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Close the remaining user address mapping races for physical
I/O, CAM, and AIO. Still TODO: streamline useracc() checks. Reviewed by: alc, tegge MFC after: 7 days
This commit is contained in:
parent
866723162a
commit
2d5c7e4506
Notes:
svn2git
2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=109572
@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ cam_periph_unlock(struct cam_periph *periph)
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int
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cam_periph_mapmem(union ccb *ccb, struct cam_periph_map_info *mapinfo)
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{
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int numbufs, i;
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int numbufs, i, j;
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int flags[CAM_PERIPH_MAXMAPS];
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u_int8_t **data_ptrs[CAM_PERIPH_MAXMAPS];
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u_int32_t lengths[CAM_PERIPH_MAXMAPS];
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@ -659,8 +659,28 @@ cam_periph_mapmem(union ccb *ccb, struct cam_periph_map_info *mapinfo)
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/* set the direction */
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mapinfo->bp[i]->b_iocmd = flags[i];
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/* map the buffer into kernel memory */
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vmapbuf(mapinfo->bp[i]);
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/*
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* Map the buffer into kernel memory.
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*
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* Note that useracc() alone is not a sufficient test.
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* vmapbuf() can still fail due to a smaller file mapped
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* into a larger area of VM, or if userland races against
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* vmapbuf() after the useracc() check.
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*/
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if (vmapbuf(mapinfo->bp[i]) < 0) {
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printf("cam_periph_mapmem: error, "
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"address %p, length %lu isn't "
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"user accessible any more\n",
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(void *)*data_ptrs[i],
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(u_long)lengths[i]);
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for (j = 0; j < i; ++j) {
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*data_ptrs[j] = mapinfo->bp[j]->b_saveaddr;
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mapinfo->bp[j]->b_flags &= ~B_PHYS;
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relpbuf(mapinfo->bp[j], NULL);
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}
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PRELE(curproc);
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return(EACCES);
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}
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/* set our pointer to the new mapped area */
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*data_ptrs[i] = mapinfo->bp[i]->b_data;
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@ -95,13 +95,23 @@ physio(dev_t dev, struct uio *uio, int ioflag)
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bp->b_blkno = btodb(bp->b_offset);
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if (uio->uio_segflg == UIO_USERSPACE) {
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/*
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* Note that useracc() alone is not a
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* sufficient test. vmapbuf() can still fail
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* due to a smaller file mapped into a larger
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* area of VM, or if userland races against
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* vmapbuf() after the useracc() check.
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*/
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if (!useracc(bp->b_data, bp->b_bufsize,
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bp->b_iocmd == BIO_READ ?
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VM_PROT_WRITE : VM_PROT_READ)) {
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error = EFAULT;
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goto doerror;
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}
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vmapbuf(bp);
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if (vmapbuf(bp) < 0) {
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error = EFAULT;
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goto doerror;
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}
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}
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DEV_STRATEGY(bp);
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@ -1124,8 +1124,19 @@ aio_qphysio(struct proc *p, struct aiocblist *aiocbe)
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}
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}
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/* Bring buffer into kernel space. */
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vmapbuf(bp);
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/*
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* Bring buffer into kernel space.
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*
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* Note that useracc() alone is not a
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* sufficient test. vmapbuf() can still fail
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* due to a smaller file mapped into a larger
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* area of VM, or if userland races against
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* vmapbuf() after the useracc() check.
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*/
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if (vmapbuf(bp) < 0) {
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error = EFAULT;
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goto doerror;
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}
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s = splbio();
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aiocbe->bp = bp;
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@ -3547,13 +3547,18 @@ vm_hold_free_pages(struct buf * bp, vm_offset_t from, vm_offset_t to)
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* All requests are (re)mapped into kernel VA space.
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* Notice that we use b_bufsize for the size of the buffer
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* to be mapped. b_bcount might be modified by the driver.
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*
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* Note that even if the caller determines that the address space should
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* be valid, a race or a smaller-file mapped into a larger space may
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* actually cause vmapbuf() to fail, so all callers of vmapbuf() MUST
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* check the return value.
