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Upgrade to OpenSSH 6.7p1, retaining libwrap support (which has been removed

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upstream) and a number of security fixes which we had already backported.

MFC after:	1 week
This commit is contained in:
Dag-Erling Smørgrav 2016-01-19 16:18:26 +00:00
commit a0ee8cc636
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00 
svn path=/head/; revision=294328
287 changed files with 17610 additions and 7141 deletions
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crypto/openssh/ChangeLog
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@ -1,3 +1,934 @@
20131006
- (djm) Release OpenSSH-6.7
20141003
- (djm) [sshd_config.5] typo; from Iain Morgan
20141001
- (djm) [openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c]
[openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Kludge around bad glibc
_FORTIFY_SOURCE check that doesn't grok heap-allocated fd_sets;
ok dtucker@
20140910
- (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Allow mremap and exit for DietLibc;
patch from Felix von Leitner; ok dtucker
20140908
- (dtucker) [INSTALL] Update info about egd. ok djm@
20140904
- (djm) [openbsd-compat/arc4random.c] Zero seed after keying PRNG
20140903
- (djm) [defines.h sshbuf.c] Move __predict_true|false to defines.h and
conditionalise to avoid duplicate definition.
- (djm) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Fix old code leading to
permissions/ACLs; from Corinna Vinschen
20140830
- (djm) [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] add
OPENSSL_[RD]SA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS defines for OpenSSL that lacks them
- (djm) [misc.c] Missing newline between functions
- (djm) [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] add include guard
- (djm) [Makefile.in] Make TEST_SHELL a variable; "good idea" tim@
20140827
- (djm) [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c]
[regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c] Don't include openssl/ec.h
on !ECC OpenSSL systems
- (djm) [monitor.c sshd.c] SIGXFSZ needs to be ignored in postauth
monitor, not preauth; bz#2263
- (djm) [openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c] implement explicit_bzero()
using memset_s() where possible; improve fallback to indirect bzero
via a volatile pointer to give it more of a chance to avoid being
optimised away.
20140825
- (djm) [bufec.c] Skip this file on !ECC OpenSSL
- (djm) [INSTALL] Recommend libcrypto be built -fPIC, mention LibreSSL,
update OpenSSL version requirement.
20140824
- (djm) [sftp-server.c] Some systems (e.g. Irix) have prctl() but not
PR_SET_DUMPABLE, so adjust ifdef; reported by Tom Christensen
20140823
- (djm) [sshd.c] Ignore SIGXFSZ in preauth monitor child; can explode on
lastlog writing on platforms with high UIDs; bz#2263
- (djm) [configure.ac] We now require a working vsnprintf everywhere (not
just for systems that lack asprintf); check for it always and extend
test to catch more brokenness. Fixes builds on Solaris <= 9
20140822
- (djm) [configure.ac] include leading zero characters in OpenSSL version
number; fixes test for unsupported versions
- (djm) [sshbuf-getput-crypto.c] Fix compilation when OpenSSL lacks ECC
- (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c] Fix compilation failure (prototype/
definition mismatch) and warning for broken/missing snprintf case.
- (djm) [configure.ac] double braces to appease autoconf
20140821
- (djm) [Makefile.in] fix reference to libtest_helper.a in sshkey test too.
- (djm) [key.h] Fix ifdefs for no-ECC OpenSSL
- (djm) [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c] Fix for systems that
don't set __progname. Diagnosed by Tom Christensen.
20140820
- (djm) [configure.ac] Check OpenSSL version is supported at configure time;
suggested by Kevin Brott
- (djm) [Makefile.in] refer to libtest_helper.a by explicit path rather than
-L/-l; fixes linking problems on some platforms
- (djm) [sshkey.h] Fix compilation when OpenSSL lacks ECC
- (djm) [contrib/cygwin/README] Correct build instructions; from Corinna
20140819
- (djm) [serverloop.c] Fix syntax error on Cygwin; from Corinna Vinschen
- (djm) [sshbuf.h] Fix compilation on systems without OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
- (djm) [ssh-dss.c] Include openssl/dsa.h for DSA_SIG
- (djm) [INSTALL contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/cygwin/README]
[contrib/redhat/openssh.spec contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Remove mentions
of TCP wrappers.
20140811
- (djm) [myproposal.h] Make curve25519 KEX dependent on
HAVE_EVP_SHA256 instead of OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
20140810
- (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec]
[contrib/redhat/openssh.spec contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update versions
20140801
- (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Skip test for non-OpenBSD netcat. We need
a better solution, but this will have to do for now.
- (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Instruct nc not to quit as soon as stdin
is closed; avoid regress failures when stdin is /dev/null
- (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Use -d (detach stdin) flag to disassociate
nc from stdin, it's more portable
20140730
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
- millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/24 22:57:10
[ssh.1]
Mention UNIX-domain socket forwarding too. OK jmc@ deraadt@
- dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/25 21:22:03
[ssh-agent.c]
Clear buffer used for handling messages. This prevents keys being
left in memory after they have been expired or deleted in some cases
(but note that ssh-agent is setgid so you would still need root to
access them). Pointed out by Kevin Burns, ok deraadt
- schwarze@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/28 15:40:08
[sftp-server.8 sshd_config.5]
some systems no longer need /dev/log;
issue noticed by jirib;
ok deraadt
20140725
- (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] restore incorrectly deleted line;
pointed out by Christian Hesse
20140722
- (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] ssh mux master lost -N somehow;
put it back
- (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] change the test for still-open Unix
domain sockets to be robust against nc implementations that produce
error messages.
- (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_{file,fuzz,sshkey}.c] Wrap ecdsa-
specific tests inside OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
- (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 01:18:50
[key.c]
Prevent spam from key_load_private_pem during hostbased auth. ok djm@
- guenther@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 07:13:42
[umac.c]
Convert from <sys/endian.h> to the shiney new <endian.h>
ok dtucker@, who also confirmed that -portable handles this already
(ID sync only, includes.h pulls in endian.h if available.)
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 01:32:12
[regress/multiplex.sh]
change the test for still-open Unix domain sockets to be robust against
nc implementations that produce error messages. from -portable
(Id sync only)
- dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 23:23:22
[regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh]
Sign test certs with ed25519 instead of ecdsa so that they'll work in
-portable on platforms that don't have ECDSA in their OpenSSL. ok djm
- dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 23:57:40
[regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh]
Add $OpenBSD tag to make syncs easier
- dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 23:35:38
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/*]
Regenerate test keys with certs signed with ed25519 instead of ecdsa.
These can be used in -portable on platforms that don't support ECDSA.
20140721
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
- millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/15 15:54:15
[forwarding.sh multiplex.sh]
Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding. A remote TCP port
may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and vice versa or
both ends may be a Unix domain socket. This is a reimplementation
of the streamlocal patches by William Ahern from:
http://www.25thandclement.com/~william/projects/streamlocal.html
OK djm@ markus@
- (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Not all netcat accept the -N option.
- (dtucker) [sshkey.c] ifdef out unused variable when compiling without
OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
20140721
- (dtucker) [cipher.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Restore the bits
needed to build AES CTR mode against OpenSSL 0.9.8f and above. ok djm
- (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshkey/
{common,test_file,test_fuzz,test_sshkey}.c] Wrap stdint.h includes in
ifdefs.
20140719
- (tim) [openbsd-compat/port-uw.c] Include misc.h for fwd_opts, used
in servconf.h.
20140718
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
- millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/15 15:54:14
[PROTOCOL auth-options.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c]
[auth-rsa.c auth.c auth1.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c]
[auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c canohost.c channels.c channels.h]
[clientloop.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c mux.c packet.c readconf.c]
[readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c session.c ssh-agent.c]
[ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
[sshd_config.5 sshlogin.c]
Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding. A remote TCP port
may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and vice versa or
both ends may be a Unix domain socket. This is a reimplementation
of the streamlocal patches by William Ahern from:
http://www.25thandclement.com/~william/projects/streamlocal.html
OK djm@ markus@
- jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/16 14:48:57
[ssh.1]
add the streamlocal* options to ssh's -o list; millert says they're
irrelevant for scp/sftp;
ok markus millert
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/17 00:10:56
[sandbox-systrace.c]
ifdef SYS_sendsyslog so this will compile without patching on -stable
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/17 00:10:18
[mux.c]
preserve errno across syscall
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/17 00:12:03
[key.c]
silence "incorrect passphrase" error spam; reported and ok dtucker@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/17 07:22:19
[mux.c ssh.c]
reflect stdio-forward ("ssh -W host:port ...") failures in exit status.
previously we were always returning 0. bz#2255 reported by Brendan
Germain; ok dtucker
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/18 02:46:01
[ssh-agent.c]
restore umask around listener socket creation (dropped in streamlocal patch
merge)
- (dtucker) [auth2-gss.c gss-serv-krb5.c] Include misc.h for fwd_opts, used
in servconf.h.
- (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Add a t-exec target to run just the executable
tests.
- (dtucker) [key.c sshkey.c] Put new ecdsa bits inside ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
20140717
- (djm) [digest-openssl.c] Preserve array order when disabling digests.
Reported by Petr Lautrbach.
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/11 08:09:54
[sandbox-systrace.c]
Permit use of SYS_sendsyslog from inside the sandbox. Clock is ticking,
update your kernels and sshd soon.. libc will start using sendsyslog()
in about 4 days.
- tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/11 13:54:34
[myproposal.h]
by popular demand, add back hamc-sha1 to server proposal for better compat
with many clients still in use. ok deraadt
20140715
- (djm) [configure.ac] Delay checks for arc4random* until after libcrypto
has been located; fixes builds agains libressl-portable
20140711
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
- benno@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/09 14:15:56
[ssh-add.c]
fix ssh-add crash while loading more than one key
ok markus@
20140709
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/07 08:19:12
[ssh_config.5]
mention that ProxyCommand is executed using shell "exec" to avoid
a lingering process; bz#1977
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/09 01:45:10
[sftp.c]
more useful error message when GLOB_NOSPACE occurs;
bz#2254, patch from Orion Poplawski
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/09 03:02:15
[key.c]
downgrade more error() to debug() to better match what old authfile.c
did; suppresses spurious errors with hostbased authentication enabled
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/06 07:42:03
[multiplex.sh test-exec.sh]
add a hook to the cleanup() function to kill $SSH_PID if it is set
use it to kill the mux master started in multiplex.sh (it was being left
around on fatal failures)
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/07 08:15:26
[multiplex.sh]
remove forced-fatal that I stuck in there to test the new cleanup
logic and forgot to remove...
20140706
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 23:18:35
[authfile.h]
remove leakmalloc droppings
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/05 23:11:48
[channels.c]
fix remote-forward cancel regression; ok markus@
20140704
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
- jsing@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 12:42:16
[cipher-chachapoly.c]
Call chacha_ivsetup() immediately before chacha_encrypt_bytes() - this
makes it easier to verify that chacha_encrypt_bytes() is only called once
per chacha_ivsetup() call.
ok djm@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 22:23:46
[sshconnect.c]
when rekeying, skip file/DNS lookup if it is the same as the key sent
during initial key exchange. bz#2154 patch from Iain Morgan; ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 22:33:41
[channels.c]
allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses when
GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family;
bz#2222 ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 22:40:43
[servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8 sshd_config.5]
Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether ~/.ssh/rc is
executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys option;
bz#2160; ok markus@
20140703
- (djm) [digest-openssl.c configure.ac] Disable RIPEMD160 if libcrypto
doesn't support it.
- (djm) [monitor_fdpass.c] Use sys/poll.h if poll.h doesn't exist;
bz#2237
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 01:45:38
[sshkey.c]
make Ed25519 keys' title fit properly in the randomart border; bz#2247
based on patch from Christian Hesse
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:11:03
[ssh-agent.c]
Only cleanup agent socket in the main agent process and not in any
subprocesses it may have started (e.g. forked askpass). Fixes
agent sockets being zapped when askpass processes fatal();
bz#2236 patch from Dmitry V. Levin
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:15:01
[ssh-add.c]
make stdout line-buffered; saves partial output getting lost when
ssh-add fatal()s part-way through (e.g. when listing keys from an
agent that supports key types that ssh-add doesn't);
bz#2234, reported by Phil Pennock
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:26:43
[digest-openssl.c]
use EVP_Digest() for one-shot hash instead of creating, updating,
finalising and destroying a context.
bz#2231, based on patch from Timo Teras
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:34:09
[gss-serv.c session.c ssh-keygen.c]
standardise on NI_MAXHOST for gethostname() string lengths; about
1/2 the cases were using it already. Fixes bz#2239 en passant
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:47:27
[ssh-keygen.c]
When hashing or removing hosts using ssh-keygen, don't choke on
@revoked markers and don't remove @cert-authority markers;
bz#2241, reported by mlindgren AT runelind.net
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 04:36:45
[digest.h]
forward-declare struct sshbuf so consumers don't need to include sshbuf.h
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 05:32:36
[ssh_config.5]
mention '%%' escape sequence in HostName directives and how it may
be used to specify IPv6 link-local addresses
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 05:38:17
[ssh.1]
document that -g will only work in the multiplexed case if applied to
the mux master
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 06:39:19
[ssh.c ssh_config.5]
Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that expands
to a unique identifer based on a has of the tuple of (local host,
remote user, hostname, port).
Helps avoid exceeding sockaddr_un's miserly pathname limits for mux
control paths.
bz#2220, based on patch from mancha1 AT zoho.com; ok markus@
- jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 07:45:27
[ssh_config.5]
escape %C since groff thinks it part of an Rs/Re block;
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 11:16:55
[auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2.c]
make the "Too many authentication failures" message include the
user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the
authentication success / failure messages; bz#2199, ok dtucker
20140702
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/13 08:26:29
[sandbox-systrace.c]
permit SYS_getentropy
from matthew
- matthew@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/18 02:59:13
[sandbox-systrace.c]
Now that we have a dedicated getentropy(2) system call for
arc4random(3), we can disallow __sysctl(2) in OpenSSH's systrace
sandbox.
ok djm
- naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/18 15:42:09
[sshbuf-getput-crypto.c]
The ssh_get_bignum functions must accept the same range of bignums
the corresponding ssh_put_bignum functions create. This fixes the
use of 16384-bit RSA keys (bug reported by Eivind Evensen).
ok djm@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 00:52:02
[krl.c]
fix bug in KRL generation: multiple consecutive revoked certificate
serial number ranges could be serialised to an invalid format.
Readers of a broken KRL caused by this bug will fail closed, so no
should-have-been-revoked key will be accepted.
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 01:13:21
[Makefile.in auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-options.c auth-rsa.c
[auth2-none.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c authfile.h cipher-3des1.c
[cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h
[digest-libc.c digest-openssl.c digest.h dns.c entropy.c hmac.h
[hostfile.c key.c key.h krl.c monitor.c packet.c rsa.c rsa.h
[ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c
[ssh-keygen.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-pkcs11.c
[ssh-rsa.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.h sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c
[sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshkey.c sshkey.h
[openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]
New key API: refactor key-related functions to be more library-like,
existing API is offered as a set of wrappers.
with and ok markus@
Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew
Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review a few months ago.
NB. This commit also removes portable OpenSSH support for OpenSSL
<0.9.8e.
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 02:19:48
[ssh.c]
don't fatal() when hostname canonicalisation fails with a
ProxyCommand in use; continue and allow the ProxyCommand to
connect anyway (e.g. to a host with a name outside the DNS
behind a bastion)
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 02:21:01
[scp.c]
when copying local->remote fails during read, don't send uninitialised
heap to the remote end. Reported by Jann Horn
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/25 14:16:09
[sshbuf.c]
unblock SIGSEGV before raising it
ok djm
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/27 16:41:56
[channels.c channels.h clientloop.c ssh.c]
fix remote fwding with same listen port but different listen address
with gerhard@, ok djm@
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/27 18:50:39
[ssh-add.c]
fix loading of private keys
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/30 12:54:39
[key.c]
suppress spurious error message when loading key with a passphrase;
reported by kettenis@ ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/02 04:59:06
[cipher-3des1.c]
fix ssh protocol 1 on the server that regressed with the sshkey change
(sometimes fatal() after auth completed), make file return useful status
codes.
NB. Id sync only for these two. They were bundled into the sshkey merge
above, since it was easier to sync the entire file and then apply
portable-specific changed atop it.
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/30 05:32:00
[regress/Makefile]
unit tests for new buffer API; including basic fuzz testing
NB. Id sync only.
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/21 07:04:21
[regress/integrity.sh]
when failing because of unexpected output, show the offending output
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 01:04:43
[regress/krl.sh]
regress test for broken consecutive revoked serial number ranges
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 01:14:17
[Makefile.in regress/Makefile regress/unittests/Makefile]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/common.h]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.fp]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.pub]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp.bb]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.g]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.priv]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.pub]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.pub]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1_pw]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp.bb]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.pub]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n_pw]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.fp]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.pub]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp.bb]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.curve]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.priv]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.pub]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1_pw]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp.bb]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.curve]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.priv]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.pub]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n_pw]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.fp]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.pub]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp.bb]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.pub]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp.bb]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.pub]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/pw]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp.bb]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.param.n]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.pub]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1_pw]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp.bb]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.param.n]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.pub]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.fp]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.pub]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp.bb]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.n]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.p]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.q]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.pub]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_pw]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp.bb]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.n]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.p]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.q]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.pub]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n]
[regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n_pw]
unit and fuzz tests for new key API
- (djm) [sshkey.c] Conditionalise inclusion of util.h
- (djm) [regress/Makefile] fix execution of sshkey unit/fuzz test
20140618
- (tim) [openssh/session.c] Work around to get chroot sftp working on UnixWare
20140617
- (dtucker) [entropy.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.{c,h}
openbsd-compat/regress/{.cvsignore,Makefile.in,opensslvertest.c}]
Move the OpenSSL header/library version test into its own function and add
tests for it. Fix it to allow fix version upgrades (but not downgrades).
Prompted by chl@ via OpenSMTPD (issue #462) and Debian (bug #748150).
ok djm@ chl@
20140616
- (dtucker) [defines.h] Fix undef of _PATH_MAILDIR. From rak at debian via
OpenSMTPD and chl@
20140612
- (dtucker) [configure.ac] Remove tcpwrappers support, support has already
been removed from sshd.c.
20140611
- (dtucker) [defines.h] Add va_copy if we don't already have it, taken from
openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c.
- (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.c regress/unittests/test_helper/*]
Wrap stdlib.h include an ifdef for platforms that don't have it.
- (tim) [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h] Add includes.h for
u_intXX_t types.
20140610
- (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c] Only do NISTP256
curve tests if OpenSSL has them.
- (dtucker) [myprosal.h] Don't include curve25519-sha256@libssh.org in
the proposal if the version of OpenSSL we're using doesn't support ECC.
- (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c] ifdef
ECC variable too.
- (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/05 22:17:50
[sshconnect2.c]
fix inverted test that caused PKCS#11 keys that were explicitly listed
not to be preferred. Reported by Dirk-Willem van Gulik
- dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/10 21:46:11
[sshbuf.h]
Group ECC functions together to make things a little easier in -portable.
"doesn't bother me" deraadt@
- (dtucker) [sshbuf.h] Only declare ECC functions if building without
OpenSSL or if OpenSSL has ECC.
- (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/arc4random.c] Use explicit_bzero instead of an
assigment that might get optimized out. ok djm@
- (dtucker) [bufaux.c bufbn.c bufec.c buffer.c] Pull in includes.h for
compat stuff, specifically whether or not OpenSSL has ECC.
20140527
- (djm) [cipher.c] Fix merge botch.
- (djm) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Updated Cygwin ssh-host-config
from Corinna Vinschen, fixing a number of bugs and preparing for
Cygwin 1.7.30.
- (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c]
[openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h] On Cygwin, determine privilege
separation user at runtime, since it may need to be a domain account.
Patch from Corinna Vinschen.
20140522
- (djm) [Makefile.in] typo in path
20140521
- (djm) [commit configure.ac defines.h sshpty.c] don't attempt to use
vhangup on Linux. It doens't work for non-root users, and for them
it just messes up the tty settings.
- (djm) [misc.c] Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC
when it is available. It takes into account time spent suspended,
thereby ensuring timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire
correctly. bz#2228 reported by John Haxby
20140519
- (djm) [rijndael.c rijndael.h] Sync with newly-ressurected versions ine
OpenBSD
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
- logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/20 09:24:26
[dns.c dns.h ssh-keygen.c]
Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519 key types.
OK from djm@
- logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/21 14:36:16
[sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp.c]
Implement sftp upload resume support.
OK from djm@, with input from guenther@, mlarkin@ and
okan@
- logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/22 10:07:12
[sftp.c]
Sort the sftp command list.
OK from djm@
- logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/22 12:42:04
[sftp.1]
Document sftp upload resume.
OK from djm@, with feedback from okan@.
- jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/22 14:16:30
[sftp.1]
zap eol whitespace;
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/23 12:42:34
[readconf.c]
don't record duplicate IdentityFiles
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/28 03:09:18
[authfile.c bufaux.c buffer.h channels.c krl.c mux.c packet.c packet.h]
[ssh-keygen.c]
buffer_get_string_ptr's return should be const to remind
callers that futzing with it will futz with the actual buffer
contents
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 13:10:30
[clientloop.c serverloop.c]
bz#1818 - don't send channel success/failre replies on channels that
have sent a close already; analysis and patch from Simon Tatham;
ok markus@
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49
[auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c]
[kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c]
[roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c]
[ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no);
reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519;
allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
- dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 19:58:50
[sftp.c]
Move nulling of variable next to where it's freed. ok markus@
- dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 20:36:51
[sftp.c]
Don't attempt to append a nul quote char to the filename. Should prevent
fatal'ing with "el_insertstr failed" when there's a single quote char
somewhere in the string. bz#2238, ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/30 05:29:56
[bufaux.c bufbn.c bufec.c buffer.c buffer.h sshbuf-getput-basic.c]
[sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c sshbuf.h ssherr.c]
[ssherr.h]
New buffer API; the first installment of the conversion/replacement
of OpenSSH's internals to make them usable as a standalone library.
This includes a set of wrappers to make it compatible with the
existing buffer API so replacement can occur incrementally.
With and ok markus@
Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew
Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review.
- naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/30 19:07:48
[mac.c myproposal.h umac.c]
UMAC can use our local fallback implementation of AES when OpenSSL isn't
available. Glue code straight from Ted Krovetz's original umac.c.
ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/02 03:27:54
[chacha.h cipher-chachapoly.h digest.h hmac.h kex.h kexc25519.c]
[misc.h poly1305.h ssh-pkcs11.c defines.h]
revert __bounded change; it causes way more problems for portable than
it solves; pointed out by dtucker@
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/03 17:20:34
[monitor.c packet.c packet.h]
unbreak compression, by re-init-ing the compression code in the
post-auth child. the new buffer code is more strict, and requires
buffer_init() while the old code was happy after a bzero();
originally from djm@
- logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/05 07:02:30
[sftp.c]
Zap extra whitespace.
OK from djm@ and dtucker@
- (djm) [configure.ac] Unconditionally define WITH_OPENSSL until we write
portability glue to support building without libcrypto
- (djm) [Makefile.in configure.ac sshbuf-getput-basic.c]
[sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf.c] compilation and portability fixes
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/13 20:44:49
[login-timeout.sh]
this test is a sorry mess of race conditions; add another sleep
to avoid a failure on slow machines (at least until I find a
better way)
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/21 22:15:37
[dhgex.sh integrity.sh kextype.sh rekey.sh try-ciphers.sh]
repair regress tests broken by server-side default cipher/kex/mac changes
by ensuring that the option under test is included in the server's
algorithm list
- dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/03 18:46:14
[proxy-connect.sh]
Add tests for with and without compression, with and without privsep.
- logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/04 10:40:59
[connect-privsep.sh]
Remove the Z flag from the list of malloc options as it
was removed from malloc.c 10 days ago.
OK from miod@
- (djm) [regress/unittests/Makefile]
[regress/unittests/Makefile.inc]
[regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile]
[regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c]
[regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c]
[regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c]
[regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c]
[regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c]
[regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c]
[regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c]
[regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c]
[regress/unittests/test_helper/Makefile]
[regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c]
[regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c]
[regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h]
Import new unit tests from OpenBSD; not yet hooked up to build.
- (djm) [regress/Makefile Makefile.in]
[regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c
[regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c]
[regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c]
[regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c]
[regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c]
[regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c]
[regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c]
[regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c]
[regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c]
[regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c]
Hook new unit tests into the build and "make tests"
- (djm) [sshbuf.c] need __predict_false
20140430
- (dtucker) [defines.h] Define __GNUC_PREREQ__ macro if we don't already
have it. Only attempt to use __attribute__(__bounded__) for gcc.
20140420
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/03 22:22:30
[session.c]
ignore enviornment variables with embedded '=' or '\0' characters;
spotted by Jann Horn; ok deraadt@
Id sync only - portable already has this.
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/12 04:44:58
[ssh-keyscan.c]
scan for Ed25519 keys by default too
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/12 04:50:32
[auth-bsdauth.c ssh-keygen.c]
don't count on things that accept arguments by reference to clear
things for us on error; most things do, but it's unsafe form.
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/12 04:51:12
[authfile.c]
correct test that kdf name is not "none" or "bcrypt"
- naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/12 13:06:59
[ssh-keyscan.1]
scan for Ed25519 keys by default too
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/15 17:28:26
[ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
Improve usage() and documentation towards the standard form.
In particular, this line saves a lot of man page reading time.
usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1]
[-N new_passphrase] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]
ok schwarze jmc
- tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/17 19:44:10
[ssh.1]
old descriptions of des and blowfish are old. maybe ok deraadt
- tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/19 14:42:44
[scp.1]
there is no need for rcp anymore
ok deraadt millert
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03
[myproposal.h]
trimm default proposals.
This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers
(arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration
(the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available
for the config files).
ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26
[myproposal.h]
The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code
makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that
direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh.
Brought up by naddy.
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27
[myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 04:55:35
[chacha.h cipher-chachapoly.h digest.h hmac.h kex.h kexc25519.c
[misc.h poly1305.h ssh-pkcs11.c]
use __bounded(...) attribute recently added to sys/cdefs.h instead of
longform __attribute__(__bounded(...));
for brevity and a warning free compilation with llvm/clang
- tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 19:58:37
[sshd.8 sshd.c]
remove libwrap support. ok deraadt djm mfriedl
- naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/28 05:17:11
[ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
sync available and default algorithms, improve algorithm list formatting
help from jmc@ and schwarze@, ok deraadt@
- jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/31 13:39:34
[ssh-keygen.1]
the text for the -K option was inserted in the wrong place in -r1.108;
fix From: Matthew Clarke
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 02:05:27
[ssh-keysign.c]
include fingerprint of key not found
use arc4random_buf() instead of loop+arc4random()
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 03:34:10
[sshconnect.c]
When using VerifyHostKeyDNS with a DNSSEC resolver, down-convert any
certificate keys to plain keys and attempt SSHFP resolution.
Prevents a server from skipping SSHFP lookup and forcing a new-hostkey
dialog by offering only certificate keys.
Reported by mcv21 AT cam.ac.uk
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 05:32:57
[packet.c]
demote a debug3 to PACKET_DEBUG; ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/12 04:55:53
[sshd.c]
avoid crash at exit: check that pmonitor!=NULL before dereferencing;
bz#2225, patch from kavi AT juniper.net
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/16 23:22:45
[bufaux.c]
skip leading zero bytes in buffer_put_bignum2_from_string();
reported by jan AT mojzis.com; ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/16 23:28:12
[ssh-agent.1]
remove the identity files from this manpage - ssh-agent doesn't deal
with them at all and the same information is duplicated in ssh-add.1
(which does deal with them); prodded by deraadt@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/18 23:52:25
[compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c version.h]
OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 have a bug that causes ~0.2% of connections
using the curve25519-sha256@libssh.org KEX exchange method to fail
when connecting with something that implements the spec properly.
Disable this KEX method when speaking to one of the affected
versions.
reported by Aris Adamantiadis; ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/19 05:54:59
[compat.c]
missing wildcard; pointed out by naddy@
- tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/19 14:53:48
[ssh-keysign.c sshd.c]
Delete futile calls to RAND_seed. ok djm
NB. Id sync only. This only applies to OpenBSD's libcrypto slashathon
- tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/19 18:15:16
[sshd.8]
remove some really old rsh references
- tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/19 18:42:19
[ssh.1]
delete .xr to hosts.equiv. there's still an unfortunate amount of
documentation referring to rhosts equivalency in here.
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/20 02:30:25
[misc.c misc.h umac.c]
use get/put_u32 to load values rather than *((UINT32 *)p) that breaks on
strict-alignment architectures; reported by and ok stsp@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/20 02:49:32
[compat.c]
add a canonical 6.6 + curve25519 bignum fix fake version that I can
recommend people use ahead of the openssh-6.7 release
20140401
- (djm) On platforms that support it, use prctl() to prevent sftp-server
from accessing /proc/self/{mem,maps}; patch from jann AT thejh.net
- (djm) Use full release (e.g. 6.5p1) in debug output rather than just
version. From des@des.no
20140317
- (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Soft-fail stat() syscalls. Add XXX to
remind myself to add sandbox violation logging via the log socket.
20140314
- (tim) [opensshd.init.in] Add support for ed25519
20140313
- (djm) Release OpenSSH 6.6
@ -2884,4 +3815,3 @@
[contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update for release 6.0
- (djm) [README] Update URL to release notes.
- (djm) Release openssh-6.0

