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Commit Graph

89 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Mark Murray
fb919e4d5a Undo part of the tangle of having sys/lock.h and sys/mutex.h included in
other "system" header files.

Also help the deprecation of lockmgr.h by making it a sub-include of
sys/lock.h and removing sys/lockmgr.h form kernel .c files.

Sort sys/*.h includes where possible in affected files.

OK'ed by:	bde (with reservations)
2001-05-01 08:13:21 +00:00
Robert Watson
80c9c40df9 o Remove the disabled p_cansched() test cases that permitted users to
modify the scheduling properties of processes with a different real
  uid but the same effective uid (i.e., daemons, et al).  (note: these
  cases were previously commented out, so this does not change the
  compiled code at al)

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2001-04-27 01:56:32 +00:00
John Baldwin
33a9ed9d0e Change the pfind() and zpfind() functions to lock the process that they
find before releasing the allproc lock and returning.

Reviewed by:	-smp, dfr, jake
2001-04-24 00:51:53 +00:00
Robert Watson
5ea6583e2d o Remove comment indicating policy permits loop-back debugging, but
semantics don't: in practice, both policy and semantics permit
  loop-back debugging operations, only it's just a subset of debugging
  operations (i.e., a proc can open its own /dev/mem), and that's at a
  higher layer.
2001-04-21 22:41:45 +00:00
Alfred Perlstein
e04670b734 Add a sanity check on ucred refcount.
Submitted by: Terry Lambert <terry@lambert.org>
2001-04-17 20:50:43 +00:00
Robert Watson
e9e7ff5b22 o Since uid checks in p_cansignal() are now identical between P_SUGID
and non-P_SUGID cases, simplify p_cansignal() logic so that the
  P_SUGID masking of possible signals is independent from uid checks,
  removing redundant code and generally improving readability.

Reviewed by:	tmm
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2001-04-13 14:33:45 +00:00
Robert Watson
44c3e09cdc o Disallow two "allow this" exceptions in p_cansignal() restricting
the ability of unprivileged processes to deliver arbitrary signals
  to daemons temporarily taking on unprivileged effective credentials
  when P_SUGID is not set on the target process:
  Removed:
     (p1->p_cred->cr_ruid != ps->p_cred->cr_uid)
     (p1->p_ucred->cr_uid != ps->p_cred->cr_uid)
o Replace two "allow this" exceptions in p_cansignal() restricting
  the ability of unprivileged processes to deliver arbitrary signals
  to daemons temporarily taking on unprivileged effective credentials
  when P_SUGID is set on the target process:
  Replaced:
     (p1->p_cred->p_ruid != p2->p_ucred->cr_uid)
     (p1->p_cred->cr_uid != p2->p_ucred->cr_uid)
  With:
     (p1->p_cred->p_ruid != p2->p_ucred->p_svuid)
     (p1->p_ucred->cr_uid != p2->p_ucred->p_svuid)
o These changes have the effect of making the uid-based handling of
  both P_SUGID and non-P_SUGID signal delivery consistent, following
  these four general cases:
     p1's ruid equals p2's ruid
     p1's euid equals p2's ruid
     p1's ruid equals p2's svuid
     p1's euid equals p2's svuid
  The P_SUGID and non-P_SUGID cases can now be largely collapsed,
  and I'll commit this in a few days if no immediate problems are
  encountered with this set of changes.
o These changes remove a number of warning cases identified by the
  proc_to_proc inter-process authorization regression test.
o As these are new restrictions, we'll have to watch out carefully for
  possible side effects on running code: they seem reasonable to me,
  but it's possible this change might have to be backed out if problems
  are experienced.

