mirror of
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Break out strictly credential-related portions of mac_process.c into a
new file, mac_cred.c. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
This commit is contained in:
parent
5031ddc46c
commit
564f8f0fee
Notes:
svn2git
2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=184425
@ -2175,6 +2175,7 @@ security/audit/audit_trigger.c optional audit
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security/audit/audit_worker.c optional audit
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security/mac/mac_atalk.c optional mac netatalk
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security/mac/mac_audit.c optional mac audit
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security/mac/mac_cred.c optional mac
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security/mac/mac_framework.c optional mac
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security/mac/mac_inet.c optional mac inet
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security/mac/mac_inet6.c optional mac inet6
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213
sys/security/mac/mac_cred.c
Normal file
213
sys/security/mac/mac_cred.c
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
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/*-
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* Copyright (c) 1999-2002, 2008 Robert N. M. Watson
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* Copyright (c) 2001 Ilmar S. Habibulin
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* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
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* Copyright (c) 2005 Samy Al Bahra
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* Copyright (c) 2006 SPARTA, Inc.
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* Copyright (c) 2008 Apple Inc.
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This software was developed by Robert Watson and Ilmar Habibulin for the
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* TrustedBSD Project.
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*
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* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network
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* Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
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* Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
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* as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
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*
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* This software was enhanced by SPARTA ISSO under SPAWAR contract
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* N66001-04-C-6019 ("SEFOS").
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include "opt_mac.h"
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/condvar.h>
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#include <sys/imgact.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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#include <sys/lock.h>
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#include <sys/malloc.h>
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#include <sys/mutex.h>
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#include <sys/mac.h>
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#include <sys/proc.h>
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#include <sys/sbuf.h>
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/vnode.h>
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#include <sys/mount.h>
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#include <sys/file.h>
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#include <sys/namei.h>
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#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <vm/vm.h>
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#include <vm/pmap.h>
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#include <vm/vm_map.h>
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#include <vm/vm_object.h>
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#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
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#include <security/mac/mac_internal.h>
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#include <security/mac/mac_policy.h>
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struct label *
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mac_cred_label_alloc(void)
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{
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struct label *label;
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label = mac_labelzone_alloc(M_WAITOK);
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MAC_PERFORM(cred_init_label, label);
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return (label);
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}
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void
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mac_cred_init(struct ucred *cred)
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{
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if (mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_CRED)
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cred->cr_label = mac_cred_label_alloc();
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else
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cred->cr_label = NULL;
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}
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void
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mac_cred_label_free(struct label *label)
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{
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MAC_PERFORM(cred_destroy_label, label);
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mac_labelzone_free(label);
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}
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void
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mac_cred_destroy(struct ucred *cred)
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{
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if (cred->cr_label != NULL) {
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mac_cred_label_free(cred->cr_label);
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cred->cr_label = NULL;
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}
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}
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/*
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* When a thread becomes an NFS server daemon, its credential may need to be
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* updated to reflect this so that policies can recognize when file system
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* operations originate from the network.
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*
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* At some point, it would be desirable if the credential used for each NFS
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* RPC could be set based on the RPC context (i.e., source system, etc) to
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* provide more fine-grained access control.
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*/
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void
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mac_cred_associate_nfsd(struct ucred *cred)
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{
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MAC_PERFORM(cred_associate_nfsd, cred);
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}
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/*
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* Initialize MAC label for the first kernel process, from which other kernel
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* processes and threads are spawned.
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*/
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void
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mac_cred_create_swapper(struct ucred *cred)
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{
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MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_swapper, cred);
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}
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/*
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* Initialize MAC label for the first userland process, from which other
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* userland processes and threads are spawned.
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*/
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void
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mac_cred_create_init(struct ucred *cred)
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{
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MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_init, cred);
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}
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int
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mac_cred_externalize_label(struct label *label, char *elements,
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char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen)
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{
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int error;
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MAC_EXTERNALIZE(cred, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
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return (error);
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}
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int
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mac_cred_internalize_label(struct label *label, char *string)
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{
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int error;
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MAC_INTERNALIZE(cred, label, string);
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return (error);
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}
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/*
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* When a new process is created, its label must be initialized. Generally,
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* this involves inheritence from the parent process, modulo possible deltas.
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* This function allows that processing to take place.
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*/
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void
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mac_cred_copy(struct ucred *src, struct ucred *dest)
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{
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MAC_PERFORM(cred_copy_label, src->cr_label, dest->cr_label);
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}
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/*
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* When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege
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* to mapped objects. This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified
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* buffer cache.