31
crypto/openssh/INSTALL
View File

@ -1,22 +1,26 @@
1. Prerequisites
----------------
You will need working installations of Zlib and OpenSSL.
You will need working installations of Zlib and libcrypto (LibreSSL /
OpenSSL)
Zlib 1.1.4 or 1.2.1.2 or greater (ealier 1.2.x versions have problems):
http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
OpenSSL 0.9.6 or greater:
http://www.openssl.org/
libcrypto (LibreSSL or OpenSSL >= 0.9.8f)
LibreSSL http://www.libressl.org/ ; or
OpenSSL http://www.openssl.org/
(OpenSSL 0.9.5a is partially supported, but some ciphers (SSH protocol 1
Blowfish) do not work correctly.)
LibreSSL/OpenSSL should be compiled as a position-independent library
(i.e. with -fPIC) otherwise OpenSSH will not be able to link with it.
If you must use a non-position-independent libcrypto, then you may need
to configure OpenSSH --without-pie.
The remaining items are optional.
NB. If you operating system supports /dev/random, you should configure
OpenSSL to use it. OpenSSH relies on OpenSSL's direct support of
/dev/random, or failing that, either prngd or egd
libcrypto (LibreSSL/OpenSSL) to use it. OpenSSH relies on libcrypto's
direct support of /dev/random, or failing that, either prngd or egd
PRNGD:
@ -27,10 +31,10 @@ http://prngd.sourceforge.net/
EGD:
The Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is supported if you have a system which
lacks /dev/random and don't want to use OpenSSH's internal entropy collection.
If the kernel lacks /dev/random the Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is
supported only if libcrypto supports it.
http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/
http://egd.sourceforge.net/
PAM:
@ -204,10 +208,11 @@ created.
--with-xauth=PATH specifies the location of the xauth binary
--with-ssl-dir=DIR allows you to specify where your OpenSSL libraries
--with-ssl-dir=DIR allows you to specify where your Libre/OpenSSL
libraries
are installed.
--with-ssl-engine enables OpenSSL's (hardware) ENGINE support
--with-ssl-engine enables Libre/OpenSSL's (hardware) ENGINE support
--with-4in6 Check for IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and convert them to
real (AF_INET) IPv4 addresses. Works around some quirks on Linux.
@ -266,4 +271,4 @@ Please refer to the "reporting bugs" section of the webpage at
http://www.openssh.com/
$Id: INSTALL,v 1.88 2013/03/07 01:33:35 dtucker Exp $
$Id: INSTALL,v 1.91 2014/09/09 02:23:11 dtucker Exp $

90
crypto/openssh/Makefile.in
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.356 2014/02/04 00:12:56 djm Exp $
# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.365 2014/08/30 06:23:07 djm Exp $
# uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
#SHELL = @SH@
@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@
PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
@ -63,7 +64,16 @@ MANFMT=@MANFMT@
TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
ssherr.o \
sshbuf.o \
sshkey.o \
sshbuf-getput-basic.o \
sshbuf-misc.o \
sshbuf-getput-crypto.o
LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \
cipher-bf1.o cipher-ctr.o cipher-3des1.o cleanup.o \
compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
@ -135,7 +145,7 @@ $(SSHOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
$(SSHDOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
.c.o:
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
$(LIBCOMPAT): always
@ -214,6 +224,12 @@ umac128.o: umac.c
clean: regressclean
rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
rm -f *.out core survey
rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a
rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf
rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey
(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) clean)
distclean: regressclean
@ -222,6 +238,12 @@ distclean: regressclean
rm -f Makefile buildpkg.sh config.h config.status
rm -f survey.sh openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile *~
rm -rf autom4te.cache
rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a
rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf
rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey
(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean)
if test -d pkg ; then \
rm -fr pkg ; \
@ -394,23 +416,71 @@ uninstall:
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c
regress-prep:
[ -d `pwd`/regress ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress
[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests
[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper ] || \
mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper
[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf ] || \
mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf
[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey ] || \
mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey
[ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \
ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $? \
$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c
[ -d `pwd`/regress ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress
[ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \
ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $? \
$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
tests interop-tests: $(TARGETS) regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT)
UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.o \
regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.o
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a: ${UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS}
$(AR) rv $@ $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS)
$(RANLIB) $@
UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.o
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.o \
regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.o \
regress/unittests/sshkey/common.o \
regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.o \
regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.o
regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
REGRESS_BINARIES=\
regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \
regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT)
tests interop-tests t-exec: regress-prep $(TARGETS) $(REGRESS_BINARIES)
BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \
TEST_SHELL="@TEST_SHELL@"; \
TEST_SSH_SCP="$${BUILDDIR}/scp"; \
TEST_SSH_SSH="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh"; \
TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${BUILDDIR}/sshd"; \
@ -434,7 +504,6 @@ tests interop-tests: $(TARGETS) regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) regress/setuid-allowed$
OBJ="$${BUILDDIR}/regress/" \
PATH="$${BUILDDIR}:$${PATH}" \
TEST_ENV=MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \
TEST_SHELL="$${TEST_SHELL}" \
TEST_SSH_SCP="$${TEST_SSH_SCP}" \
TEST_SSH_SSH="$${TEST_SSH_SSH}" \
TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${TEST_SSH_SSHD}" \
@ -450,6 +519,7 @@ tests interop-tests: $(TARGETS) regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) regress/setuid-allowed$
TEST_SSH_CONCH="$${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" \
TEST_SSH_IPV6="$${TEST_SSH_IPV6}" \
TEST_SSH_ECC="$${TEST_SSH_ECC}" \
TEST_SHELL="${TEST_SHELL}" \
EXEEXT="$(EXEEXT)" \
$@ && echo all tests passed

52
crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL
View File

@ -232,6 +232,56 @@ The contents of the "data" field for layer 2 packets is:
The "frame" field contains an IEEE 802.3 Ethernet frame, including
header.
2.4. connection: Unix domain socket forwarding
OpenSSH supports local and remote Unix domain socket forwarding
using the "streamlocal" extension. Forwarding is initiated as per
TCP sockets but with a single path instead of a host and port.
Similar to direct-tcpip, direct-streamlocal is sent by the client
to request that the server make a connection to a Unix domain socket.
byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
string "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com"
uint32 sender channel
uint32 initial window size
uint32 maximum packet size
string socket path
string reserved for future use
Similar to forwarded-tcpip, forwarded-streamlocal is sent by the
server when the client has previously send the server a streamlocal-forward
GLOBAL_REQUEST.
byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
string "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com"
uint32 sender channel
uint32 initial window size
uint32 maximum packet size
string socket path
string reserved for future use
The reserved field is not currently defined and is ignored on the
remote end. It is intended to be used in the future to pass
information about the socket file, such as ownership and mode.
The client currently sends the empty string for this field.
Similar to tcpip-forward, streamlocal-forward is sent by the client
to request remote forwarding of a Unix domain socket.
byte SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
string "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"
boolean TRUE
string socket path
Similar to cancel-tcpip-forward, cancel-streamlocal-forward is sent
by the client cancel the forwarding of a Unix domain socket.
byte SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
string "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"
boolean FALSE
string socket path
3. SFTP protocol changes
3.1. sftp: Reversal of arguments to SSH_FXP_SYMLINK
@ -356,4 +406,4 @@ respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
"1".
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.23 2013/12/01 23:19:05 djm Exp $
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.24 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $

4
crypto/openssh/README
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.6 for the release notes.
See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7 for the release notes.
- A Japanese translation of this document and of the OpenSSH FAQ is
- available at http://www.unixuser.org/~haruyama/security/openssh/index.html
@ -62,4 +62,4 @@ References -
[6] http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=style&sektion=9
[7] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
$Id: README,v 1.86 2014/02/27 23:03:53 djm Exp $
$Id: README,v 1.87 2014/08/10 01:35:06 djm Exp $

9
crypto/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.11 2007/09/21 08:15:29 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.13 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
@ -54,6 +56,11 @@ bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
char *challenge = NULL;
*infotxt = NULL;
*numprompts = 0;
*prompts = NULL;
*echo_on = NULL;
if (authctxt->as != NULL) {
debug2("bsdauth_query: try reuse session");
challenge = auth_getitem(authctxt->as, AUTHV_CHALLENGE);

6
crypto/openssh/auth-chall.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth-chall.c,v 1.13 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth-chall.c,v 1.14 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -26,6 +26,9 @@
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
@ -34,6 +37,7 @@
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
/* limited protocol v1 interface to kbd-interactive authentication */

1
crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c
View File

@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "key.h"

17
crypto/openssh/auth-options.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.62 2013/12/19 00:27:57 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.64 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -26,9 +26,9 @@
#include "log.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
@ -325,6 +325,7 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
patterns[i] = '\0';
opts++;
p = patterns;
/* XXX - add streamlocal support */
host = hpdelim(&p);
if (host == NULL || strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen "
@ -586,8 +587,8 @@ auth_cert_options(Key *k, struct passwd *pw)
if (key_cert_is_legacy(k)) {
/* All options are in the one field for v00 certs */
if (parse_option_list(buffer_ptr(&k->cert->critical),
buffer_len(&k->cert->critical), pw,
if (parse_option_list(buffer_ptr(k->cert->critical),
buffer_len(k->cert->critical), pw,
OPTIONS_CRITICAL|OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 1,
&cert_no_port_forwarding_flag,
&cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag,
@ -599,14 +600,14 @@ auth_cert_options(Key *k, struct passwd *pw)
return -1;
} else {
/* Separate options and extensions for v01 certs */
if (parse_option_list(buffer_ptr(&k->cert->critical),
buffer_len(&k->cert->critical), pw,
if (parse_option_list(buffer_ptr(k->cert->critical),
buffer_len(k->cert->critical), pw,
OPTIONS_CRITICAL, 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&cert_forced_command,
&cert_source_address_done) == -1)
return -1;
if (parse_option_list(buffer_ptr(&k->cert->extensions),
buffer_len(&k->cert->extensions), pw,
if (parse_option_list(buffer_ptr(k->cert->extensions),
buffer_len(k->cert->extensions), pw,
OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 1,
&cert_no_port_forwarding_flag,
&cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag,

3
crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.43 2007/09/21 08:15:29 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.44 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
#include "packet.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"

3
crypto/openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.43 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.44 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"

4
crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.44 2010/03/07 11:57:13 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.45 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -34,12 +34,12 @@
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "misc.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;

7
crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.86 2014/01/27 19:18:54 markus Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.88 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include "buffer.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
@ -45,7 +46,6 @@
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "digest.h"
@ -144,7 +144,8 @@ auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *key)
challenge = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key));
/* Encrypt the challenge with the public key. */
rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, key->rsa);
if (rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, key->rsa) != 0)
fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt failed", __func__);
/* Send the encrypted challenge to the client. */
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);

22
crypto/openssh/auth.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.103 2013/05/19 02:42:42 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.106 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "groupaccess.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
@ -64,7 +65,6 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "loginrec.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
@ -327,6 +327,20 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
#endif
}
void
auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
packet_disconnect("Too many authentication failures for "
"%s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s",
authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
authctxt->user,
get_remote_ipaddr(),
get_remote_port(),
compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1");
/* NOTREACHED */
}
/*
* Check whether root logins are disallowed.
*/
@ -660,6 +674,7 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user)
int
auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
{
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
char *key_fp;
if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL)
@ -672,6 +687,7 @@ auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
default:
goto revoked;
}
#endif
debug3("%s: treating %s as a key list", __func__,
options.revoked_keys_file);
switch (key_in_file(key, options.revoked_keys_file, 0)) {
@ -683,6 +699,7 @@ auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
error("Revoked keys file is unreadable: refusing public key "
"authentication");
return 1;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case 1:
revoked:
/* Key revoked */
@ -691,6 +708,7 @@ auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
"%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);
free(key_fp);
return 1;
#endif
}
fatal("key_in_file returned junk");
}

5
crypto/openssh/auth.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.77 2014/01/29 06:18:35 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.78 2014/07/03 11:16:55 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ void auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *, ...)
__attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)))
__attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
void auth_log(Authctxt *, int, int, const char *, const char *);
void auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *) __attribute__((noreturn));
void userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, const char *, const char *);
int auth_root_allowed(const char *);
@ -210,8 +211,6 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
int sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
#define AUTH_FAIL_MSG "Too many authentication failures for %.100s"
#define SKEY_PROMPT "\nS/Key Password: "
#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)

5
crypto/openssh/auth1.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.80 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.82 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include "packet.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "key.h"
@ -363,7 +364,7 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
#endif
packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
auth_maxtries_exceeded(authctxt);
}
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);

1
crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c
View File

@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
#include "packet.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
/* import */

1
crypto/openssh/auth2-gss.c
View File

@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#include "log.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "ssh-gss.h"

3
crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.17 2013/12/30 23:52:27 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.18 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include "packet.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "key.h"

3
crypto/openssh/auth2-kbdint.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.6 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.7 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include "auth.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
/* import */

6
crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.16 2010/06/25 08:46:17 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.18 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -30,9 +30,10 @@
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
@ -42,6 +43,7 @@
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh2.h"

3
crypto/openssh/auth2-passwd.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.11 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.12 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
/* import */

8
crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.39 2013/12/30 23:52:27 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.41 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
#include "packet.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "key.h"
@ -61,7 +62,6 @@
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "match.h"
@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
}
static int
match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct KeyCert *cert)
match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
{
char *result;
u_int i;
@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct KeyCert *cert)
}
static int
match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct KeyCert *cert)
match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
{
FILE *f;
char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts;

5
crypto/openssh/auth2.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.130 2014/01/29 06:18:35 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.132 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "key.h"
@ -392,7 +393,7 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method,
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
#endif
packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
auth_maxtries_exceeded(authctxt);
}
methods = authmethods_get(authctxt);
debug3("%s: failure partial=%d next methods=\"%s\"", __func__,

22
crypto/openssh/authfd.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.92 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.93 2014/04/29 18:01:49 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -41,9 +41,6 @@
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <signal.h>
@ -313,8 +310,10 @@ ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int versi
Key *
ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
{
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
int keybits;
u_int bits;
#endif
u_char *blob;
u_int blen;
Key *key = NULL;
@ -328,6 +327,7 @@ ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int versio
* error if the packet is too short or contains corrupt data.
*/
switch (version) {
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
case 1:
key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
@ -339,6 +339,7 @@ ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int versio
logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
break;
#endif
case 2:
blob = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, &blen);
*comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
@ -361,6 +362,7 @@ ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int versio
* supported) and 1 corresponding to protocol version 1.1.
*/
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
int
ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
Key* key, BIGNUM *challenge,
@ -410,6 +412,7 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
buffer_free(&buffer);
return success;
}
#endif
/* ask agent to sign data, returns -1 on error, 0 on success */
int
@ -457,6 +460,7 @@ ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
/* Encode key for a message to the agent. */
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
static void
ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
{
@ -470,6 +474,7 @@ ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
buffer_put_bignum(b, key->p); /* ssh key->q, SSL key->p */
buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
}
#endif
static void
ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
@ -493,6 +498,7 @@ ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key,
buffer_init(&msg);
switch (key->type) {
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
case KEY_RSA1:
type = constrained ?
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED :
@ -500,6 +506,8 @@ ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key,
buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(&msg, key->rsa, comment);
break;
#endif
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
@ -508,6 +516,7 @@ ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key,
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
#endif
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
type = constrained ?
@ -552,12 +561,15 @@ ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key)
buffer_init(&msg);
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY);
buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->e);
buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->n);
} else if (key->type != KEY_UNSPEC) {
} else
#endif
if (key->type != KEY_UNSPEC) {
key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen);
buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY);
buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);

1561
crypto/openssh/authfile.c
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

59
crypto/openssh/authfile.h
View File

@ -1,32 +1,47 @@
/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.17 2013/12/06 13:34:54 markus Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.19 2014/07/03 23:18:35 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef AUTHFILE_H
#define AUTHFILE_H
int key_save_private(Key *, const char *, const char *, const char *,
int, const char *, int);
int key_load_file(int, const char *, Buffer *);
Key *key_load_cert(const char *);
Key *key_load_public(const char *, char **);
Key *key_load_public_type(int, const char *, char **);
Key *key_parse_private(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, char **);
Key *key_load_private(const char *, const char *, char **);
Key *key_load_private_cert(int, const char *, const char *, int *);
Key *key_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *, char **, int *);
Key *key_load_private_pem(int, int, const char *, char **);
int key_perm_ok(int, const char *);
int key_in_file(Key *, const char *, int);
struct sshbuf;
struct sshkey;
int sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *, const char *,
const char *, const char *, int, const char *, int);
int sshkey_load_file(int, const char *, struct sshbuf *);
int sshkey_load_cert(const char *, struct sshkey **);
int sshkey_load_public(const char *, struct sshkey **, char **);
int sshkey_load_private(const char *, const char *, struct sshkey **, char **);
int sshkey_load_private_cert(int, const char *, const char *,
struct sshkey **, int *);
int sshkey_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *,
struct sshkey **, char **, int *);
int sshkey_load_private_pem(int, int, const char *, struct sshkey **, char **);
int sshkey_perm_ok(int, const char *);
int sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *, const char *, int);
#endif

