: Jase Thew (bazerka beardz.net)
2010-01-17 12:57:11 +00:00
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_ip6, saddrsel, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW,
"B", "Do (not) use IPv6 source address selection rather than the "
"primary jail IPv6 address.");
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
#endif
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_NODE(allow, "Jail permission flags");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, set_hostname, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW,
"B", "Jail may set hostname");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, sysvipc, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW,
"B", "Jail may use SYSV IPC");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, raw_sockets, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW,
"B", "Jail may create raw sockets");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, chflags, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW,
"B", "Jail may alter system file flags");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, mount, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW,
"B", "Jail may mount/unmount jail-friendly file systems");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, quotas, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW,
"B", "Jail may set file quotas");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, socket_af, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW,
"B", "Jail may create sockets other than just UNIX/IPv4/IPv6/route");
Add racct. It's an API to keep per-process, per-jail, per-loginclass and per-loginclass resource accounting information, to be used by the new resource limits code. It's connected to the build, but the code that actually calls the new functions will come later. Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Reviewed by: kib (earlier version)
2011-03-29 17:47:25 +00:00
void
prison_racct_foreach(void (*callback)(struct racct *racct,
void *arg2, void *arg3), void *arg2, void *arg3)
{
Change the way rctl interfaces with jails by introducing prison_racct structure, which acts as a proxy between them. This makes jail rules persistent, i.e. they can be added before jail gets created, and they don't disappear when the jail gets destroyed.
2011-05-03 07:32:58 +00:00
struct prison_racct *prr;
Add racct. It's an API to keep per-process, per-jail, per-loginclass and per-loginclass resource accounting information, to be used by the new resource limits code. It's connected to the build, but the code that actually calls the new functions will come later. Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Reviewed by: kib (earlier version)
2011-03-29 17:47:25 +00:00
sx_slock(&allprison_lock);
Change the way rctl interfaces with jails by introducing prison_racct structure, which acts as a proxy between them. This makes jail rules persistent, i.e. they can be added before jail gets created, and they don't disappear when the jail gets destroyed.
2011-05-03 07:32:58 +00:00
LIST_FOREACH(prr, &allprison_racct, prr_next)
(callback)(prr->prr_racct, arg2, arg3);
Add racct. It's an API to keep per-process, per-jail, per-loginclass and per-loginclass resource accounting information, to be used by the new resource limits code. It's connected to the build, but the code that actually calls the new functions will come later. Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Reviewed by: kib (earlier version)
2011-03-29 17:47:25 +00:00
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
}
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
Change the way rctl interfaces with jails by introducing prison_racct structure, which acts as a proxy between them. This makes jail rules persistent, i.e. they can be added before jail gets created, and they don't disappear when the jail gets destroyed.
2011-05-03 07:32:58 +00:00
static struct prison_racct *
prison_racct_find_locked(const char *name)
{
struct prison_racct *prr;
sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SA_XLOCKED);
if (name[0] == '\0' || strlen(name) >= MAXHOSTNAMELEN)
return (NULL);
LIST_FOREACH(prr, &allprison_racct, prr_next) {
if (strcmp(name, prr->prr_name) != 0)
continue;
/* Found prison_racct with a matching name? */
prison_racct_hold(prr);
return (prr);
}
/* Add new prison_racct. */
prr = malloc(sizeof(*prr), M_PRISON_RACCT, M_ZERO | M_WAITOK);
racct_create(&prr->prr_racct);
strcpy(prr->prr_name, name);
refcount_init(&prr->prr_refcount, 1);
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&allprison_racct, prr, prr_next);
return (prr);
}
struct prison_racct *
prison_racct_find(const char *name)
{
struct prison_racct *prr;
sx_xlock(&allprison_lock);
prr = prison_racct_find_locked(name);
sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock);
return (prr);
}
void
prison_racct_hold(struct prison_racct *prr)
