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b4b831ef39
MS-CHAPv1 MPPE-keys). - Added rad_demangle_mppe_key() for demangling mppe-keys (needed for MPPE-keys). - Added some typecasts for avoiding compiler warnings. - Fix: better handle wrong usage of the lib (if the programmer has not called rad_create_request() but rad_put_*(), then a weird error message was returned). - Added a new function for putting the Message-Authenticator. - Verify the Message-Authenticator, if it was found inside a response packet and silently drop the packet, if the validation failed. - Implicitly put the Message-Authenticator, if the EAP-Message attribute was added. - Added some missing defines. Submitted by: Michael Bretterklieber PR: 46555
1233 lines
28 KiB
C
1233 lines
28 KiB
C
/*-
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* Copyright 1998 Juniper Networks, Inc.
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/time.h>
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <arpa/inet.h>
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#ifdef WITH_SSL
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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#define MD5Init MD5_Init
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#define MD5Update MD5_Update
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#define MD5Final MD5_Final
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#else
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#define MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH 16
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#include <md5.h>
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#endif
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/* We need the MPPE_KEY_LEN define */
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#include <netgraph/ng_mppc.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <netdb.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <stddef.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include "radlib_private.h"
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static void clear_password(struct rad_handle *);
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static void generr(struct rad_handle *, const char *, ...)
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__printflike(2, 3);
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static void insert_scrambled_password(struct rad_handle *, int);
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static void insert_request_authenticator(struct rad_handle *, int);
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static void insert_message_authenticator(struct rad_handle *, int);
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static int is_valid_response(struct rad_handle *, int,
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const struct sockaddr_in *);
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static int put_password_attr(struct rad_handle *, int,
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const void *, size_t);
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static int put_raw_attr(struct rad_handle *, int,
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const void *, size_t);
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static int split(char *, char *[], int, char *, size_t);
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static void
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clear_password(struct rad_handle *h)
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{
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if (h->pass_len != 0) {
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memset(h->pass, 0, h->pass_len);
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h->pass_len = 0;
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}
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h->pass_pos = 0;
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}
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static void
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generr(struct rad_handle *h, const char *format, ...)
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{
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va_list ap;
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va_start(ap, format);
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vsnprintf(h->errmsg, ERRSIZE, format, ap);
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va_end(ap);
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}
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static void
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insert_scrambled_password(struct rad_handle *h, int srv)
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{
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MD5_CTX ctx;
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unsigned char md5[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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const struct rad_server *srvp;
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int padded_len;
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int pos;
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srvp = &h->servers[srv];
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padded_len = h->pass_len == 0 ? 16 : (h->pass_len+15) & ~0xf;
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memcpy(md5, &h->request[POS_AUTH], LEN_AUTH);
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for (pos = 0; pos < padded_len; pos += 16) {
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int i;
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/* Calculate the new scrambler */
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MD5Init(&ctx);
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MD5Update(&ctx, srvp->secret, strlen(srvp->secret));
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MD5Update(&ctx, md5, 16);
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MD5Final(md5, &ctx);
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/*
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* Mix in the current chunk of the password, and copy
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* the result into the right place in the request. Also
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* modify the scrambler in place, since we will use this
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* in calculating the scrambler for next time.
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
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h->request[h->pass_pos + pos + i] =
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md5[i] ^= h->pass[pos + i];
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}
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}
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static void
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insert_request_authenticator(struct rad_handle *h, int srv)
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{
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MD5_CTX ctx;
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const struct rad_server *srvp;
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srvp = &h->servers[srv];
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/* Create the request authenticator */
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MD5Init(&ctx);
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MD5Update(&ctx, &h->request[POS_CODE], POS_AUTH - POS_CODE);
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MD5Update(&ctx, memset(&h->request[POS_AUTH], 0, LEN_AUTH), LEN_AUTH);
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MD5Update(&ctx, &h->request[POS_ATTRS], h->req_len - POS_ATTRS);
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MD5Update(&ctx, srvp->secret, strlen(srvp->secret));
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MD5Final(&h->request[POS_AUTH], &ctx);
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}
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static void
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insert_message_authenticator(struct rad_handle *h, int srv)
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{
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#ifdef WITH_SSL
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u_char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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u_int md_len;
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const struct rad_server *srvp;
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HMAC_CTX ctx;
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srvp = &h->servers[srv];
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if (h->authentic_pos != 0) {
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HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
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HMAC_Init(&ctx, srvp->secret, strlen(srvp->secret), EVP_md5());
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HMAC_Update(&ctx, &h->request[POS_CODE], POS_AUTH - POS_CODE);
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HMAC_Update(&ctx, &h->request[POS_AUTH], LEN_AUTH);
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HMAC_Update(&ctx, &h->request[POS_ATTRS],
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h->req_len - POS_ATTRS);
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HMAC_Final(&ctx, md, &md_len);
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HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
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HMAC_cleanup(&ctx);
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memcpy(&h->request[h->authentic_pos + 2], md, md_len);
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}
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#endif
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}
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/*
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* Return true if the current response is valid for a request to the
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* specified server.