Submitted by:		src/tools/regression/security/proc_to_proc/testuid
Reviewed by:		tmm
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2001-04-13 03:06:22 +00:00
Robert Watson
0489082737 o Disable two "allow this" exceptions in p_cansched()m retricting the
ability of unprivileged processes to modify the scheduling properties
  of daemons temporarily taking on unprivileged effective credentials.
  These cases (p1->p_cred->p_ruid == p2->p_ucred->cr_uid) and
  (p1->p_ucred->cr_uid == p2->p_ucred->cr_uid), respectively permitting
  a subject process to influence the scheduling of a daemon if the subject
  process has the same real uid or effective uid as the daemon's effective
  uid.  This removes a number of the warning cases identified by the
  proc_to_proc iner-process authorization regression test.
o As these are new restrictions, we'll have to watch out carefully for
  possible side effects on running code: they seem reasonable to me,
  but it's possible this change might have to be backed out if problems
  are experienced.

Reported by:	src/tools/regression/security/proc_to_proc/testuid
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2001-04-12 22:46:07 +00:00
Robert Watson
eb9e5c1d72 o Reduce information leakage into jails by adding invocations of
p_can(...P_CAN_SEE...) to getpgid(), getsid(), and setpgid(),
  blocking these operations on processes that should not be visible
  by the requesting process.  Required to reduce information leakage
  in MAC environments.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2001-04-12 19:39:00 +00:00
Robert Watson
4c5eb9c397 o Replace p_cankill() with p_cansignal(), remove wrappage of p_can()
from signal authorization checking.
o p_cansignal() takes three arguments: subject process, object process,
  and signal number, unlike p_cankill(), which only took into account
  the processes and not the signal number, improving the abstraction
  such that CANSIGNAL() from kern_sig.c can now also be eliminated;
  previously CANSIGNAL() special-cased the handling of SIGCONT based
  on process session.  privused is now deprecated.
o The new p_cansignal() further limits the set of signals that may
  be delivered to processes with P_SUGID set, and restructures the
  access control check to allow it to be extended more easily.
o These changes take into account work done by the OpenBSD Project,
  as well as by Robert Watson and Thomas Moestl on the TrustedBSD
  Project.

Obtained from:  TrustedBSD Project
2001-04-12 02:38:08 +00:00
Robert Watson
130d0157d1 o Introduce a new system call, __setsugid(), which allows a process to
toggle the P_SUGID bit explicitly, rather than relying on it being
  set implicitly by other protection and credential logic.  This feature
  is introduced to support inter-process authorization regression testing
  by simplifying userland credential management allowing the easy
  isolation and reproduction of authorization events with specific
  security contexts.  This feature is enabled only by "options REGRESSION"
  and is not intended to be used by applications.  While the feature is
  not known to introduce security vulnerabilities, it does allow
  processes to enter previously inaccessible parts of the credential
  state machine, and is therefore disabled by default.  It may not
  constitute a risk, and therefore in the future pending further analysis
  (and appropriate need) may become a published interface.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2001-04-11 20:20:40 +00:00
Robert Watson
f8e6ab29c2 o Restructure privilege check associated with process visibility for
ps_showallprocs such that if superuser is present to override process
  hiding, the search falls through [to success].  When additional
  restrictions are placed on process visibility, such as MAC, new clauses
  will be placed above the return(0).

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2001-03-29 22:59:44 +00:00
Robert Watson
ed6397209d o introduce u_cansee(), which performs access control checks between
two subject ucreds.  Unlike p_cansee(), u_cansee() doesn't have
  process lock requirements, only valid ucred reference requirements,
  so is prefered as process locking improves.  For now, back p_cansee()
  into u_cansee(), but eventually p_cansee() will go away.

Reviewed by:	jhb, tmm
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2001-03-28 20:50:15 +00:00
John Baldwin
bae3a80b16 Just use the proc lock to protect read accesses to p_pptr rather than the
more expensive proctree lock.
2001-03-24 04:00:01 +00:00
Robert Watson
91421ba234 o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject
credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison).
o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence.
o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and
  pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference
  management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code.
o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead
  of struct proc arguments.
o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed,
  rather than directly checking pointers all over the place.
o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function.
o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h.
o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the
  flag in the process flags field itself.
o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect
  mutex use.

Notes:

o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required.
o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs
  credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code.
o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is
  required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the
  structure.

