entry point, which is no longer required now that we don't support
old-style multicast tunnels. This removes the last mbuf object class
entry point that isn't init/copy/destroy.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Framework by moving from mac_mbuf_create_netlayer() to more specific
entry points for specific network services:
- mac_netinet_firewall_reply() to be used when replying to in-bound TCP
segments in pf and ipfw (etc).
- Rename mac_netinet_icmp_reply() to mac_netinet_icmp_replyinplace() and
add mac_netinet_icmp_reply(), reflecting that in some cases we overwrite
a label in place, but in others we apply the label to a new mbuf.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
in the TrustedBSD MAC Framework:
- Add mac_atalk.c and add explicit entry point mac_netatalk_aarp_send()
for AARP packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer
entry point.
- Add mac_inet6.c and add explicit entry point mac_netinet6_nd6_send()
for ND6 packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer entry
point.
- Add expliict entry point mac_netinet_arp_send() for ARP packet
labeling, and mac_netinet_igmp_send() for IGMP packet labeling,
rather than using a generic link layer entry point.
- Remove previous genering link layer entry point,
mac_mbuf_create_linklayer() as it is no longer used.
- Add implementations of new entry points to various policies, largely
by replicating the existing link layer entry point for them; remove
old link layer entry point implementation.
- Make MAC_IFNET_LOCK(), MAC_IFNET_UNLOCK(), and mac_ifnet_mtx global
to the MAC Framework rather than static to mac_net.c as it is now
needed outside of mac_net.c.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
we move towards netinet as a pseudo-object for the MAC Framework.
Rename 'mac_create_mbuf_linklayer' to 'mac_mbuf_create_linklayer' to
reflect general object-first ordering preference.
Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
from mac_vfs.c to mac_process.c to join other functions that setup up
process labels for specific purposes. Unlike the two proc create calls,
this call is intended to run after creation when a process registers as
the NFS daemon, so remains an _associate_ call..
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code
a bit easier to read.
When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather
than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making
the code a little easier to read.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to
the following general forms:
mac_<object>_<method/action>
mac_<object>_check_<method/action>
The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly
reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more
consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain
multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical
parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for
certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly,
some entry point names.
All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules
not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to
conform to the new KPI.
Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
point to mac_check_vnode_unlink(), reflecting UNIX naming conventions.
This is the first of several commits to synchronize the MAC Framework
in FreeBSD 7.0 with the MAC Framework as it will appear in Mac OS X
Leopard.
Reveiwed by: csjp, Samy Bahra <sbahra at gwu dot edu>
Submitted by: Jacques Vidrine <nectar at apple dot com>
Obtained from: Apple Computer, Inc.
Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR
Approved by: re (bmah)
where similar data structures exist to support devfs and the MAC
Framework, but are named differently.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
labels: the mount label (label of the mountpoint) and the fs label (label
of the file system). In practice, policies appear to only ever use one,
and the distinction is not helpful.
Combine mnt_mntlabel and mnt_fslabel into a single mnt_label, and
eliminate extra machinery required to maintain the additional label.
Update policies to reflect removal of extra entry points and label.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
the introduction of priv(9) and MAC Framework entry points for privilege
checking/granting. These entry points exactly aligned with privileges and
provided no additional security context:
- mac_check_sysarch_ioperm()
- mac_check_kld_unload()
- mac_check_settime()
- mac_check_system_nfsd()
Add mpo_priv_check() implementations to Biba and LOMAC policies, which,
for each privilege, determine if they can be granted to processes
considered unprivileged by those two policies. These mostly, but not
entirely, align with the set of privileges granted in jails.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
calls. Add MAC Framework entry points and MAC policy entry points for
audit(), auditctl(), auditon(), setaudit(), aud setauid().
MAC Framework entry points are only added for audit system calls where
additional argument context may be useful for policy decision-making; other
audit system calls without arguments may be controlled via the priv(9)
entry points.