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*/
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static int
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is_valid_response(struct rad_handle *h, int srv,
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const struct sockaddr_in *from)
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{
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MD5_CTX ctx;
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unsigned char md5[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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const struct rad_server *srvp;
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int len;
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#ifdef WITH_SSL
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HMAC_CTX hctx;
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u_char resp[MSGSIZE], md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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int pos, md_len;
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#endif
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srvp = &h->servers[srv];
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/* Check the source address */
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if (from->sin_family != srvp->addr.sin_family ||
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from->sin_addr.s_addr != srvp->addr.sin_addr.s_addr ||
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from->sin_port != srvp->addr.sin_port)
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return 0;
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/* Check the message length */
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if (h->resp_len < POS_ATTRS)
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return 0;
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len = h->response[POS_LENGTH] << 8 | h->response[POS_LENGTH+1];
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if (len > h->resp_len)
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return 0;
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/* Check the response authenticator */
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MD5Init(&ctx);
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MD5Update(&ctx, &h->response[POS_CODE], POS_AUTH - POS_CODE);
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MD5Update(&ctx, &h->request[POS_AUTH], LEN_AUTH);
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MD5Update(&ctx, &h->response[POS_ATTRS], len - POS_ATTRS);
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MD5Update(&ctx, srvp->secret, strlen(srvp->secret));
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MD5Final(md5, &ctx);
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if (memcmp(&h->response[POS_AUTH], md5, sizeof md5) != 0)
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return 0;
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#ifdef WITH_SSL
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/*
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* For non accounting responses check the message authenticator,
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* if any.
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*/
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if (h->response[POS_CODE] != RAD_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE) {
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memcpy(resp, h->response, MSGSIZE);
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pos = POS_ATTRS;
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/* Search and verify the Message-Authenticator */
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while (pos < len - 2) {
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if (h->response[pos] == RAD_MESSAGE_AUTHENTIC) {
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/* zero fill the Message-Authenticator */
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memset(&resp[pos + 2], 0, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
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HMAC_Init(&hctx, srvp->secret,
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strlen(srvp->secret), EVP_md5());
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HMAC_Update(&hctx, &h->response[POS_CODE],
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POS_AUTH - POS_CODE);
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HMAC_Update(&hctx, &h->request[POS_AUTH],
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LEN_AUTH);
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HMAC_Update(&hctx, &resp[POS_ATTRS],
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h->resp_len - POS_ATTRS);
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HMAC_Final(&hctx, md, &md_len);
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HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
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HMAC_cleanup(&hctx);
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if (memcmp(md, &h->response[pos + 2],
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MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0)
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return 0;
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break;
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}
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pos += h->response[pos + 1];
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}
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}
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#endif
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return 1;
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}
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static int
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put_password_attr(struct rad_handle *h, int type, const void *value, size_t len)
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{
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int padded_len;
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int pad_len;
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if (h->pass_pos != 0) {
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generr(h, "Multiple User-Password attributes specified");
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return -1;
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}
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if (len > PASSSIZE)
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len = PASSSIZE;
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padded_len = len == 0 ? 16 : (len+15) & ~0xf;
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pad_len = padded_len - len;
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/*
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* Put in a place-holder attribute containing all zeros, and
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* remember where it is so we can fill it in later.