Reviewed by:	freebsd-arch
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2001-02-21 06:39:57 +00:00
Robert Watson
661702ab20 o Fix spellign in a comment: s/referernce/reference/ 2001-02-14 06:53:57 +00:00
Bosko Milekic
9ed346bab0 Change and clean the mutex lock interface.
mtx_enter(lock, type) becomes:

mtx_lock(lock) for sleep locks (MTX_DEF-initialized locks)
mtx_lock_spin(lock) for spin locks (MTX_SPIN-initialized)

similarily, for releasing a lock, we now have:

mtx_unlock(lock) for MTX_DEF and mtx_unlock_spin(lock) for MTX_SPIN.
We change the caller interface for the two different types of locks
because the semantics are entirely different for each case, and this
makes it explicitly clear and, at the same time, it rids us of the
extra `type' argument.

The enter->lock and exit->unlock change has been made with the idea
that we're "locking data" and not "entering locked code" in mind.

Further, remove all additional "flags" previously passed to the
lock acquire/release routines with the exception of two:

MTX_QUIET and MTX_NOSWITCH

The functionality of these flags is preserved and they can be passed
to the lock/unlock routines by calling the corresponding wrappers:

mtx_{lock, unlock}_flags(lock, flag(s)) and
mtx_{lock, unlock}_spin_flags(lock, flag(s)) for MTX_DEF and MTX_SPIN
locks, respectively.

Re-inline some lock acq/rel code; in the sleep lock case, we only
inline the _obtain_lock()s in order to ensure that the inlined code
fits into a cache line. In the spin lock case, we inline recursion and
actually only perform a function call if we need to spin. This change
has been made with the idea that we generally tend to avoid spin locks
and that also the spin locks that we do have and are heavily used
(i.e. sched_lock) do recurse, and therefore in an effort to reduce
function call overhead for some architectures (such as alpha), we
inline recursion for this case.

Create a new malloc type for the witness code and retire from using
the M_DEV type. The new type is called M_WITNESS and is only declared
if WITNESS is enabled.

Begin cleaning up some machdep/mutex.h code - specifically updated the
"optimized" inlined code in alpha/mutex.h and wrote MTX_LOCK_SPIN
and MTX_UNLOCK_SPIN asm macros for the i386/mutex.h as we presently
need those.

Finally, caught up to the interface changes in all sys code.

Contributors: jake, jhb, jasone (in no particular order)
2001-02-09 06:11:45 +00:00
Jeroen Ruigrok van der Werven
2fa72ea7d4 Fix typo: compatability -> compatibility.
Compatability is not an existing english word.
2001-02-06 12:05:58 +00:00
Ben Smithurst
4c061a9da1 Fix getsid() to use "=" instead of "==".
Not objected to by:	audit
2001-01-13 22:49:59 +00:00
Jake Burkholder
98f03f9030 Protect proc.p_pptr and proc.p_children/p_sibling with the
proctree_lock.

linprocfs not locked pending response from informal maintainer.

Reviewed by:	jhb, -smp@
2000-12-23 19:43:10 +00:00
Alfred Perlstein
5c3f70d7c0 make crfree into a function rather than a macro to avoid bloat because of
the mutex aquire/release

reorder struct ucred
2000-11-30 19:09:48 +00:00
Alfred Perlstein
1e5d626ad9 ucred system overhaul:
1) mpsafe (protect the refcount with a mutex).
2) reduce duplicated code by removing the inlined crdup() from crcopy()
   and make crcopy() call crdup().
3) use M_ZERO flag when allocating initial structs instead of calling bzero
   after allocation.
4) expand the size of the refcount from a u_short to an u_int, by using
   shorts we might have an overflow.

Glanced at by: jake
2000-11-27 00:09:16 +00:00
Robert Watson
7f73938e96 o Fix a mis-transcription of sef's -STABLE protection fixes--only root
could debug processes after the commit that introduced the typo.
  Security is good, but security is not always the same as turning things
  off :-).