338
crypto/openssh/bufaux.c
View File

@ -1,70 +1,40 @@
/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.57 2014/04/16 23:22:45 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.60 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Auxiliary functions for storing and retrieving various data types to/from
* Buffers.
* Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
*
* SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* Emulation wrappers for legacy OpenSSH buffer API atop sshbuf */
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
/*
* Returns integers from the buffer (msb first).
*/
#include "ssherr.h"
int
buffer_get_short_ret(u_short *ret, Buffer *buffer)
buffer_get_short_ret(u_short *v, Buffer *buffer)
{
u_char buf[2];
int ret;
if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 2) == -1)
return (-1);
*ret = get_u16(buf);
return (0);
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_u16(buffer, v)) != 0) {
error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
u_short
@ -73,21 +43,21 @@ buffer_get_short(Buffer *buffer)
u_short ret;
if (buffer_get_short_ret(&ret, buffer) == -1)
fatal("buffer_get_short: buffer error");
fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
return (ret);
}
int
buffer_get_int_ret(u_int *ret, Buffer *buffer)
buffer_get_int_ret(u_int *v, Buffer *buffer)
{
u_char buf[4];
int ret;
if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 4) == -1)
return (-1);
if (ret != NULL)
*ret = get_u32(buf);
return (0);
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_u32(buffer, v)) != 0) {
error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
u_int
@ -96,21 +66,21 @@ buffer_get_int(Buffer *buffer)
u_int ret;
if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ret, buffer) == -1)
fatal("buffer_get_int: buffer error");
fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
return (ret);
}
int
buffer_get_int64_ret(u_int64_t *ret, Buffer *buffer)
buffer_get_int64_ret(u_int64_t *v, Buffer *buffer)
{
u_char buf[8];
int ret;
if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 8) == -1)
return (-1);
if (ret != NULL)
*ret = get_u64(buf);
return (0);
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_u64(buffer, v)) != 0) {
error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
u_int64_t
@ -119,78 +89,52 @@ buffer_get_int64(Buffer *buffer)
u_int64_t ret;
if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&ret, buffer) == -1)
fatal("buffer_get_int: buffer error");
fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
return (ret);
}
/*
* Stores integers in the buffer, msb first.
*/
void
buffer_put_short(Buffer *buffer, u_short value)
{
char buf[2];
int ret;
put_u16(buf, value);
buffer_append(buffer, buf, 2);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u16(buffer, value)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
}
void
buffer_put_int(Buffer *buffer, u_int value)
{
char buf[4];
int ret;
put_u32(buf, value);
buffer_append(buffer, buf, 4);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, value)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
}
void
buffer_put_int64(Buffer *buffer, u_int64_t value)
{
char buf[8];
int ret;
put_u64(buf, value);
buffer_append(buffer, buf, 8);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u64(buffer, value)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
}
/*
* Returns an arbitrary binary string from the buffer. The string cannot
* be longer than 256k. The returned value points to memory allocated
* with xmalloc; it is the responsibility of the calling function to free
* the data. If length_ptr is non-NULL, the length of the returned data
* will be stored there. A null character will be automatically appended
* to the returned string, and is not counted in length.
*/
void *
buffer_get_string_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
{
size_t len;
int ret;
u_char *value;
u_int len;
/* Get the length. */
if (buffer_get_int_ret(&len, buffer) != 0) {
error("buffer_get_string_ret: cannot extract length");
return (NULL);
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(buffer, &value, &len)) != 0) {
error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
return NULL;
}
if (len > 256 * 1024) {
error("buffer_get_string_ret: bad string length %u", len);
return (NULL);
}
/* Allocate space for the string. Add one byte for a null character. */
value = xmalloc(len + 1);
/* Get the string. */
if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, value, len) == -1) {
error("buffer_get_string_ret: buffer_get failed");
free(value);
return (NULL);
}
/* Append a null character to make processing easier. */
value[len] = '\0';
/* Optionally return the length of the string. */
if (length_ptr)
*length_ptr = len;
return (value);
if (length_ptr != NULL)
*length_ptr = len; /* Safe: sshbuf never stores len > 2^31 */
return value;
}
void *
@ -199,31 +143,24 @@ buffer_get_string(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
void *ret;
if ((ret = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, length_ptr)) == NULL)
fatal("buffer_get_string: buffer error");
fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
return (ret);
}
char *
buffer_get_cstring_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
{
u_int length;
char *cp, *ret = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, &length);
size_t len;
int ret;
char *value;
if (ret == NULL)
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(buffer, &value, &len)) != 0) {
error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
return NULL;
if ((cp = memchr(ret, '\0', length)) != NULL) {
/* XXX allow \0 at end-of-string for a while, remove later */
if (cp == ret + length - 1)
error("buffer_get_cstring_ret: string contains \\0");
else {
explicit_bzero(ret, length);
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
}
if (length_ptr != NULL)
*length_ptr = length;
return ret;
*length_ptr = len; /* Safe: sshbuf never stores len > 2^31 */
return value;
}
char *
@ -232,162 +169,91 @@ buffer_get_cstring(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
char *ret;
if ((ret = buffer_get_cstring_ret(buffer, length_ptr)) == NULL)
fatal("buffer_get_cstring: buffer error");
fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
return ret;
}
void *
const void *
buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
{
void *ptr;
u_int len;
size_t len;
int ret;
const u_char *value;
if (buffer_get_int_ret(&len, buffer) != 0)
return NULL;
if (len > 256 * 1024) {
error("buffer_get_string_ptr: bad string length %u", len);
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buffer, &value, &len)) != 0) {
error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
return NULL;
}
ptr = buffer_ptr(buffer);
buffer_consume(buffer, len);
if (length_ptr)
*length_ptr = len;
return (ptr);
if (length_ptr != NULL)
*length_ptr = len; /* Safe: sshbuf never stores len > 2^31 */
return value;
}
void *
const void *
buffer_get_string_ptr(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
{
void *ret;
const void *ret;
if ((ret = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(buffer, length_ptr)) == NULL)
fatal("buffer_get_string_ptr: buffer error");
fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
return (ret);
}
/*
* Stores and arbitrary binary string in the buffer.
*/
void
buffer_put_string(Buffer *buffer, const void *buf, u_int len)
{
buffer_put_int(buffer, len);
buffer_append(buffer, buf, len);
int ret;
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(buffer, buf, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
}
void
buffer_put_cstring(Buffer *buffer, const char *s)
{
if (s == NULL)
fatal("buffer_put_cstring: s == NULL");
buffer_put_string(buffer, s, strlen(s));
int ret;
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, s)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
}
/*
* Returns a character from the buffer (0 - 255).
*/
int
buffer_get_char_ret(u_char *ret, Buffer *buffer)
buffer_get_char_ret(char *v, Buffer *buffer)
{
if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, ret, 1) == -1) {
error("buffer_get_char_ret: buffer_get_ret failed");
return (-1);
int ret;
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_u8(buffer, (u_char *)v)) != 0) {
error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
return -1;
}
return (0);
return 0;
}
int
buffer_get_char(Buffer *buffer)
{
u_char ch;
char ch;
if (buffer_get_char_ret(&ch, buffer) == -1)
fatal("buffer_get_char: buffer error");
return ch;
fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
return (u_char) ch;
}
/*
* Stores a character in the buffer.
*/
void
buffer_put_char(Buffer *buffer, int value)
{
char ch = value;
int ret;
buffer_append(buffer, &ch, 1);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u8(buffer, value)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
}
/* Pseudo bignum functions */
void *
buffer_get_bignum2_as_string_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
{
u_int len;
u_char *bin, *p, *ret;
if ((p = bin = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, &len)) == NULL) {
error("%s: invalid bignum", __func__);
return NULL;
}
if (len > 0 && (bin[0] & 0x80)) {
error("%s: negative numbers not supported", __func__);
free(bin);
return NULL;
}
if (len > 8 * 1024) {
error("%s: cannot handle BN of size %d", __func__, len);
free(bin);
return NULL;
}
/* Skip zero prefix on numbers with the MSB set */
if (len > 1 && bin[0] == 0x00 && (bin[1] & 0x80) != 0) {
p++;
len--;
}
ret = xmalloc(len);
memcpy(ret, p, len);
explicit_bzero(p, len);
free(bin);
return ret;
}
void *
buffer_get_bignum2_as_string(Buffer *buffer, u_int *l)
{
void *ret = buffer_get_bignum2_as_string_ret(buffer, l);
if (ret == NULL)
fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
return ret;
}
/*
* Stores a string using the bignum encoding rules (\0 pad if MSB set).
*/
void
buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(Buffer *buffer, const u_char *s, u_int l)
{
u_char *buf, *p;
int pad = 0;
int ret;
if (l > 8 * 1024)
fatal("%s: length %u too long", __func__, l);
/* Skip leading zero bytes */
for (; l > 0 && *s == 0; l--, s++)
;
p = buf = xmalloc(l + 1);
/*
* If most significant bit is set then prepend a zero byte to
* avoid interpretation as a negative number.
*/
if (l > 0 && (s[0] & 0x80) != 0) {
*p++ = '\0';
pad = 1;
}
memcpy(p, s, l);
buffer_put_string(buffer, buf, l + pad);
explicit_bzero(buf, l + pad);
free(buf);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(buffer, s, l)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
}

206
crypto/openssh/bufbn.c
View File

@ -1,229 +1,103 @@
/* $OpenBSD: bufbn.c,v 1.11 2014/02/27 08:25:09 djm Exp $*/
/* $OpenBSD: bufbn.c,v 1.12 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Auxiliary functions for storing and retrieving various data types to/from
* Buffers.
* Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
*
* SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* Emulation wrappers for legacy OpenSSH buffer API atop sshbuf */
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
/*
* Stores an BIGNUM in the buffer with a 2-byte msb first bit count, followed
* by (bits+7)/8 bytes of binary data, msb first.
*/
int
buffer_put_bignum_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
{
int bits = BN_num_bits(value);
int bin_size = (bits + 7) / 8;
u_char *buf = xmalloc(bin_size);
int oi;
char msg[2];
int ret;
/* Get the value of in binary */
oi = BN_bn2bin(value, buf);
if (oi != bin_size) {
error("buffer_put_bignum_ret: BN_bn2bin() failed: oi %d != bin_size %d",
oi, bin_size);
free(buf);
return (-1);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, value)) != 0) {
error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
return -1;
}
/* Store the number of bits in the buffer in two bytes, msb first. */
put_u16(msg, bits);
buffer_append(buffer, msg, 2);
/* Store the binary data. */
buffer_append(buffer, buf, oi);
explicit_bzero(buf, bin_size);
free(buf);
return (0);
return 0;
}
void
buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
{
if (buffer_put_bignum_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
fatal("buffer_put_bignum: buffer error");
fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
}
/*
* Retrieves a BIGNUM from the buffer.
*/
int
buffer_get_bignum_ret(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
{
u_int bits, bytes;
u_char buf[2], *bin;
int ret;
/* Get the number of bits. */
if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 2) == -1) {
error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: invalid length");
return (-1);
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_bignum1(buffer, value)) != 0) {
error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
return -1;
}
bits = get_u16(buf);
if (bits > 65535-7) {
error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d",
bits);
return (-1);
}
/* Compute the number of binary bytes that follow. */
bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
if (bytes > 8 * 1024) {
error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d", bytes);
return (-1);
}
if (buffer_len(buffer) < bytes) {
error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: input buffer too small");
return (-1);
}
bin = buffer_ptr(buffer);
if (BN_bin2bn(bin, bytes, value) == NULL) {
error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: BN_bin2bn failed");
return (-1);
}
if (buffer_consume_ret(buffer, bytes) == -1) {
error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: buffer_consume failed");
return (-1);
}
return (0);
return 0;
}
void
buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
{
if (buffer_get_bignum_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
fatal("buffer_get_bignum: buffer error");
fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
}
/*
* Stores a BIGNUM in the buffer in SSH2 format.
*/
int
buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
{
u_int bytes;
u_char *buf;
int oi;
u_int hasnohigh = 0;
int ret;
if (BN_is_zero(value)) {
buffer_put_int(buffer, 0);
return 0;
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buffer, value)) != 0) {
error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
return -1;
}
if (value->neg) {
error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: negative numbers not supported");
return (-1);
}
bytes = BN_num_bytes(value) + 1; /* extra padding byte */
if (bytes < 2) {
error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: BN too small");
return (-1);
}
buf = xmalloc(bytes);
buf[0] = 0x00;
/* Get the value of in binary */
oi = BN_bn2bin(value, buf+1);
if (oi < 0 || (u_int)oi != bytes - 1) {
error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: BN_bn2bin() failed: "
"oi %d != bin_size %d", oi, bytes);
free(buf);
return (-1);
}
hasnohigh = (buf[1] & 0x80) ? 0 : 1;
buffer_put_string(buffer, buf+hasnohigh, bytes-hasnohigh);
explicit_bzero(buf, bytes);
free(buf);
return (0);
return 0;
}
void
buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
{
if (buffer_put_bignum2_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
fatal("buffer_put_bignum2: buffer error");
fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
}
int
buffer_get_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
{
u_int len;
u_char *bin;
int ret;
if ((bin = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, &len)) == NULL) {
error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: invalid bignum");
return (-1);
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buffer, value)) != 0) {
error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
return -1;
}
if (len > 0 && (bin[0] & 0x80)) {
error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: negative numbers not supported");
free(bin);
return (-1);
}
if (len > 8 * 1024) {
error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d",
len);
free(bin);
return (-1);
}
if (BN_bin2bn(bin, len, value) == NULL) {
error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: BN_bin2bn failed");
free(bin);
return (-1);
}
free(bin);
return (0);
return 0;
}
void
buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
{
if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
fatal("buffer_get_bignum2: buffer error");
fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
}

106
crypto/openssh/bufec.c
View File

@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
/* $OpenBSD: bufec.c,v 1.3 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: bufec.c,v 1.4 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
* Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
@ -15,73 +16,29 @@
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
/* Emulation wrappers for legacy OpenSSH buffer API atop sshbuf */
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
/*
* Maximum supported EC GFp field length is 528 bits. SEC1 uncompressed
* encoding represents this as two bitstring points that should each
* be no longer than the field length, SEC1 specifies a 1 byte
* point type header.
* Being paranoid here may insulate us to parsing problems in
* EC_POINT_oct2point.
*/
#define BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN ((528*2 / 8) + 1)
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
/*
* Append an EC_POINT to the buffer as a string containing a SEC1 encoded
* uncompressed point. Fortunately OpenSSL handles the gory details for us.
*/
int
buffer_put_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve,
const EC_POINT *point)
{
u_char *buf = NULL;
size_t len;
BN_CTX *bnctx;
int ret = -1;
int ret;
/* Determine length */
if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__);
len = EC_POINT_point2oct(curve, point, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
NULL, 0, bnctx);
if (len > BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN) {
error("%s: giant EC point: len = %lu (max %u)",
__func__, (u_long)len, BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN);
goto out;
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_ec(buffer, point, curve)) != 0) {
error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
return -1;
}
/* Convert */
buf = xmalloc(len);
if (EC_POINT_point2oct(curve, point, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
buf, len, bnctx) != len) {
error("%s: EC_POINT_point2oct length mismatch", __func__);
goto out;
}
/* Append */
buffer_put_string(buffer, buf, len);
ret = 0;
out:
if (buf != NULL) {
explicit_bzero(buf, len);
free(buf);
}
BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
return ret;
return 0;
}
void
@ -96,43 +53,13 @@ int
buffer_get_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve,
EC_POINT *point)
{
u_char *buf;
u_int len;
BN_CTX *bnctx;
int ret = -1;
int ret;
if ((buf = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, &len)) == NULL) {
error("%s: invalid point", __func__);
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_ec(buffer, point, curve)) != 0) {
error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
return -1;
}
if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__);
if (len > BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN) {
error("%s: EC_POINT too long: %u > max %u", __func__,
len, BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN);
goto out;
}
if (len == 0) {
error("%s: EC_POINT buffer is empty", __func__);
goto out;
}
if (buf[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
error("%s: EC_POINT is in an incorrect form: "
"0x%02x (want 0x%02x)", __func__, buf[0],
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED);
goto out;
}
if (EC_POINT_oct2point(curve, point, buf, len, bnctx) != 1) {
error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: BN_bin2bn failed");
goto out;
}
/* EC_POINT_oct2point verifies that the point is on the curve for us */
ret = 0;
out:
BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
explicit_bzero(buf, len);
free(buf);
return ret;
return 0;
}
void
@ -144,3 +71,4 @@ buffer_get_ecpoint(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve,
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */

247
crypto/openssh/buffer.c
View File

@ -1,254 +1,119 @@
/* $OpenBSD: buffer.c,v 1.35 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: buffer.c,v 1.36 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Functions for manipulating fifo buffers (that can grow if needed).
* Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* Emulation wrappers for legacy OpenSSH buffer API atop sshbuf */
#include "includes.h"
__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "log.h"
#define BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK 0x100000
#define BUFFER_MAX_LEN 0xa00000
#define BUFFER_ALLOCSZ 0x008000
/* Initializes the buffer structure. */
void
buffer_init(Buffer *buffer)
{
const u_int len = 4096;
buffer->alloc = 0;
buffer->buf = xmalloc(len);
buffer->alloc = len;
buffer->offset = 0;
buffer->end = 0;
}
/* Frees any memory used for the buffer. */
void
buffer_free(Buffer *buffer)
{
if (buffer->alloc > 0) {
explicit_bzero(buffer->buf, buffer->alloc);
buffer->alloc = 0;
free(buffer->buf);
}
}
/*
* Clears any data from the buffer, making it empty. This does not actually
* zero the memory.
*/
void
buffer_clear(Buffer *buffer)
{
buffer->offset = 0;
buffer->end = 0;
}
/* Appends data to the buffer, expanding it if necessary. */
#include "ssherr.h"
void
buffer_append(Buffer *buffer, const void *data, u_int len)
{
void *p;
p = buffer_append_space(buffer, len);
memcpy(p, data, len);
}
int ret;
static int
buffer_compact(Buffer *buffer)
{
/*
* If the buffer is quite empty, but all data is at the end, move the
* data to the beginning.
*/
if (buffer->offset > MIN(buffer->alloc, BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK)) {
memmove(buffer->buf, buffer->buf + buffer->offset,
buffer->end - buffer->offset);
buffer->end -= buffer->offset;
buffer->offset = 0;
return (1);
}
return (0);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put(buffer, data, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
}
/*
* Appends space to the buffer, expanding the buffer if necessary. This does
* not actually copy the data into the buffer, but instead returns a pointer
* to the allocated region.
*/
void *
buffer_append_space(Buffer *buffer, u_int len)
{
u_int newlen;
void *p;
int ret;
u_char *p;
if (len > BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK)
fatal("buffer_append_space: len %u not supported", len);
/* If the buffer is empty, start using it from the beginning. */
if (buffer->offset == buffer->end) {
buffer->offset = 0;
buffer->end = 0;
}
restart:
/* If there is enough space to store all data, store it now. */
if (buffer->end + len < buffer->alloc) {
p = buffer->buf + buffer->end;
buffer->end += len;
return p;
}
/* Compact data back to the start of the buffer if necessary */
if (buffer_compact(buffer))
goto restart;
/* Increase the size of the buffer and retry. */
newlen = roundup(buffer->alloc + len, BUFFER_ALLOCSZ);
if (newlen > BUFFER_MAX_LEN)
fatal("buffer_append_space: alloc %u not supported",
newlen);
buffer->buf = xrealloc(buffer->buf, 1, newlen);
buffer->alloc = newlen;
goto restart;
/* NOTREACHED */
if ((ret = sshbuf_reserve(buffer, len, &p)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
return p;
}
/*
* Check whether an allocation of 'len' will fit in the buffer
* This must follow the same math as buffer_append_space
*/
int
buffer_check_alloc(Buffer *buffer, u_int len)
{
if (buffer->offset == buffer->end) {
buffer->offset = 0;
buffer->end = 0;
}
restart:
if (buffer->end + len < buffer->alloc)
return (1);
if (buffer_compact(buffer))
goto restart;
if (roundup(buffer->alloc + len, BUFFER_ALLOCSZ) <= BUFFER_MAX_LEN)
return (1);
return (0);
int ret = sshbuf_check_reserve(buffer, len);
if (ret == 0)
return 1;
if (ret == SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE)
return 0;
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
}
/* Returns the number of bytes of data in the buffer. */
u_int
buffer_len(const Buffer *buffer)
{
return buffer->end - buffer->offset;
}
/* Gets data from the beginning of the buffer. */
int
buffer_get_ret(Buffer *buffer, void *buf, u_int len)
{
if (len > buffer->end - buffer->offset) {
error("buffer_get_ret: trying to get more bytes %d than in buffer %d",
len, buffer->end - buffer->offset);
return (-1);
int ret;
if ((ret = sshbuf_get(buffer, buf, len)) != 0) {
error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
return -1;
}
memcpy(buf, buffer->buf + buffer->offset, len);
buffer->offset += len;
return (0);
return 0;
}
void
buffer_get(Buffer *buffer, void *buf, u_int len)
{
if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, buf, len) == -1)
fatal("buffer_get: buffer error");
fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
}
/* Consumes the given number of bytes from the beginning of the buffer. */
int
buffer_consume_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes)
{
if (bytes > buffer->end - buffer->offset) {
error("buffer_consume_ret: trying to get more bytes than in buffer");
return (-1);
}
buffer->offset += bytes;
return (0);
int ret = sshbuf_consume(buffer, bytes);
if (ret == 0)
return 0;
if (ret == SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE)
return -1;
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
}
void
buffer_consume(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes)
{
if (buffer_consume_ret(buffer, bytes) == -1)
fatal("buffer_consume: buffer error");
fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
}
/* Consumes the given number of bytes from the end of the buffer. */
int
buffer_consume_end_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes)
{
if (bytes > buffer->end - buffer->offset)
return (-1);
buffer->end -= bytes;
return (0);
int ret = sshbuf_consume_end(buffer, bytes);
if (ret == 0)
return 0;
if (ret == SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE)
return -1;
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
}
void
buffer_consume_end(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes)
{
if (buffer_consume_end_ret(buffer, bytes) == -1)
fatal("buffer_consume_end: trying to get more bytes than in buffer");
fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
}
/* Returns a pointer to the first used byte in the buffer. */
void *
buffer_ptr(const Buffer *buffer)
{
return buffer->buf + buffer->offset;
}
/* Dumps the contents of the buffer to stderr. */
void
buffer_dump(const Buffer *buffer)
{
u_int i;
u_char *ucp = buffer->buf;
for (i = buffer->offset; i < buffer->end; i++) {
fprintf(stderr, "%02x", ucp[i]);
if ((i-buffer->offset)%16==15)
fprintf(stderr, "\r\n");
else if ((i-buffer->offset)%2==1)
fprintf(stderr, " ");
}
fprintf(stderr, "\r\n");
}

68
crypto/openssh/buffer.h
View File

@ -1,58 +1,59 @@
/* $OpenBSD: buffer.h,v 1.23 2014/01/12 08:13:13 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: buffer.h,v 1.25 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $ */
/* $FreeBSD$ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Code for manipulating FIFO buffers.
* Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* Emulation wrappers for legacy OpenSSH buffer API atop sshbuf */
#ifndef BUFFER_H
#define BUFFER_H
typedef struct {
u_char *buf; /* Buffer for data. */
u_int alloc; /* Number of bytes allocated for data. */
u_int offset; /* Offset of first byte containing data. */
u_int end; /* Offset of last byte containing data. */
} Buffer;
#include "sshbuf.h"
void buffer_init(Buffer *);
void buffer_clear(Buffer *);
void buffer_free(Buffer *);
typedef struct sshbuf Buffer;
u_int buffer_len(const Buffer *);
void *buffer_ptr(const Buffer *);
#define buffer_init(b) sshbuf_init(b)
#define buffer_clear(b) sshbuf_reset(b)
#define buffer_free(b) sshbuf_free(b)
#define buffer_dump(b) sshbuf_dump(b, stderr)
/* XXX cast is safe: sshbuf never stores more than len 2^31 */
#define buffer_len(b) ((u_int) sshbuf_len(b))
#define buffer_ptr(b) sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)
void buffer_append(Buffer *, const void *, u_int);
void *buffer_append_space(Buffer *, u_int);
int buffer_check_alloc(Buffer *, u_int);
void buffer_get(Buffer *, void *, u_int);
void buffer_consume(Buffer *, u_int);
void buffer_consume_end(Buffer *, u_int);
void buffer_dump(const Buffer *);
int buffer_get_ret(Buffer *, void *, u_int);
int buffer_consume_ret(Buffer *, u_int);
int buffer_consume_end_ret(Buffer *, u_int);
#include <openssl/bn.h>
void buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
void buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
void buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
void buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
void buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(Buffer *, const u_char *, u_int);
u_short buffer_get_short(Buffer *);
void buffer_put_short(Buffer *, u_short);
@ -67,13 +68,12 @@ int buffer_get_char(Buffer *);
void buffer_put_char(Buffer *, int);
void *buffer_get_string(Buffer *, u_int *);
void *buffer_get_string_ptr(Buffer *, u_int *);
const void *buffer_get_string_ptr(Buffer *, u_int *);
void buffer_put_string(Buffer *, const void *, u_int);
char *buffer_get_cstring(Buffer *, u_int *);
void buffer_put_cstring(Buffer *, const char *);
#define buffer_skip_string(b) \
do { u_int l = buffer_get_int(b); buffer_consume(b, l); } while (0)
#define buffer_skip_string(b) (void)buffer_get_string_ptr(b, NULL);
int buffer_put_bignum_ret(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
int buffer_get_bignum_ret(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
@ -84,20 +84,16 @@ int buffer_get_int_ret(u_int *, Buffer *);
int buffer_get_int64_ret(u_int64_t *, Buffer *);
void *buffer_get_string_ret(Buffer *, u_int *);
char *buffer_get_cstring_ret(Buffer *, u_int *);
void *buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(Buffer *, u_int *);
int buffer_get_char_ret(u_char *, Buffer *);
void *buffer_get_bignum2_as_string_ret(Buffer *, u_int *);
void *buffer_get_bignum2_as_string(Buffer *, u_int *);
void buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(Buffer *, const u_char *, u_int);
const void *buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(Buffer *, u_int *);
int buffer_get_char_ret(char *, Buffer *);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
#include <openssl/ec.h>
int buffer_put_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *, const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
void buffer_put_ecpoint(Buffer *, const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
int buffer_get_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *, const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *);
void buffer_get_ecpoint(Buffer *, const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *);
#endif
#endif /* BUFFER_H */
#endif /* BUFFER_H */

12
crypto/openssh/canohost.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.70 2014/01/19 04:17:29 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.71 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
@ -262,6 +263,11 @@ get_socket_address(int sock, int remote, int flags)
if (addr.ss_family == AF_INET6)
addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
if (addr.ss_family == AF_UNIX) {
/* Get the Unix domain socket path. */
return xstrdup(((struct sockaddr_un *)&addr)->sun_path);
}
ipv64_normalise_mapped(&addr, &addrlen);
/* Get the address in ascii. */
@ -384,6 +390,10 @@ get_sock_port(int sock, int local)
if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
/* Unix domain sockets don't have a port number. */
if (from.ss_family == AF_UNIX)
return 0;
/* Return port number. */
if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, NULL, 0,
strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0)

