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freebsd/sys/dev/random/yarrow.c
Allan Jude 7a3f5d11fb Replace sys/crypto/sha2/sha2.c with lib/libmd/sha512c.c
cperciva's libmd implementation is 5-30% faster

The same was done for SHA256 previously in r263218

cperciva's implementation was lacking SHA-384 which I implemented, validated against OpenSSL and the NIST documentation

Extend sbin/md5 to create sha384(1)

Chase dependancies on sys/crypto/sha2/sha2.{c,h} and replace them with sha512{c.c,.h}

Reviewed by:	cperciva, des, delphij
Approved by:	secteam, bapt (mentor)
MFC after:	2 weeks
Sponsored by:	ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D3929
2015-12-27 17:33:59 +00:00

396 lines
14 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 2000-2015 Mark R V Murray
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
* in this position and unchanged.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#ifdef _KERNEL
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/random.h>
#include <sys/sdt.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <machine/cpu.h>
#include <crypto/rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.h>
#include <crypto/sha2/sha256.h>
#include <dev/random/hash.h>
#include <dev/random/randomdev.h>
#include <dev/random/random_harvestq.h>
#include <dev/random/uint128.h>
#include <dev/random/yarrow.h>
#else /* !_KERNEL */
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <threads.h>
#include "unit_test.h"
#include <crypto/rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.h>
#include <crypto/sha2/sha256.h>
#include <dev/random/hash.h>
#include <dev/random/randomdev.h>
#include <dev/random/uint128.h>
#include <dev/random/yarrow.h>
#endif /* _KERNEL */
#define RANDOM_YARROW_TIMEBIN 16 /* max value for Pt/t */
#define RANDOM_YARROW_FAST 0
#define RANDOM_YARROW_SLOW 1
#define RANDOM_YARROW_NPOOLS 2
/* This algorithm (and code) presumes that RANDOM_KEYSIZE is twice as large as RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE */
CTASSERT(RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE == sizeof(uint128_t));
CTASSERT(RANDOM_KEYSIZE == 2*RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE);
/* Probes for dtrace(1) */
SDT_PROVIDER_DECLARE(random);
SDT_PROVIDER_DEFINE(random);
SDT_PROBE_DEFINE3(random, yarrow, event_processor, debug, "boolean", "u_int", "struct ys_pool *");
/*
* This is the beastie that needs protecting. It contains all of the
* state that we are excited about. Exactly one is instantiated.
*/
static struct yarrow_state {
uint128_t ys_counter; /* C */
struct randomdev_key ys_key; /* K */
u_int ys_gengateinterval; /* Pg */
u_int ys_bins; /* Pt/t */
u_int ys_outputblocks; /* count output blocks for gates */
u_int ys_slowoverthresh; /* slow pool overthreshhold reseed count */
struct ys_pool {
u_int ysp_source_bits[ENTROPYSOURCE]; /* estimated bits of entropy per source */
u_int ysp_thresh; /* pool reseed threshhold */
struct randomdev_hash ysp_hash; /* accumulated entropy */
} ys_pool[RANDOM_YARROW_NPOOLS];/* pool[0] is fast, pool[1] is slow */
bool ys_seeded;
/* Reseed lock */
mtx_t ys_mtx;
} yarrow_state;
#ifdef _KERNEL
static struct sysctl_ctx_list random_clist;
RANDOM_CHECK_UINT(gengateinterval, 4, 64);
RANDOM_CHECK_UINT(bins, RANDOM_YARROW_NPOOLS, 16);
RANDOM_CHECK_UINT(fastthresh, (RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE*8)/4, (RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE*8)); /* Bit counts */
RANDOM_CHECK_UINT(slowthresh, (RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE*8)/4, (RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE*8)); /* Bit counts */
RANDOM_CHECK_UINT(slowoverthresh, 1, 5);
#endif /* _KERNEL */
static void random_yarrow_pre_read(void);
static void random_yarrow_read(uint8_t *, u_int);
static bool random_yarrow_seeded(void);
static void random_yarrow_process_event(struct harvest_event *);
static void random_yarrow_init_alg(void *);
static void random_yarrow_deinit_alg(void *);
static void random_yarrow_reseed_internal(u_int);
struct random_algorithm random_alg_context = {
.ra_ident = "Yarrow",
.ra_init_alg = random_yarrow_init_alg,
.ra_deinit_alg = random_yarrow_deinit_alg,
.ra_pre_read = random_yarrow_pre_read,
.ra_read = random_yarrow_read,
.ra_seeded = random_yarrow_seeded,
.ra_event_processor = random_yarrow_process_event,
.ra_poolcount = RANDOM_YARROW_NPOOLS,
};
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
random_yarrow_init_alg(void *unused __unused)
{
int i, j;
#ifdef _KERNEL
struct sysctl_oid *random_yarrow_o;
#endif
RANDOM_RESEED_INIT_LOCK();
/* Start unseeded, therefore blocked. */
yarrow_state.ys_seeded = false;
#ifdef _KERNEL
/*
* Yarrow parameters. Do not adjust these unless you have
* have a very good clue about what they do!
