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freebsd/sys/netipsec/xform_tcp.c
Robert Watson 530c006014 Merge the remainder of kern_vimage.c and vimage.h into vnet.c and
vnet.h, we now use jails (rather than vimages) as the abstraction
for virtualization management, and what remained was specific to
virtual network stacks.  Minor cleanups are done in the process,
and comments updated to reflect these changes.

Reviewed by:	bz
Approved by:	re (vimage blanket)
2009-08-01 19:26:27 +00:00

172 lines
4.7 KiB
C

/* $FreeBSD$ */
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2003 Bruce M. Simpson <bms@spc.org>
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
* derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/* TCP MD5 Signature Option (RFC2385) */
#include "opt_inet.h"
#include "opt_inet6.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/mbuf.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/protosw.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <netinet/ip_var.h>
#include <netinet/tcp.h>
#include <netinet/tcp_var.h>
#include <net/route.h>
#include <net/vnet.h>
#include <netipsec/ipsec.h>
#include <netipsec/xform.h>
#ifdef INET6
#include <netinet/ip6.h>
#include <netipsec/ipsec6.h>
#endif
#include <netipsec/key.h>
#include <netipsec/key_debug.h>
/*
* Initialize a TCP-MD5 SA. Called when the SA is being set up.
*
* We don't need to set up the tdb prefixed fields, as we don't use the
* opencrypto code; we just perform a key length check.
*
* XXX: Currently we only allow a single 'magic' SPI to be used.
*
* This allows per-host granularity without affecting the userland
* interface, which is a simple socket option toggle switch,
* TCP_SIGNATURE_ENABLE.
*
* To allow per-service granularity requires that we have a means
* of mapping port to SPI. The mandated way of doing this is to
* use SPD entries to specify packet flows which get the TCP-MD5
* treatment, however the code to do this is currently unstable
* and unsuitable for production use.
*
* Therefore we use this compromise in the meantime.
*/
static int
tcpsignature_init(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp)
{
int keylen;
if (sav->spi != htonl(TCP_SIG_SPI)) {
DPRINTF(("%s: SPI must be TCP_SIG_SPI (0x1000)\n",
__func__));
return (EINVAL);
}
if (sav->alg_auth != SADB_X_AALG_TCP_MD5) {
DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported authentication algorithm %u\n",
__func__, sav->alg_auth));
return (EINVAL);
}
if (sav->key_auth == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("%s: no authentication key present\n", __func__));
return (EINVAL);
}
keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth);
if ((keylen < TCP_KEYLEN_MIN) || (keylen > TCP_KEYLEN_MAX)) {
DPRINTF(("%s: invalid key length %u\n", __func__, keylen));
return (EINVAL);
}
return (0);
}
/*
* Paranoia.
*
* Called when the SA is deleted.
*/
static int
tcpsignature_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav)
{
if (sav->key_auth)
bzero(sav->key_auth->key_data, _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth));
sav->tdb_cryptoid = 0;
sav->tdb_authalgxform = NULL;
sav->tdb_xform = NULL;
return (0);
}
/*
* Verify that an input packet passes authentication.
* Called from the ipsec layer.
* We do this from within tcp itself, so this routine is just a stub.
*/
static int
tcpsignature_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip,
int protoff)
{
return (0);
}
/*
* Prepend the authentication header.
* Called from the ipsec layer.
* We do this from within tcp itself, so this routine is just a stub.
*/
static int
tcpsignature_output(struct mbuf *m, struct ipsecrequest *isr,
struct mbuf **mp, int skip, int protoff)
{
return (EINVAL);
}
static struct xformsw tcpsignature_xformsw = {
XF_TCPSIGNATURE, XFT_AUTH, "TCPMD5",
tcpsignature_init, tcpsignature_zeroize,
tcpsignature_input, tcpsignature_output
};
static void
tcpsignature_attach(void)
{
xform_register(&tcpsignature_xformsw);
}
SYSINIT(tcpsignature_xform_init, SI_SUB_DRIVERS, SI_ORDER_FIRST,
tcpsignature_attach, NULL);