2
crypto/openssh/chacha.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: chacha.h,v 1.1 2013/11/21 00:45:44 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: chacha.h,v 1.3 2014/05/02 03:27:54 djm Exp $ */
/*
chacha-merged.c version 20080118

695
crypto/openssh/channels.c
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

31
crypto/openssh/channels.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.113 2013/06/07 15:37:52 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.115 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/* $FreeBSD$ */
/*
@ -57,7 +57,9 @@
#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER 15 /* Listener for mux conn. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT 16 /* Conn. to mux slave */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED 17 /* Abandoned session, eg mux */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE 18
#define SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER 18 /* Listening on a domain socket. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER 19 /* Listening to a R-style domain socket. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE 20
#define CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC -1
@ -255,6 +257,8 @@ char *channel_open_message(void);
int channel_find_open(void);
/* tcp forwarding */
struct Forward;
struct ForwardOptions;
void channel_set_af(int af);
void channel_permit_all_opens(void);
void channel_add_permitted_opens(char *, int);
@ -264,18 +268,19 @@ void channel_update_permitted_opens(int, int);
void channel_clear_permitted_opens(void);
void channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void);
void channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(void);
int channel_input_port_forward_request(int, int);
Channel *channel_connect_to(const char *, u_short, char *, char *);
int channel_input_port_forward_request(int, struct ForwardOptions *);
Channel *channel_connect_to_port(const char *, u_short, char *, char *);
Channel *channel_connect_to_path(const char *, char *, char *);
Channel *channel_connect_stdio_fwd(const char*, u_short, int, int);
Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_address(u_short, char *, char *);
int channel_request_remote_forwarding(const char *, u_short,
const char *, u_short);
int channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(const char *, u_short,
const char *, u_short, int);
int channel_request_rforward_cancel(const char *host, u_short port);
int channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(const char *, u_short, int *, int);
int channel_cancel_rport_listener(const char *, u_short);
int channel_cancel_lport_listener(const char *, u_short, int, int);
Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_address(const char *, u_short,
char *, char *);
Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_path(const char *, char *, char *);
int channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct Forward *);
int channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct Forward *, struct ForwardOptions *);
int channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct Forward *);
int channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct Forward *, int *, struct ForwardOptions *);
int channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct Forward *);
int channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct Forward *, int, struct ForwardOptions *);
int permitopen_port(const char *);
/* x11 forwarding */

57
crypto/openssh/cipher-3des1.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: cipher-3des1.c,v 1.10 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: cipher-3des1.c,v 1.11 2014/07/02 04:59:06 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -29,13 +29,11 @@
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
/*
* This is used by SSH1:
@ -57,7 +55,7 @@ struct ssh1_3des_ctx
};
const EVP_CIPHER * evp_ssh1_3des(void);
void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int);
int ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int);
static int
ssh1_3des_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
@ -67,11 +65,12 @@ ssh1_3des_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
u_char *k1, *k2, *k3;
if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
c = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*c));
if ((c = calloc(1, sizeof(*c))) == NULL)
return 0;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
}
if (key == NULL)
return (1);
return 1;
if (enc == -1)
enc = ctx->encrypt;
k1 = k2 = k3 = (u_char *) key;
@ -85,44 +84,29 @@ ssh1_3des_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k1);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k2);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k3);
#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
EVP_CipherInit(&c->k1, EVP_des_cbc(), k1, NULL, enc);
EVP_CipherInit(&c->k2, EVP_des_cbc(), k2, NULL, !enc);
EVP_CipherInit(&c->k3, EVP_des_cbc(), k3, NULL, enc);
#else
if (EVP_CipherInit(&c->k1, EVP_des_cbc(), k1, NULL, enc) == 0 ||
EVP_CipherInit(&c->k2, EVP_des_cbc(), k2, NULL, !enc) == 0 ||
EVP_CipherInit(&c->k3, EVP_des_cbc(), k3, NULL, enc) == 0) {
explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c));
free(c);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
return (0);
return 0;
}
#endif
return (1);
return 1;
}
static int
ssh1_3des_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE len)
ssh1_3des_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, size_t len)
{
struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c;
if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
error("ssh1_3des_cbc: no context");
return (0);
}
#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
EVP_Cipher(&c->k1, dest, (u_char *)src, len);
EVP_Cipher(&c->k2, dest, dest, len);
EVP_Cipher(&c->k3, dest, dest, len);
#else
if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
return 0;
if (EVP_Cipher(&c->k1, dest, (u_char *)src, len) == 0 ||
EVP_Cipher(&c->k2, dest, dest, len) == 0 ||
EVP_Cipher(&c->k3, dest, dest, len) == 0)
return (0);
#endif
return (1);
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int
@ -138,29 +122,28 @@ ssh1_3des_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
free(c);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
}
return (1);
return 1;
}
void
int
ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int doset, u_char *iv, int len)
{
struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c;
if (len != 24)
fatal("%s: bad 3des iv length: %d", __func__, len);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: no 3des context", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (doset) {
debug3("%s: Installed 3DES IV", __func__);
memcpy(c->k1.iv, iv, 8);
memcpy(c->k2.iv, iv + 8, 8);
memcpy(c->k3.iv, iv + 16, 8);
} else {
debug3("%s: Copying 3DES IV", __func__);
memcpy(iv, c->k1.iv, 8);
memcpy(iv + 8, c->k2.iv, 8);
memcpy(iv + 16, c->k3.iv, 8);
}
return 0;
}
const EVP_CIPHER *
@ -176,8 +159,6 @@ evp_ssh1_3des(void)
ssh1_3des.init = ssh1_3des_init;
ssh1_3des.cleanup = ssh1_3des_cleanup;
ssh1_3des.do_cipher = ssh1_3des_cbc;
#ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
ssh1_3des.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH;
#endif
return (&ssh1_3des);
return &ssh1_3des;
}

78
crypto/openssh/cipher-aesctr.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
/* $OpenBSD: cipher-aesctr.c,v 1.1 2014/04/29 15:39:33 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "cipher-aesctr.h"
/*
* increment counter 'ctr',
* the counter is of size 'len' bytes and stored in network-byte-order.
* (LSB at ctr[len-1], MSB at ctr[0])
*/
static __inline__ void
aesctr_inc(u8 *ctr, u32 len)
{
ssize_t i;
#ifndef CONSTANT_TIME_INCREMENT
for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--)
if (++ctr[i]) /* continue on overflow */
return;
#else
u8 x, add = 1;
for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
ctr[i] += add;
/* constant time for: x = ctr[i] ? 1 : 0 */
x = ctr[i];
x = (x | (x >> 4)) & 0xf;
x = (x | (x >> 2)) & 0x3;
x = (x | (x >> 1)) & 0x1;
add *= (x^1);
}
#endif
}
void
aesctr_keysetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *k,u32 kbits,u32 ivbits)
{
x->rounds = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(x->ek, k, kbits);
}
void
aesctr_ivsetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *iv)
{
memcpy(x->ctr, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
void
aesctr_encrypt_bytes(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *m,u8 *c,u32 bytes)
{
u32 n = 0;
u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
while ((bytes--) > 0) {
if (n == 0) {
rijndaelEncrypt(x->ek, x->rounds, x->ctr, buf);
aesctr_inc(x->ctr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
*(c++) = *(m++) ^ buf[n];
n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
}
}

35
crypto/openssh/cipher-aesctr.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
/* $OpenBSD: cipher-aesctr.h,v 1.1 2014/04/29 15:39:33 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSH_AESCTR_H
#define OPENSSH_AESCTR_H
#include "rijndael.h"
#define AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16
typedef struct aesctr_ctx {
int rounds; /* keylen-dependent #rounds */
u32 ek[4*(AES_MAXROUNDS + 1)]; /* encrypt key schedule */
u8 ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* counter */
} aesctr_ctx;
void aesctr_keysetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *k,u32 kbits,u32 ivbits);
void aesctr_ivsetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *iv);
void aesctr_encrypt_bytes(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *m,u8 *c,u32 bytes);
#endif

31
crypto/openssh/cipher-chachapoly.c
View File

@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.c,v 1.4 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.c,v 1.6 2014/07/03 12:42:16 jsing Exp $ */
#include "includes.h"
@ -24,16 +24,18 @@
#include <stdio.h> /* needed for misc.h */
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "cipher-chachapoly.h"
void chachapoly_init(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx,
int chachapoly_init(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx,
const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
{
if (keylen != (32 + 32)) /* 2 x 256 bit keys */
fatal("%s: invalid keylen %u", __func__, keylen);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
chacha_keysetup(&ctx->main_ctx, key, 256);
chacha_keysetup(&ctx->header_ctx, key + 32, 256);
return 0;
}
/*
@ -52,33 +54,37 @@ chachapoly_crypt(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest,
u_char seqbuf[8];
const u_char one[8] = { 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; /* NB little-endian */
u_char expected_tag[POLY1305_TAGLEN], poly_key[POLY1305_KEYLEN];
int r = -1;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
/*
* Run ChaCha20 once to generate the Poly1305 key. The IV is the
* packet sequence number.
*/
memset(poly_key, 0, sizeof(poly_key));
put_u64(seqbuf, seqnr);
POKE_U64(seqbuf, seqnr);
chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->main_ctx, seqbuf, NULL);
chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->main_ctx,
poly_key, poly_key, sizeof(poly_key));
/* Set Chacha's block counter to 1 */
chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->main_ctx, seqbuf, one);
/* If decrypting, check tag before anything else */
if (!do_encrypt) {
const u_char *tag = src + aadlen + len;
poly1305_auth(expected_tag, src, aadlen + len, poly_key);
if (timingsafe_bcmp(expected_tag, tag, POLY1305_TAGLEN) != 0)
if (timingsafe_bcmp(expected_tag, tag, POLY1305_TAGLEN) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
goto out;
}
}
/* Crypt additional data */
if (aadlen) {
chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->header_ctx, seqbuf, NULL);
chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->header_ctx, src, dest, aadlen);
}
/* Set Chacha's block counter to 1 */
chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->main_ctx, seqbuf, one);
chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->main_ctx, src + aadlen,
dest + aadlen, len);
@ -88,7 +94,6 @@ chachapoly_crypt(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest,
poly_key);
}
r = 0;
out:
explicit_bzero(expected_tag, sizeof(expected_tag));
explicit_bzero(seqbuf, sizeof(seqbuf));
@ -104,11 +109,11 @@ chachapoly_get_length(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx,
u_char buf[4], seqbuf[8];
if (len < 4)
return -1; /* Insufficient length */
put_u64(seqbuf, seqnr);
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
POKE_U64(seqbuf, seqnr);
chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->header_ctx, seqbuf, NULL);
chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->header_ctx, cp, buf, 4);
*plenp = get_u32(buf);
*plenp = PEEK_U32(buf);
return 0;
}

4
crypto/openssh/cipher-chachapoly.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.h,v 1.1 2013/11/21 00:45:44 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.h,v 1.4 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) Damien Miller 2013 <djm@mindrot.org>
@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ struct chachapoly_ctx {
struct chacha_ctx main_ctx, header_ctx;
};
void chachapoly_init(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx,
int chachapoly_init(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx,
const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
int chachapoly_crypt(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx, u_int seqnr,

439
crypto/openssh/cipher.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.97 2014/02/07 06:55:54 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.99 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -43,21 +43,21 @@
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "digest.h"
/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void);
extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
extern void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int);
extern int ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int);
#endif
struct Cipher {
struct sshcipher {
char *name;
int number; /* for ssh1 only */
u_int block_size;
@ -68,15 +68,23 @@ struct Cipher {
u_int flags;
#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0)
#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1)
#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2)
#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3)
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void);
#else
void *ignored;
#endif
};
static const struct Cipher ciphers[] = {
{ "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = {
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
{ "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc },
{ "3des", SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des },
{ "blowfish", SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_bf },
#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{ "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
{ "3des-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
{ "blowfish-cbc",
SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_bf_cbc },
@ -93,26 +101,33 @@ static const struct Cipher ciphers[] = {
{ "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr },
{ "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr },
{ "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr },
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
{ "aes128-gcm@openssh.com",
SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm },
{ "aes256-gcm@openssh.com",
SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm },
#endif
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM */
#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
{ "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL },
{ "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL },
{ "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL },
{ "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_NONE, NULL },
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
{ "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com",
SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 64, 0, 16, 0, CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY, NULL },
{ NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
};
/*--*/
/* Returns a list of supported ciphers separated by the specified char. */
/* Returns a comma-separated list of supported ciphers. */
char *
cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only)
{
char *ret = NULL;
char *tmp, *ret = NULL;
size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
const Cipher *c;
const struct sshcipher *c;
for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) {
if (c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2)
@ -122,7 +137,11 @@ cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only)
if (ret != NULL)
ret[rlen++] = sep;
nlen = strlen(c->name);
ret = xrealloc(ret, 1, rlen + nlen + 2);
if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
ret = tmp;
memcpy(ret + rlen, c->name, nlen + 1);
rlen += nlen;
}
@ -130,19 +149,19 @@ cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only)
}
u_int
cipher_blocksize(const Cipher *c)
cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
return (c->block_size);
}
u_int
cipher_keylen(const Cipher *c)
cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
return (c->key_len);
}
u_int
cipher_seclen(const Cipher *c)
cipher_seclen(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
if (strcmp("3des-cbc", c->name) == 0)
return 14;
@ -150,13 +169,13 @@ cipher_seclen(const Cipher *c)
}
u_int
cipher_authlen(const Cipher *c)
cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
return (c->auth_len);
}
u_int
cipher_ivlen(const Cipher *c)
cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
/*
* Default is cipher block size, except for chacha20+poly1305 that
@ -167,13 +186,13 @@ cipher_ivlen(const Cipher *c)
}
u_int
cipher_get_number(const Cipher *c)
cipher_get_number(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
return (c->number);
}
u_int
cipher_is_cbc(const Cipher *c)
cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
return (c->flags & CFLAG_CBC) != 0;
}
@ -190,20 +209,20 @@ cipher_mask_ssh1(int client)
return mask;
}
const Cipher *
const struct sshcipher *
cipher_by_name(const char *name)
{
const Cipher *c;
const struct sshcipher *c;
for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
return c;
return NULL;
}
const Cipher *
const struct sshcipher *
cipher_by_number(int id)
{
const Cipher *c;
const struct sshcipher *c;
for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
if (c->number == id)
return c;
@ -214,23 +233,22 @@ cipher_by_number(int id)
int
ciphers_valid(const char *names)
{
const Cipher *c;
const struct sshcipher *c;
char *cipher_list, *cp;
char *p;
if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
return 0;
cipher_list = cp = xstrdup(names);
if ((cipher_list = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
return 0;
for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) {
c = cipher_by_name(p);
if (c == NULL || c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) {
debug("bad cipher %s [%s]", p, names);
free(cipher_list);
return 0;
}
}
debug3("ciphers ok: [%s]", names);
free(cipher_list);
return 1;
}
@ -243,7 +261,7 @@ ciphers_valid(const char *names)
int
cipher_number(const char *name)
{
const Cipher *c;
const struct sshcipher *c;
if (name == NULL)
return -1;
for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
@ -255,90 +273,104 @@ cipher_number(const char *name)
char *
cipher_name(int id)
{
const Cipher *c = cipher_by_number(id);
const struct sshcipher *c = cipher_by_number(id);
return (c==NULL) ? "<unknown>" : c->name;
}
void
cipher_init(CipherContext *cc, const Cipher *cipher,
const char *
cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
{
if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL)
return NULL;
if (cc->cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_DES)
return "use of DES is strongly discouraged due to "
"cryptographic weaknesses";
return NULL;
}
int
cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const struct sshcipher *cipher,
const u_char *key, u_int keylen, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen,
int do_encrypt)
{
static int dowarn = 1;
#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
EVP_CIPHER *type;
#else
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
const EVP_CIPHER *type;
int klen;
#endif
u_char *junk, *discard;
if (cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_DES) {
if (dowarn) {
error("Warning: use of DES is strongly discouraged "
"due to cryptographic weaknesses");
dowarn = 0;
}
if (keylen > 8)
keylen = 8;
}
#endif
cc->plaintext = (cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_NONE);
cc->encrypt = do_encrypt;
if (keylen < cipher->key_len)
fatal("cipher_init: key length %d is insufficient for %s.",
keylen, cipher->name);
if (iv != NULL && ivlen < cipher_ivlen(cipher))
fatal("cipher_init: iv length %d is insufficient for %s.",
ivlen, cipher->name);
cc->cipher = cipher;
if (keylen < cipher->key_len ||
(iv != NULL && ivlen < cipher_ivlen(cipher)))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
cc->cipher = cipher;
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
chachapoly_init(&cc->cp_ctx, key, keylen);
return;
return chachapoly_init(&cc->cp_ctx, key, keylen);
}
#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) {
aesctr_keysetup(&cc->ac_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, 8 * ivlen);
aesctr_ivsetup(&cc->ac_ctx, iv);
return 0;
}
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)
return 0;
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
#else
type = (*cipher->evptype)();
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cc->evp);
#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
if (type->key_len > 0 && type->key_len != keylen) {
debug("cipher_init: set keylen (%d -> %d)",
type->key_len, keylen);
type->key_len = keylen;
}
EVP_CipherInit(&cc->evp, type, (u_char *)key, (u_char *)iv,
(do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT));
#else
if (EVP_CipherInit(&cc->evp, type, NULL, (u_char *)iv,
(do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0)
fatal("cipher_init: EVP_CipherInit failed for %s",
cipher->name);
(do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto bad;
}
if (cipher_authlen(cipher) &&
!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
-1, (u_char *)iv))
fatal("cipher_init: EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED failed for %s",
cipher->name);
-1, (u_char *)iv)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto bad;
}
klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&cc->evp);
if (klen > 0 && keylen != (u_int)klen) {
debug2("cipher_init: set keylen (%d -> %d)", klen, keylen);
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&cc->evp, keylen) == 0)
fatal("cipher_init: set keylen failed (%d -> %d)",
klen, keylen);
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&cc->evp, keylen) == 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto bad;
}
}
if (EVP_CipherInit(&cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)key, NULL, -1) == 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto bad;
}
if (EVP_CipherInit(&cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)key, NULL, -1) == 0)
fatal("cipher_init: EVP_CipherInit: set key failed for %s",
cipher->name);
#endif
if (cipher->discard_len > 0) {
junk = xmalloc(cipher->discard_len);
discard = xmalloc(cipher->discard_len);
if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, discard, junk,
cipher->discard_len) == 0)
fatal("evp_crypt: EVP_Cipher failed during discard");
if ((junk = malloc(cipher->discard_len)) == NULL ||
(discard = malloc(cipher->discard_len)) == NULL) {
if (junk != NULL)
free(junk);
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto bad;
}
ret = EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, discard, junk, cipher->discard_len);
explicit_bzero(discard, cipher->discard_len);
free(junk);
free(discard);
if (ret != 1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
bad:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cc->evp);
return ret;
}
}
#endif
return 0;
}
/*
@ -350,204 +382,244 @@ cipher_init(CipherContext *cc, const Cipher *cipher,
* Use 'authlen' bytes at offset 'len'+'aadlen' as the authentication tag.
* This tag is written on encryption and verified on decryption.
* Both 'aadlen' and 'authlen' can be set to 0.
* cipher_crypt() returns 0 on success and -1 if the decryption integrity
* check fails.
*/
int
cipher_crypt(CipherContext *cc, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen)
cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest,
const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen)
{
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
return chachapoly_crypt(&cc->cp_ctx, seqnr, dest, src, len,
aadlen, authlen, cc->encrypt);
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
return chachapoly_crypt(&cc->cp_ctx, seqnr, dest, src,
len, aadlen, authlen, cc->encrypt);
}
#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) {
if (aadlen)
memcpy(dest, src, aadlen);
aesctr_encrypt_bytes(&cc->ac_ctx, src + aadlen,
dest + aadlen, len);
return 0;
}
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) {
memcpy(dest, src, aadlen + len);
return 0;
}
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
#else
if (authlen) {
u_char lastiv[1];
if (authlen != cipher_authlen(cc->cipher))
fatal("%s: authlen mismatch %d", __func__, authlen);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
/* increment IV */
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN,
1, lastiv))
fatal("%s: EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
/* set tag on decyption */
if (!cc->encrypt &&
!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG,
authlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen + len))
fatal("%s: EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
}
if (aadlen) {
if (authlen &&
EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)src, aadlen) < 0)
fatal("%s: EVP_Cipher(aad) failed", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
memcpy(dest, src, aadlen);
}
if (len % cc->cipher->block_size)
fatal("%s: bad plaintext length %d", __func__, len);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, dest + aadlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen,
len) < 0)
fatal("%s: EVP_Cipher failed", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
if (authlen) {
/* compute tag (on encrypt) or verify tag (on decrypt) */
if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, NULL, NULL, 0) < 0) {
if (cc->encrypt)
fatal("%s: EVP_Cipher(final) failed", __func__);
else
return -1;
}
if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, NULL, NULL, 0) < 0)
return cc->encrypt ?
SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
if (cc->encrypt &&
!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG,
authlen, dest + aadlen + len))
fatal("%s: EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
}
return 0;
#endif
}
/* Extract the packet length, including any decryption necessary beforehand */
int
cipher_get_length(CipherContext *cc, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr,
cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr,
const u_char *cp, u_int len)
{
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
return chachapoly_get_length(&cc->cp_ctx, plenp, seqnr,
cp, len);
if (len < 4)
return -1;
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
*plenp = get_u32(cp);
return 0;
}
void
cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *cc)
int
cipher_cleanup(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
{
if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL)
return 0;
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
explicit_bzero(&cc->cp_ctx, sizeof(cc->cp_ctx));
else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0)
explicit_bzero(&cc->ac_ctx, sizeof(cc->ac_ctx));
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cc->evp) == 0)
error("cipher_cleanup: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup failed");
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
#endif
return 0;
}
/*
* Selects the cipher, and keys if by computing the MD5 checksum of the
* passphrase and using the resulting 16 bytes as the key.
*/
void
cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, const Cipher *cipher,
int
cipher_set_key_string(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const struct sshcipher *cipher,
const char *passphrase, int do_encrypt)
{
u_char digest[16];
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_MD5, passphrase, strlen(passphrase),
digest, sizeof(digest)) < 0)
fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
cipher_init(cc, cipher, digest, 16, NULL, 0, do_encrypt);
if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_MD5,
passphrase, strlen(passphrase),
digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
goto out;
r = cipher_init(cc, cipher, digest, 16, NULL, 0, do_encrypt);
out:
explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
return r;
}
/*
* Exports an IV from the CipherContext required to export the key
* Exports an IV from the sshcipher_ctx required to export the key
* state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent
* process.
*/
int
cipher_get_keyiv_len(const CipherContext *cc)
cipher_get_keyiv_len(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
{
const Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
int ivlen;
const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
int ivlen = 0;
if (c->number == SSH_CIPHER_3DES)
ivlen = 24;
else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
ivlen = 0;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
else
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
return (ivlen);
}
void
cipher_get_keyiv(CipherContext *cc, u_char *iv, u_int len)
int
cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_char *iv, u_int len)
{
const Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
int evplen;
const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
int evplen;
#endif
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
if (len != 0)
fatal("%s: wrong iv length %d != %d", __func__, len, 0);
return;
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return 0;
}
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)
return 0;
switch (c->number) {
case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2:
case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
if (evplen <= 0)
return;
if ((u_int)evplen != len)
fatal("%s: wrong iv length %d != %d", __func__,
evplen, len);
#ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
if (c->evptype == evp_rijndael)
ssh_rijndael_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, len);
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr)
ssh_aes_ctr_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, len);
else
#endif
memcpy(iv, cc->evp.iv, len);
break;
case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, 24);
break;
default:
fatal("%s: bad cipher %d", __func__, c->number);
}
}
void
cipher_set_keyiv(CipherContext *cc, u_char *iv)
{
const Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
int evplen = 0;
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
return;
switch (c->number) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2:
case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
if (evplen == 0)
return;
#ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
if (c->evptype == evp_rijndael)
ssh_rijndael_iv(&cc->evp, 1, iv, evplen);
else
#endif
return 0;
else if (evplen < 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
if ((u_int)evplen != len)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr)
ssh_aes_ctr_iv(&cc->evp, 1, iv, evplen);
ssh_aes_ctr_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, len);
else
#endif
memcpy(cc->evp.iv, iv, evplen);
if (cipher_authlen(c)) {
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN,
len, iv))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
} else
memcpy(iv, cc->evp.iv, len);
break;
#endif
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 1, iv, 24);
break;
return ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, 24);
#endif
default:
fatal("%s: bad cipher %d", __func__, c->number);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
return 0;
}
int
cipher_get_keycontext(const CipherContext *cc, u_char *dat)
cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const u_char *iv)
{
const Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
int evplen = 0;
#endif
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
return 0;
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)
return 0;
switch (c->number) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2:
case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
if (evplen <= 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
if (cipher_authlen(c)) {
/* XXX iv arg is const, but EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl isn't */
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp,
EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, (void *)iv))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
} else
memcpy(cc->evp.iv, iv, evplen);
break;
#endif
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
return ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 1, (u_char *)iv, 24);
#endif
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
return 0;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#define EVP_X_STATE(evp) (evp).cipher_data
#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp) (evp).cipher->ctx_size
#endif
int
cipher_get_keycontext(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_char *dat)
{
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
int plen = 0;
if (c->evptype == EVP_rc4) {
@ -557,16 +629,21 @@ cipher_get_keycontext(const CipherContext *cc, u_char *dat)
memcpy(dat, EVP_X_STATE(cc->evp), plen);
}
return (plen);
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
void
cipher_set_keycontext(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dat)
cipher_set_keycontext(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const u_char *dat)
{
const Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
int plen;
if (c->evptype == EVP_rc4) {
plen = EVP_X_STATE_LEN(cc->evp);
memcpy(EVP_X_STATE(cc->evp), dat, plen);
}
#endif
}