*/
random_yarrow_o = SYSCTL_ADD_NODE(&random_clist,
SYSCTL_STATIC_CHILDREN(_kern_random),
OID_AUTO, "yarrow", CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
"Yarrow Parameters");
SYSCTL_ADD_PROC(&random_clist,
SYSCTL_CHILDREN(random_yarrow_o), OID_AUTO,
"gengateinterval", CTLTYPE_UINT | CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
&yarrow_state.ys_gengateinterval, 0,
random_check_uint_gengateinterval, "UI",
"Generation gate interval");
SYSCTL_ADD_PROC(&random_clist,
SYSCTL_CHILDREN(random_yarrow_o), OID_AUTO,
"bins", CTLTYPE_UINT | CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
&yarrow_state.ys_bins, 0,
random_check_uint_bins, "UI",
"Execution time tuner");
SYSCTL_ADD_PROC(&random_clist,
SYSCTL_CHILDREN(random_yarrow_o), OID_AUTO,
"fastthresh", CTLTYPE_UINT | CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
&yarrow_state.ys_pool[0].ysp_thresh, 0,
random_check_uint_fastthresh, "UI",
"Fast reseed threshold");
SYSCTL_ADD_PROC(&random_clist,
SYSCTL_CHILDREN(random_yarrow_o), OID_AUTO,
"slowthresh", CTLTYPE_UINT | CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
&yarrow_state.ys_pool[1].ysp_thresh, 0,
random_check_uint_slowthresh, "UI",
"Slow reseed threshold");
SYSCTL_ADD_PROC(&random_clist,
SYSCTL_CHILDREN(random_yarrow_o), OID_AUTO,
"slowoverthresh", CTLTYPE_UINT | CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
&yarrow_state.ys_slowoverthresh, 0,
random_check_uint_slowoverthresh, "UI",
"Slow over-threshold reseed");
#endif /* _KERNEL */
yarrow_state.ys_gengateinterval = 10;
yarrow_state.ys_bins = 10;
yarrow_state.ys_pool[RANDOM_YARROW_FAST].ysp_thresh = (3*(RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE*8))/4;
yarrow_state.ys_pool[RANDOM_YARROW_SLOW].ysp_thresh = (RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE*8);
yarrow_state.ys_slowoverthresh = 2;
/* Ensure that the first time we read, we are gated. */
yarrow_state.ys_outputblocks = yarrow_state.ys_gengateinterval;
/* Initialise the fast and slow entropy pools */
for (i = RANDOM_YARROW_FAST; i <= RANDOM_YARROW_SLOW; i++) {
randomdev_hash_init(&yarrow_state.ys_pool[i].ysp_hash);
for (j = RANDOM_START; j < ENTROPYSOURCE; j++)
yarrow_state.ys_pool[i].ysp_source_bits[j] = 0;
}
/* Clear the counter */
yarrow_state.ys_counter = UINT128_ZERO;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
random_yarrow_deinit_alg(void *unused __unused)
{
RANDOM_RESEED_DEINIT_LOCK();
explicit_bzero(&yarrow_state, sizeof(yarrow_state));
#ifdef _KERNEL
sysctl_ctx_free(&random_clist);
#endif
}
/* Process a single stochastic event off the harvest queue */
static void
random_yarrow_process_event(struct harvest_event *event)
{
u_int pl, overthreshhold[RANDOM_YARROW_NPOOLS];
enum random_entropy_source src;
RANDOM_RESEED_LOCK();
/*
* Accumulate the event into the appropriate pool
* where each event carries the destination information.