Update various policy modules to implement audit-related checks, and in
some cases, other missing system-related checks.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
it isn't used in the access control decision. This became visible to
Coverity with the change to a function call retrieving label values.
Coverity CID: 1723
LABEL_TO_SLOT() macro used by policy modules to query and set label data
in struct label. Instead of using a union, store an intptr_t, simplifying
the API.
Update policies: in most cases this required only small tweaks to current
wrapper macros. In two cases, a single wrapper macros had to be split into
separate get and set macros.
Move struct label definition from _label.h to mac_internal.h and remove
_label.h. With this change, policies may now treat struct label * as
opaque, allowing us to change the layout of struct label without breaking
the policy module ABI. For example, we could make the maximum number of
policies with labels modifiable at boot-time rather than just at
compile-time.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Don't perform a nested include of _label.h in mac.h, as mac.h now
describes only the user API to MAC, and _label.h defines the in-kernel
representation of MAC labels.
Remove mac.h includes from policies and MAC framework components that do
not use userspace MAC API definitions.
Add _KERNEL inclusion checks to mac_internal.h and mac_policy.h, as these
are kernel-only include files
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Framework and security modules, to src/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h,
completing the removal of kernel-only MAC Framework include files from
src/sys/sys. Update the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules. Delete
the old mac_policy.h.
Third party policy modules will need similar updating.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
exists to allow the mandatory access control policy to properly initialize
mbufs generated by the firewall. An example where this might happen is keep
alive packets, or ICMP error packets in response to other packets.
This takes care of kernel panics associated with un-initialize mbuf labels
when the firewall generates packets.
[1] I modified this patch from it's original version, the initial patch
introduced a number of entry points which were programmatically
equivalent. So I introduced only one. Instead, we should leverage
mac_create_mbuf_netlayer() which is used for similar situations,
an example being icmp_error()
This will minimize the impact associated with the MFC
Submitted by: mlaier [1]
MFC after: 1 week
This is a RELENG_6 candidate
we will initialize the label to biba/low for files that have been created
through an NFS RPC. This is a safe default given the default nature of our
NFS implementation, there is not a whole lot of data integrity there by
default. This also fixes kernel panics associated with file creation over NFS
while creating files on filesystems which have multilabel enabled with BIBA
enabled.
MFC after: 2 weeks
Discussed with: rwatson
security.mac.biba.interfaces_equal
If non-zero, all network interfaces be created with the label:
biba/equal(equal-equal)
This is useful where programs which initialize network interfaces
do not have any labeling support. This includes dhclient and ppp. A
long term solution is to add labeling support into dhclient(8)
and ppp(8), and remove this variable.
It should be noted that this behavior is different then setting the:
security.mac.biba.trust_all_interfaces
sysctl variable, as this will create interfaces with a biba/high label.
Lower integrity processes are not able to write to the interface in this
event. The security.mac.biba.interfaces_equal will override
trust_all_interfaces.
The security.mac.biba.interfaces_equal variable will be set to zero
or disabled by default.
MFC after: 2 weeks
provided access to the root file system before the start of the
init process. This was used briefly by SEBSD before it knew about
preloading data in the loader, and using that method to gain
access to data earlier results in fewer inconsistencies in the
approach. Policy modules still have access to the root file system
creation event through the mac_create_mount() entry point.
Removed now, and will be removed from RELENG_6, in order to gain
third party policy dependencies on the entry point for the lifetime
of the 6.x branch.
MFC after: 3 days
Submitted by: Chris Vance <Christopher dot Vance at SPARTA dot com>
Sponsored by: SPARTA
process that caused the clone event to take place for the device driver
creating the device. This allows cloned device drivers to adapt the
device node based on security aspects of the process, such as the uid,
gid, and MAC label.
- Add a cred reference to struct cdev, so that when a device node is
instantiated as a vnode, the cloning credential can be exposed to
MAC.
- Add make_dev_cred(), a version of make_dev() that additionally
accepts the credential to stick in the struct cdev. Implement it and
make_dev() in terms of a back-end make_dev_credv().