59
crypto/openssh/cipher.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.44 2014/01/25 10:12:50 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.46 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@ -37,8 +37,10 @@
#ifndef CIPHER_H
#define CIPHER_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "cipher-chachapoly.h"
#include "cipher-aesctr.h"
/*
* Cipher types for SSH-1. New types can be added, but old types should not
@ -60,44 +62,47 @@
#define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1
#define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0
typedef struct Cipher Cipher;
typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext;
struct Cipher;
struct CipherContext {
struct sshcipher;
struct sshcipher_ctx {
int plaintext;
int encrypt;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX evp;
struct chachapoly_ctx cp_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */
const Cipher *cipher;
struct aesctr_ctx ac_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
};
typedef struct sshcipher Cipher ;
typedef struct sshcipher_ctx CipherContext ;
u_int cipher_mask_ssh1(int);
const Cipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
const Cipher *cipher_by_number(int);
const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_number(int);
int cipher_number(const char *);
char *cipher_name(int);
int ciphers_valid(const char *);
char *cipher_alg_list(char, int);
void cipher_init(CipherContext *, const Cipher *, const u_char *, u_int,
const u_char *, u_int, int);
int cipher_crypt(CipherContext *, u_int, u_char *, const u_char *,
int cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx *, const struct sshcipher *,
const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int, int);
const char* cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *);
int cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int, u_char *, const u_char *,
u_int, u_int, u_int);
int cipher_get_length(CipherContext *, u_int *, u_int,
int cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int *, u_int,
const u_char *, u_int);
void cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *);
void cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, const Cipher *, const char *, int);
u_int cipher_blocksize(const Cipher *);
u_int cipher_keylen(const Cipher *);
u_int cipher_seclen(const Cipher *);
u_int cipher_authlen(const Cipher *);
u_int cipher_ivlen(const Cipher *);
u_int cipher_is_cbc(const Cipher *);
int cipher_cleanup(struct sshcipher_ctx *);
int cipher_set_key_string(struct sshcipher_ctx *, const struct sshcipher *,
const char *, int);
u_int cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *);
u_int cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *);
u_int cipher_seclen(const struct sshcipher *);
u_int cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *);
u_int cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *);
u_int cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *);
u_int cipher_get_number(const Cipher *);
void cipher_get_keyiv(CipherContext *, u_char *, u_int);
void cipher_set_keyiv(CipherContext *, u_char *);
int cipher_get_keyiv_len(const CipherContext *);
int cipher_get_keycontext(const CipherContext *, u_char *);
void cipher_set_keycontext(CipherContext *, u_char *);
u_int cipher_get_number(const struct sshcipher *);
int cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_char *, u_int);
int cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *, const u_char *);
int cipher_get_keyiv_len(const struct sshcipher_ctx *);
int cipher_get_keycontext(const struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_char *);
void cipher_set_keycontext(struct sshcipher_ctx *, const u_char *);
#endif /* CIPHER_H */

82
crypto/openssh/clientloop.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.258 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.261 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -101,13 +101,13 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "clientloop.h"
#include "sshconnect.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "roaming.h"
@ -872,13 +872,11 @@ static void
process_cmdline(void)
{
void (*handler)(int);
char *s, *cmd, *cancel_host;
int delete = 0, local = 0, remote = 0, dynamic = 0;
int cancel_port, ok;
Forward fwd;
char *s, *cmd;
int ok, delete = 0, local = 0, remote = 0, dynamic = 0;
struct Forward fwd;
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
fwd.listen_host = fwd.connect_host = NULL;
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
handler = signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
@ -944,29 +942,20 @@ process_cmdline(void)
/* XXX update list of forwards in options */
if (delete) {
cancel_port = 0;
cancel_host = hpdelim(&s); /* may be NULL */
if (s != NULL) {
cancel_port = a2port(s);
cancel_host = cleanhostname(cancel_host);
} else {
cancel_port = a2port(cancel_host);
cancel_host = NULL;
}
if (cancel_port <= 0) {
logit("Bad forwarding close port");
/* We pass 1 for dynamicfwd to restrict to 1 or 2 fields. */
if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, 1, 0)) {
logit("Bad forwarding close specification.");
goto out;
}
if (remote)
ok = channel_request_rforward_cancel(cancel_host,
cancel_port) == 0;
ok = channel_request_rforward_cancel(&fwd) == 0;
else if (dynamic)
ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(cancel_host,
cancel_port, 0, options.gateway_ports) > 0;
ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(&fwd,
0, &options.fwd_opts) > 0;
else
ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(cancel_host,
cancel_port, CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC,
options.gateway_ports) > 0;
ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(&fwd,
CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC,
&options.fwd_opts) > 0;
if (!ok) {
logit("Unkown port forwarding.");
goto out;
@ -978,16 +967,13 @@ process_cmdline(void)
goto out;
}
if (local || dynamic) {
if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(fwd.listen_host,
fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_host,
fwd.connect_port, options.gateway_ports)) {
if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(&fwd,
&options.fwd_opts)) {
logit("Port forwarding failed.");
goto out;
}
} else {
if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(fwd.listen_host,
fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_host,
fwd.connect_port) < 0) {
if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(&fwd) < 0) {
logit("Port forwarding failed.");
goto out;
}
@ -1000,7 +986,9 @@ process_cmdline(void)
enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
free(cmd);
free(fwd.listen_host);
free(fwd.listen_path);
free(fwd.connect_host);
free(fwd.connect_path);
}
/* reasons to suppress output of an escape command in help output */
@ -1846,11 +1834,10 @@ client_request_forwarded_tcpip(const char *request_type, int rchan)
originator_port = packet_get_int();
packet_check_eom();
debug("client_request_forwarded_tcpip: listen %s port %d, "
"originator %s port %d", listen_address, listen_port,
originator_address, originator_port);
debug("%s: listen %s port %d, originator %s port %d", __func__,
listen_address, listen_port, originator_address, originator_port);
c = channel_connect_by_listen_address(listen_port,
c = channel_connect_by_listen_address(listen_address, listen_port,
"forwarded-tcpip", originator_address);
free(originator_address);
@ -1858,6 +1845,27 @@ client_request_forwarded_tcpip(const char *request_type, int rchan)
return c;
}
static Channel *
client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(const char *request_type, int rchan)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *listen_path;
/* Get the remote path. */
listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL);
/* XXX: Skip reserved field for now. */
if (packet_get_string_ptr(NULL) == NULL)
fatal("%s: packet_get_string_ptr failed", __func__);
packet_check_eom();
debug("%s: %s", __func__, listen_path);
c = channel_connect_by_listen_path(listen_path,
"forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com", "forwarded-streamlocal");
free(listen_path);
return c;
}
static Channel *
client_request_x11(const char *request_type, int rchan)
{
@ -1985,6 +1993,8 @@ client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-tcpip") == 0) {
c = client_request_forwarded_tcpip(ctype, rchan);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
c = client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(ctype, rchan);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "x11") == 0) {
c = client_request_x11(ctype, rchan);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "auth-agent@openssh.com") == 0) {
@ -2055,7 +2065,7 @@ client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
}
packet_check_eom();
}
if (reply && c != NULL) {
if (reply && c != NULL && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) {
packet_start(success ?
SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
packet_put_int(c->remote_id);

2
crypto/openssh/compat.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.82 2013/12/30 23:52:27 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.85 2014/04/20 02:49:32 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*

2
crypto/openssh/compat.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.44 2013/12/30 23:52:27 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.45 2014/04/18 23:52:25 djm Exp $ */
/* $FreeBSD$ */
/*

19
crypto/openssh/config.h
View File

@ -421,6 +421,9 @@
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_init' function. */
#define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_INIT 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_ripemd160' function. */
#define HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha256' function. */
#define HAVE_EVP_SHA256 1
@ -428,7 +431,7 @@
/* #undef HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `explicit_bzero' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO */
#define HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmod' function. */
#define HAVE_FCHMOD 1
@ -769,6 +772,9 @@
/* Define to 1 if you have the <memory.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_MEMORY_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `memset_s' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_MEMSET_S */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `mkdtemp' function. */
#define HAVE_MKDTEMP 1
@ -1140,7 +1146,7 @@
/* #undef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/capability.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_SYS_CAPABILITY_H 1
/* #undef HAVE_SYS_CAPABILITY_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/cdefs.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H 1
@ -1325,9 +1331,6 @@
/* Define if va_copy exists */
#define HAVE_VA_COPY 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `vhangup' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_VHANGUP */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <vis.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_VIS_H 1
@ -1663,9 +1666,15 @@
/* Define if you want IRIX project management */
/* #undef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */
/* use libcrypto for cryptography */
#define WITH_OPENSSL 1
/* Define if you want SELinux support. */
/* #undef WITH_SELINUX */
/* include SSH protocol version 1 support */
#define WITH_SSH1 1
/* Define WORDS_BIGENDIAN to 1 if your processor stores words with the most
significant byte first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel). */
#if defined AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD

15
crypto/openssh/config.h.in
View File

@ -420,6 +420,9 @@
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_init' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_INIT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_ripemd160' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha256' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
@ -768,6 +771,9 @@
/* Define to 1 if you have the <memory.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_MEMORY_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `memset_s' function. */
#undef HAVE_MEMSET_S
/* Define to 1 if you have the `mkdtemp' function. */
#undef HAVE_MKDTEMP
@ -1324,9 +1330,6 @@
/* Define if va_copy exists */
#undef HAVE_VA_COPY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `vhangup' function. */
#undef HAVE_VHANGUP
/* Define to 1 if you have the <vis.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_VIS_H
@ -1662,9 +1665,15 @@
/* Define if you want IRIX project management */
#undef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
/* use libcrypto for cryptography */
#undef WITH_OPENSSL
/* Define if you want SELinux support. */
#undef WITH_SELINUX
/* include SSH protocol version 1 support */
#undef WITH_SSH1
/* Define WORDS_BIGENDIAN to 1 if your processor stores words with the most
significant byte first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel). */
#if defined AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD

138
crypto/openssh/configure vendored
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /bin/sh
# From configure.ac Revision: 1.571 .
# From configure.ac Revision: 1.583 .
# Guess values for system-dependent variables and create Makefiles.
# Generated by GNU Autoconf 2.68 for OpenSSH Portable.
#
@ -6604,7 +6604,6 @@ for ac_header in \
sys/audit.h \
sys/bitypes.h \
sys/bsdtty.h \
sys/capability.h \
sys/cdefs.h \
sys/dir.h \
sys/mman.h \
@ -6646,6 +6645,25 @@ fi
done
# sys/capsicum.h requires sys/types.h
for ac_header in sys/capsicum.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/capsicum.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" "
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SYS_CAPSICUM_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris
for ac_header in lastlog.h
do :
@ -10348,10 +10366,6 @@ for ac_func in \
Blowfish_expandstate \
Blowfish_expand0state \
Blowfish_stream2word \
arc4random \
arc4random_buf \
arc4random_stir \
arc4random_uniform \
asprintf \
b64_ntop \
__b64_ntop \
@ -10395,6 +10409,7 @@ for ac_func in \
mblen \
md5_crypt \
memmove \
memset_s \
mkdtemp \
mmap \
ngetaddrinfo \
@ -10453,7 +10468,6 @@ for ac_func in \
user_from_uid \
usleep \
vasprintf \
vhangup \
vsnprintf \
waitpid \
@ -11269,11 +11283,9 @@ fi
fi
# If we don't have a working asprintf, then we strongly depend on vsnprintf
# returning the right thing on overflow: the number of characters it tried to
# create (as per SUSv3)
if test "x$ac_cv_func_asprintf" != "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then
# We depend on vsnprintf returning the right thing on overflow: the
# number of characters it tried to create (as per SUSv3)
if test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
@ -11288,10 +11300,14 @@ else
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
int x_snprintf(char *str,size_t count,const char *fmt,...)
int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...)
{
size_t ret; va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt); ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap); va_end(ap);
size_t ret;
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
return ret;
}
@ -11299,8 +11315,12 @@ int
main ()
{
char x[1];
exit(x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) == 11 ? 0 : 1);
char x[1];
if (x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
return 1;
if (x_snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
return 1;
return 0;
;
return 0;
@ -11897,7 +11917,7 @@ main ()
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%x (%s)\n", OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) <0)
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%08x (%s)\n", OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) <0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
@ -11954,7 +11974,8 @@ main ()
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%x (%s)\n", SSLeay(), SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION))) <0)
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%08x (%s)\n", SSLeay(),
SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION))) <0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
@ -11966,6 +11987,13 @@ _ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver`
# Check version is supported.
case "$ssl_library_ver" in
0090[0-7]*|009080[0-5]*)
as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL >= 0.9.8f required" "$LINENO" 5
;;
*) ;;
esac
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ssl_library_ver" >&5
$as_echo "$ssl_library_ver" >&6; }
@ -11981,6 +12009,18 @@ rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
fi
# XXX make --without-openssl work
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define WITH_OPENSSL 1
_ACEOF
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define WITH_SSH1 1
_ACEOF
# Check whether --with-openssl-header-check was given.
if test "${with_openssl_header_check+set}" = set; then :
@ -12511,6 +12551,25 @@ else
hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
fi
done
# Search for RIPE-MD support in OpenSSL
for ac_func in EVP_ripemd160
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_ripemd160" "ac_cv_func_EVP_ripemd160"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_ripemd160" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160 1
_ACEOF
else
unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
hmac-ripemd160
hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com
hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com"
fi
done
@ -12714,6 +12773,24 @@ fi
for ac_func in \
arc4random \
arc4random_buf \
arc4random_stir \
arc4random_uniform \
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ia_openinfo in -liaf" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ia_openinfo in -liaf... " >&6; }
@ -13123,7 +13200,14 @@ fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd
case "$host" in
*-*-cygwin*)
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
;;
*)
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd
;;
esac
# Check whether --with-privsep-user was given.
if test "${with_privsep_user+set}" = set; then :
@ -13136,11 +13220,19 @@ if test "${with_privsep_user+set}" = set; then :
fi
if test "x$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" = "xCYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
_ACEOF
else
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER "$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"
_ACEOF
fi
if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then
@ -13404,10 +13496,10 @@ $as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER 1" >>confdefs.h
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capability_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capability_h" != "xyes" && \
as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires sys/capability.h header" "$LINENO" 5
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" != "xyes" && \
as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires sys/capsicum.h header" "$LINENO" 5
test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \
as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function" "$LINENO" 5
SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum"

99
crypto/openssh/configure.ac
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.571 2014/02/21 17:09:34 tim Exp $
# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.583 2014/08/26 20:32:01 djm Exp $
#
# Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
#
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
# OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.571 $)
AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.583 $)
AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
AC_LANG([C])
@ -364,7 +364,6 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \
sys/audit.h \
sys/bitypes.h \
sys/bsdtty.h \
sys/capability.h \
sys/cdefs.h \
sys/dir.h \
sys/mman.h \
@ -394,6 +393,13 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \
vis.h \
])
# sys/capsicum.h requires sys/types.h
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/capsicum.h], [], [], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
])
# lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([lastlog.h], [], [], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
@ -1631,10 +1637,6 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
Blowfish_expandstate \
Blowfish_expand0state \
Blowfish_stream2word \
arc4random \
arc4random_buf \
arc4random_stir \
arc4random_uniform \
asprintf \
b64_ntop \
__b64_ntop \
@ -1678,6 +1680,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
mblen \
md5_crypt \
memmove \
memset_s \
mkdtemp \
mmap \
ngetaddrinfo \
@ -1736,7 +1739,6 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
user_from_uid \
usleep \
vasprintf \
vhangup \
vsnprintf \
waitpid \
])
@ -1948,11 +1950,9 @@ if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
)
fi
# If we don't have a working asprintf, then we strongly depend on vsnprintf
# returning the right thing on overflow: the number of characters it tried to
# create (as per SUSv3)
if test "x$ac_cv_func_asprintf" != "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then
# We depend on vsnprintf returning the right thing on overflow: the
# number of characters it tried to create (as per SUSv3)
if test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
@ -1960,15 +1960,23 @@ if test "x$ac_cv_func_asprintf" != "xyes" && \
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
int x_snprintf(char *str,size_t count,const char *fmt,...)
int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...)
{
size_t ret; va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt); ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap); va_end(ap);
size_t ret;
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
return ret;
}
]], [[
char x[1];
exit(x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) == 11 ? 0 : 1);
char x[1];
if (x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
return 1;
if (x_snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
return 1;
return 0;
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[
@ -2304,7 +2312,7 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%x (%s)\n", OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) <0)
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%08x (%s)\n", OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) <0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
@ -2339,13 +2347,21 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%x (%s)\n", SSLeay(), SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION))) <0)
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%08x (%s)\n", SSLeay(),
SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION))) <0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
]])],
[
ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver`
# Check version is supported.
case "$ssl_library_ver" in
0090[[0-7]]*|009080[[0-5]]*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 0.9.8f required])
;;
*) ;;
esac
AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_library_ver])
],
[
@ -2357,6 +2373,10 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
]
)
# XXX make --without-openssl work
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([WITH_OPENSSL], [1], [use libcrypto for cryptography])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([WITH_SSH1], [1], [include SSH protocol version 1 support])
AC_ARG_WITH([openssl-header-check],
[ --without-openssl-header-check Disable OpenSSL version consistency check],
[ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
@ -2565,6 +2585,14 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([SHA256_Update EVP_sha256], ,
hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
]
)
# Search for RIPE-MD support in OpenSSL
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([EVP_ripemd160], ,
[unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
hmac-ripemd160
hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com
hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com"
]
)
# Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1])
@ -2685,6 +2713,13 @@ fi
AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_ECC])
AC_SUBST([COMMENT_OUT_ECC])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
arc4random \
arc4random_buf \
arc4random_stir \
arc4random_uniform \
])
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
AC_CHECK_LIB([iaf], [ia_openinfo], [
LIBS="$LIBS -liaf"
@ -2868,7 +2903,14 @@ if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
])
fi
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd
case "$host" in
*-*-cygwin*)
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
;;
*)
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd
;;
esac
AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-user],
[ --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation],
[
@ -2878,8 +2920,13 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-user],
fi
]
)
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], ["$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"],
[non-privileged user for privilege separation])
if test "x$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" = "xCYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], [CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER],
[Cygwin function to fetch non-privileged user for privilege separation])
else
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], ["$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"],
[non-privileged user for privilege separation])
fi
AC_SUBST([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER])
if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then
@ -3044,10 +3091,10 @@ elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER], [1], [Sandbox using seccomp filter])
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capability_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capability_h" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires sys/capability.h header])
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires sys/capsicum.h header])
test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function])
SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum"

5
crypto/openssh/contrib/caldera/openssh.spec
View File

@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
#old cvs stuff. please update before use. may be deprecated.
%define use_stable 1
%define version 6.6p1
%define version 6.7p1
%if %{use_stable}
%define cvs %{nil}
%define release 1
@ -178,7 +178,6 @@ by Jim Knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com>.
CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \
%configure \
--with-pam \
--with-tcp-wrappers \
--with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/sshd \
#leave this line for easy edits.
@ -363,4 +362,4 @@ fi
* Mon Jan 01 1998 ...
Template Version: 1.31
$Id: openssh.spec,v 1.83 2014/02/27 23:03:55 djm Exp $
$Id: openssh.spec,v 1.85 2014/08/19 01:36:08 djm Exp $

3
crypto/openssh/contrib/cygwin/README
View File

@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ Building OpenSSH
Building from source is easy. Just unpack the source archive, cd to that
directory, and call cygport:
cygport openssh.cygport almostall
cygport openssh.cygport all
You must have installed the following packages to be able to build OpenSSH
with the aforementioned cygport script:
@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ with the aforementioned cygport script:
zlib
crypt
openssl-devel
libwrap-devel
libedit-devel
libkrb5-devel

198
crypto/openssh/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config
View File