{
refcount_acquire(&prr->prr_refcount);
}
void
prison_racct_free(struct prison_racct *prr)
{
int old;
old = prr->prr_refcount;
if (old > 1 && atomic_cmpset_int(&prr->prr_refcount, old, old - 1))
return;
sx_xlock(&allprison_lock);
if (refcount_release(&prr->prr_refcount)) {
racct_destroy(&prr->prr_racct);
LIST_REMOVE(prr, prr_next);
sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock);
free(prr, M_PRISON_RACCT);
return;
}
sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock);
}
#ifdef RACCT
static void
prison_racct_attach(struct prison *pr)
{
struct prison_racct *prr;
prr = prison_racct_find_locked(pr->pr_name);
KASSERT(prr != NULL, ("cannot find prison_racct"));
pr->pr_prison_racct = prr;
}
static void
prison_racct_detach(struct prison *pr)
{
prison_racct_free(pr->pr_prison_racct);
pr->pr_prison_racct = NULL;
}
#endif /* RACCT */
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#ifdef DDB
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
static void
db_show_prison(struct prison *pr)
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
{
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
int fi;
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6)
int ii;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#endif
Some jail parameters (in particular, "ip4" and "ip6" for IP address restrictions) were found to be inadequately described by a boolean. Define a new parameter type with three values (disable, new, inherit) to handle these and future cases. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor) Discussed with: rwatson
2009-07-25 14:48:57 +00:00
unsigned jsf;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#ifdef INET6
char ip6buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
#endif
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
db_printf("prison %p:\n", pr);
db_printf(" jid = %d\n", pr->pr_id);
db_printf(" name = %s\n", pr->pr_name);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
db_printf(" parent = %p\n", pr->pr_parent);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
db_printf(" ref = %d\n", pr->pr_ref);
db_printf(" uref = %d\n", pr->pr_uref);
db_printf(" path = %s\n", pr->pr_path);
db_printf(" cpuset = %d\n", pr->pr_cpuset
? pr->pr_cpuset->cs_id : -1);
Manage vnets via the jail system. If a jail is given the boolean parameter "vnet" when it is created, a new vnet instance will be created along with the jail. Networks interfaces can be moved between prisons with an ioctl similar to the one that moves them between vimages. For now vnets will co-exist under both jails and vimages, but soon struct vimage will be going away. Reviewed by: zec, julian Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-15 18:59:29 +00:00
#ifdef VIMAGE
db_printf(" vnet = %p\n", pr->pr_vnet);
#endif
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
db_printf(" root = %p\n", pr->pr_root);
db_printf(" securelevel = %d\n", pr->pr_securelevel);
Change DDB show prison: - name some columns more closely to the user space variables, as we do for host.* or allow.* (in the listing) already. - print pr_childmax (children.max). - prefix hex values with 0x. MFC after: 3 weeks
2010-01-11 22:34:25 +00:00
db_printf(" children.max = %d\n", pr->pr_childmax);
db_printf(" children.cur = %d\n", pr->pr_childcount);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
db_printf(" child = %p\n", LIST_FIRST(&pr->pr_children));
db_printf(" sibling = %p\n", LIST_NEXT(pr, pr_sibling));
Change DDB show prison: - name some columns more closely to the user space variables, as we do for host.* or allow.* (in the listing) already. - print pr_childmax (children.max). - prefix hex values with 0x. MFC after: 3 weeks
2010-01-11 22:34:25 +00:00
db_printf(" flags = 0x%x", pr->pr_flags);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
for (fi = 0; fi < sizeof(pr_flag_names) / sizeof(pr_flag_names[0]);
fi++)
if (pr_flag_names[fi] != NULL && (pr->pr_flags & (1 << fi)))
db_printf(" %s", pr_flag_names[fi]);
Some jail parameters (in particular, "ip4" and "ip6" for IP address restrictions) were found to be inadequately described by a boolean. Define a new parameter type with three values (disable, new, inherit) to handle these and future cases. Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor) Discussed with: rwatson
2009-07-25 14:48:57 +00:00
for (fi = 0; fi < sizeof(pr_flag_jailsys) / sizeof(pr_flag_jailsys[0]);
fi++) {
jsf = pr->pr_flags &
(pr_flag_jailsys[fi].disable | pr_flag_jailsys[fi].new);
db_printf(" %-16s= %s\n", pr_flag_jailsys[fi].name,
pr_flag_jailsys[fi].disable &&
(jsf == pr_flag_jailsys[fi].disable) ? "disable"
: (jsf == pr_flag_jailsys[fi].new) ? "new"
: "inherit");
}
Change DDB show prison: - name some columns more closely to the user space variables, as we do for host.* or allow.* (in the listing) already. - print pr_childmax (children.max). - prefix hex values with 0x. MFC after: 3 weeks