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*/
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clear_password(h);
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put_raw_attr(h, type, h->pass, padded_len);
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h->pass_pos = h->req_len - padded_len;
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/* Save the cleartext password, padded as necessary */
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memcpy(h->pass, value, len);
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h->pass_len = len;
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memset(h->pass + len, 0, pad_len);
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return 0;
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}
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static int
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put_raw_attr(struct rad_handle *h, int type, const void *value, size_t len)
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{
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if (len > 253) {
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generr(h, "Attribute too long");
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return -1;
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}
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if (h->req_len + 2 + len > MSGSIZE) {
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generr(h, "Maximum message length exceeded");
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return -1;
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}
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h->request[h->req_len++] = type;
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h->request[h->req_len++] = len + 2;
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memcpy(&h->request[h->req_len], value, len);
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h->req_len += len;
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return 0;
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}
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int
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rad_add_server(struct rad_handle *h, const char *host, int port,
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const char *secret, int timeout, int tries)
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{
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struct rad_server *srvp;
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if (h->num_servers >= MAXSERVERS) {
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generr(h, "Too many RADIUS servers specified");
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return -1;
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}
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srvp = &h->servers[h->num_servers];
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memset(&srvp->addr, 0, sizeof srvp->addr);
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srvp->addr.sin_len = sizeof srvp->addr;
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srvp->addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
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if (!inet_aton(host, &srvp->addr.sin_addr)) {
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struct hostent *hent;
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if ((hent = gethostbyname(host)) == NULL) {
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generr(h, "%s: host not found", host);
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return -1;
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}
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memcpy(&srvp->addr.sin_addr, hent->h_addr,
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sizeof srvp->addr.sin_addr);
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}
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if (port != 0)
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srvp->addr.sin_port = htons((u_short)port);
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else {
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struct servent *sent;
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if (h->type == RADIUS_AUTH)
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srvp->addr.sin_port =
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(sent = getservbyname("radius", "udp")) != NULL ?
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sent->s_port : htons(RADIUS_PORT);
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else
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srvp->addr.sin_port =
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(sent = getservbyname("radacct", "udp")) != NULL ?
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sent->s_port : htons(RADACCT_PORT);
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}
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if ((srvp->secret = strdup(secret)) == NULL) {
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generr(h, "Out of memory");
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return -1;
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}
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srvp->timeout = timeout;
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srvp->max_tries = tries;
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srvp->num_tries = 0;
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h->num_servers++;
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return 0;
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}
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void
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rad_close(struct rad_handle *h)
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{
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int srv;
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if (h->fd != -1)
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close(h->fd);
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for (srv = 0; srv < h->num_servers; srv++) {
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memset(h->servers[srv].secret, 0,
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strlen(h->servers[srv].secret));
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free(h->servers[srv].secret);
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}
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clear_password(h);
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free(h);
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}
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int
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rad_config(struct rad_handle *h, const char *path)
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{
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FILE *fp;
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char buf[MAXCONFLINE];
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int linenum;
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int retval;
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if (path == NULL)
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path = PATH_RADIUS_CONF;
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if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) {
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generr(h, "Cannot open \"%s\": %s", path, strerror(errno));
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return -1;
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}
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retval = 0;
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linenum = 0;
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while (fgets(buf, sizeof buf, fp) != NULL) {
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int len;
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char *fields[5];
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int nfields;
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char msg[ERRSIZE];
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char *type;
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char *host, *res;
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char *port_str;
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char *secret;
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char *timeout_str;
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char *maxtries_str;
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char *end;
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char *wanttype;
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unsigned long timeout;
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unsigned long maxtries;
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int port;
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int i;
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linenum++;
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len = strlen(buf);
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/* We know len > 0, else fgets would have returned NULL. */
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if (buf[len - 1] != '\n') {
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if (len == sizeof buf - 1)
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generr(h, "%s:%d: line too long", path,
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linenum);
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else
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generr(h, "%s:%d: missing newline", path,
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linenum);
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retval = -1;
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break;
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}
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buf[len - 1] = '\0';
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/* Extract the fields from the line. */
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nfields = split(buf, fields, 5, msg, sizeof msg);
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if (nfields == -1) {
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generr(h, "%s:%d: %s", path, linenum, msg);
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retval = -1;
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break;
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}
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if (nfields == 0)
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continue;
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/*
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* The first field should contain "auth" or "acct" for
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* authentication or accounting, respectively. But older
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* versions of the file didn't have that field. Default
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* it to "auth" for backward compatibility.