@ -34,9 +34,9 @@ declare -a csih_required_commands=(
/usr/bin/mv coreutils
/usr/bin/rm coreutils
/usr/bin/cygpath cygwin
/usr/bin/mkpasswd cygwin
/usr/bin/mount cygwin
/usr/bin/ps cygwin
/usr/bin/setfacl cygwin
/usr/bin/umount cygwin
/usr/bin/cmp diffutils
/usr/bin/grep grep
@ -59,8 +59,9 @@ PREFIX=/usr
SYSCONFDIR=/etc
LOCALSTATEDIR=/var
sshd_config_configured=no
port_number=22
privsep_configured=no
strictmodes=yes
privsep_used=yes
cygwin_value=""
user_account=
@ -89,28 +90,8 @@ update_services_file() {
# Depends on the above mount
_wservices=`cygpath -w "${_services}"`
# Remove sshd 22/port from services
if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q 'sshd[ \t][ \t]*22' "${_services}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ]
then
/usr/bin/grep -v 'sshd[ \t][ \t]*22' "${_services}" > "${_serv_tmp}"
if [ -f "${_serv_tmp}" ]
then
if /usr/bin/mv "${_serv_tmp}" "${_services}"
then
csih_inform "Removing sshd from ${_wservices}"
else
csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_wservices} failed!"
let ++ret
fi
/usr/bin/rm -f "${_serv_tmp}"
else
csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_wservices} failed!"
let ++ret
fi
fi
# Add ssh 22/tcp and ssh 22/udp to services
if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q 'ssh[ \t][ \t]*22' "${_services}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ]
if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q 'ssh[[:space:]][[:space:]]*22' "${_services}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ]
then
if /usr/bin/awk '{ if ( $2 ~ /^23\/tcp/ ) print "ssh 22/tcp'"${_spaces}"'SSH Remote Login Protocol\nssh 22/udp'"${_spaces}"'SSH Remote Login Protocol"; print $0; }' < "${_services}" > "${_serv_tmp}"
then
@ -131,18 +112,46 @@ update_services_file() {
return $ret
} # --- End of update_services_file --- #
# ======================================================================
# Routine: sshd_strictmodes
# MODIFIES: strictmodes
# ======================================================================
sshd_strictmodes() {
if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ]
then
echo
csih_inform "StrictModes is set to 'yes' by default."
csih_inform "This is the recommended setting, but it requires that the POSIX"
csih_inform "permissions of the user's home directory, the user's .ssh"
csih_inform "directory, and the user's ssh key files are tight so that"
csih_inform "only the user has write permissions."
csih_inform "On the other hand, StrictModes don't work well with default"
csih_inform "Windows permissions of a home directory mounted with the"
csih_inform "'noacl' option, and they don't work at all if the home"
csih_inform "directory is on a FAT or FAT32 partition."
if ! csih_request "Should StrictModes be used?"
then
strictmodes=no
fi
fi
return 0
}
# ======================================================================
# Routine: sshd_privsep
# MODIFIES: privsep_configured privsep_used
# MODIFIES: privsep_used
# ======================================================================
sshd_privsep() {
local sshdconfig_tmp
local ret=0
if [ "${privsep_configured}" != "yes" ]
if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ]
then
csih_inform "Privilege separation is set to yes by default since OpenSSH 3.3."
csih_inform "However, this requires a non-privileged account called 'sshd'."
echo
csih_inform "Privilege separation is set to 'sandbox' by default since"
csih_inform "OpenSSH 6.1. This is unsupported by Cygwin and has to be set"
csih_inform "to 'yes' or 'no'."
csih_inform "However, using privilege separation requires a non-privileged account"
csih_inform "called 'sshd'."
csih_inform "For more info on privilege separation read /usr/share/doc/openssh/README.privsep."
if csih_request "Should privilege separation be used?"
then
@ -159,36 +168,53 @@ sshd_privsep() {
privsep_used=no
fi
fi
return $ret
} # --- End of sshd_privsep --- #
# Create default sshd_config from skeleton files in /etc/defaults/etc or
# modify to add the missing privsep configuration option
if /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" >/dev/null 2>&1
# ======================================================================
# Routine: sshd_config_tweak
# ======================================================================
sshd_config_tweak() {
local ret=0
# Modify sshd_config
csih_inform "Updating ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file"
if [ "${port_number}" -ne 22 ]
then
csih_inform "Updating ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file"
sshdconfig_tmp=${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config.$$
/usr/bin/sed -e "s/^#UsePrivilegeSeparation yes/UsePrivilegeSeparation ${privsep_used}/
s/^#Port 22/Port ${port_number}/
s/^#StrictModes yes/StrictModes no/" \
< ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config \
> "${sshdconfig_tmp}"
if ! /usr/bin/mv "${sshdconfig_tmp}" ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
/usr/bin/sed -i -e "s/^#\?[[:space:]]*Port[[:space:]].*/Port ${port_number}/" \
${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
if [ $? -ne 0 ]
then
csih_warning "Setting privilege separation to 'yes' failed!"
csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
let ++ret
csih_warning "Setting listening port to ${port_number} failed!"
csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
let ++ret
fi
elif [ "${privsep_configured}" != "yes" ]
fi
if [ "${strictmodes}" = "no" ]
then
echo >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
if ! echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation ${privsep_used}" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
/usr/bin/sed -i -e "s/^#\?[[:space:]]*StrictModes[[:space:]].*/StrictModes no/" \
${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
if [ $? -ne 0 ]
then
csih_warning "Setting privilege separation to 'yes' failed!"
csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
let ++ret
csih_warning "Setting StrictModes to 'no' failed!"
csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
let ++ret
fi
fi
if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ]
then
/usr/bin/sed -i -e "
s/^#\?UsePrivilegeSeparation .*/UsePrivilegeSeparation ${privsep_used}/" \
${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
if [ $? -ne 0 ]
then
csih_warning "Setting privilege separation failed!"
csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
let ++ret
fi
fi
return $ret
} # --- End of sshd_privsep --- #
} # --- End of sshd_config_tweak --- #
# ======================================================================
# Routine: update_inetd_conf
@ -207,11 +233,11 @@ update_inetd_conf() {
# we have inetutils-1.5 inetd.d support
if [ -f "${_inetcnf}" ]
then
/usr/bin/grep -q '^[ \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0
/usr/bin/grep -q '^[[:space:]]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0
# check for sshd OR ssh in top-level inetd.conf file, and remove
# will be replaced by a file in inetd.d/
if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ]
if [ $(/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?) -eq 0 ]
then
/usr/bin/grep -v '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ]
@ -236,9 +262,9 @@ update_inetd_conf() {
then
if [ "${_with_comment}" -eq 0 ]
then
/usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[ \t]*//' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}"
/usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[[:space:]]*//' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}"
else
/usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[ \t]*/# /' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}"
/usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[[:space:]]*/# /' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}"
fi
if /usr/bin/mv "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}" "${_sshd_inetd_conf}"
then
@ -251,13 +277,13 @@ update_inetd_conf() {
elif [ -f "${_inetcnf}" ]
then
/usr/bin/grep -q '^[ \t]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0
/usr/bin/grep -q '^[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0
# check for sshd in top-level inetd.conf file, and remove
# will be replaced by a file in inetd.d/
if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ]
if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^#\?[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ]
then
/usr/bin/grep -v '^[# \t]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
/usr/bin/grep -v '^#\?[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ]
then
if /usr/bin/mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}"
@ -305,17 +331,26 @@ check_service_files_ownership() {
if [ -z "${run_service_as}" ]
then
accnt_name=$(/usr/bin/cygrunsrv -VQ sshd | /usr/bin/sed -ne 's/^Account *: *//gp')
accnt_name=$(/usr/bin/cygrunsrv -VQ sshd |
/usr/bin/sed -ne 's/^Account *: *//gp')
if [ "${accnt_name}" = "LocalSystem" ]
then
# Convert "LocalSystem" to "SYSTEM" as is the correct account name
accnt_name="SYSTEM:"
elif [[ "${accnt_name}" =~ ^\.\\ ]]
then
# Convert "." domain to local machine name
accnt_name="U-${COMPUTERNAME}${accnt_name#.},"
run_service_as="SYSTEM"
else
dom="${accnt_name%%\\*}"
accnt_name="${accnt_name#*\\}"
if [ "${dom}" = '.' ]
then
# Check local account
run_service_as=$(/usr/bin/mkpasswd -l -u "${accnt_name}" |
/usr/bin/awk -F: '{print $1;}')
else
# Check domain
run_service_as=$(/usr/bin/mkpasswd -d "${dom}" -u "${accnt_name}" |
/usr/bin/awk -F: '{print $1;}')
fi
fi
run_service_as=$(/usr/bin/grep -Fi "${accnt_name}" /etc/passwd | /usr/bin/awk -F: '{print $1;}')
if [ -z "${run_service_as}" ]
then
csih_warning "Couldn't determine name of user running sshd service from /etc/passwd!"
@ -615,32 +650,6 @@ echo
warning_cnt=0
# Check for ${SYSCONFDIR} directory
csih_make_dir "${SYSCONFDIR}" "Cannot create global configuration files."
if ! /usr/bin/chmod 775 "${SYSCONFDIR}" >/dev/null 2>&1
then
csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${SYSCONFDIR}!"
let ++warning_cnt
fi
if ! /usr/bin/setfacl -m u:system:rwx "${SYSCONFDIR}" >/dev/null 2>&1
then
csih_warning "Can't set extended permissions on ${SYSCONFDIR}!"
let ++warning_cnt
fi
# Check for /var/log directory
csih_make_dir "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log" "Cannot create log directory."
if ! /usr/bin/chmod 775 "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log" >/dev/null 2>&1
then
csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log!"
let ++warning_cnt
fi
if ! /usr/bin/setfacl -m u:system:rwx "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log" >/dev/null 2>&1
then
csih_warning "Can't set extended permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log!"
let ++warning_cnt
fi
# Create /var/log/lastlog if not already exists
if [ -e ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog -a ! -f ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog ]
then
@ -665,13 +674,9 @@ then
csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty!"
let ++warning_cnt
fi
if ! /usr/bin/setfacl -m u:system:rwx "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty" >/dev/null 2>&1
then
csih_warning "Can't set extended permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty!"
let ++warning_cnt
fi
# generate missing host keys
csih_inform "Generating missing SSH host keys"
/usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A || let warning_cnt+=$?
# handle ssh_config
@ -690,10 +695,11 @@ fi
csih_install_config "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" || let ++warning_cnt
if ! /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" >/dev/null 2>&1
then
/usr/bin/grep -q UsePrivilegeSeparation ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config && privsep_configured=yes
sshd_config_configured=yes
fi
sshd_strictmodes || let warning_cnt+=$?
sshd_privsep || let warning_cnt+=$?
sshd_config_tweak || let warning_cnt+=$?
update_services_file || let warning_cnt+=$?
update_inetd_conf || let warning_cnt+=$?
install_service || let warning_cnt+=$?

5
crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
%define ver 6.6p1
%define ver 6.7p1
%define rel 1
# OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID
@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ PreReq: initscripts >= 5.00
%else
Requires: initscripts >= 5.20
%endif
BuildRequires: perl, openssl-devel, tcp_wrappers
BuildRequires: perl, openssl-devel
BuildRequires: /bin/login
%if ! %{build6x}
BuildPreReq: glibc-devel, pam
@ -192,7 +192,6 @@ echo K5DIR=$K5DIR
--sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
--libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh \
--datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \
--with-tcp-wrappers \
--with-rsh=%{_bindir}/rsh \
--with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin \
--with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \

5
crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
View File

@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
Summary: OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation
Name: openssh
Version: 6.6p1
Version: 6.7p1
URL: http://www.openssh.com/
Release: 1
Source0: openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
@ -28,11 +28,9 @@ Provides: ssh
# (Build[ing] Prereq[uisites] only work for RPM 2.95 and newer.)
# building prerequisites -- stuff for
# OpenSSL (openssl-devel),
# TCP Wrappers (tcpd-devel),
# and Gnome (glibdev, gtkdev, and gnlibsd)
#
BuildPrereq: openssl
BuildPrereq: tcpd-devel
BuildPrereq: zlib-devel
#BuildPrereq: glibdev
#BuildPrereq: gtkdev
@ -140,7 +138,6 @@ CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \
--mandir=%{_mandir} \
--with-privsep-path=/var/lib/empty \
--with-pam \
--with-tcp-wrappers \
--libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh
make

27
crypto/openssh/defines.h
View File

@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
#ifndef _DEFINES_H
#define _DEFINES_H
/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.176 2014/01/17 13:12:38 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.183 2014/09/02 19:33:26 djm Exp $ */
/* Constants */
@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ struct winsize {
/* user may have set a different path */
#if defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY)
# undef _PATH_MAILDIR MAILDIR
# undef _PATH_MAILDIR
#endif /* defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY) */
#ifdef MAIL_DIRECTORY
@ -603,10 +603,6 @@ struct winsize {
# define memmove(s1, s2, n) bcopy((s2), (s1), (n))
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) */
#if defined(HAVE_VHANGUP) && !defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX)
# define USE_VHANGUP
#endif /* defined(HAVE_VHANGUP) && !defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) */
#ifndef GETPGRP_VOID
# include <unistd.h>
# define getpgrp() getpgrp(0)
@ -826,4 +822,23 @@ struct winsize {
# define arc4random_stir()
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_VA_COPY
# ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY
# define va_copy(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src)
# else
# define va_copy(dest, src) (dest) = (src)
# endif
#endif
#ifndef __predict_true
# if defined(__GNUC__) && \
((__GNUC__ > (2)) || (__GNUC__ == (2) && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= (96)))
# define __predict_true(exp) __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 1)
# define __predict_false(exp) __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 0)
# else
# define __predict_true(exp) ((exp) != 0)
# define __predict_false(exp) ((exp) != 0)
# endif /* gcc version */
#endif /* __predict_true */
#endif /* _DEFINES_H */

27
crypto/openssh/digest-libc.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.2 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.3 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
* Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@ -28,7 +28,8 @@
#include <sha1.h>
#include <sha2.h>
#include "buffer.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
typedef void md_init_fn(void *mdctx);
@ -164,7 +165,7 @@ ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to)
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(from->alg);
if (digest == NULL || from->alg != to->alg)
return -1;
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
memcpy(to->mdctx, from->mdctx, digest->ctx_len);
return 0;
}
@ -175,15 +176,15 @@ ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
if (digest == NULL)
return -1;
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
digest->md_update(ctx->mdctx, m, mlen);
return 0;
}
int
ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const Buffer *b)
ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b)
{
return ssh_digest_update(ctx, buffer_ptr(b), buffer_len(b));
return ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b));
}
int
@ -192,11 +193,11 @@ ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
if (digest == NULL)
return -1;
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (dlen > UINT_MAX)
return -1;
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */
return -1;
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
digest->md_final(d, ctx->mdctx);
return 0;
}
@ -223,16 +224,16 @@ ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx = ssh_digest_start(alg);
if (ctx == NULL)
return -1;
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, m, mlen) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_final(ctx, d, dlen) != 0)
return -1;
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
ssh_digest_free(ctx);
return 0;
}
int
ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const Buffer *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
{
return ssh_digest_memory(alg, buffer_ptr(b), buffer_len(b), d, dlen);
return ssh_digest_memory(alg, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), d, dlen);
}

58
crypto/openssh/digest-openssl.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.2 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.4 2014/07/03 03:26:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
@ -26,8 +26,18 @@
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160
# define EVP_ripemd160 NULL
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160 */
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
# define EVP_sha256 NULL
# define EVP_sha384 NULL
# define EVP_sha512 NULL
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */
struct ssh_digest_ctx {
int alg;
@ -46,11 +56,9 @@ const struct ssh_digest digests[] = {
{ SSH_DIGEST_MD5, "MD5", 16, EVP_md5 },
{ SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, "RIPEMD160", 20, EVP_ripemd160 },
{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, "SHA1", 20, EVP_sha1 },
#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 /* XXX replace with local if missing */
{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, "SHA256", 32, EVP_sha256 },
{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA384, "SHA384", 48, EVP_sha384 },
{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, "SHA512", 64, EVP_sha512 },
#endif
{ -1, NULL, 0, NULL },
};
@ -61,6 +69,8 @@ ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
return NULL;
if (digests[alg].id != alg) /* sanity */
return NULL;
if (digests[alg].mdfunc == NULL)
return NULL;
return &(digests[alg]);
}
@ -98,9 +108,11 @@ ssh_digest_start(int alg)
int
ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to)
{
if (from->alg != to->alg)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
/* we have bcopy-style order while openssl has memcpy-style */
if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&to->mdctx, &from->mdctx))
return -1;
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
return 0;
}
@ -108,14 +120,14 @@ int
ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
{
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->mdctx, m, mlen) != 1)
return -1;
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
return 0;
}
int
ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const Buffer *b)
ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b)
{
return ssh_digest_update(ctx, buffer_ptr(b), buffer_len(b));
return ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b));
}
int
@ -125,13 +137,13 @@ ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
u_int l = dlen;
if (dlen > UINT_MAX)
return -1;
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */
return -1;
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->mdctx, d, &l) != 1)
return -1;
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
if (l != digest->digest_len) /* sanity */
return -1;
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
@ -148,19 +160,23 @@ ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
int
ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
{
struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx = ssh_digest_start(alg);
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
u_int mdlen;
if (ctx == NULL)
return -1;
if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, m, mlen) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_final(ctx, d, dlen) != 0)
return -1;
ssh_digest_free(ctx);
if (digest == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (dlen > UINT_MAX)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (dlen < digest->digest_len)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
mdlen = dlen;
if (!EVP_Digest(m, mlen, d, &mdlen, digest->mdfunc(), NULL))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
return 0;
}
int
ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const Buffer *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
{
return ssh_digest_memory(alg, buffer_ptr(b), buffer_len(b), d, dlen);
return ssh_digest_memory(alg, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), d, dlen);
}

8
crypto/openssh/digest.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: digest.h,v 1.2 2014/01/27 18:58:14 markus Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: digest.h,v 1.6 2014/07/03 04:36:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 5
#define SSH_DIGEST_MAX 6
struct sshbuf;
struct ssh_digest_ctx;
/* Returns the algorithm's digest length in bytes or 0 for invalid algorithm */
@ -47,14 +48,15 @@ int ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen,
u_char *d, size_t dlen)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)))
__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 4, 5)));
int ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const Buffer *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
int ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 3, 4)));
/* Update API */
struct ssh_digest_ctx *ssh_digest_start(int alg);
int ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
int ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const Buffer *b);
int ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx,
const struct sshbuf *b);
int ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
void ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx);

9
crypto/openssh/dns.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.29 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.31 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "key.h"
@ -96,6 +98,11 @@ dns_read_key(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type,
if (!*digest_type)
*digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA256;
break;
case KEY_ED25519:
*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_ED25519;
if (!*digest_type)
*digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA256;
break;
default:
*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED; /* 0 */
*digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; /* 0 */

5
crypto/openssh/dns.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.12 2012/05/23 03:28:28 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.13 2014/04/20 09:24:26 logan Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
@ -32,7 +32,8 @@ enum sshfp_types {
SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED = 0,
SSHFP_KEY_RSA = 1,
SSHFP_KEY_DSA = 2,
SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA = 3
SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA = 3,
SSHFP_KEY_ED25519 = 4
};
enum sshfp_hashes {

13
crypto/openssh/entropy.c
View File

@ -43,6 +43,8 @@
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
@ -209,16 +211,7 @@ seed_rng(void)
#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
#endif
/*
* OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
* We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
* After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
* allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
* within a patch series.
*/
u_long version_mask = SSLeay() >= 0x1000000f ? ~0xffff0L : ~0xff0L;
if (((SSLeay() ^ OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) & version_mask) ||
(SSLeay() >> 12) < (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >> 12))
if (!ssh_compatible_openssl(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay()))
fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
"have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());

4
crypto/openssh/freebsd-configure.sh
View File

@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ configure_args="
set -e
# make sure configure uses the correct compiler
export CC=$(echo ".include <bsd.lib.mk>" | make -f /dev/stdin -VCC)
export CPP=$(echo ".include <bsd.lib.mk>" | make -f /dev/stdin -VCPP)
# generate config.h with krb5 and stash it
sh configure $configure_args --with-kerberos5
mv config.log config.log.orig

1
crypto/openssh/gss-serv-krb5.c
View File

@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "buffer.h"

6
crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.26 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.27 2014/07/03 03:34:09 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@ -97,13 +97,13 @@ static OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
{
OM_uint32 status;
char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
char lname[NI_MAXHOST];
gss_OID_set oidset;
gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
if (gethostname(lname, sizeof(lname))) {
gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
return (-1);
}

5
crypto/openssh/hmac.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: hmac.h,v 1.6 2014/01/27 18:58:14 markus Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: hmac.h,v 1.9 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
/* Returns the algorithm's digest length in bytes or 0 for invalid algorithm */
size_t ssh_hmac_bytes(int alg);
struct sshbuf;
struct ssh_hmac_ctx;
struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ssh_hmac_start(int alg);
@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ int ssh_hmac_init(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *key, size_t klen)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
int ssh_hmac_update(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
int ssh_hmac_update_buffer(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const Buffer *b);
int ssh_hmac_update_buffer(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b);
int ssh_hmac_final(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
void ssh_hmac_free(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx);

9
crypto/openssh/hostfile.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.55 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.57 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "match.h"
@ -182,6 +183,7 @@ static int
hostfile_check_key(int bits, const Key *key, const char *host,
const char *filename, u_long linenum)
{
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_RSA1 || key->rsa == NULL)
return 1;
if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) {
@ -191,6 +193,7 @@ hostfile_check_key(int bits, const Key *key, const char *host,
logit("Warning: replace %d with %d in %s, line %lu.",
bits, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), filename, linenum);
}
#endif
return 1;
}
@ -296,11 +299,15 @@ load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *host, const char *path)
key = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, key)) {
key_free(key);
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, key)) {
key_free(key);
continue;
}
#else
continue;
#endif
}
if (!hostfile_check_key(kbits, key, host, path, linenum))
continue;

18
crypto/openssh/kex.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.98 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.99 2014/04/29 18:01:49 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -33,7 +33,9 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
@ -70,12 +72,13 @@ struct kexalg {
int hash_alg;
};
static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{ KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
{ KEX_DH14, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
{ KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
{ KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
#endif
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
@ -84,12 +87,13 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1,
SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
# endif
#endif
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
{ KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
{ KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
#endif
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */
{ NULL, -1, -1, -1},
};
@ -615,6 +619,7 @@ kex_derive_keys(Kex *kex, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
}
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
void
kex_derive_keys_bn(Kex *kex, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, const BIGNUM *secret)
{
@ -626,6 +631,7 @@ kex_derive_keys_bn(Kex *kex, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, const BIGNUM *secret)
buffer_ptr(&shared_secret), buffer_len(&shared_secret));
buffer_free(&shared_secret);
}
#endif
Newkeys *
kex_get_newkeys(int mode)
@ -637,6 +643,7 @@ kex_get_newkeys(int mode)
return ret;
}
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
void
derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *host_modulus, BIGNUM *server_modulus,
u_int8_t cookie[8], u_int8_t id[16])
@ -669,6 +676,7 @@ derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *host_modulus, BIGNUM *server_modulus,
explicit_bzero(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf));
explicit_bzero(obuf, sizeof(obuf));
}
#endif
#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
void

2
crypto/openssh/kex.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.62 2014/01/27 18:58:14 markus Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.64 2014/05/02 03:27:54 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.

2
crypto/openssh/kexc25519.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.5 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.7 2014/05/02 03:27:54 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.

2864
crypto/openssh/key.c
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

185
crypto/openssh/key.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.41 2014/01/09 23:20:00 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.42 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@ -26,141 +26,86 @@
#ifndef KEY_H
#define KEY_H
#include "buffer.h"
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include "sshkey.h"
typedef struct sshkey Key;
#define types sshkey_types
#define fp_type sshkey_fp_type
#define fp_rep sshkey_fp_rep
#ifndef SSH_KEY_NO_DEFINE
#define key_new sshkey_new
#define key_free sshkey_free
#define key_equal_public sshkey_equal_public
#define key_equal sshkey_equal
#define key_fingerprint sshkey_fingerprint
#define key_type sshkey_type
#define key_cert_type sshkey_cert_type
#define key_ssh_name sshkey_ssh_name
#define key_ssh_name_plain sshkey_ssh_name_plain
#define key_type_from_name sshkey_type_from_name
#define key_ecdsa_nid_from_name sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name
#define key_type_is_cert sshkey_type_is_cert
#define key_size sshkey_size
#define key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid
#define key_ecdsa_key_to_nid sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid
#define key_names_valid2 sshkey_names_valid2
#define key_is_cert sshkey_is_cert
#define key_type_plain sshkey_type_plain
#define key_cert_is_legacy sshkey_cert_is_legacy
#define key_curve_name_to_nid sshkey_curve_name_to_nid
#define key_curve_nid_to_bits sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits
#define key_curve_nid_to_name sshkey_curve_nid_to_name
#define key_ec_nid_to_hash_alg sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg
#define key_dump_ec_point sshkey_dump_ec_point
#define key_dump_ec_key sshkey_dump_ec_key
#define key_fingerprint sshkey_fingerprint
#endif
typedef struct Key Key;
enum types {
KEY_RSA1,
KEY_RSA,
KEY_DSA,
KEY_ECDSA,
KEY_ED25519,
KEY_RSA_CERT,
KEY_DSA_CERT,
KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
KEY_ED25519_CERT,
KEY_RSA_CERT_V00,
KEY_DSA_CERT_V00,
KEY_UNSPEC
};
enum fp_type {
SSH_FP_SHA1,
SSH_FP_MD5,
SSH_FP_SHA256
};
enum fp_rep {
SSH_FP_HEX,
SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE,
SSH_FP_RANDOMART
};
/* key is stored in external hardware */
#define KEY_FLAG_EXT 0x0001
#define CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS 256
struct KeyCert {
Buffer certblob; /* Kept around for use on wire */
u_int type; /* SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER or SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST */
u_int64_t serial;
char *key_id;
u_int nprincipals;
char **principals;
u_int64_t valid_after, valid_before;
Buffer critical;
Buffer extensions;
Key *signature_key;
};
struct Key {
int type;
int flags;
RSA *rsa;
DSA *dsa;
int ecdsa_nid; /* NID of curve */
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
EC_KEY *ecdsa;
#else
void *ecdsa;
#endif
struct KeyCert *cert;
u_char *ed25519_sk;
u_char *ed25519_pk;
};
#define ED25519_SK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES
#define ED25519_PK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES
Key *key_new(int);
void key_add_private(Key *);
Key *key_new_private(int);
void key_free(Key *);
Key *key_demote(const Key *);
int key_equal_public(const Key *, const Key *);
int key_equal(const Key *, const Key *);
char *key_fingerprint(const Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep);
u_char *key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *);
const char *key_type(const Key *);
const char *key_cert_type(const Key *);
int key_write(const Key *, FILE *);
int key_read(Key *, char **);
u_int key_size(const Key *);
void key_add_private(Key *);
Key *key_new_private(int);
void key_free(Key *);
Key *key_demote(const Key *);
u_char *key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *);
int key_write(const Key *, FILE *);
int key_read(Key *, char **);
Key *key_generate(int, u_int);
Key *key_from_private(const Key *);
int key_type_from_name(char *);
int key_is_cert(const Key *);
int key_type_is_cert(int);
int key_type_plain(int);
int key_to_certified(Key *, int);
int key_drop_cert(Key *);
int key_certify(Key *, Key *);
void key_cert_copy(const Key *, struct Key *);
void key_cert_copy(const Key *, Key *);
int key_cert_check_authority(const Key *, int, int, const char *,
const char **);
int key_cert_is_legacy(const Key *);
char *key_alg_list(int, int);
int key_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *);
int key_curve_name_to_nid(const char *);
const char *key_curve_nid_to_name(int);
u_int key_curve_nid_to_bits(int);
int key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
int key_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *);
int key_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid);
int key_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
int key_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *);
#endif
char *key_alg_list(int, int);
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
int key_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
int key_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *);
#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) */
Key *key_from_blob(const u_char *, u_int);
int key_to_blob(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *);
const char *key_ssh_name(const Key *);
const char *key_ssh_name_plain(const Key *);
int key_names_valid2(const char *);
Key *key_from_blob(const u_char *, u_int);
int key_to_blob(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *);
int key_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int);
int key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
int ssh_dss_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int);
int ssh_dss_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
int ssh_ecdsa_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int);
int ssh_ecdsa_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
int ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int);
int ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
int ssh_ed25519_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int);
int ssh_ed25519_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
void key_private_serialize(const Key *, struct sshbuf *);
Key *key_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *);
#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && (defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) || defined(DEBUG_PK))
void key_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
void key_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *);
#endif
void key_private_serialize(const Key *, Buffer *);
Key *key_private_deserialize(Buffer *);
/* authfile.c */
int key_save_private(Key *, const char *, const char *, const char *,
int, const char *, int);
int key_load_file(int, const char *, struct sshbuf *);
Key *key_load_cert(const char *);
Key *key_load_public(const char *, char **);
Key *key_load_private(const char *, const char *, char **);
Key *key_load_private_cert(int, const char *, const char *, int *);
Key *key_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *, char **, int *);
Key *key_load_private_pem(int, int, const char *, char **);
int key_perm_ok(int, const char *);
int key_in_file(Key *, const char *, int);
#endif