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*/
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void
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mac_cred_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
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{
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MAC_PERFORM(cred_relabel, cred, newlabel);
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}
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int
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mac_cred_check_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
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{
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int error;
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MAC_CHECK(cred_check_relabel, cred, newlabel);
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return (error);
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}
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int
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mac_cred_check_visible(struct ucred *cr1, struct ucred *cr2)
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{
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int error;
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MAC_CHECK(cred_check_visible, cr1, cr2);
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return (error);
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}
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@ -84,26 +84,6 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap_revocation_via_cow, CTLFLAG_RW,
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static void mac_proc_vm_revoke_recurse(struct thread *td,
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struct ucred *cred, struct vm_map *map);
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struct label *
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mac_cred_label_alloc(void)
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{
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struct label *label;
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label = mac_labelzone_alloc(M_WAITOK);
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MAC_PERFORM(cred_init_label, label);
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return (label);
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}
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void
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mac_cred_init(struct ucred *cred)
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{
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if (mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_CRED)
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cred->cr_label = mac_cred_label_alloc();
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else
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cred->cr_label = NULL;
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}
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static struct label *
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mac_proc_label_alloc(void)
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{
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@ -124,24 +104,6 @@ mac_proc_init(struct proc *p)
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p->p_label = NULL;
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}
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void
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mac_cred_label_free(struct label *label)
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{
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MAC_PERFORM(cred_destroy_label, label);
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mac_labelzone_free(label);
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}
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void
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mac_cred_destroy(struct ucred *cred)
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{
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if (cred->cr_label != NULL) {
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mac_cred_label_free(cred->cr_label);
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cred->cr_label = NULL;
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}
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}
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static void
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mac_proc_label_free(struct label *label)
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{
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@ -160,65 +122,6 @@ mac_proc_destroy(struct proc *p)
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}
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}
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/*
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* When a thread becomes an NFS server daemon, its credential may need to be
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* updated to reflect this so that policies can recognize when file system
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* operations originate from the network.
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*
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* At some point, it would be desirable if the credential used for each NFS
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* RPC could be set based on the RPC context (i.e., source system, etc) to
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* provide more fine-grained access control.
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*/
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void
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mac_cred_associate_nfsd(struct ucred *cred)
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{
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MAC_PERFORM(cred_associate_nfsd, cred);
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}
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/*
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* Initialize MAC label for the first kernel process, from which other kernel
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* processes and threads are spawned.
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*/
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void
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mac_cred_create_swapper(struct ucred *cred)
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{
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MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_swapper, cred);
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}
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/*
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* Initialize MAC label for the first userland process, from which other
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* userland processes and threads are spawned.
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*/
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void
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mac_cred_create_init(struct ucred *cred)
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{
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MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_init, cred);
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}
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int
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mac_cred_externalize_label(struct label *label, char *elements,
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char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen)
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{
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int error;
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MAC_EXTERNALIZE(cred, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
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return (error);
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}
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int
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mac_cred_internalize_label(struct label *label, char *string)
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{
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int error;
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MAC_INTERNALIZE(cred, label, string);
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return (error);
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}
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void
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mac_thread_userret(struct thread *td)
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{
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@ -226,18 +129,6 @@ mac_thread_userret(struct thread *td)
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MAC_PERFORM(thread_userret, td);
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}
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/*
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* When a new process is created, its label must be initialized. Generally,
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* this involves inheritence from the parent process, modulo possible deltas.
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* This function allows that processing to take place.
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*/
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void
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mac_cred_copy(struct ucred *src, struct ucred *dest)
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{
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MAC_PERFORM(cred_copy_label, src->cr_label, dest->cr_label);
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}
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int
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mac_execve_enter(struct image_params *imgp, struct mac *mac_p)
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{
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@ -484,38 +375,6 @@ mac_proc_vm_revoke_recurse(struct thread *td, struct ucred *cred,
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vm_map_unlock_read(map);
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}
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/*
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* When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege
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* to mapped objects. This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified
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* buffer cache.
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*/
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void
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mac_cred_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
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{
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MAC_PERFORM(cred_relabel, cred, newlabel);
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}
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int
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mac_cred_check_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
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{
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int error;
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MAC_CHECK(cred_check_relabel, cred, newlabel);
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return (error);
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}
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int
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mac_cred_check_visible(struct ucred *cr1, struct ucred *cr2)
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{
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int error;
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MAC_CHECK(cred_check_visible, cr1, cr2);
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return (error);
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}
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int
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mac_proc_check_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p)
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{
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