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*/
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if (strcmp(fields[0], "auth") != 0 &&
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strcmp(fields[0], "acct") != 0) {
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if (nfields >= 5) {
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generr(h, "%s:%d: invalid service type", path,
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linenum);
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retval = -1;
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break;
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}
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nfields++;
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for (i = nfields; --i > 0; )
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fields[i] = fields[i - 1];
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fields[0] = "auth";
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}
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if (nfields < 3) {
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generr(h, "%s:%d: missing shared secret", path,
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linenum);
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retval = -1;
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break;
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}
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type = fields[0];
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host = fields[1];
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secret = fields[2];
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timeout_str = fields[3];
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maxtries_str = fields[4];
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/* Ignore the line if it is for the wrong service type. */
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wanttype = h->type == RADIUS_AUTH ? "auth" : "acct";
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if (strcmp(type, wanttype) != 0)
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continue;
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|
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/* Parse and validate the fields. */
|
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res = host;
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host = strsep(&res, ":");
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port_str = strsep(&res, ":");
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if (port_str != NULL) {
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port = strtoul(port_str, &end, 10);
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if (*end != '\0') {
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generr(h, "%s:%d: invalid port", path,
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linenum);
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retval = -1;
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break;
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}
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} else
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port = 0;
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if (timeout_str != NULL) {
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timeout = strtoul(timeout_str, &end, 10);
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if (*end != '\0') {
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generr(h, "%s:%d: invalid timeout", path,
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linenum);
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retval = -1;
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break;
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}
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} else
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timeout = TIMEOUT;
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if (maxtries_str != NULL) {
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maxtries = strtoul(maxtries_str, &end, 10);
|
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if (*end != '\0') {
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generr(h, "%s:%d: invalid maxtries", path,
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linenum);
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retval = -1;
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break;
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}
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} else
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maxtries = MAXTRIES;
|
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|
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if (rad_add_server(h, host, port, secret, timeout, maxtries) ==
|
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-1) {
|
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strcpy(msg, h->errmsg);
|
|
generr(h, "%s:%d: %s", path, linenum, msg);
|
|
retval = -1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Clear out the buffer to wipe a possible copy of a shared secret */
|
|
memset(buf, 0, sizeof buf);
|
|
fclose(fp);
|
|
return retval;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* rad_init_send_request() must have previously been called.
|
|
* Returns:
|
|
* 0 The application should select on *fd with a timeout of tv before
|
|
* calling rad_continue_send_request again.
|
|
* < 0 Failure
|
|
* > 0 Success
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
rad_continue_send_request(struct rad_handle *h, int selected, int *fd,
|
|
struct timeval *tv)
|
|
{
|
|
int n;
|
|
|
|
if (selected) {
|
|
struct sockaddr_in from;
|
|
int fromlen;
|
|
|
|
fromlen = sizeof from;
|
|
h->resp_len = recvfrom(h->fd, h->response,
|
|
MSGSIZE, MSG_WAITALL, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen);
|
|
if (h->resp_len == -1) {
|
|
generr(h, "recvfrom: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (is_valid_response(h, h->srv, &from)) {
|
|
h->resp_len = h->response[POS_LENGTH] << 8 |
|
|
h->response[POS_LENGTH+1];
|
|
h->resp_pos = POS_ATTRS;
|
