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a2c0d2026f
Prevent a potentially sufficiently smart compiler from optimising away our attempts to clear sensitive buffers. A related change was discussed and rejected in D16059, but I don't believe the reasoning there applies: the code clearly documents its intent that the `memset` calls clear sensitive buffers so they don't hang around. `explicit_bzero` is the appropriate function for this purpose. A potential performance disadvantage seems less important: the functions in crypt are specifically designed to be slow, so a few extra calls to guarantee that sensitive buffers are cleared does not significantly affect runtime. See also: D16059 Reviewed by: delphij, kevans MFC after: 1 week Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D47037
148 lines
4.4 KiB
C
148 lines
4.4 KiB
C
/*-
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2003 Poul-Henning Kamp
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <err.h>
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#include <md5.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <strings.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include "crypt.h"
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/*
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* UNIX password
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*/
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int
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crypt_md5(const char *pw, const char *salt, char *buffer)
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{
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MD5_CTX ctx,ctx1;
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unsigned long l;
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int sl, pl;
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u_int i;
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u_char final[MD5_SIZE];
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const char *ep;
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static const char *magic = "$1$";
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/* If the salt starts with the magic string, skip that. */
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if (!strncmp(salt, magic, strlen(magic)))
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salt += strlen(magic);
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/* It stops at the first '$', max 8 chars */
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for (ep = salt; *ep && *ep != '$' && ep < salt + 8; ep++)
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continue;
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/* get the length of the true salt */
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sl = ep - salt;
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MD5Init(&ctx);
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/* The password first, since that is what is most unknown */
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MD5Update(&ctx, (const u_char *)pw, strlen(pw));
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/* Then our magic string */
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MD5Update(&ctx, (const u_char *)magic, strlen(magic));
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/* Then the raw salt */
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MD5Update(&ctx, (const u_char *)salt, (u_int)sl);
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/* Then just as many characters of the MD5(pw,salt,pw) */
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MD5Init(&ctx1);
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MD5Update(&ctx1, (const u_char *)pw, strlen(pw));
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MD5Update(&ctx1, (const u_char *)salt, (u_int)sl);
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MD5Update(&ctx1, (const u_char *)pw, strlen(pw));
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MD5Final(final, &ctx1);
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for(pl = (int)strlen(pw); pl > 0; pl -= MD5_SIZE)
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MD5Update(&ctx, (const u_char *)final,
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(u_int)(pl > MD5_SIZE ? MD5_SIZE : pl));
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/* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */
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explicit_bzero(final, sizeof(final));
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/* Then something really weird... */
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for (i = strlen(pw); i; i >>= 1)
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if(i & 1)
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MD5Update(&ctx, (const u_char *)final, 1);
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else
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MD5Update(&ctx, (const u_char *)pw, 1);
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/* Now make the output string */
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buffer = stpcpy(buffer, magic);
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buffer = stpncpy(buffer, salt, (u_int)sl);
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*buffer++ = '$';
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MD5Final(final, &ctx);
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/*
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* and now, just to make sure things don't run too fast
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* On a 60 Mhz Pentium this takes 34 msec, so you would
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* need 30 seconds to build a 1000 entry dictionary...
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*/
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for(i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
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MD5Init(&ctx1);
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if(i & 1)
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MD5Update(&ctx1, (const u_char *)pw, strlen(pw));
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else
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MD5Update(&ctx1, (const u_char *)final, MD5_SIZE);
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if(i % 3)
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MD5Update(&ctx1, (const u_char *)salt, (u_int)sl);
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if(i % 7)
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MD5Update(&ctx1, (const u_char *)pw, strlen(pw));
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if(i & 1)
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MD5Update(&ctx1, (const u_char *)final, MD5_SIZE);
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else
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MD5Update(&ctx1, (const u_char *)pw, strlen(pw));
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MD5Final(final, &ctx1);
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}
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l = (final[ 0]<<16) | (final[ 6]<<8) | final[12];
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_crypt_to64(buffer, l, 4); buffer += 4;
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l = (final[ 1]<<16) | (final[ 7]<<8) | final[13];
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_crypt_to64(buffer, l, 4); buffer += 4;
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l = (final[ 2]<<16) | (final[ 8]<<8) | final[14];
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_crypt_to64(buffer, l, 4); buffer += 4;
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l = (final[ 3]<<16) | (final[ 9]<<8) | final[15];
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_crypt_to64(buffer, l, 4); buffer += 4;
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l = (final[ 4]<<16) | (final[10]<<8) | final[ 5];
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_crypt_to64(buffer, l, 4); buffer += 4;
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l = final[11];
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_crypt_to64(buffer, l, 2); buffer += 2;
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*buffer = '\0';
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/* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */
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explicit_bzero(final, sizeof(final));
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return (0);
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}
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