- Add a new event handler, dev_clone_cred, which can be registered to
receive the credential instead of dev_clone, if desired.
- Modify the MAC entry point mac_create_devfs_device() to accept an
optional credential pointer (may be NULL), so that MAC policies can
inspect and act on the label or other elements of the credential
when initializing the skeleton device protections.
- Modify tty_pty.c to register clone_dev_cred and invoke make_dev_cred(),
so that the pty clone credential is exposed to the MAC Framework.
While currently primarily focussed on MAC policies, this change is also
a prerequisite for changes to allow ptys to be instantiated with the UID
of the process looking up the pty. This requires further changes to the
pty driver -- in particular, to immediately recycle pty nodes on last
close so that the credential-related state can be recreated on next
lookup.
Submitted by: Andrew Reisse <andrew.reisse@sparta.com>
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
MFC after: 1 week
MFC note: Merge to 6.x, but not 5.x for ABI reasons
redundant with respect to existing mbuf copy label routines. Expose
a new mac_copy_mbuf() routine at the top end of the Framework and
use that; use the existing mpo_copy_mbuf_label() routine on the
bottom end.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR
Approved by: re (scottl)
points to convert _sema() to _sem() for consistency purposes with
respect to the other semaphore-related entry points:
mac_init_sysv_sema() -> mac_init_sysv_sem()
mac_destroy_sysv_sem() -> mac_destroy_sysv_sem()
mac_create_sysv_sema() -> mac_create_sysv_sem()
mac_cleanup_sysv_sema() -> mac_cleanup_sysv_sem()
Congruent changes are made to the policy interface to support this.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
access to POSIX Semaphores:
mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore
mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore
mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore
mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed
mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried
mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened
mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to
mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked
mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore
Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points.
For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively
read/write.
Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net>
Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MAP_SHARED so that the entry point gets executed un-conditionally.
This may be useful for security policies which want to perform access
control checks around run-time linking.
-add the mmap(2) flags argument to the check_vnode_mmap entry point
so that we can make access control decisions based on the type of
mapped object.
-update any dependent API around this parameter addition such as
function prototype modifications, entry point parameter additions
and the inclusion of sys/mman.h header file.
-Change the MLS, BIBA and LOMAC security policies so that subject
domination routines are not executed unless the type of mapping is
shared. This is done to maintain compatibility between the old
vm_mmap_vnode(9) and these policies.
Reviewed by: rwatson
MFC after: 1 month
accurately represents the intention of the 'single' label element in
Biba and MLS labels. It also approximates the use of 'effective' in
traditional UNIX credentials, and avoids confusion with 'singlelabel'
in the context of file systems.
Inspired by: trhodes
network interfaces. This global mutex will protect all ifnet labels.
Acquire the mutex across various MAC activities on interfaces, such
as security checks, propagating interface labels to mbufs generated
from the interface, retrieving and setting the interface label.
Introduce mpo_copy_ifnet_label MAC policy entry point to copy the
value of an interface label from one label to another. Use this
to avoid performing a label externalize while holding mac_ifnet_mtx;
copy the label to a temporary ifnet label and then externalize that.
Implement mpo_copy_ifnet_label for various MAC policies that
implement interface labeling using generic label copying routines.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee Research
Now I believe it is done in the right way.
Removed some XXMAC cases, we now assume 'high' integrity level for all
sysctls, except those with CTLFLAG_ANYBODY flag set. No more magic.
Reviewed by: rwatson
Approved by: rwatson, scottl (mentor)
Tested with: LINT (compilation), mac_biba(4) (functionality)
to use the "year1-year3" format, as opposed to "year1, year2, year3".
This seems to make lawyers more happy, but also prevents the
lines from getting excessively long as the years start to add up.
Suggested by: imp
would allocate two 'struct pipe's from the pipe zone, and malloc a
mutex.
- Create a new "struct pipepair" object holding the two 'struct
pipe' instances, struct mutex, and struct label reference. Pipe
structures now have a back-pointer to the pipe pair, and a
'pipe_present' flag to indicate whether the half has been
closed.