|
return h->response[POS_CODE];
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (h->try == h->total_tries) {
|
|
generr(h, "No valid RADIUS responses received");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Scan round-robin to the next server that has some
|
|
* tries left. There is guaranteed to be one, or we
|
|
* would have exited this loop by now.
|
|
*/
|
|
while (h->servers[h->srv].num_tries >= h->servers[h->srv].max_tries)
|
|
if (++h->srv >= h->num_servers)
|
|
h->srv = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (h->request[POS_CODE] == RAD_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST)
|
|
/* Insert the request authenticator into the request */
|
|
insert_request_authenticator(h, h->srv);
|
|
else
|
|
/* Insert the scrambled password into the request */
|
|
if (h->pass_pos != 0)
|
|
insert_scrambled_password(h, h->srv);
|
|
|
|
insert_message_authenticator(h, h->srv);
|
|
|
|
/* Send the request */
|
|
n = sendto(h->fd, h->request, h->req_len, 0,
|
|
(const struct sockaddr *)&h->servers[h->srv].addr,
|
|
sizeof h->servers[h->srv].addr);
|
|
if (n != h->req_len) {
|
|
if (n == -1)
|
|
generr(h, "sendto: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
else
|
|
generr(h, "sendto: short write");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
h->try++;
|
|
h->servers[h->srv].num_tries++;
|
|
tv->tv_sec = h->servers[h->srv].timeout;
|
|
tv->tv_usec = 0;
|
|
*fd = h->fd;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
rad_create_request(struct rad_handle *h, int code)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
h->request[POS_CODE] = code;
|
|
h->request[POS_IDENT] = ++h->ident;
|
|
/* Create a random authenticator */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < LEN_AUTH; i += 2) {
|
|
long r;
|
|
r = random();
|
|
h->request[POS_AUTH+i] = (u_char)r;
|
|
h->request[POS_AUTH+i+1] = (u_char)(r >> 8);
|
|
}
|
|
h->req_len = POS_ATTRS;
|
|
clear_password(h);
|
|
h->request_created = 1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct in_addr
|
|
rad_cvt_addr(const void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct in_addr value;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&value.s_addr, data, sizeof value.s_addr);
|
|
return value;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
u_int32_t
|
|
rad_cvt_int(const void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
u_int32_t value;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&value, data, sizeof value);
|
|
return ntohl(value);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
char *
|
|
rad_cvt_string(const void *data, size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
char *s;
|
|
|
|
s = malloc(len + 1);
|
|
if (s != NULL) {
|
|
memcpy(s, data, len);
|
|
s[len] = '\0';
|
|
}
|
|
return s;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Returns the attribute type. If none are left, returns 0. On failure,
|
|
* returns -1.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
rad_get_attr(struct rad_handle *h, const void **value, size_t *len)
|
|
{
|
|
int type;
|
|
|
|
if (h->resp_pos >= h->resp_len)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (h->resp_pos + 2 > h->resp_len) {
|
|
generr(h, "Malformed attribute in response");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
type = h->response[h->resp_pos++];
|
|
*len = h->response[h->resp_pos++] - 2;
|
|
if (h->resp_pos + (int)*len > h->resp_len) {
|
|
generr(h, "Malformed attribute in response");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
*value = &h->response[h->resp_pos];
|
|
h->resp_pos += *len;
|
|
return type;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Returns -1 on error, 0 to indicate no event and >0 for success
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
rad_init_send_request(struct rad_handle *h, int *fd, struct timeval *tv)
|
|
{
|
|
int srv;
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure we have a socket to use */
|
|
if (h->fd == -1) {
|
|
struct sockaddr_in sin;
|
|
|
|
if ((h->fd = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP)) == -1) {
|
|
generr(h, "Cannot create socket: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
memset(&sin, 0, sizeof sin);
|
|
sin.sin_len = sizeof sin;
|
|
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
|
|
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
|
|
sin.sin_port = htons(0);
|
|
if (bind(h->fd, (const struct sockaddr *)&sin,
|
|
sizeof sin) == -1) {
|
|
generr(h, "bind: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
close(h->fd);
|
|
h->fd = -1;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (h->request[POS_CODE] == RAD_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST) {
|
|
/* Make sure no password given */
|
|
if (h->pass_pos || h->chap_pass) {
|
|
generr(h, "User or Chap Password"
|
|
" in accounting request");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (h->eap_msg == 0) {
|
|
/* Make sure the user gave us a password */
|
|
if (h->pass_pos == 0 && !h->chap_pass) {
|
|
generr(h, "No User or Chap Password"
|
|
" attributes given");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (h->pass_pos != 0 && h->chap_pass) {
|
|
generr(h, "Both User and Chap Password"
|
|
" attributes given");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fill in the length field in the message */
|
|
h->request[POS_LENGTH] = h->req_len >> 8;
|
|
h->request[POS_LENGTH+1] = h->req_len;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Count the total number of tries we will make, and zero the
|
|
* counter for each server.
|
|
*/
|
|
h->total_tries = 0;
|
|
for (srv = 0; srv < h->num_servers; srv++) {
|
|
h->total_tries += h->servers[srv].max_tries;
|
|
h->servers[srv].num_tries = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (h->total_tries == 0) {
|
|
generr(h, "No RADIUS servers specified");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
h->try = h->srv = 0;
|
|
|
|
return rad_continue_send_request(h, 0, fd, tv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Create and initialize a rad_handle structure, and return it to the
|
|
* caller. Can fail only if the necessary memory cannot be allocated.