15
crypto/openssh/krl.c
View File

@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.14 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.17 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
#include "includes.h"
@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ plain_key_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blob, u_int *blen)
}
r = key_to_blob(kcopy, blob, blen);
free(kcopy);
return r == 0 ? -1 : 0;
return r;
}
/* Revoke a key blob. Ownership of blob is transferred to the tree */
@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
u_int len;
debug3("%s: revoke type %s", __func__, key_type(key));
if (plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len) != 0)
if (plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len) < 0)
return -1;
return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_keys, blob, len);
}
@ -575,6 +575,7 @@ revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, Buffer *buf)
buffer_put_char(buf, state);
buffer_put_string(buf,
buffer_ptr(&sect), buffer_len(&sect));
buffer_clear(&sect);
}
/* If we are starting a new section then prepare it now */
@ -753,7 +754,8 @@ static int
parse_revoked_certs(Buffer *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl)
{
int ret = -1, nbits;
u_char type, *blob;
u_char type;
const u_char *blob;
u_int blen;
Buffer subsect;
u_int64_t serial, serial_lo, serial_hi;
@ -887,7 +889,8 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(Buffer *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
char timestamp[64];
int ret = -1, r, sig_seen;
Key *key = NULL, **ca_used = NULL;
u_char type, *blob, *rdata = NULL;
u_char type, *rdata = NULL;
const u_char *blob;
u_int i, j, sig_off, sects_off, rlen, blen, format_version, nca_used;
nca_used = 0;
@ -1127,7 +1130,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
/* Next, explicit keys */
memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
if (plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len) != 0)
if (plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len) < 0)
return -1;
erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
free(rb.blob);

5
crypto/openssh/mac.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.28 2014/02/07 06:55:54 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.30 2014/04/30 19:07:48 naddy Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -175,7 +175,8 @@ mac_compute(Mac *mac, u_int32_t seqno, u_char *data, int datalen)
u_char m[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
u_int64_t for_align;
} u;
u_char b[4], nonce[8];
u_char b[4];
u_char nonce[8];
if (mac->mac_len > sizeof(u))
fatal("mac_compute: mac too long %u %zu",

85
crypto/openssh/misc.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.92 2013/10/14 23:28:23 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.94 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
@ -789,6 +790,20 @@ get_u32(const void *vp)
return (v);
}
u_int32_t
get_u32_le(const void *vp)
{
const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
u_int32_t v;
v = (u_int32_t)p[0];
v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 8;
v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 16;
v |= (u_int32_t)p[3] << 24;
return (v);
}
u_int16_t
get_u16(const void *vp)
{
@ -827,6 +842,16 @@ put_u32(void *vp, u_int32_t v)
p[3] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
}
void
put_u32_le(void *vp, u_int32_t v)
{
u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
p[0] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
}
void
put_u16(void *vp, u_int16_t v)
@ -859,17 +884,24 @@ ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *tv, int ms)
time_t
monotime(void)
{
#if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC)
#if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && \
(defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) || defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME))
struct timespec ts;
static int gettime_failed = 0;
if (!gettime_failed) {
#if defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME)
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts) == 0)
return (ts.tv_sec);
#endif
#if defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC)
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts) == 0)
return (ts.tv_sec);
#endif
debug3("clock_gettime: %s", strerror(errno));
gettime_failed = 1;
}
#endif
#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME && (CLOCK_MONOTONIC || CLOCK_BOOTTIME */
return time(NULL);
}
@ -1026,6 +1058,53 @@ lowercase(char *s)
for (; *s; s++)
*s = tolower((u_char)*s);
}
int
unix_listener(const char *path, int backlog, int unlink_first)
{
struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
int saved_errno, sock;
memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if (strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, path, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) {
error("%s: \"%s\" too long for Unix domain socket", __func__,
path);
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
return -1;
}
sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (sock < 0) {
saved_errno = errno;
error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
if (unlink_first == 1) {
if (unlink(path) != 0 && errno != ENOENT)
error("unlink(%s): %.100s", path, strerror(errno));
}
if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) {
saved_errno = errno;
error("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno));
close(sock);
error("%s: cannot bind to path: %s", __func__, path);
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
if (listen(sock, backlog) < 0) {
saved_errno = errno;
error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
close(sock);
unlink(path);
error("%s: cannot listen on path: %s", __func__, path);
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
return sock;
}
void
sock_set_v6only(int s)
{

31
crypto/openssh/misc.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.50 2013/10/14 23:28:23 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.54 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/* $FreeBSD$ */
/*
@ -16,6 +16,25 @@
#ifndef _MISC_H
#define _MISC_H
/* Data structure for representing a forwarding request. */
struct Forward {
char *listen_host; /* Host (address) to listen on. */
int listen_port; /* Port to forward. */
char *listen_path; /* Path to bind domain socket. */
char *connect_host; /* Host to connect. */
int connect_port; /* Port to connect on connect_host. */
char *connect_path; /* Path to connect domain socket. */
int allocated_port; /* Dynamically allocated listen port */
int handle; /* Handle for dynamic listen ports */
};
/* Common server and client forwarding options. */
struct ForwardOptions {
int gateway_ports; /* Allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */
mode_t streamlocal_bind_mask; /* umask for streamlocal binds */
int streamlocal_bind_unlink; /* unlink socket before bind */
};
/* misc.c */
char *chop(char *);
@ -38,6 +57,7 @@ void ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *, int *);
void ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *, int);
time_t monotime(void);
void lowercase(char *s);
int unix_listener(const char *, int, int);
void sock_set_v6only(int);
@ -69,6 +89,9 @@ int tun_open(int, int);
#define SSH_TUNID_ERR (SSH_TUNID_ANY - 1)
#define SSH_TUNID_MAX (SSH_TUNID_ANY - 2)
/* Fake port to indicate that host field is really a path. */
#define PORT_STREAMLOCAL -2
/* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */
u_int64_t get_u64(const void *)
__attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8)));
@ -83,6 +106,12 @@ void put_u32(void *, u_int32_t)
void put_u16(void *, u_int16_t)
__attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2)));
/* Little-endian store/load, used by umac.c */
u_int32_t get_u32_le(const void *)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4)));
void put_u32_le(void *, u_int32_t)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4)));
struct bwlimit {
size_t buflen;
u_int64_t rate, thresh, lamt;

4
crypto/openssh/moduli.0
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
MODULI(5) OpenBSD Programmer's Manual MODULI(5)
MODULI(5) File Formats Manual MODULI(5)
NAME
moduli - Diffie-Hellman moduli
@ -71,4 +71,4 @@ STANDARDS
the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006,
2006.
OpenBSD 5.5 September 26, 2012 OpenBSD 5.5
OpenBSD 5.6 September 26, 2012 OpenBSD 5.6

33
crypto/openssh/monitor.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.131 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.135 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@ -40,9 +40,10 @@
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
@ -56,7 +57,9 @@
#include <skey.h>
#endif
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
@ -84,6 +87,7 @@
#include "sshlogin.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#include "monitor_mm.h"
@ -92,7 +96,6 @@
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "roaming.h"
@ -185,7 +188,10 @@ int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
static Authctxt *authctxt;
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
#endif
/* local state for key verify */
static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
@ -215,7 +221,9 @@ struct mon_table {
#define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
#endif
{MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
{MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
@ -252,7 +260,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
};
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
#endif
{MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
{MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
{MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
@ -265,6 +275,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
};
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
{MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
{MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
{MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
@ -292,10 +303,12 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
#endif
#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
{MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
{MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
{MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
@ -303,6 +316,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
#endif
#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
{0, 0, NULL}
};
@ -457,6 +471,9 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
#ifdef SIGXFSZ
signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN);
#endif
if (compat20) {
mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
@ -630,6 +647,7 @@ monitor_reset_key_state(void)
hostbased_chost = NULL;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
int
mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
@ -664,6 +682,7 @@ mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
return (0);
}
#endif
extern AuthenticationConnection *auth_conn;
@ -1166,6 +1185,7 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
cuser, chost);
auth_method = "hostbased";
break;
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
@ -1175,6 +1195,7 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
auth_clear_options();
auth_method = "rsa";
break;
#endif
default:
fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
break;
@ -1511,6 +1532,7 @@ mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
return (0);
}
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
int
mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
@ -1688,6 +1710,7 @@ mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
return (success);
}
#endif
int
mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
@ -1792,6 +1815,8 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
if (options.compression)
mm_init_compression(pmonitor->m_zlib);
packet_set_postauth();
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
(time_t)options.rekey_interval);
@ -1828,11 +1853,13 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
timingsafe_bcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)
fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id");
kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
#endif
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
kex->server = 1;
kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);

11
crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.c
View File

@ -34,12 +34,17 @@
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#endif
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
# include <poll.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
# include <sys/poll.h>
# endif
#endif
#include "log.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"

12
crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.79 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.80 2014/04/29 18:01:49 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@ -38,14 +38,18 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include "dh.h"
#endif
#include "buffer.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "cipher.h"
@ -174,6 +178,7 @@ mm_request_receive_expect(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
rtype, type);
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
DH *
mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max)
{
@ -207,6 +212,7 @@ mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max)
return (dh_new_group(g, p));
}
#endif
int
mm_key_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
@ -911,6 +917,7 @@ mm_terminate(void)
buffer_free(&m);
}
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
int
mm_ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *num)
{
@ -930,6 +937,7 @@ mm_ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *num)
return (rsafail);
}
#endif
static void
mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts,
@ -1077,6 +1085,7 @@ mm_ssh1_session_id(u_char session_id[16])
buffer_free(&m);
}
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
int
mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
{
@ -1172,6 +1181,7 @@ mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *p, u_char response[16])
return (success);
}
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
void

277
crypto/openssh/mux.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.44 2013/07/12 00:19:58 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.48 2014/07/17 07:22:19 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
*
@ -106,6 +106,11 @@ struct mux_session_confirm_ctx {
u_int rid;
};
/* Context for stdio fwd open confirmation callback */
struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx {
u_int rid;
};
/* Context for global channel callback */
struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx {
u_int cid; /* channel id */
@ -158,6 +163,7 @@ struct mux_master_state {
#define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC 3
static void mux_session_confirm(int, int, void *);
static void mux_stdio_confirm(int, int, void *);
static int process_mux_master_hello(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
static int process_mux_new_session(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
@ -510,29 +516,33 @@ process_mux_terminate(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
}
static char *
format_forward(u_int ftype, Forward *fwd)
format_forward(u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd)
{
char *ret;
switch (ftype) {
case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
xasprintf(&ret, "local forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d",
(fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path :
(fwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
(options.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
(options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port,
(fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path :
fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port);
break;
case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
xasprintf(&ret, "dynamic forward %.200s:%d -> *",
(fwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
(options.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
(options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port);
break;
case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
xasprintf(&ret, "remote forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d",
(fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path :
(fwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
"LOCALHOST" : fwd->listen_host,
fwd->listen_port,
(fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path :
fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port);
break;
default:
@ -552,14 +562,18 @@ compare_host(const char *a, const char *b)
}
static int
compare_forward(Forward *a, Forward *b)
compare_forward(struct Forward *a, struct Forward *b)
{
if (!compare_host(a->listen_host, b->listen_host))
return 0;
if (!compare_host(a->listen_path, b->listen_path))
return 0;
if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port)
return 0;
if (!compare_host(a->connect_host, b->connect_host))
return 0;
if (!compare_host(a->connect_path, b->connect_path))
return 0;
if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port)
return 0;
@ -571,7 +585,7 @@ mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx = ctxt;
char *failmsg = NULL;
Forward *rfwd;
struct Forward *rfwd;
Channel *c;
Buffer out;
@ -588,7 +602,8 @@ mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
rfwd = &options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid];
debug("%s: %s for: listen %d, connect %s:%d", __func__,
type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path :
rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) {
rfwd->allocated_port = packet_get_int();
@ -608,8 +623,12 @@ mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
} else {
if (rfwd->listen_port == 0)
channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle, -1);
xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for "
"listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL)
xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for "
"listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path);
else
xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for "
"listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
}
fail:
error("%s: %s", __func__, failmsg);
@ -628,34 +647,45 @@ mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
static int
process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
{
Forward fwd;
struct Forward fwd;
char *fwd_desc = NULL;
char *listen_addr, *connect_addr;
u_int ftype;
u_int lport, cport;
int i, ret = 0, freefwd = 1;
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
/* XXX - lport/cport check redundant */
if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ftype, m) != 0 ||
(fwd.listen_host = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
(listen_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
buffer_get_int_ret(&lport, m) != 0 ||
(fwd.connect_host = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
(connect_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
buffer_get_int_ret(&cport, m) != 0 ||
lport > 65535 || cport > 65535) {
(lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) ||
(cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) {
error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
if (*listen_addr == '\0') {
free(listen_addr);
listen_addr = NULL;
}
if (*connect_addr == '\0') {
free(connect_addr);
connect_addr = NULL;
}
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
fwd.listen_port = lport;
if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.listen_path = listen_addr;
else
fwd.listen_host = listen_addr;
fwd.connect_port = cport;
if (*fwd.listen_host == '\0') {
free(fwd.listen_host);
fwd.listen_host = NULL;
}
if (*fwd.connect_host == '\0') {
free(fwd.connect_host);
fwd.connect_host = NULL;
}
if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.connect_path = connect_addr;
else
fwd.connect_host = connect_addr;
debug2("%s: channel %d: request %s", __func__, c->self,
(fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd)));
@ -664,25 +694,30 @@ process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) {
logit("%s: invalid forwarding type %u", __func__, ftype);
invalid:
free(fwd.listen_host);
free(fwd.connect_host);
free(listen_addr);
free(connect_addr);
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
buffer_put_int(r, rid);
buffer_put_cstring(r, "Invalid forwarding request");
return 0;
}
if (fwd.listen_port >= 65536) {
if (ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.listen_path) {
logit("%s: streamlocal and dynamic forwards "
"are mutually exclusive", __func__);
goto invalid;
}
if (fwd.listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.listen_port >= 65536) {
logit("%s: invalid listen port %u", __func__,
fwd.listen_port);
goto invalid;
}
if (fwd.connect_port >= 65536 || (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC &&
ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE && fwd.connect_port == 0)) {
if ((fwd.connect_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.connect_port >= 65536)
|| (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE && fwd.connect_port == 0)) {
logit("%s: invalid connect port %u", __func__,
fwd.connect_port);
goto invalid;
}
if (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.connect_host == NULL) {
if (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.connect_host == NULL && fwd.connect_path == NULL) {
logit("%s: missing connect host", __func__);
goto invalid;
}
@ -733,9 +768,8 @@ process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
}
if (ftype == MUX_FWD_LOCAL || ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) {
if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(fwd.listen_host,
fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_host, fwd.connect_port,
options.gateway_ports)) {
if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(&fwd,
&options.fwd_opts)) {
fail:
logit("slave-requested %s failed", fwd_desc);
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
@ -748,8 +782,7 @@ process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
} else {
struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx;
fwd.handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(fwd.listen_host,
fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_host, fwd.connect_port);
fwd.handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(&fwd);
if (fwd.handle < 0)
goto fail;
add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd);
@ -770,7 +803,9 @@ process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
free(fwd_desc);
if (freefwd) {
free(fwd.listen_host);
free(fwd.listen_path);
free(fwd.connect_host);
free(fwd.connect_path);
}
return ret;
}
@ -778,37 +813,47 @@ process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
static int
process_mux_close_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
{
Forward fwd, *found_fwd;
struct Forward fwd, *found_fwd;
char *fwd_desc = NULL;
const char *error_reason = NULL;
char *listen_addr = NULL, *connect_addr = NULL;
u_int ftype;
int i, listen_port, ret = 0;
int i, ret = 0;
u_int lport, cport;
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ftype, m) != 0 ||
(fwd.listen_host = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
(listen_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
buffer_get_int_ret(&lport, m) != 0 ||
(fwd.connect_host = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
(connect_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
buffer_get_int_ret(&cport, m) != 0 ||
lport > 65535 || cport > 65535) {
(lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) ||
(cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) {
error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
fwd.listen_port = lport;
fwd.connect_port = cport;
if (*fwd.listen_host == '\0') {
free(fwd.listen_host);
fwd.listen_host = NULL;
if (*listen_addr == '\0') {
free(listen_addr);
listen_addr = NULL;
}
if (*fwd.connect_host == '\0') {
free(fwd.connect_host);
fwd.connect_host = NULL;
if (*connect_addr == '\0') {
free(connect_addr);
connect_addr = NULL;
}
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
fwd.listen_port = lport;
if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.listen_path = listen_addr;
else
fwd.listen_host = listen_addr;
fwd.connect_port = cport;
if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.connect_path = connect_addr;
else
fwd.connect_host = connect_addr;
debug2("%s: channel %d: request cancel %s", __func__, c->self,
(fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd)));
@ -843,18 +888,14 @@ process_mux_close_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
* This shouldn't fail unless we confused the host/port
* between options.remote_forwards and permitted_opens.
* However, for dynamic allocated listen ports we need
* to lookup the actual listen port.
* to use the actual listen port.
*/
listen_port = (fwd.listen_port == 0) ?
found_fwd->allocated_port : fwd.listen_port;
if (channel_request_rforward_cancel(fwd.listen_host,
listen_port) == -1)
if (channel_request_rforward_cancel(found_fwd) == -1)
error_reason = "port not in permitted opens";
} else { /* local and dynamic forwards */
/* Ditto */
if (channel_cancel_lport_listener(fwd.listen_host,
fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_port,
options.gateway_ports) == -1)
if (channel_cancel_lport_listener(&fwd, fwd.connect_port,
&options.fwd_opts) == -1)
error_reason = "port not found";
}
@ -863,8 +904,11 @@ process_mux_close_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
buffer_put_int(r, rid);
free(found_fwd->listen_host);
free(found_fwd->listen_path);
free(found_fwd->connect_host);
free(found_fwd->connect_path);
found_fwd->listen_host = found_fwd->connect_host = NULL;
found_fwd->listen_path = found_fwd->connect_path = NULL;
found_fwd->listen_port = found_fwd->connect_port = 0;
} else {
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
@ -873,8 +917,8 @@ process_mux_close_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
}
out:
free(fwd_desc);
free(fwd.listen_host);
free(fwd.connect_host);
free(listen_addr);
free(connect_addr);
return ret;
}
@ -886,6 +930,7 @@ process_mux_stdio_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
char *reserved, *chost;
u_int cport, i, j;
int new_fd[2];
struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx;
chost = reserved = NULL;
if ((reserved = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
@ -965,15 +1010,60 @@ process_mux_stdio_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
channel_register_cleanup(nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1);
/* prepare reply */
/* XXX defer until channel confirmed */
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED);
buffer_put_int(r, rid);
buffer_put_int(r, nc->self);
cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx));
cctx->rid = rid;
channel_register_open_confirm(nc->self, mux_stdio_confirm, cctx);
c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */
/* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */
return 0;
}
/* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux stdio fwd session. */
static void
mux_stdio_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg)
{
struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg;
Channel *c, *cc;
Buffer reply;
if (cctx == NULL)
fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__);
if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id);
if ((cc = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__,
id, c->ctl_chan);
if (!success) {
debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__);
/* prepare reply */
buffer_init(&reply);
buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_FAILURE);
buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid);
buffer_put_cstring(&reply, "Session open refused by peer");
goto done;
}
debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__);
/* prepare reply */
buffer_init(&reply);
buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED);
buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid);
buffer_put_int(&reply, c->self);
done:
/* Send reply */
buffer_put_string(&cc->output, buffer_ptr(&reply), buffer_len(&reply));
buffer_free(&reply);
if (cc->mux_pause <= 0)
fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause);
cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL;
free(cctx);
}
static int
process_mux_stop_listening(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
{
@ -1013,7 +1103,7 @@ mux_master_read_cb(Channel *c)
{
struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx;
Buffer in, out;
void *ptr;
const u_char *ptr;
u_int type, rid, have, i;
int ret = -1;
@ -1136,12 +1226,11 @@ mux_tty_alloc_failed(Channel *c)
void
muxserver_listen(void)
{
struct sockaddr_un addr;
socklen_t sun_len;
mode_t old_umask;
char *orig_control_path = options.control_path;
char rbuf[16+1];
u_int i, r;
int oerrno;
if (options.control_path == NULL ||
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO)
@ -1166,24 +1255,12 @@ muxserver_listen(void)
xasprintf(&options.control_path, "%s.%s", orig_control_path, rbuf);
debug3("%s: temporary control path %s", __func__, options.control_path);
memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
sun_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
strlen(options.control_path) + 1;
if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, options.control_path,
sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path)) {
error("ControlPath \"%s\" too long for Unix domain socket",
options.control_path);
goto disable_mux_master;
}
if ((muxserver_sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
old_umask = umask(0177);
if (bind(muxserver_sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sun_len) == -1) {
if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EADDRINUSE) {
muxserver_sock = unix_listener(options.control_path, 64, 0);
oerrno = errno;
umask(old_umask);
if (muxserver_sock < 0) {
if (oerrno == EINVAL || oerrno == EADDRINUSE) {
error("ControlSocket %s already exists, "
"disabling multiplexing", options.control_path);
disable_mux_master:
@ -1196,13 +1273,11 @@ muxserver_listen(void)
options.control_path = NULL;
options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
return;
} else
fatal("%s bind(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
} else {
/* unix_listener() logs the error */
cleanup_exit(255);
}
}
umask(old_umask);
if (listen(muxserver_sock, 64) == -1)
fatal("%s listen(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
/* Now atomically "move" the mux socket into position */
if (link(options.control_path, orig_control_path) != 0) {
@ -1432,7 +1507,7 @@ mux_client_read_packet(int fd, Buffer *m)
{
Buffer queue;
u_int need, have;
void *ptr;
const u_char *ptr;
int oerrno;
buffer_init(&queue);
@ -1596,7 +1671,7 @@ mux_client_request_terminate(int fd)
}
static int
mux_client_forward(int fd, int cancel_flag, u_int ftype, Forward *fwd)
mux_client_forward(int fd, int cancel_flag, u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd)
{
Buffer m;
char *e, *fwd_desc;
@ -1611,11 +1686,19 @@ mux_client_forward(int fd, int cancel_flag, u_int ftype, Forward *fwd)
buffer_put_int(&m, cancel_flag ? MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD : MUX_C_OPEN_FWD);
buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id);
buffer_put_int(&m, ftype);
buffer_put_cstring(&m,
fwd->listen_host == NULL ? "" : fwd->listen_host);
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
buffer_put_cstring(&m, fwd->listen_path);
} else {
buffer_put_cstring(&m,
fwd->listen_host == NULL ? "" : fwd->listen_host);
}
buffer_put_int(&m, fwd->listen_port);
buffer_put_cstring(&m,
fwd->connect_host == NULL ? "" : fwd->connect_host);
if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
buffer_put_cstring(&m, fwd->connect_path);
} else {
buffer_put_cstring(&m,
fwd->connect_host == NULL ? "" : fwd->connect_host);
}
buffer_put_int(&m, fwd->connect_port);
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
@ -1925,7 +2008,7 @@ mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(int fd)
case MUX_S_FAILURE:
e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
buffer_free(&m);
fatal("%s: stdio forwarding request failed: %s", __func__, e);
fatal("Stdio forwarding request failed: %s", e);
default:
buffer_free(&m);
error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",