- Perform mutex init/destroy in zone init/destroy, avoiding
reallocating the mutex for each pipe. Perform most pipe structure
setup in zone constructor.
- VM memory mappings for pageable buffers are still done outside of
the UMA zone.
- Change MAC API to speak 'struct pipepair' instead of 'struct pipe',
update many policies. MAC labels are also handled outside of the
UMA zone for now. Label-only policy modules don't have to be
recompiled, but if a module is recompiled, its pipe entry points
will need to be updated. If a module actually reached into the
pipe structures (unlikely), that would also need to be modified.
These changes substantially simplify failure handling in the pipe
code as there are many fewer possible failure modes.
On half-close, pipes no longer free the 'struct pipe' for the closed
half until a full-close takes place. However, VM mapped buffers
are still released on half-close.
Some code refactoring is now possible to clean up some of the back
references, etc; this patch attempts not to change the structure
of most of the pipe implementation, only allocation/free code
paths, so as to avoid introducing bugs (hopefully).
This cuts about 8%-9% off the cost of sequential pipe allocation
and free in system call tests on UP and SMP in my micro-benchmarks.
May or may not make a difference in macro-benchmarks, but doing
less work is good.
Reviewed by: juli, tjr
Testing help: dwhite, fenestro, scottl, et al
wait, rather than the socket label. This avoids reaching up to
the socket layer during connection close, which requires locking
changes. To do this, introduce MAC Framework entry point
mac_create_mbuf_from_inpcb(), which is called from tcp_twrespond()
instead of calling mac_create_mbuf_from_socket() or
mac_create_mbuf_netlayer(). Introduce MAC Policy entry point
mpo_create_mbuf_from_inpcb(), and implementations for various
policies, which generally just copy label data from the inpcb to
the mbuf. Assert the inpcb lock in the entry point since we
require consistency for the inpcb label reference.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
and the mpo_create_cred() MAC policy entry point to
mpo_copy_cred_label(). This is more consistent with similar entry
points for creation and label copying, as mac_create_cred() was
called from crdup() as opposed to during process creation. For
a number of policies, this removes the requirement for special
handling when copying credential labels, and improves consistency.
Approved by: re (scottl)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
the MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and
IPv6-based protocols. This permits MAC labels to be checked during
network delivery operations without dereferencing inp->inp_socket
to get to so->so_label, which will eventually avoid our having to
grab the socket lock during delivery at the network layer.
This change introduces 'struct inpcb' as a labeled object to the
MAC Framework, along with the normal circus of entry points:
initialization, creation from socket, destruction, as well as a
delivery access control check.
For most policies, the inpcb label will simply be a cache of the
socket label, so a new protocol switch method is introduced,
pr_sosetlabel() to notify protocols that the socket layer label
has been updated so that the cache can be updated while holding
appropriate locks. Most protocols implement this using
pru_sosetlabel_null(), but IPv4/IPv6 protocols using inpcbs use
the the worker function in_pcbsosetlabel(), which calls into the
MAC Framework to perform a cache update.
Biba, LOMAC, and MLS implement these entry points, as do the stub
policy, and test policy.
Reviewed by: sam, bms
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
system calls, and prefer these calls over getsockopt()/setsockopt()
for ABI reasons. When addressing UNIX domain sockets, these calls
retrieve and modify the socket label, not the label of the
rendezvous vnode.
- Create mac_copy_socket_label() entry point based on
mac_copy_pipe_label() entry point, intended to copy the socket
label into temporary storage that doesn't require a socket lock
to be held (currently Giant).
- Implement mac_copy_socket_label() for various policies.
- Expose socket label allocation, free, internalize, externalize
entry points as non-static from mac_net.c.
- Use mac_socket_label_set() in __mac_set_fd().
MAC-aware applications may now use mac_get_fd(), mac_set_fd(), and
mac_get_peer() to retrieve and set various socket labels without
directly invoking the getsockopt() interface.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