|
|
* In that case, it returns NULL.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct rad_handle *
|
|
rad_auth_open(void)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rad_handle *h;
|
|
|
|
h = (struct rad_handle *)malloc(sizeof(struct rad_handle));
|
|
if (h != NULL) {
|
|
srandomdev();
|
|
h->fd = -1;
|
|
h->num_servers = 0;
|
|
h->ident = random();
|
|
h->errmsg[0] = '\0';
|
|
memset(h->pass, 0, sizeof h->pass);
|
|
h->pass_len = 0;
|
|
h->pass_pos = 0;
|
|
h->chap_pass = 0;
|
|
h->authentic_pos = 0;
|
|
h->type = RADIUS_AUTH;
|
|
h->request_created = 0;
|
|
h->eap_msg = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return h;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct rad_handle *
|
|
rad_acct_open(void)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rad_handle *h;
|
|
|
|
h = rad_open();
|
|
if (h != NULL)
|
|
h->type = RADIUS_ACCT;
|
|
return h;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct rad_handle *
|
|
rad_open(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return rad_auth_open();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
rad_put_addr(struct rad_handle *h, int type, struct in_addr addr)
|
|
{
|
|
return rad_put_attr(h, type, &addr.s_addr, sizeof addr.s_addr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
rad_put_attr(struct rad_handle *h, int type, const void *value, size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
int result;
|
|
|
|
if (!h->request_created) {
|
|
generr(h, "Please call rad_create_request()"
|
|
" before putting attributes");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (h->request[POS_CODE] == RAD_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST) {
|
|
if (type == RAD_EAP_MESSAGE) {
|
|
generr(h, "EAP-Message attribute is not valid"
|
|
" in accounting requests");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* When proxying EAP Messages, the Message Authenticator
|
|
* MUST be present; see RFC 3579.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (type == RAD_EAP_MESSAGE) {
|
|
if (rad_put_message_authentic(h) == -1)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (type == RAD_USER_PASSWORD) {
|
|
result = put_password_attr(h, type, value, len);
|
|
} else if (type == RAD_MESSAGE_AUTHENTIC) {
|
|
result = rad_put_message_authentic(h);
|
|
} else {
|
|
result = put_raw_attr(h, type, value, len);
|
|
if (result == 0) {
|
|
if (type == RAD_CHAP_PASSWORD)
|
|
h->chap_pass = 1;
|
|
else if (type == RAD_EAP_MESSAGE)
|
|
h->eap_msg = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
rad_put_int(struct rad_handle *h, int type, u_int32_t value)
|
|
{
|
|
u_int32_t nvalue;
|
|
|
|
nvalue = htonl(value);
|
|
return rad_put_attr(h, type, &nvalue, sizeof nvalue);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
rad_put_string(struct rad_handle *h, int type, const char *str)
|
|
{
|
|
return rad_put_attr(h, type, str, strlen(str));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
rad_put_message_authentic(struct rad_handle *h)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef WITH_SSL
|
|
u_char md_zero[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
if (h->request[POS_CODE] == RAD_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST) {
|
|
generr(h, "Message-Authenticator is not valid"
|
|
" in accounting requests");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (h->authentic_pos == 0) {
|
|
h->authentic_pos = h->req_len;
|
|
memset(md_zero, 0, sizeof(md_zero));
|
|
return (put_raw_attr(h, RAD_MESSAGE_AUTHENTIC, md_zero,
|
|
sizeof(md_zero)));
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
generr(h, "Message Authenticator not supported,"
|
|
" please recompile libradius with SSL support");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Returns the response type code on success, or -1 on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
rad_send_request(struct rad_handle *h)
|
|
{
|
|
struct timeval timelimit;
|
|
struct timeval tv;
|
|
int fd;
|
|
int n;
|
|
|
|
n = rad_init_send_request(h, &fd, &tv);
|
|
|
|
if (n != 0)
|
|
return n;
|
|
|
|
gettimeofday(&timelimit, NULL);
|
|
timeradd(&tv, &timelimit, &timelimit);
|
|
|
|
for ( ; ; ) {
|
|
fd_set readfds;
|
|
|
|
FD_ZERO(&readfds);
|
|
FD_SET(fd, &readfds);
|
|
|
|
n = select(fd + 1, &readfds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
|
|
|
|
if (n == -1) {
|
|
generr(h, "select: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!FD_ISSET(fd, &readfds)) {
|
|
/* Compute a new timeout */
|
|
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
|
|
timersub(&timelimit, &tv, &tv);
|
|
if (tv.tv_sec > 0 || (tv.tv_sec == 0 && tv.tv_usec > 0))
|
|
/* Continue the select */
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n = rad_continue_send_request(h, n, &fd, &tv);
|
|
|
|
if (n != 0)
|
|
return n;
|
|
|
|
gettimeofday(&timelimit, NULL);
|
|
timeradd(&tv, &timelimit, &timelimit);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const char *
|
|
rad_strerror(struct rad_handle *h)
|
|
{
|
|
return h->errmsg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Destructively split a string into fields separated by white space.
