by Philippe Biondi and Arnaud Ebalard. This is a temporary fix
until more discussion can be had on the exact risks involved in
allowing source routing in IPv6
Submitted by: itojun
Reviewed by: jinmei
MFC after: 1 day
o make some variables parameters (frequency of crack, and maximum channel)
o try to spoof mac if association fails
Submitted by: Andrea Bittau <a.bittau@cs.ucl.ac.uk>
- Move FreeBSD-specific code to zfs_freebsd_*() functions in zfs_vnops.c
and keep original functions as similar to vendor's code as possible.
- Add various includes back, now that we have them.
once (CWD a/b/c vs. 3 CWDs). If an error occurs, we fall back to the default
method of a single CWD per directory element. Since this is technically
a violation of the basic FTP RFC, this behavior is under a compile-time
option FTP_COMBINE_CWDS and is off by default. It should work with most
Unix-based FTP daemons and can save latency.
MFC after: 2 weeks
macro, as za_first_integer field also contains type. This should be fixed in
ZFS itself, but this bug is not visible on Solaris, because there, type is
not stored in za_first_integer. On the other hand it will be visible on
MacOS X.
Reported by: Barry Pederson <bp@barryp.org>
'zfs mount -a' from the main system - this is by design, as mountpoint
may be set to dangerous value. This all means, that such file system
has to be mounted from within a jail. To make it easier, reorganize
rc.d/zfs script so it can be used from within a jail.
variable name conventions for arguments passed into the framework --
for example, name network interfaces 'ifp', sockets 'so', mounts 'mp',
mbufs 'm', processes 'p', etc, wherever possible. Previously there
was significant variation in this regard.
Normalize copyright lists to ranges where sensible.
labels: the mount label (label of the mountpoint) and the fs label (label
of the file system). In practice, policies appear to only ever use one,
and the distinction is not helpful.
Combine mnt_mntlabel and mnt_fslabel into a single mnt_label, and
eliminate extra machinery required to maintain the additional label.
Update policies to reflect removal of extra entry points and label.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
the introduction of priv(9) and MAC Framework entry points for privilege
checking/granting. These entry points exactly aligned with privileges and
provided no additional security context:
- mac_check_sysarch_ioperm()
- mac_check_kld_unload()
- mac_check_settime()
- mac_check_system_nfsd()
Add mpo_priv_check() implementations to Biba and LOMAC policies, which,
for each privilege, determine if they can be granted to processes
considered unprivileged by those two policies. These mostly, but not
entirely, align with the set of privileges granted in jails.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
- The '-c' option now takes a comma-separated list of CPU
numbers, or a literal '*' denoting all CPUs in the system.
Subsequent system PMCs are allocated on the CPUs so specified.
Change the default behaviour to allocate system PMCs on all CPUs,
not just CPU 0.
Update the manual page and add an example of how to use the new
functionality.
- Attach PMCs to a (commandline) child process more reliably. This
fixes a long standing bug in counting events incurred by short-lived
processes.
- Redistribute counter declarations to where they are used, rather than at
the file header, so it's more clear where we do (and don't) have
counters.
- Add many more counters, one per policy entry point, so that many
individual access controls and object life cycle events are tracked.
- Perform counter increments for label destruction explicitly in entry
point functions rather than in LABEL_DESTROY().
- Use LABEL_INIT() instead of SLOT_SET() directly in label init functions
to be symmetric with destruction.
- Align counter names more carefully with entry point names.
- More constant and variable name normalization.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
- Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy.
- Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage
various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy
quite a bit.
- Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels.
Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and
doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels
will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional
credentials, NULL-checks are still required.
- Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label
validation and tear-down.
- Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels.
- Normalize the names of counters, magic values.
- Remove unused policy "enabled" flag.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
set/clear it but would not do it. Now we will.
- Moved to latest socket api for extended sndrcv info struct.
- Moved to support all new levels of fragment interleave.
Not really sure how to handle committers who no longer have a ports
commit bit but are still active in other repos. Maybe a new node
definition? *shrug*
vs 4), supress all unused partition output unless -v is specified.
This makes operating on a 'typical' disk with one partition less
painful. The 30 lines needed for the empty partitions no longer
scroll the useful information off the screen. When the user requests
a specific partition, the unused information is not suppressed.
Also add the partition name to the -s output.
Initialize the partition name to 'FreeBSD' when -I is specified.
calls. Add MAC Framework entry points and MAC policy entry points for
audit(), auditctl(), auditon(), setaudit(), aud setauid().
MAC Framework entry points are only added for audit system calls where
additional argument context may be useful for policy decision-making; other
audit system calls without arguments may be controlled via the priv(9)
entry points.
Update various policy modules to implement audit-related checks, and in
some cases, other missing system-related checks.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
- Replace PRIV_NFSD with PRIV_NFS_DAEMON, add PRIV_NFS_LOCKD.
- Use PRIV_NFS_DAEMON in the NFS server.
- In the NFS client, move the privilege check from nfslockdans(), which
occurs every time a write is performed on /dev/nfslock, and instead do it
in nfslock_open() just once. This allows us to avoid checking the saved
uid for root, and just use the effective on open. Use PRIV_NFS_LOCKD.
Before the change the command above:
# zfs set sharenfs=freefall.freebsd.org,69.147.83.54 tank/foo
was translated to:
/tank/foo -freefall.freebsd.org -69.147.83.54
instead of:
/tank/foo freefall.freebsd.org 69.147.83.54
This commit corrects this.
@118370 Correct typo.
@118371 Integrate changes from vendor.
@118491 Show backtrace on unexpected code paths.
@118494 Integrate changes from vendor.
@118504 Fix sendfile(2). I had two ways of fixing it:
1. Fixing sendfile(2) itself to use VOP_GETPAGES() instead of
hacking around with vn_rdwr(UIO_NOCOPY), which was suggested
by ups.
2. Modify ZFS behaviour to handle this special case.
Although 1 is more correct, I've choosen 2, because hack from 1
have a side-effect of beeing faster - it reads ahead MAXBSIZE
bytes instead of reading page by page. This is not easy to implement
with VOP_GETPAGES(), at least not for me in this very moment.
Reported by: Andrey V. Elsukov <bu7cher@yandex.ru>
@118525 Reorganize the code to reduce diff.
@118526 This code path is expected. It is simply when file is opened with
O_FSYNC flag.
Reported by: kris
Reported by: Michal Suszko <dry@dry.pl>