PR:		kern/22711
Obtained from:	brooks@one-eyed-alien.net
2000-11-10 23:57:48 +00:00
Robert Watson
c087a04f6a o Tighten up rules for which processes can't debug which other processes
in the p_candebug() function.  Synchronize with sef's CHECKIO()
  macro from the old procfs, which seems to be a good source of security
  checks.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2000-10-30 20:30:03 +00:00
Don Lewis
19c34d1596 Nuke a bit of dead code. 2000-10-29 01:00:36 +00:00
Andrew Gallatin
810bfc8ea1 unstaticize change_ruid() because it is needed by osf1_setuid() 2000-10-26 15:49:35 +00:00
Don Lewis
f535380cb6 Remove uidinfo hash table lookup and maintenance out of chgproccnt() and
chgsbsize(), which are called rather frequently and may be called from an
interrupt context in the case of chgsbsize().  Instead, do the hash table
lookup and maintenance when credentials are changed, which is a lot less
frequent.  Add pointers to the uidinfo structures to the ucred and pcred
structures for fast access.  Pass a pointer to the credential to chgproccnt()
and chgsbsize() instead of passing the uid.  Add a reference count to the
uidinfo structure and use it to decide when to free the structure rather
than freeing the structure when the resource consumption drops to zero.
Move the resource tracking code from kern_proc.c to kern_resource.c.  Move
some duplicate code sequences in kern_prot.c to separate helper functions.
Change KASSERTs in this code to unconditional tests and calls to panic().
2000-09-05 22:11:13 +00:00
Robert Watson
c52396e365 o p_cansee() wasn't setting privused when suser() was required to override
kern.ps_showallprocs.  Apparently got lost in the merge process from
  the capability patches.  Now fixed.

Submitted by:	jdp
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2000-08-31 15:55:17 +00:00
Robert Watson
387d2c036b o Centralize inter-process access control, introducing:
int p_can(p1, p2, operation, privused)

  which allows specification of subject process, object process,
  inter-process operation, and an optional call-by-reference privused
  flag, allowing the caller to determine if privilege was required
  for the call to succeed.  This allows jail, kern.ps_showallprocs and
  regular credential-based interaction checks to occur in one block of
  code.  Possible operations are P_CAN_SEE, P_CAN_SCHED, P_CAN_KILL,
  and P_CAN_DEBUG.  p_can currently breaks out as a wrapper to a
  series of static function checks in kern_prot, which should not
  be invoked directly.

o Commented out capabilities entries are included for some checks.

o Update most inter-process authorization to make use of p_can() instead
  of manual checks, PRISON_CHECK(), P_TRESPASS(), and
  kern.ps_showallprocs.

o Modify suser{,_xxx} to use const arguments, as it no longer modifies
  process flags due to the disabling of ASU.

o Modify some checks/errors in procfs so that ENOENT is returned instead
  of ESRCH, further improving concealment of processes that should not
  be visible to other processes.  Also introduce new access checks to
  improve hiding of processes for procfs_lookup(), procfs_getattr(),
  procfs_readdir().  Correct a bug reported by bp concerning not
  handling the CREATE case in procfs_lookup().  Remove volatile flag in
  procfs that caused apparently spurious qualifier warnigns (approved by
  bde).

o Add comment noting that ktrace() has not been updated, as its access
  control checks are different from ptrace(), whereas they should
  probably be the same.  Further discussion should happen on this topic.

Reviewed by:	bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others
Approved by:	bde
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2000-08-30 04:49:09 +00:00
Robert Watson
c6fac29aff o Disable flagging of ASU in suser_xxx() authorization check. For the
time being, the ASU accounting flag will no longer be available, but
  may be reinstituted in the future once authorization have been redone.
  As it is, the kernel went through contortions in access control to
  avoid calling suser, which always set the flag.  This will also allow
  suser to accept const struct *{cred, proc} arguments.

Reviewed by:	bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others
Approved by:	bde
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2000-08-30 04:35:32 +00:00
Alfred Perlstein
c636255150 fix races in the uidinfo subsystem, several problems existed:
1) while allocating a uidinfo struct malloc is called with M_WAITOK,
   it's possible that while asleep another process by the same user
   could have woken up earlier and inserted an entry into the uid
   hash table.  Having redundant entries causes inconsistancies that
   we can't handle.

   fix: do a non-waiting malloc, and if that fails then do a blocking
   malloc, after waking up check that no one else has inserted an entry
   for us already.