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*/
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void
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int
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vmapbuf(struct buf *bp)
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{
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caddr_t addr, kva;
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vm_offset_t pa;
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int pidx;
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int pidx, i;
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struct vm_page *m;
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struct pmap *pmap = &curproc->p_vmspace->vm_pmap;
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@ -3573,11 +3578,25 @@ vmapbuf(struct buf *bp)
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* the userland address space, and kextract is only guarenteed
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* to work for the kernland address space (see: sparc64 port).
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*/
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vm_fault_quick((addr >= bp->b_data) ? addr : bp->b_data,
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(bp->b_iocmd == BIO_READ)?(VM_PROT_READ|VM_PROT_WRITE):VM_PROT_READ);
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retry:
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i = vm_fault_quick((addr >= bp->b_data) ? addr : bp->b_data,
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(bp->b_iocmd == BIO_READ) ?
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(VM_PROT_READ|VM_PROT_WRITE) : VM_PROT_READ);
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if (i < 0) {
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printf("vmapbuf: warning, bad user address during I/O\n");
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vm_page_lock_queues();
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for (i = 0; i < pidx; ++i) {
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vm_page_unhold(bp->b_pages[i]);
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bp->b_pages[i] = NULL;
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}
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vm_page_unlock_queues();
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return(-1);
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}
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pa = trunc_page(pmap_extract(pmap, (vm_offset_t) addr));
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if (pa == 0)
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panic("vmapbuf: page not present");
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if (pa == 0) {
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printf("vmapbuf: warning, race against user address during I/O");
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goto retry;
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}
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m = PHYS_TO_VM_PAGE(pa);
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vm_page_lock_queues();
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vm_page_hold(m);
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@ -3592,6 +3611,7 @@ vmapbuf(struct buf *bp)
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bp->b_npages = pidx;
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bp->b_saveaddr = bp->b_data;
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bp->b_data = kva + (((vm_offset_t) bp->b_data) & PAGE_MASK);
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return(0);
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}
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/*
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@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ void vfs_bio_clrbuf(struct buf *);
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void vfs_busy_pages(struct buf *, int clear_modify);
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void vfs_unbusy_pages(struct buf *);
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void vwakeup(struct buf *);
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void vmapbuf(struct buf *);
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int vmapbuf(struct buf *);
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void vunmapbuf(struct buf *);
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void relpbuf(struct buf *, int *);
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void brelvp(struct buf *);
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@ -121,6 +121,12 @@ static void vm_proc_swapout(struct proc *p);
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/*
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* MPSAFE
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*
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* WARNING! This code calls vm_map_check_protection() which only checks
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* the associated vm_map_entry range. It does not determine whether the
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* contents of the memory is actually readable or writable. In most cases
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* just checking the vm_map_entry is sufficient within the kernel's address
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* space.
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*/
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int
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kernacc(addr, len, rw)
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@ -142,6 +148,12 @@ kernacc(addr, len, rw)
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/*
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* MPSAFE
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*
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* WARNING! This code calls vm_map_check_protection() which only checks
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* the associated vm_map_entry range. It does not determine whether the
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* contents of the memory is actually readable or writable. vmapbuf(),
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* vm_fault_quick(), or copyin()/copout()/su*()/fu*() functions should be
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* used in conjuction with this call.
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*/
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int
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useracc(addr, len, rw)
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@ -2179,9 +2179,14 @@ vm_map_remove(vm_map_t map, vm_offset_t start, vm_offset_t end)
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/*
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* vm_map_check_protection:
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*
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* Assert that the target map allows the specified
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* privilege on the entire address region given.
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* The entire region must be allocated.
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* Assert that the target map allows the specified privilege on the
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* entire address region given. The entire region must be allocated.
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*
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* WARNING! This code does not and should not check whether the
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* contents of the region is accessible. For example a smaller file
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* might be mapped into a larger address space.
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*
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* NOTE! This code is also called by munmap().
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*/
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boolean_t
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vm_map_check_protection(vm_map_t map, vm_offset_t start, vm_offset_t end,
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