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tcp_syncache: add net.inet.tcp.syncache.see_other sysctl

A security feature from c06f087ccb appeared to be a huge bottleneck
under SYN flood. To mitigate that add a sysctl that would make
syncache(4) globally visible, ignoring UID/GID, jail(2) and mac(4)
checks. When turned on, we won't need to call crhold() on the listening
socket credential for every incoming SYN packet.

Reviewed by:	bz
This commit is contained in:
Gleb Smirnoff 2021-03-19 00:22:36 -07:00
parent 34256484af
commit cb8d7c44d6
3 changed files with 36 additions and 4 deletions

View File

@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
.\"
.\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
.Dd January 22, 2008
.Dd April 12, 2021
.Dt SYNCACHE 4
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ MIBs for controlling TCP SYN caching
.Nm sysctl Cm net.inet.tcp.syncache.rexmtlimit
.It
.Nm sysctl Cm net.inet.tcp.syncache.count
.It
.Nm sysctl Cm net.inet.tcp.syncache.see_other
.El
.Sh DESCRIPTION
The
@ -150,6 +152,25 @@ Tunable via
Number of entries present in the
.Nm
(read-only).
.It Va see_other
If set to true value, all
.Nm
entries will be visible via
.Va net.inet.tcp.pcblist
sysctl, or via
.Xr netstat 1 ,
ignoring all of
.Xr security 7
UID/GID,
.Xr jail 2
and
.Xr mac 4
checks.
If turned off, the visibility checks are enforced.
However, extra
.Xr ucred 9
referencing is required on every incoming SYN packet processed.
The default is off.
.El
.Pp
Statistics on the performance of the
@ -192,9 +213,13 @@ Connections created from segment containing ACK.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr netstat 1 ,
.Xr jail 2 ,
.Xr mac ,
.Xr tcp 4 ,
.Xr security 7,
.Xr loader 8 ,
.Xr sysctl 8
.Xr sysctl 8 ,
.Xr ucred 9
.Sh HISTORY
The existing
.Nm

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@ -191,6 +191,11 @@ SYSCTL_UINT(_net_inet_tcp_syncache, OID_AUTO, hashsize, CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_R
&VNET_NAME(tcp_syncache.hashsize), 0,
"Size of TCP syncache hashtable");
SYSCTL_BOOL(_net_inet_tcp_syncache, OID_AUTO, see_other, CTLFLAG_VNET |
CTLFLAG_RW, &VNET_NAME(tcp_syncache.see_other), 0,
"All syncache(4) entries are visible, ignoring UID/GID, jail(2) "
"and mac(4) checks");
static int
sysctl_net_inet_tcp_syncache_rexmtlimit_check(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
@ -1409,7 +1414,7 @@ syncache_add(struct in_conninfo *inc, struct tcpopt *to, struct tcphdr *th,
*/
KASSERT(SOLISTENING(so), ("%s: %p not listening", __func__, so));
tp = sototcpcb(so);
cred = crhold(so->so_cred);
cred = V_tcp_syncache.see_other ? NULL : crhold(so->so_cred);
#ifdef INET6
if (inc->inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6) {
@ -2498,7 +2503,8 @@ syncache_pcblist(struct sysctl_req *req)
sch = &V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i];
SCH_LOCK(sch);
TAILQ_FOREACH(sc, &sch->sch_bucket, sc_hash) {
if (cr_cansee(req->td->td_ucred, sc->sc_cred) != 0)
if (sc->sc_cred != NULL &&
cr_cansee(req->td->td_ucred, sc->sc_cred) != 0)
continue;
if (sc->sc_inc.inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6)
xt.xt_inp.inp_vflag = INP_IPV6;

View File

@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ struct tcp_syncache {
time_t pause_until;
uint8_t pause_backoff;
volatile bool paused;
bool see_other;
};
/* Internal use for the syncookie functions. */