|
|
* `#' at the beginning of a field begins a comment that extends to the
|
|
* end of the string. Fields may be quoted with `"'. Inside quoted
|
|
* strings, the backslash escapes `\"' and `\\' are honored.
|
|
*
|
|
* Pointers to up to the first maxfields fields are stored in the fields
|
|
* array. Missing fields get NULL pointers.
|
|
*
|
|
* The return value is the actual number of fields parsed, and is always
|
|
* <= maxfields.
|
|
*
|
|
* On a syntax error, places a message in the msg string, and returns -1.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
split(char *str, char *fields[], int maxfields, char *msg, size_t msglen)
|
|
{
|
|
char *p;
|
|
int i;
|
|
static const char ws[] = " \t";
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < maxfields; i++)
|
|
fields[i] = NULL;
|
|
p = str;
|
|
i = 0;
|
|
while (*p != '\0') {
|
|
p += strspn(p, ws);
|
|
if (*p == '#' || *p == '\0')
|
|
break;
|
|
if (i >= maxfields) {
|
|
snprintf(msg, msglen, "line has too many fields");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (*p == '"') {
|
|
char *dst;
|
|
|
|
dst = ++p;
|
|
fields[i] = dst;
|
|
while (*p != '"') {
|
|
if (*p == '\\') {
|
|
p++;
|
|
if (*p != '"' && *p != '\\' &&
|
|
*p != '\0') {
|
|
snprintf(msg, msglen,
|
|
"invalid `\\' escape");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (*p == '\0') {
|
|
snprintf(msg, msglen,
|
|
"unterminated quoted string");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
*dst++ = *p++;
|
|
}
|
|
*dst = '\0';
|
|
p++;
|
|
if (*fields[i] == '\0') {
|
|
snprintf(msg, msglen,
|
|
"empty quoted string not permitted");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (*p != '\0' && strspn(p, ws) == 0) {
|
|
snprintf(msg, msglen, "quoted string not"
|
|
" followed by white space");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
fields[i] = p;
|
|
p += strcspn(p, ws);
|
|
if (*p != '\0')
|
|
*p++ = '\0';
|
|
}
|
|
i++;
|
|
}
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
rad_get_vendor_attr(u_int32_t *vendor, const void **data, size_t *len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct vendor_attribute *attr;
|
|
|
|
attr = (struct vendor_attribute *)*data;
|
|
*vendor = ntohl(attr->vendor_value);
|
|
*data = attr->attrib_data;
|
|
*len = attr->attrib_len - 2;
|
|
|
|
return (attr->attrib_type);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
rad_put_vendor_addr(struct rad_handle *h, int vendor, int type,
|
|
struct in_addr addr)
|
|
{
|
|
return (rad_put_vendor_attr(h, vendor, type, &addr.s_addr,
|
|
sizeof addr.s_addr));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
rad_put_vendor_attr(struct rad_handle *h, int vendor, int type,
|
|
const void *value, size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct vendor_attribute *attr;
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
if (!h->request_created) {
|
|
generr(h, "Please call rad_create_request()"
|
|
" before putting attributes");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((attr = malloc(len + 6)) == NULL) {
|
|
generr(h, "malloc failure (%d bytes)", len + 6);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
attr->vendor_value = htonl(vendor);
|
|
attr->attrib_type = type;
|
|
attr->attrib_len = len + 2;
|
|
memcpy(attr->attrib_data, value, len);
|
|
|
|
res = put_raw_attr(h, RAD_VENDOR_SPECIFIC, attr, len + 6);
|
|
free(attr);
|
|
if (res == 0 && vendor == RAD_VENDOR_MICROSOFT
|
|
&& (type == RAD_MICROSOFT_MS_CHAP_RESPONSE
|
|
|| type == RAD_MICROSOFT_MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE)) {
|
|
h->chap_pass = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return (res);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
rad_put_vendor_int(struct rad_handle *h, int vendor, int type, u_int32_t i)
|
|
{
|
|
u_int32_t value;
|
|
|
|
value = htonl(i);
|
|
return (rad_put_vendor_attr(h, vendor, type, &value, sizeof value));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
rad_put_vendor_string(struct rad_handle *h, int vendor, int type,
|
|
const char *str)
|
|
{
|
|
return (rad_put_vendor_attr(h, vendor, type, str, strlen(str)));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssize_t