2) Because many checks for sbsize were done as "test then set" in a non
   atomic manner it was possible to exceed the limits put up via races.

   fix: instead of querying the count then setting, we just attempt to
   set the count and leave it up to the function to return success or
   failure.

3) The uidinfo code was inlining and repeating, lookups and insertions
   and deletions needed to be in their own functions for clarity.

Reviewed by: green
2000-06-22 22:27:16 +00:00
Robert Watson
579f4eb4cd o bde suggested moving the SYSCTL from kern_mib to the more appropriate
kern_prot, which cleans up some namespace issues
o Don't need a special handler to limit un-setting, as suser is used to
  protect suser_permitted, making it one-way by definition.

Suggested by:	bde
2000-06-05 18:30:55 +00:00
Robert Watson
0309554711 o Introduce kern.suser_permitted, a sysctl that disables the suser_xxx()
returning anything but EPERM.
o suser is enabled by default; once disabled, cannot be reenabled
o To be used in alternative security models where uid0 does not connote
  additional privileges
o Should be noted that uid0 still has some additional powers as it
  owns many important files and executables, so suffers from the same
  fundamental security flaws as securelevels.  This is fixed with
  MAC integrity protection code (in progress)
o Not safe for consumption unless you are *really* sure you don't want
  things like shutdown to work, et al :-)

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2000-06-05 14:53:55 +00:00
Peter Wemm
0e59fec6d8 Make issetugid return correctly. It was returning -1 with
errno == 1 if it was set?id!

Submitted by:	 Valentin Nechayev <netch@segfault.kiev.ua>
2000-05-09 00:58:34 +00:00
Matthew Dillon
7c8fdcbd19 Make the sigprocmask() and geteuid() system calls MP SAFE. Expand
commentary for copyin/copyout to indicate that they are MP SAFE as
    well.

Reviewed by: msmith
2000-04-02 17:52:43 +00:00
Matthew Dillon
36e9f877df Commit major SMP cleanups and move the BGL (big giant lock) in the
syscall path inward.  A system call may select whether it needs the MP
    lock or not (the default being that it does need it).

    A great deal of conditional SMP code for various deadended experiments
    has been removed.  'cil' and 'cml' have been removed entirely, and the
    locking around the cpl has been removed.  The conditional
    separately-locked fast-interrupt code has been removed, meaning that
    interrupts must hold the CPL now (but they pretty much had to anyway).
    Another reason for doing this is that the original separate-lock for
    interrupts just doesn't apply to the interrupt thread mechanism being
    contemplated.

    Modifications to the cpl may now ONLY occur while holding the MP
    lock.  For example, if an otherwise MP safe syscall needs to mess with
    the cpl, it must hold the MP lock for the duration and must (as usual)
    save/restore the cpl in a nested fashion.

    This is precursor work for the real meat coming later: avoiding having
    to hold the MP lock for common syscalls and I/O's and interrupt threads.
    It is expected that the spl mechanisms and new interrupt threading
    mechanisms will be able to run in tandem, allowing a slow piecemeal
    transition to occur.

    This patch should result in a moderate performance improvement due to
    the considerable amount of code that has been removed from the critical
    path, especially the simplification of the spl*() calls.  The real
    performance gains will come later.

Approved by: jkh
Reviewed by: current, bde (exception.s)
Some work taken from: luoqi's patch
2000-03-28 07:16:37 +00:00
Peter Wemm
8ccd633455 Implement setres[ug]id() and getres[ug]id(). This has been sitting in
my tree for ages (~2 years) waiting for an excuse to commit it.  Now Linux
has implemented it and it seems that Staroffice (when using the
linux_base6.1 port's libc) calls this in the linux emulator and dies in
setup.  The Linux emulator can call these now.
2000-01-16 16:34:26 +00:00
Sean Eric Fagan
893618352c Handle the case where we truss an SUGID program -- in particular, we need
to wake up any processes waiting via PIOCWAIT on process exit, and truss
needs to be more aware that a process may actually disappear while it's
waiting.

