PRISON_ROOT to the suser_xxx() check. Since securelevels may now
be raised in specific jails, use of system flags can still be
restricted in jail(), but in a more configurable way.
o Users of jail() expecting system flags (such as schg) to restrict
jail()'s should be sure to set the securelevel appropriately in
jail()'s.
o This fixes activities involving automated system flag removal in
jail(), including installkernel and friends.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
securelevel_gt(), determine first if a local securelevel exists --
if so, perform the check based on imax(local, global). Otherwise,
simply use the global value.
o Note: even though local securelevels might lag below the global one,
if the global value is updated to higher than local values, maximum
will still be used, making the global dominant even if there is local
lag.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
one is present in the current jail, otherwise, to return the global
securelevel.
o If the securelevel is being updated, require that it be greater than
the maximum of local and global, if a local securelevel exists,
otherwise, just maximum of the global. If there is a local
securelevel, update the local one instead of the global one.
o Note: this does allow local securelevels to lag behind the global one
as long as the local one is not updated following a global increase.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
a time change, and callers so that they provide td->td_proc.
o Modify settime() to use securevel_gt() for securelevel checking.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
in vn_rdwr_inchunks(), allowing other processes to gain an exclusive
lock on the vnode. Specifically: directory scanning, to avoid a race to the
root directory, and multiple child processes coring simultaniously so they
can figure out that some other core'ing child has an exclusive adv lock and
just exit instead.
This completely fixes performance problems when large programs core. You
can have hundreds of copies (forked children) of the same binary core all
at once and not notice.
MFC after: 3 days
We still have to account for a copyin. Make sure the copyin will
succeed by passing the FreeBSD syscall a pointer to userspace,
albeit one that's automagically mapped into kernel space.
Reported by: mr, Mitsuru IWASAKI <iwasaki@jp.FreeBSD.org>
Tested by: Mitsuru IWASAKI <iwasaki@jp.FreeBSD.org>
with weird PCI-PCI bridge configurations to work. Defining
PCI_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_IO_RANGE causes the sanity checks to pass even
with out of range values.
Reviewed by: msmith
for securelevel_ge() and securelevel_gt(), I was a little surprised,
but fixed it. Turns out that it was the code that was inverted, during
a whitespace cleanup in my commit tree. This commit inverts the
checks, and restores the comment.
This fixed the problem on the 3 platforms I've been able to test on.
I'm still of the oppinion that the BIOS should take care of this,
however some board makers only apply this when they spot a
SBLive! soundcard, but the problem exists even without a SBLive!.
This fix should probably go somewhere else, but for now I'll
keep it here since we havn't got a central place to put
such things.
problems currently experienced in -CURRENT.
This should fix the problem that the PS/2 mouse is detected
twice if the acpi module is not loaded on some systems.
refering to securelevels; also, update the unprivileged process text
to better indicate the scope of actions permittable when any system
flags are already set (limited).
Submitted by: Udo Schweigert <udo.schweigert@siemens.com>
sizeof(struct inode) into a new malloc bucket on the i386. This
didn't happen in -current due to the removal of i_lock, but it does
no harm to apply the workaround to -current first.
Reduce the size of the i_spare[] array in struct inode from 4 to
3 entries, and change ext2fs to use i_din.di_spare[1] so that it
does not need i_spare[3].
Reviewed by: bde
MFC after: 3 days
we're at least consistent with what tcsendbreak(3) is documented
to do.
MFC after: 2 weeks
Note, the MFC will be to sys/dev/dgb/dgm.c on the RELENG_4 branch
I am not sure if this is absolutely necessary on all systems. Yet,
there certainly are motherboards and notebook systems which require
this, although there are other systems which just don't. I hope we
shall know when to do this on which systems, as the development of our
ACPI subsystem progresses... (I know we didn't need this for the APM
resume.)
all the debugging code into the function versions of the mutex operations
in kern_mutex.c. This reduced the __mtx_* macros to simply wrappers of
the _{get,rel}_lock_* macros, so the __mtx_* macros were also abolished in
favor of just calling the _{get,rel}_lock_* macros. The tangled hairy mass
of macros calling macros is at least a bit more sane now.
* Don't get confused when memory regions don't lie on page boundaries -
remember our page size is typically larger than the firmware's page size.
* Add a function ia64_running_in_simulator() which is intended to detect
whether the kernel is running in SKI or on real hardware.
ppc to go into EPP mode. These 8 inputs are timestamped in polled
loop so their resolution will be nanoseconds but their granularity
will only be 1/hz.
selrecord() in ptcpoll(). The pre-KSE code used the passed in proc pointer
rather than curproc, and an earlier seltrue() call uses the passed in
thread and not curthread.
