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Fix a couple of typos.

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Safe for 2.2.
This commit is contained in:
Stephen McKay 1997-01-04 16:12:06 +00:00
parent 639cfb9f88
commit e06d6c7b85
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00 
svn path=/head/; revision=21280
1 changed files with 5 additions and 5 deletions
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10
usr.sbin/rndcontrol/random.4
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@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
.\" ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
.\" OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
.\" $Id: random.4,v 1.1.1.1 1995/10/28 17:04:25 markm Exp $
.\" $Id: random.4,v 1.2 1996/08/23 00:56:35 mpp Exp $
.\"
.Dd October 21, 1995
.Dt RANDOM 4 i386
@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ This device gathers environmental noise from device drivers, etc.,
and returns good random numbers, suitable for cryptographic use.
Besides the obvious cryptographic uses, these numbers are also good
for seeding TCP sequence numbers, and other places where it is
desireable to have numbers which are not only random, but hard to
desirable to have numbers which are not only random, but hard to
predict by an attacker.
.Ss Theory of operation
Computers are very predictable devices. Hence it is extremely hard
@ -79,9 +79,9 @@ When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the MD5
hash of a counter plus the contents of the "entropy pool". The
reason for the MD5 hash is so that we can avoid exposing the
internal state of random number generator. Although the MD5 hash
does protect the pool, as each random byte which is generated from
does protect the pool, each random byte which is generated from
the pool reveals some information which was derived from the
internal state, and thus increasing the amount of information an
internal state, and thus increases the amount of information an
outside attacker has available to try to make some guesses about
the random number generator's internal state. For this reason,
the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many bits of
@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ scancode as random inputs into the "entropy pool".
The second function uses the inter-interrupt timing as random
inputs to the entropy pool. Note that not all interrupts are good
sources of randomness! For example, the timer interrupts is not a
good choice, because the periodicity of the interrupts is to
good choice, because the periodicity of the interrupts is too
regular, and hence predictable to an attacker. Disk interrupts are
a better measure, since the timing of the disk interrupts are more
unpredictable. The routines try to estimate how many bits of