* We lock against pool state modification which can happen
* during accumulation/reseeding and reading/regating
*/
pl = event->he_destination % RANDOM_YARROW_NPOOLS;
randomdev_hash_iterate(&yarrow_state.ys_pool[pl].ysp_hash, event, sizeof(*event));
yarrow_state.ys_pool[pl].ysp_source_bits[event->he_source] += event->he_bits;
/* Count the over-threshold sources in each pool */
for (pl = RANDOM_YARROW_FAST; pl <= RANDOM_YARROW_SLOW; pl++) {
overthreshhold[pl] = 0;
for (src = RANDOM_START; src < ENTROPYSOURCE; src++) {
if (yarrow_state.ys_pool[pl].ysp_source_bits[src] > yarrow_state.ys_pool[pl].ysp_thresh)
overthreshhold[pl]++;
}
}
/*
* If enough slow sources are over threshhold, then slow reseed
* else if any fast source over threshhold, then fast reseed.
*/
if (overthreshhold[RANDOM_YARROW_SLOW] >= yarrow_state.ys_slowoverthresh)
random_yarrow_reseed_internal(RANDOM_YARROW_SLOW);
else if (overthreshhold[RANDOM_YARROW_FAST] > 0 && yarrow_state.ys_seeded)
random_yarrow_reseed_internal(RANDOM_YARROW_FAST);
explicit_bzero(event, sizeof(*event));
RANDOM_RESEED_UNLOCK();
}
static void
random_yarrow_reseed_internal(u_int fastslow)
{
/*
* Interrupt-context stack is a limited resource; make large
* structures static.
*/
static uint8_t v[RANDOM_YARROW_TIMEBIN][RANDOM_KEYSIZE]; /* v[i] */
static uint128_t temp;
static struct randomdev_hash context;
u_int i;
enum random_entropy_source j;
KASSERT(yarrow_state.ys_pool[RANDOM_YARROW_FAST].ysp_thresh > 0, ("random: Yarrow fast threshold = 0"));
KASSERT(yarrow_state.ys_pool[RANDOM_YARROW_SLOW].ysp_thresh > 0, ("random: Yarrow slow threshold = 0"));
RANDOM_RESEED_ASSERT_LOCK_OWNED();
SDT_PROBE3(random, yarrow, event_processor, debug, yarrow_state.ys_seeded, yarrow_state.ys_slowoverthresh, yarrow_state.ys_pool);
/* 1. Hash the accumulated entropy into v[0] */
randomdev_hash_init(&context);
/* Feed the slow pool hash in if slow */
if (fastslow == RANDOM_YARROW_SLOW) {
randomdev_hash_finish(&yarrow_state.ys_pool[RANDOM_YARROW_SLOW].ysp_hash, &temp);
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, &temp, sizeof(temp));
}
randomdev_hash_finish(&yarrow_state.ys_pool[RANDOM_YARROW_FAST].ysp_hash, &temp);
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, &temp, sizeof(temp));
randomdev_hash_finish(&context, v[0]);
/*-
* 2. Compute hash values for all v. _Supposed_ to be computationally
* intensive.
*/
if (yarrow_state.ys_bins > RANDOM_YARROW_TIMEBIN)
yarrow_state.ys_bins = RANDOM_YARROW_TIMEBIN;
for (i = 1; i < yarrow_state.ys_bins; i++) {
randomdev_hash_init(&context);
/* v[i] #= h(v[i - 1]) */
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, v[i - 1], RANDOM_KEYSIZE);
/* v[i] #= h(v[0]) */
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, v[0], RANDOM_KEYSIZE);
/* v[i] #= h(i) */
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, &i, sizeof(i));
/* Return the hashval */
randomdev_hash_finish(&context, v[i]);
}
/*-
* 3. Compute a new key; h' is the identity function here;
* it is not being ignored!