105
crypto/openssh/myproposal.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.35 2013/12/06 13:39:49 markus Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.41 2014/07/11 13:54:34 tedu Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@ -69,23 +69,28 @@
#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
# define KEX_SHA256_METHODS \
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
#define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS \
"curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,"
#define SHA2_HMAC_MODES \
"hmac-sha2-256," \
"hmac-sha2-512,"
#else
# define KEX_SHA256_METHODS
# define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS
# define SHA2_HMAC_MODES
#endif
# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
# ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
# define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,"
# else
# define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS ""
# endif
#define KEX_SERVER_KEX \
KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS \
KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
KEX_SHA256_METHODS \
"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_SERVER_KEX "," \
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \
"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \
@ -102,47 +107,91 @@
/* the actual algorithms */
#define KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT \
#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
"arcfour256,arcfour128," \
AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES \
"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com"
#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT "," \
"arcfour256,arcfour128," \
"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc," \
"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,arcfour,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se"
#define KEX_DEFAULT_MAC \
"hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
#define KEX_SERVER_MAC \
"umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \
"umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
"umac-64@openssh.com," \
"umac-128@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha2-256," \
"hmac-sha2-512," \
"hmac-sha1"
#define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC "," \
"hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-md5," \
"hmac-sha1," \
"umac-64@openssh.com," \
"umac-128@openssh.com," \
SHA2_HMAC_MODES \
"hmac-ripemd160," \
"hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha1-96," \
"hmac-md5-96"
#else
#define KEX_SERVER_KEX \
"curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"
#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \
"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"ssh-ed25519"
#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com"
#define KEX_SERVER_MAC \
"umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \
"umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
"umac-64@openssh.com," \
"umac-128@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha2-256," \
"hmac-sha2-512," \
"hmac-sha1"
#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_SERVER_KEX
#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT
#define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib"
#define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG ""
static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
KEX_DEFAULT_KEX,
KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG,
KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT,
KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT,
KEX_DEFAULT_MAC,
KEX_DEFAULT_MAC,
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP,
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP,
KEX_DEFAULT_LANG,
#define KEX_CLIENT \
KEX_CLIENT_KEX, \
KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \
KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \
KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \
KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \
KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \
KEX_DEFAULT_LANG
};
#define KEX_SERVER \
KEX_SERVER_KEX, \
KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \
KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \
KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \
KEX_SERVER_MAC, \
KEX_SERVER_MAC, \
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \
KEX_DEFAULT_LANG

4
crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.55 2014/02/04 00:37:50 djm Exp $
# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.56 2014/09/30 23:43:08 djm Exp $
sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
piddir=@piddir@
@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@
OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt_long.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha2.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strnlen.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o strtoull.o timingsafe_bcmp.o vis.o blowfish.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o explicit_bzero.o
COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o kludge-fd_set.o
PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o

4
crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c
View File

@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ _rs_stir(void)
_rs_init(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
} else
_rs_rekey(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
memset(rnd, 0, sizeof(rnd));
explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
/* invalidate rs_buf */
rs_have = 0;
@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ arc4random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n)
buf[i] = r & 0xff;
r >>= 8;
}
i = r = 0;
explicit_bzero(&r, sizeof(r));
}
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) */

16
crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c
View File

@ -57,6 +57,22 @@ check_ntsec(const char *filename)
return (pathconf(filename, _PC_POSIX_PERMISSIONS));
}
const char *
cygwin_ssh_privsep_user()
{
static char cyg_privsep_user[DNLEN + UNLEN + 2];
if (!cyg_privsep_user[0])
{
#ifdef CW_CYGNAME_FROM_WINNAME
if (cygwin_internal (CW_CYGNAME_FROM_WINNAME, "sshd", cyg_privsep_user,
sizeof cyg_privsep_user) != 0)
#endif
strcpy (cyg_privsep_user, "sshd");
}
return cyg_privsep_user;
}
#define NL(x) x, (sizeof (x) - 1)
#define WENV_SIZ (sizeof (wenv_arr) / sizeof (wenv_arr[0]))

6
crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $Id: bsd-cygwin_util.h,v 1.17 2014/01/18 10:04:00 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $Id: bsd-cygwin_util.h,v 1.18 2014/05/27 04:34:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2011, 2013 Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
/* Avoid including windows headers. */
typedef void *HANDLE;
#define INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE ((HANDLE) -1)
#define DNLEN 16
#define UNLEN 256
/* Cygwin functions for which declarations are only available when including
windows headers, so we have to define them here explicitely. */
@ -48,6 +50,8 @@ extern void cygwin_set_impersonation_token (const HANDLE);
#include <sys/cygwin.h>
#include <io.h>
#define CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER (cygwin_ssh_privsep_user())
const char *cygwin_ssh_privsep_user();
int binary_open(const char *, int , ...);
int check_ntsec(const char *);

4
crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c
View File

@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
}
while (*value && (cnt < max)) {
DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, *value);
*value++;
value++;
++cnt;
}
while ((padlen < 0) && (cnt < max)) {
@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
static int
fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
LLONG value, int base, int min, int max, int flags)
intmax_t value, int base, int min, int max, int flags)
{
int signvalue = 0;
unsigned LLONG uvalue;

28
crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c
View File

@ -7,14 +7,34 @@
#include "includes.h"
#ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
/*
* explicit_bzero - don't let the compiler optimize away bzero
*/
#ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
#ifdef HAVE_MEMSET_S
void
explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n)
{
bzero(p, n);
(void)memset_s(p, n, 0, n);
}
#endif
#else /* HAVE_MEMSET_S */
/*
* Indirect bzero through a volatile pointer to hopefully avoid
* dead-store optimisation eliminating the call.
*/
static void (* volatile ssh_bzero)(void *, size_t) = bzero;
void
explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n)
{
ssh_bzero(p, n);
}
#endif /* HAVE_MEMSET_S */
#endif /* HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO */

28
crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
/* Placed in the public domain. */
/*
* _FORTIFY_SOURCE includes a misguided check for FD_SET(n)/FD_ISSET(b)
* where n > FD_SETSIZE. This breaks OpenSSH and other programs that
* explicitly allocate fd_sets. To avoid this, we wrap FD_SET in a
* function compiled without _FORTIFY_SOURCE.
*/
#include "config.h"
#if defined(HAVE_FEATURES_H) && defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
# include <features.h>
# if defined(__GNU_LIBRARY__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0)
# undef _FORTIFY_SOURCE
# undef __USE_FORTIFY_LEVEL
# include <sys/socket.h>
void kludge_FD_SET(int n, fd_set *set) {
FD_SET(n, set);
}
int kludge_FD_ISSET(int n, fd_set *set) {
return FD_ISSET(n, set);
}
# endif /* __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) */
# endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ && __GLIBC_PREREQ */
#endif /* HAVE_FEATURES_H && _FORTIFY_SOURCE */

18
crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.61 2014/02/04 00:18:23 djm Exp $ */
/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.62 2014/09/30 23:43:08 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
@ -268,4 +268,20 @@ char *shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw);
#include "port-tun.h"
#include "port-uw.h"
/* _FORTIFY_SOURCE breaks FD_ISSET(n)/FD_SET(n) for n > FD_SETSIZE. Avoid. */
#if defined(HAVE_FEATURES_H) && defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
# include <features.h>
# if defined(__GNU_LIBRARY__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0)
# include <sys/socket.h> /* Ensure include guard is defined */
# undef FD_SET
# undef FD_ISSET
# define FD_SET(n, set) kludge_FD_SET(n, set)
# define FD_ISSET(n, set) kludge_FD_ISSET(n, set)
void kludge_FD_SET(int, fd_set *);
int kludge_FD_ISSET(int, fd_set *);
# endif /* __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) */
# endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ && __GLIBC_PREREQ */
#endif /* HAVE_FEATURES_H && _FORTIFY_SOURCE */
#endif /* _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H */

166
crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $Id: openssl-compat.c,v 1.17 2014/02/13 05:38:33 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $Id: openssl-compat.c,v 1.19 2014/07/02 05:28:07 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS
#include "includes.h"
#include <stdarg.h>
@ -26,148 +27,45 @@
# include <openssl/conf.h>
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD
# include <openssl/rsa.h>
#endif
#include "log.h"
#define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS
#include "openssl-compat.h"
#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
int
ssh_EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
EVP_CipherInit(evp, type, key, iv, enc);
return 1;
}
/*
* OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
* We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
* After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
* allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
* within a patch series.
*/
int
ssh_EVP_Cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, char *dst, char *src, int len)
ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver)
{
EVP_Cipher(evp, dst, src, len);
return 1;
long mask, hfix, lfix;
/* exact match is always OK */
if (headerver == libver)
return 1;
/* for versions < 1.0.0, major,minor,fix,status must match */
if (headerver < 0x1000000f) {
mask = 0xfffff00fL; /* major,minor,fix,status */
return (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask);
}
/*
* For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
* fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
*/
mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
lfix = (libver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
if ( (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask) && lfix >= hfix)
return 1;
return 0;
}
int
ssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(evp);
return 1;
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX
int
EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md, void *engine)
{
if (engine != NULL)
fatal("%s: ENGINE is not supported", __func__);
# ifdef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
EVP_DigestInit(ctx, md);
return 1;
# else
return EVP_DigestInit(ctx, md);
# endif
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTFINAL_EX
int
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *s)
{
# ifdef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, md, s);
return 1;
# else
return EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, md, s);
# endif
}
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
int
ssh_EVP_DigestUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, unsigned int cnt)
{
EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, d, cnt);
return 1;
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX
int
EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in)
{
return EVP_MD_CTX_copy(out, in);
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_BN_IS_PRIME_EX
int
BN_is_prime_ex(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks, BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb)
{
if (cb != NULL)
fatal("%s: callback args not supported", __func__);
return BN_is_prime(p, nchecks, NULL, ctx, NULL);
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX
int
RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *bn_e, void *cb)
{
RSA *new_rsa, tmp_rsa;
unsigned long e;
if (cb != NULL)
fatal("%s: callback args not supported", __func__);
e = BN_get_word(bn_e);
if (e == 0xffffffffL)
fatal("%s: value of e too large", __func__);
new_rsa = RSA_generate_key(bits, e, NULL, NULL);
if (new_rsa == NULL)
return 0;
/* swap rsa/new_rsa then free new_rsa */
tmp_rsa = *rsa;
*rsa = *new_rsa;
*new_rsa = tmp_rsa;
RSA_free(new_rsa);
return 1;
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX
int
DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *dsa, int bits, const unsigned char *seed,
int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, void *cb)
{
DSA *new_dsa, tmp_dsa;
if (cb != NULL)
fatal("%s: callback args not supported", __func__);
new_dsa = DSA_generate_parameters(bits, (unsigned char *)seed, seed_len,
counter_ret, h_ret, NULL, NULL);
if (new_dsa == NULL)
return 0;
/* swap dsa/new_dsa then free new_dsa */
tmp_dsa = *dsa;
*dsa = *new_dsa;
*new_dsa = tmp_dsa;
DSA_free(new_dsa);
return 1;
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD
RSA_METHOD *
RSA_get_default_method(void)
{
return RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
}
#endif
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
void
ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void)

121
crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.26 2014/02/13 05:38:33 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.31 2014/08/29 18:18:29 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
@ -16,28 +16,19 @@
* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H
#define _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H
#include "includes.h"
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
/* Only in 0.9.8 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
# define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 16384
#endif
int ssh_compatible_openssl(long, long);
/* OPENSSL_free() is Free() in versions before OpenSSL 0.9.6 */
#if !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090600f)
# define OPENSSL_free(x) Free(x)
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00906000L
# define SSH_OLD_EVP
# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(e) ((e)->app_data)
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x0090805fL)
# error OpenSSL 0.9.8f or greater is required
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000001L
@ -46,27 +37,17 @@
# define LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE size_t
#endif
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L) || defined(OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES)
# define USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 16384
#endif
#ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
# include "rijndael.h"
# define AES_KEY rijndael_ctx
# define AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16
# define AES_encrypt(a, b, c) rijndael_encrypt(c, a, b)
# define AES_set_encrypt_key(a, b, c) rijndael_set_key(c, (char *)a, b, 1)
# define EVP_aes_128_cbc evp_rijndael
# define EVP_aes_192_cbc evp_rijndael
# define EVP_aes_256_cbc evp_rijndael
const EVP_CIPHER *evp_rijndael(void);
void ssh_rijndael_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
#ifndef OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
# define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
#define EVP_aes_128_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
#define EVP_aes_192_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
#define EVP_aes_256_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
# define EVP_aes_128_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
# define EVP_aes_192_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
# define EVP_aes_256_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_128_ctr(void);
void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, size_t);
#endif
@ -88,26 +69,9 @@ void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, size_t);
# endif
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
#define EVP_X_STATE(evp) &(evp).c
#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp) sizeof((evp).c)
#else
#define EVP_X_STATE(evp) (evp).cipher_data
#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp) (evp).cipher->ctx_size
#endif
/* OpenSSL 0.9.8e returns cipher key len not context key len */
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x0090805fL)
# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(c) ((c)->key_len)
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD
RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void);
#endif
/*
* We overload some of the OpenSSL crypto functions with ssh_* equivalents
* which cater for older and/or less featureful OpenSSL version.
* to automatically handle OpenSSL engine initialisation.
*
* In order for the compat library to call the real functions, it must
* define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS before including this file and
@ -115,19 +79,6 @@ RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void);
*/
#ifndef SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS
# ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
# ifdef EVP_Cipher
# undef EVP_Cipher
# endif
# define EVP_CipherInit(a,b,c,d,e) ssh_EVP_CipherInit((a),(b),(c),(d),(e))
# define EVP_Cipher(a,b,c,d) ssh_EVP_Cipher((a),(b),(c),(d))
# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(a) ssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup((a))
# endif /* SSH_OLD_EVP */
# ifdef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
# define EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c) ssh_EVP_DigestUpdate((a),(b),(c))
# endif
# ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
# ifdef OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms
# undef OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms
@ -135,48 +86,8 @@ RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void);
# define OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms()
# endif
# ifndef HAVE_BN_IS_PRIME_EX
int BN_is_prime_ex(const BIGNUM *, int, BN_CTX *, void *);
# endif
# ifndef HAVE_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX
int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *, int, const unsigned char *, int, int *,
unsigned long *, void *);
# endif
# ifndef HAVE_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX
int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *, int, BIGNUM *, void *);
# endif
# ifndef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX
int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *, const EVP_MD *, void *);
# endif
# ifndef HAVE_EVP_DISESTFINAL_EX
int EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *, unsigned char *, unsigned int *);
# endif
# ifndef EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX
int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *, const EVP_MD_CTX *);
# endif
int ssh_EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, const EVP_CIPHER *, unsigned char *,
unsigned char *, int);
int ssh_EVP_Cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, char *, char *, int);
int ssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
void ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void);
# ifndef HAVE_HMAC_CTX_INIT
# define HMAC_CTX_init(a)
# endif
# ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_INIT
# define EVP_MD_CTX_init(a)
# endif
# ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_CLEANUP
# define EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(a)
# endif
#endif /* SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS */
#endif /* _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H */

1
crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
View File

@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
#include "key.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
#include "servconf.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"

6
crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.4 2006/08/19 09:12:14 dtucker Exp $
# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.5 2014/06/17 13:06:08 dtucker Exp $
sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
piddir=@piddir@
@ -16,11 +16,11 @@ LIBS=@LIBS@
LDFLAGS=@LDFLAGS@ $(LIBCOMPAT)
TESTPROGS=closefromtest$(EXEEXT) snprintftest$(EXEEXT) strduptest$(EXEEXT) \
strtonumtest$(EXEEXT)
strtonumtest$(EXEEXT) opensslvertest$(EXEEXT)
all: t-exec ${OTHERTESTS}
%$(EXEEXT): %.c
%$(EXEEXT): %.c $(LIBCOMPAT)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< $(LIBCOMPAT) $(LIBS)
t-exec: $(TESTPROGS)

69
crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2014 Darren Tucker
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int ssh_compatible_openssl(long, long);
struct version_test {
long headerver;
long libver;
int result;
} version_tests[] = {
/* built with 0.9.8b release headers */
{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0090802fL, 1}, /* exact match */
{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0090804fL, 1}, /* newer library fix version: ok */
{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0090801fL, 1}, /* older library fix version: ok */
{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0090702fL, 0}, /* older library minor version: NO */
{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0090902fL, 0}, /* newer library minor version: NO */
{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0080802fL, 0}, /* older library major version: NO */
{ 0x0090802fL, 0x1000100fL, 0}, /* newer library major version: NO */
/* built with 1.0.1b release headers */
{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000101fL, 1},/* exact match */
{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000102fL, 1}, /* newer library patch version: ok */
{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000100fL, 1}, /* older library patch version: ok */
{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000201fL, 1}, /* newer library fix version: ok */
{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000001fL, 0}, /* older library fix version: NO */
{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1010101fL, 0}, /* newer library minor version: NO */
{ 0x1000101fL, 0x0000101fL, 0}, /* older library major version: NO */
{ 0x1000101fL, 0x2000101fL, 0}, /* newer library major version: NO */
};
void
fail(long hver, long lver, int result)
{
fprintf(stderr, "opensslver: header %lx library %lx != %d \n", hver, lver, result);
exit(1);
}
int
main(void)
{
unsigned int i;
int res;
long hver, lver;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(version_tests) / sizeof(version_tests[0]); i++) {
hver = version_tests[i].headerver;
lver = version_tests[i].libver;
res = version_tests[i].result;
if (ssh_compatible_openssl(hver, lver) != res)
fail(hver, lver, res);
}
exit(0);
}

4
crypto/openssh/opensshd.init.in
View File

@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ HOST_KEY_RSA1=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_key
HOST_KEY_DSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_dsa_key
HOST_KEY_RSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_rsa_key
@COMMENT_OUT_ECC@HOST_KEY_ECDSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
HOST_KEY_ED25519=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_ed25519_key
checkkeys() {
@ -36,6 +37,9 @@ checkkeys() {
@COMMENT_OUT_ECC@ if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_ECDSA ]; then
@COMMENT_OUT_ECC@ ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t ecdsa -f ${HOST_KEY_ECDSA} -N ""
@COMMENT_OUT_ECC@ fi
if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_ED25519 ]; then
${SSH_KEYGEN} -t ed25519 -f ${HOST_KEY_ED25519} -N ""
fi
}
stop_service() {

70
crypto/openssh/packet.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.192 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.198 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -67,7 +67,6 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "crc32.h"
#include "compress.h"
#include "deattack.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
@ -78,7 +77,9 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "log.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "roaming.h"
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
@ -223,6 +224,7 @@ void
packet_set_connection(int fd_in, int fd_out)
{
const Cipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
int r;
if (none == NULL)
fatal("packet_set_connection: cannot load cipher 'none'");
@ -230,10 +232,11 @@ packet_set_connection(int fd_in, int fd_out)
active_state = alloc_session_state();
active_state->connection_in = fd_in;
active_state->connection_out = fd_out;
cipher_init(&active_state->send_context, none, (const u_char *)"",
0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
cipher_init(&active_state->receive_context, none, (const u_char *)"",
0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT);
if ((r = cipher_init(&active_state->send_context, none,
(const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_init(&active_state->receive_context, none,
(const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0)
fatal("%s: cipher_init: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
if (!active_state->initialized) {
active_state->initialized = 1;
@ -330,13 +333,15 @@ void
packet_get_keyiv(int mode, u_char *iv, u_int len)
{
CipherContext *cc;
int r;
if (mode == MODE_OUT)
cc = &active_state->send_context;
else
cc = &active_state->receive_context;
cipher_get_keyiv(cc, iv, len);
if ((r = cipher_get_keyiv(cc, iv, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: cipher_get_keyiv: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
int
@ -382,13 +387,15 @@ void
packet_set_iv(int mode, u_char *dat)
{
CipherContext *cc;
int r;
if (mode == MODE_OUT)
cc = &active_state->send_context;
else
cc = &active_state->receive_context;
cipher_set_keyiv(cc, dat);
if ((r = cipher_set_keyiv(cc, dat)) != 0)
fatal("%s: cipher_set_keyiv: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
int
@ -553,6 +560,7 @@ void
packet_set_encryption_key(const u_char *key, u_int keylen, int number)
{
const Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_number(number);
int r;
if (cipher == NULL)
fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: unknown cipher number %d", number);
@ -562,10 +570,11 @@ packet_set_encryption_key(const u_char *key, u_int keylen, int number)
fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: keylen too big: %d", keylen);
memcpy(active_state->ssh1_key, key, keylen);
active_state->ssh1_keylen = keylen;
cipher_init(&active_state->send_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL,
0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
cipher_init(&active_state->receive_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL,
0, CIPHER_DECRYPT);
if ((r = cipher_init(&active_state->send_context, cipher,
key, keylen, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_init(&active_state->receive_context, cipher,
key, keylen, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0)
fatal("%s: cipher_init: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
u_int
@ -631,6 +640,7 @@ packet_put_raw(const void *buf, u_int len)
buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, len);
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
void
packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value)
{
@ -642,6 +652,7 @@ packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value)
{
buffer_put_bignum2(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value);
}
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
void
@ -743,7 +754,7 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
Comp *comp;
CipherContext *cc;
u_int64_t *max_blocks;
int crypt_type;
int r, crypt_type;
debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode);
@ -785,8 +796,9 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0 && mac_init(mac) == 0)
mac->enabled = 1;
DBG(debug("cipher_init_context: %d", mode));
cipher_init(cc, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len,
enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type);
if ((r = cipher_init(cc, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len,
enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: cipher_init: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */
/* explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->block_size);
explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len);
@ -913,8 +925,8 @@ packet_send2_wrapped(void)
roundup(active_state->extra_pad, block_size);
pad = active_state->extra_pad -
((len + padlen) % active_state->extra_pad);
debug3("packet_send2: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)",
pad, len, padlen, active_state->extra_pad);
DBG(debug3("%s: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)",
__func__, pad, len, padlen, active_state->extra_pad));
padlen += pad;
active_state->extra_pad = 0;
}
@ -1570,6 +1582,7 @@ packet_get_int64(void)
* must have been initialized before this call.
*/
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
void
packet_get_bignum(BIGNUM * value)
{
@ -1599,6 +1612,7 @@ packet_get_raw(u_int *length_ptr)
*length_ptr = bytes;
return buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet);
}
#endif
int
packet_remaining(void)
@ -1619,7 +1633,7 @@ packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr)
return buffer_get_string(&active_state->incoming_packet, length_ptr);
}
void *
const void *
packet_get_string_ptr(u_int *length_ptr)
{
return buffer_get_string_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet, length_ptr);
@ -2056,3 +2070,23 @@ packet_restore_state(void)
add_recv_bytes(len);
}
}
/* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */
void
packet_set_postauth(void)
{
Comp *comp;
int mode;
debug("%s: called", __func__);
/* This was set in net child, but is not visible in user child */
active_state->after_authentication = 1;
active_state->rekeying = 0;
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
continue;
comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
if (comp && comp->enabled)
packet_init_compression();
}
}

5
crypto/openssh/packet.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.59 2013/07/12 00:19:59 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.61 2014/05/03 17:20:34 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ void packet_get_ecpoint(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *);
void *packet_get_raw(u_int *length_ptr);
void *packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr);
char *packet_get_cstring(u_int *length_ptr);
void *packet_get_string_ptr(u_int *length_ptr);
const void *packet_get_string_ptr(u_int *length_ptr);
void packet_disconnect(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((noreturn)) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
void packet_send_debug(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ time_t packet_get_rekey_timeout(void);
void packet_backup_state(void);
void packet_restore_state(void);
void packet_set_postauth(void);
void *packet_get_input(void);
void *packet_get_output(void);

3
crypto/openssh/platform.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $Id: platform.c,v 1.21 2014/01/21 01:59:29 tim Exp $ */
/* $Id: platform.c,v 1.22 2014/07/18 04:11:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved.
@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include "log.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"

2
crypto/openssh/poly1305.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: poly1305.h,v 1.2 2013/12/19 22:57:13 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: poly1305.h,v 1.4 2014/05/02 03:27:54 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Public Domain poly1305 from Andrew Moon

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