Reviewed by:	Paul Saab <ps@yahoo-inc.com>
2000-01-10 04:09:05 +00:00
Poul-Henning Kamp
b9effc8901 truss /usr/bin/su
login (or not if root)
	then exit the shell

truss will get stuct in tsleep

I dont know if this is correct, but it fixes the problem and
according to the commends in pioctl.h, PF_ISUGID is set when we
want to ignore UID changes.

The code is checking for when PF_ISUGID is not set and since it
never is set, we always ignore UID changes.

Submitted by:	Paul Saab <ps@yahoo-inc.com>
2000-01-03 14:26:47 +00:00
Poul-Henning Kamp
a9e0361b4a Introduce the new function
p_trespass(struct proc *p1, struct proc *p2)
which returns zero or an errno depending on the legality of p1 trespassing
on p2.

Replace kern_sig.c:CANSIGNAL() with call to p_trespass() and one
extra signal related check.

Replace procfs.h:CHECKIO() macros with calls to p_trespass().

Only show command lines to process which can trespass on the target
process.
1999-11-21 19:03:20 +00:00
Peter Wemm
d1f088dab5 Trim unused options (or #ifdef for undoc options).
Submitted by:	phk
1999-10-11 15:19:12 +00:00
Peter Wemm
c3aac50f28 $Id$ -> $FreeBSD$ 1999-08-28 01:08:13 +00:00
Poul-Henning Kamp
75c1354190 This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature.
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing.  The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.

For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact:  "real virtual servers".

Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.

Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.

It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.

A few notes:

   I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.

   The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.

   mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.

   /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
   jailed processes.

   Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.

   There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.

   Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)

If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!

Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.

Have fun...

Sponsored by:   http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by:       http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
Poul-Henning Kamp
1c308b817a Change suser_xxx() to suser() where it applies. 1999-04-27 12:21:16 +00:00
Poul-Henning Kamp
f711d546d2 Suser() simplification:
1:
  s/suser/suser_xxx/

2:
  Add new function: suser(struct proc *), prototyped in <sys/proc.h>.

3:
  s/suser_xxx(\([a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)->p_ucred, \&\1->p_acflag)/suser(\1)/

The remaining suser_xxx() calls will be scrutinized and dealt with
later.

There may be some unneeded #include <sys/cred.h>, but they are left
as an exercise for Bruce.

More changes to the suser() API will come along with the "jail" code.
1999-04-27 11:18:52 +00:00
Matthew Dillon
8aef171243 Fix warnings in preparation for adding -Wall -Wcast-qual to the
kernel compile
1999-01-28 00:57:57 +00:00
Don Lewis
65de0c7a93 getpgid() and getsid() were doing a comparision rather than an assignment,
which is fortunate, because otherwise another bug would allow them to be
used to stomp on the syscall return value of another process.
1998-12-13 07:07:51 +00:00
Peter Wemm
1c5bb3eaa1 add #include <sys/kernel.h> where it's needed by MALLOC_DEFINE() 1998-11-10 09:16:29 +00:00
Don Lewis
643a8daaaf If the session leader dies, s_leader is set to NULL and getsid() may
dereference a NULL pointer, causing a panic.  Instead of following
s_leader to find the session id, store it in the session structure.

Jukka found the following info:

	BTW - I just found what I have been looking for. Std 1003.1
	Part 1: SYSTEM API [C LANGUAGE] section 2.2.2.80 states quite
	explicitly...

	Session lifetime: The period between when a session is created
	and the end of lifetime of all the process groups that remain
	as members of the session.

	So, this quite clearly tells that while there is any single
	process in any process group which is a member of the session,
	the session remains as an independent entity.

Reviewed by:	peter
Submitted by:	"Jukka A. Ukkonen" <jau@jau.tmt.tele.fi>
1998-11-09 15:08:04 +00:00
Doug Rabson
10d4743f6f 64bit fixes: use size_t not u_int for sizes. 1998-06-10 10:28:29 +00:00