|
|
rad_request_authenticator(struct rad_handle *h, char *buf, size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (len < LEN_AUTH)
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
memcpy(buf, h->request + POS_AUTH, LEN_AUTH);
|
|
if (len > LEN_AUTH)
|
|
buf[LEN_AUTH] = '\0';
|
|
return (LEN_AUTH);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
u_char *
|
|
rad_demangle(struct rad_handle *h, const void *mangled, size_t mlen)
|
|
{
|
|
char R[LEN_AUTH];
|
|
const char *S;
|
|
int i, Ppos;
|
|
MD5_CTX Context;
|
|
u_char b[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH], *C, *demangled;
|
|
|
|
if ((mlen % 16 != 0) || mlen > 128) {
|
|
generr(h, "Cannot interpret mangled data of length %lu",
|
|
(u_long)mlen);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
C = (u_char *)mangled;
|
|
|
|
/* We need the shared secret as Salt */
|
|
S = rad_server_secret(h);
|
|
|
|
/* We need the request authenticator */
|
|
if (rad_request_authenticator(h, R, sizeof R) != LEN_AUTH) {
|
|
generr(h, "Cannot obtain the RADIUS request authenticator");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
demangled = malloc(mlen);
|
|
if (!demangled)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
MD5Init(&Context);
|
|
MD5Update(&Context, S, strlen(S));
|
|
MD5Update(&Context, R, LEN_AUTH);
|
|
MD5Final(b, &Context);
|
|
Ppos = 0;
|
|
while (mlen) {
|
|
|
|
mlen -= 16;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
|
|
demangled[Ppos++] = C[i] ^ b[i];
|
|
|
|
if (mlen) {
|
|
MD5Init(&Context);
|
|
MD5Update(&Context, S, strlen(S));
|
|
MD5Update(&Context, C, 16);
|
|
MD5Final(b, &Context);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
C += 16;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return demangled;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
u_char *
|
|
rad_demangle_mppe_key(struct rad_handle *h, const void *mangled,
|
|
size_t mlen, size_t *len)
|
|
{
|
|
char R[LEN_AUTH]; /* variable names as per rfc2548 */
|
|
const char *S;
|
|
u_char b[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH], *demangled;
|
|
const u_char *A, *C;
|
|
MD5_CTX Context;
|
|
int Slen, i, Clen, Ppos;
|
|
u_char *P;
|
|
|
|
if (mlen % 16 != SALT_LEN) {
|
|
generr(h, "Cannot interpret mangled data of length %lu",
|
|
(u_long)mlen);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We need the RADIUS Request-Authenticator */
|
|
if (rad_request_authenticator(h, R, sizeof R) != LEN_AUTH) {
|
|
generr(h, "Cannot obtain the RADIUS request authenticator");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
A = (const u_char *)mangled; /* Salt comes first */
|
|
C = (const u_char *)mangled + SALT_LEN; /* Then the ciphertext */
|
|
Clen = mlen - SALT_LEN;
|
|
S = rad_server_secret(h); /* We need the RADIUS secret */
|
|
Slen = strlen(S);
|
|
P = alloca(Clen); /* We derive our plaintext */
|
|
|
|
MD5Init(&Context);
|
|
MD5Update(&Context, S, Slen);
|
|
MD5Update(&Context, R, LEN_AUTH);
|
|
MD5Update(&Context, A, SALT_LEN);
|
|
MD5Final(b, &Context);
|
|
Ppos = 0;
|
|
|
|
while (Clen) {
|
|
Clen -= 16;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
|
|
P[Ppos++] = C[i] ^ b[i];
|
|
|
|
if (Clen) {
|
|
MD5Init(&Context);
|
|
MD5Update(&Context, S, Slen);
|
|
MD5Update(&Context, C, 16);
|
|
MD5Final(b, &Context);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
C += 16;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The resulting plain text consists of a one-byte length, the text and
|
|
* maybe some padding.
|
|
*/
|
|
*len = *P;
|
|
if (*len > mlen - 1) {
|
|
generr(h, "Mangled data seems to be garbage %d %d",
|
|
*len, mlen-1);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (*len > MPPE_KEY_LEN * 2) {
|
|
generr(h, "Key to long (%d) for me max. %d",
|
|
*len, MPPE_KEY_LEN * 2);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
demangled = malloc(*len);
|
|
if (!demangled)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(demangled, P + 1, *len);
|
|
return demangled;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const char *
|
|
rad_server_secret(struct rad_handle *h)
|
|
{
|
|
return (h->servers[h->srv].secret);
|
|
}
|