*/
randomdev_hash_init(&context);
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, &yarrow_state.ys_key, RANDOM_KEYSIZE);
for (i = 1; i < yarrow_state.ys_bins; i++)
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, v[i], RANDOM_KEYSIZE);
randomdev_hash_finish(&context, &temp);
randomdev_encrypt_init(&yarrow_state.ys_key, &temp);
/* 4. Recompute the counter */
yarrow_state.ys_counter = UINT128_ZERO;
randomdev_encrypt(&yarrow_state.ys_key, &yarrow_state.ys_counter, &temp, RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE);
yarrow_state.ys_counter = temp;
/* 5. Reset entropy estimate accumulators to zero */
for (i = 0; i <= fastslow; i++)
for (j = RANDOM_START; j < ENTROPYSOURCE; j++)
yarrow_state.ys_pool[i].ysp_source_bits[j] = 0;
/* 6. Wipe memory of intermediate values */
explicit_bzero(v, sizeof(v));
explicit_bzero(&temp, sizeof(temp));
explicit_bzero(&context, sizeof(context));
/* Not defined so writes ain't gonna happen. Kept for documenting. */
#ifdef RANDOM_RWFILE_WRITE_IS_OK
/*-
* 7. Dump to seed file.
* This pseudo-code is documentation. Please leave it alone.
*/
seed_file = "<some file>";
error = randomdev_write_file(seed_file, <generated entropy>, PAGE_SIZE);
if (error == 0)
printf("random: entropy seed file '%s' successfully written\n", seed_file);
#endif
/* Unblock the device if it was blocked due to being unseeded */
if (!yarrow_state.ys_seeded) {
yarrow_state.ys_seeded = true;
randomdev_unblock();
}
}
static __inline void
random_yarrow_generator_gate(void)
{
u_int i;
uint8_t temp[RANDOM_KEYSIZE];
RANDOM_RESEED_ASSERT_LOCK_OWNED();
uint128_increment(&yarrow_state.ys_counter);
for (i = 0; i < RANDOM_KEYSIZE; i += RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE)
randomdev_encrypt(&yarrow_state.ys_key, &yarrow_state.ys_counter, temp + i, RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE);
randomdev_encrypt_init(&yarrow_state.ys_key, temp);
explicit_bzero(temp, sizeof(temp));
}
/*-
* Used to return processed entropy from the PRNG. There is a pre_read
* required to be present (but it can be a stub) in order to allow
* specific actions at the begin of the read.
* Yarrow does its reseeding in its own thread; _pre_read() is not used
* by Yarrow but must be kept for completeness.
*/
void
random_yarrow_pre_read(void)
{
}
/*-
* Main read from Yarrow.
* The supplied buf MUST be a multiple (>=0) of RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE in size.
* Lots of code presumes this for efficiency, both here and in other
* routines. You are NOT allowed to break this!
*/
void
random_yarrow_read(uint8_t *buf, u_int bytecount)
{
u_int blockcount, i;
KASSERT((bytecount % RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE) == 0, ("%s(): bytecount (= %d) must be a multiple of %d", __func__, bytecount, RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE ));
RANDOM_RESEED_LOCK();
blockcount = (bytecount + RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE - 1)/RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE;
for (i = 0; i < blockcount; i++) {
if (yarrow_state.ys_outputblocks++ >= yarrow_state.ys_gengateinterval) {
random_yarrow_generator_gate();
yarrow_state.ys_outputblocks = 0;
}
uint128_increment(&yarrow_state.ys_counter);
randomdev_encrypt(&yarrow_state.ys_key, &yarrow_state.ys_counter, buf, RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE);
buf += RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE;
}
RANDOM_RESEED_UNLOCK();
}
bool
random_yarrow_seeded(void)
{
return (yarrow_state.ys_seeded);
}