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gcc 11 cleanup
Compiling with gcc 11.1.0 produces three new warnings. Change the code slightly to avoid them. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Attila Fülöp <attila@fueloep.org> Closes #12130 Closes #12188 Closes #12237
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@ -82,7 +82,11 @@ alloc_pw_size(size_t len)
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return (NULL);
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}
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pw->len = len;
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pw->value = malloc(len);
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/*
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* The use of malloc() triggers a spurious gcc 11 -Wmaybe-uninitialized
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* warning in the mlock() function call below, so use calloc().
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*/
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pw->value = calloc(len, 1);
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if (!pw->value) {
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free(pw);
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return (NULL);
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@ -99,7 +103,11 @@ alloc_pw_string(const char *source)
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return (NULL);
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}
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pw->len = strlen(source) + 1;
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pw->value = malloc(pw->len);
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/*
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* The use of malloc() triggers a spurious gcc 11 -Wmaybe-uninitialized
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* warning in the mlock() function call below, so use calloc().
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*/
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pw->value = calloc(pw->len, 1);
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if (!pw->value) {
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free(pw);
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return (NULL);
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@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ typedef struct {
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*/
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#define CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID ((uint64_t)-1)
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extern crypto_mech_type_t crypto_mech2id(crypto_mech_name_t name);
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extern crypto_mech_type_t crypto_mech2id(char *name);
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/*
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* Create and destroy context templates.
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@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ enum dnode_dirtycontext {
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* example, reading 32 dnodes from a 16k dnode block and all of the spill
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* blocks could issue 33 separate reads. Now suppose those dnodes have size
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* 1024 and therefore don't need spill blocks. Then the worst case number
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* of blocks read is reduced to from 33 to two--one per dnode block.
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* of blocks read is reduced from 33 to two--one per dnode block.
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*
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* ZFS-on-Linux systems that make heavy use of extended attributes benefit
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* from this feature. In particular, ZFS-on-Linux supports the xattr=sa
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@ -232,8 +232,8 @@ typedef struct dnode_phys {
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* Both dn_pad2 and dn_pad3 are protected by the block's MAC. This
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* allows us to protect any fields that might be added here in the
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* future. In either case, developers will want to check
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* zio_crypt_init_uios_dnode() to ensure the new field is being
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* protected properly.
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* zio_crypt_init_uios_dnode() and zio_crypt_do_dnode_hmac_updates()
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* to ensure the new field is being protected and updated properly.
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*/
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uint64_t dn_pad3[4];
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@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ unsigned long zfs_key_max_salt_uses = ZFS_KEY_MAX_SALT_USES_DEFAULT;
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typedef struct blkptr_auth_buf {
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uint64_t bab_prop; /* blk_prop - portable mask */
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uint8_t bab_mac[ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN]; /* MAC from blk_cksum */
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uint8_t bab_mac[ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN]; /* MAC from blk_cksum */
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uint64_t bab_pad; /* reserved for future use */
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} blkptr_auth_buf_t;
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@ -1045,17 +1045,23 @@ zio_crypt_do_dnode_hmac_updates(crypto_context_t ctx, uint64_t version,
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boolean_t should_bswap, dnode_phys_t *dnp)
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{
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int ret, i;
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dnode_phys_t *adnp;
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dnode_phys_t *adnp, tmp_dncore;
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size_t dn_core_size = offsetof(dnode_phys_t, dn_blkptr);
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boolean_t le_bswap = (should_bswap == ZFS_HOST_BYTEORDER);
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crypto_data_t cd;
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uint8_t tmp_dncore[offsetof(dnode_phys_t, dn_blkptr)];
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cd.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW;
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cd.cd_offset = 0;
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/* authenticate the core dnode (masking out non-portable bits) */
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bcopy(dnp, tmp_dncore, sizeof (tmp_dncore));
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adnp = (dnode_phys_t *)tmp_dncore;
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/*
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* Authenticate the core dnode (masking out non-portable bits).
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* We only copy the first 64 bytes we operate on to avoid the overhead
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* of copying 512-64 unneeded bytes. The compiler seems to be fine
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* with that.
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*/
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bcopy(dnp, &tmp_dncore, dn_core_size);
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adnp = &tmp_dncore;
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if (le_bswap) {
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adnp->dn_datablkszsec = BSWAP_16(adnp->dn_datablkszsec);
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adnp->dn_bonuslen = BSWAP_16(adnp->dn_bonuslen);
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@ -1065,7 +1071,7 @@ zio_crypt_do_dnode_hmac_updates(crypto_context_t ctx, uint64_t version,
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adnp->dn_flags &= DNODE_CRYPT_PORTABLE_FLAGS_MASK;
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adnp->dn_used = 0;
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cd.cd_length = sizeof (tmp_dncore);
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cd.cd_length = dn_core_size;
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cd.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)adnp;
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cd.cd_raw.iov_len = cd.cd_length;
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