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Syncoockies can be used in combination with the syncache. If the cache
overflows, syncookies are used. This patch restricts the usage of syncookies in this case: accept syncookies only if there was an overflow of the syncache recently. This mitigates a problem reported in PR217637, where is syncookie was accepted without any recent drops. Thanks to glebius@ for suggesting an improvement. PR: 217637 Reviewed by: gnn, glebius MFC after: 1 week Sponsored by: Netflix, Inc. Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10272
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Notes:
svn2git
2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=317208
@ -260,6 +260,7 @@ syncache_init(void)
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&V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i].sch_mtx, 0);
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V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i].sch_length = 0;
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V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i].sch_sc = &V_tcp_syncache;
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V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i].sch_last_overflow = INT64_MIN;
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}
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/* Create the syncache entry zone. */
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@ -335,6 +336,7 @@ syncache_insert(struct syncache *sc, struct syncache_head *sch)
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KASSERT(!TAILQ_EMPTY(&sch->sch_bucket),
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("sch->sch_length incorrect"));
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sc2 = TAILQ_LAST(&sch->sch_bucket, sch_head);
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sch->sch_last_overflow = time_uptime;
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syncache_drop(sc2, sch);
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TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_bucketoverflow);
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}
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@ -974,10 +976,13 @@ syncache_expand(struct in_conninfo *inc, struct tcpopt *to, struct tcphdr *th,
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/*
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* There is no syncache entry, so see if this ACK is
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* a returning syncookie. To do this, first:
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* A. See if this socket has had a syncache entry dropped in
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* the past. We don't want to accept a bogus syncookie
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* if we've never received a SYN.
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* B. check that the syncookie is valid. If it is, then
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* A. Check if syncookies are used in case of syncache
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* overflows
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* B. See if this socket has had a syncache entry dropped in
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* the recent past. We don't want to accept a bogus
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* syncookie if we've never received a SYN or accept it
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* twice.
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* C. check that the syncookie is valid. If it is, then
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* cobble up a fake syncache entry, and return.
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*/
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if (!V_tcp_syncookies) {
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@ -988,6 +993,15 @@ syncache_expand(struct in_conninfo *inc, struct tcpopt *to, struct tcphdr *th,
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s, __func__);
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goto failed;
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}
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if (!V_tcp_syncookiesonly &&
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sch->sch_last_overflow < time_uptime - SYNCOOKIE_LIFETIME) {
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SCH_UNLOCK(sch);
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if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)))
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log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Spurious ACK, "
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"segment rejected (no syncache entry)\n",
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s, __func__);
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goto failed;
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}
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bzero(&scs, sizeof(scs));
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sc = syncookie_lookup(inc, sch, &scs, th, to, *lsop);
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SCH_UNLOCK(sch);
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@ -1411,8 +1425,10 @@ syncache_add(struct in_conninfo *inc, struct tcpopt *to, struct tcphdr *th,
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* entry and insert the new one.
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*/
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TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_zonefail);
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if ((sc = TAILQ_LAST(&sch->sch_bucket, sch_head)) != NULL)
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if ((sc = TAILQ_LAST(&sch->sch_bucket, sch_head)) != NULL) {
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sch->sch_last_overflow = time_uptime;
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syncache_drop(sc, sch);
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}
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sc = uma_zalloc(V_tcp_syncache.zone, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
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if (sc == NULL) {
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if (V_tcp_syncookies) {
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@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ struct syncache_head {
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int sch_nextc;
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u_int sch_length;
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struct tcp_syncache *sch_sc;
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time_t sch_last_overflow;
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};
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#define SYNCOOKIE_SECRET_SIZE 16
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