2010-01-11 22:34:25 +00:00
db_printf(" allow = 0x%x", pr->pr_allow);
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
for (fi = 0; fi < sizeof(pr_allow_names) / sizeof(pr_allow_names[0]);
fi++)
if (pr_allow_names[fi] != NULL && (pr->pr_allow & (1 << fi)))
db_printf(" %s", pr_allow_names[fi]);
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
db_printf("\n");
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
db_printf(" enforce_statfs = %d\n", pr->pr_enforce_statfs);
Rename the host-related prison fields to be the same as the host.* parameters they represent, and the variables they replaced, instead of abbreviated versions of them. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-06-13 15:39:12 +00:00
db_printf(" host.hostname = %s\n", pr->pr_hostname);
db_printf(" host.domainname = %s\n", pr->pr_domainname);
db_printf(" host.hostuuid = %s\n", pr->pr_hostuuid);
Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system. The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable "hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible. The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their associated global variables removed. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-29 21:27:12 +00:00
db_printf(" host.hostid = %lu\n", pr->pr_hostid);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#ifdef INET
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
db_printf(" ip4s = %d\n", pr->pr_ip4s);
for (ii = 0; ii < pr->pr_ip4s; ii++)
db_printf(" %s %s\n",
Change DDB show prison: - name some columns more closely to the user space variables, as we do for host.* or allow.* (in the listing) already. - print pr_childmax (children.max). - prefix hex values with 0x. MFC after: 3 weeks
2010-01-11 22:34:25 +00:00
ii == 0 ? "ip4.addr =" : " ",
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
inet_ntoa(pr->pr_ip4[ii]));
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#endif
#ifdef INET6
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
db_printf(" ip6s = %d\n", pr->pr_ip6s);
for (ii = 0; ii < pr->pr_ip6s; ii++)
db_printf(" %s %s\n",
Change DDB show prison: - name some columns more closely to the user space variables, as we do for host.* or allow.* (in the listing) already. - print pr_childmax (children.max). - prefix hex values with 0x. MFC after: 3 weeks
2010-01-11 22:34:25 +00:00
ii == 0 ? "ip6.addr =" : " ",
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
ip6_sprintf(ip6buf, &pr->pr_ip6[ii]));
#endif
}
DB_SHOW_COMMAND(prison, db_show_prison_command)
{
struct prison *pr;
if (!have_addr) {
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
/*
* Show all prisons in the list, and prison0 which is not
* listed.
*/
db_show_prison(&prison0);
if (!db_pager_quit) {
TAILQ_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) {
db_show_prison(pr);
if (db_pager_quit)
break;
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
}
return;
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (addr == 0)
pr = &prison0;
else {
/* Look for a prison with the ID and with references. */
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
TAILQ_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list)
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (pr->pr_id == addr && pr->pr_ref > 0)
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
break;
Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents, but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style dot-separated strings. Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel. Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which should not cause any problems for code that properly uses securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge(). Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system call. Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
if (pr == NULL)
/* Look again, without requiring a reference. */
TAILQ_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list)
if (pr->pr_id == addr)
break;
if (pr == NULL)
/* Assume address points to a valid prison. */
pr = (struct prison *)addr;
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
db_show_prison(pr);
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
}
Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value" interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added: * jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails. This replaces jail(2). * jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the security.jail.list sysctl. * jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail. Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2). Approved by: bz (mentor)
2009-04-29 21:14:15 +00:00
MFp4: Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
2008-11-29 14:32:14 +00:00
#endif /* DDB */
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