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313cb084c4
it's not "plain" OpenSSH 2.3.0. |
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.. | ||
lib | ||
pam_ssh | ||
scp | ||
sftp-server | ||
ssh | ||
ssh-add | ||
ssh-agent | ||
ssh-keygen | ||
sshd | ||
atomicio.c | ||
auth1.c | ||
auth2-skey.c | ||
auth2.c | ||
auth-krb4.c | ||
auth-krb5.c | ||
auth-options.c | ||
auth-options.h | ||
auth-pam.c | ||
auth-pam.h | ||
auth-passwd.c | ||
auth-rh-rsa.c | ||
auth-rhosts.c | ||
auth-rsa.c | ||
auth-skey.c | ||
auth.c | ||
auth.h | ||
authfd.c | ||
authfd.h | ||
authfile.c | ||
authfile.h | ||
bufaux.c | ||
bufaux.h | ||
buffer.c | ||
buffer.h | ||
canohost.c | ||
channels.c | ||
channels.h | ||
cipher.c | ||
cipher.h | ||
cli.c | ||
cli.h | ||
clientloop.c | ||
compat.c | ||
compat.h | ||
compress.c | ||
compress.h | ||
crc32.c | ||
crc32.h | ||
deattack.c | ||
deattack.h | ||
dh.c | ||
dh.h | ||
dispatch.c | ||
dispatch.h | ||
dsa.c | ||
dsa.h | ||
getput.h | ||
hmac.c | ||
hmac.h | ||
hostfile.c | ||
hostfile.h | ||
includes.h | ||
kex.c | ||
kex.h | ||
key.c | ||
key.h | ||
LICENCE | ||
log-client.c | ||
log-server.c | ||
log.c | ||
login.c | ||
Makefile | ||
Makefile.inc | ||
match.c | ||
match.h | ||
mpaux.c | ||
mpaux.h | ||
myproposal.h | ||
nchan2.ms | ||
nchan.c | ||
nchan.h | ||
nchan.ms | ||
OVERVIEW | ||
packet.c | ||
packet.h | ||
pty.c | ||
pty.h | ||
radix.c | ||
readconf.c | ||
readconf.h | ||
README | ||
readpass.c | ||
RFC.nroff | ||
rijndael.c | ||
rijndael.h | ||
rsa.c | ||
rsa.h | ||
scp.1 | ||
scp.c | ||
servconf.c | ||
servconf.h | ||
serverloop.c | ||
session.c | ||
session.h | ||
sftp-server.8 | ||
sftp-server.c | ||
ssh2.h | ||
ssh_config | ||
ssh-add.1 | ||
ssh-add.c | ||
ssh-agent.1 | ||
ssh-agent.c | ||
ssh-keygen.1 | ||
ssh-keygen.c | ||
ssh.1 | ||
ssh.c | ||
ssh.h | ||
sshconnect1.c | ||
sshconnect2.c | ||
sshconnect.c | ||
sshconnect.h | ||
sshd_config | ||
sshd.8 | ||
sshd.c | ||
tildexpand.c | ||
ttymodes.c | ||
ttymodes.h | ||
uidswap.c | ||
uidswap.h | ||
util.c | ||
uuencode.c | ||
uuencode.h | ||
version.h | ||
xmalloc.c | ||
xmalloc.h |
[ Please note that this file has not been updated for OpenSSH and covers the ssh-1.2.12 release from Dec 1995 only. ] Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program to log into another computer over a network, to execute commands in a remote machine, and to move files from one machine to another. It provides strong authentication and secure communications over insecure channels. It is intended as a replacement for rlogin, rsh, rcp, and rdist. See the file INSTALL for installation instructions. See COPYING for license terms and other legal issues. See RFC for a description of the protocol. There is a WWW page for ssh; see http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh. This file has been updated to match ssh-1.2.12. FEATURES o Strong authentication. Closes several security holes (e.g., IP, routing, and DNS spoofing). New authentication methods: .rhosts together with RSA based host authentication, and pure RSA authentication. o Improved privacy. All communications are automatically and transparently encrypted. RSA is used for key exchange, and a conventional cipher (normally IDEA, DES, or triple-DES) for encrypting the session. Encryption is started before authentication, and no passwords or other information is transmitted in the clear. Encryption is also used to protect against spoofed packets. o Secure X11 sessions. The program automatically sets DISPLAY on the server machine, and forwards any X11 connections over the secure channel. Fake Xauthority information is automatically generated and forwarded to the remote machine; the local client automatically examines incoming X11 connections and replaces the fake authorization data with the real data (never telling the remote machine the real information). o Arbitrary TCP/IP ports can be redirected through the encrypted channel in both directions (e.g., for e-cash transactions). o No retraining needed for normal users; everything happens automatically, and old .rhosts files will work with strong authentication if administration installs host key files. o Never trusts the network. Minimal trust on the remote side of the connection. Minimal trust on domain name servers. Pure RSA authentication never trusts anything but the private key. o Client RSA-authenticates the server machine in the beginning of every connection to prevent trojan horses (by routing or DNS spoofing) and man-in-the-middle attacks, and the server RSA-authenticates the client machine before accepting .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication (to prevent DNS, routing, or IP-spoofing). o Host authentication key distribution can be centrally by the administration, automatically when the first connection is made to a machine (the key obtained on the first connection will be recorded and used for authentication in the future), or manually by each user for his/her own use. The central and per-user host key repositories are both used and complement each other. Host keys can be generated centrally or automatically when the software is installed. Host authentication keys are typically 1024 bits. o Any user can create any number of user authentication RSA keys for his/her own use. Each user has a file which lists the RSA public keys for which proof of possession of the corresponding private key is accepted as authentication. User authentication keys are typically 1024 bits. o The server program has its own server RSA key which is automatically regenerated every hour. This key is never saved in any file. Exchanged session keys are encrypted using both the server key and the server host key. The purpose of the separate server key is to make it impossible to decipher a captured session by breaking into the server machine at a later time; one hour from the connection even the server machine cannot decipher the session key. The key regeneration interval is configurable. The server key is normally 768 bits. o An authentication agent, running in the user's laptop or local workstation, can be used to hold the user's RSA authentication keys. Ssh automatically forwards the connection to the authentication agent over any connections, and there is no need to store the RSA authentication keys on any machine in the network (except the user's own local machine). The authentication protocols never reveal the keys; they can only be used to verify that the user's agent has a certain key. Eventually the agent could rely on a smart card to perform all authentication computations. o The software can be installed and used (with restricted functionality) even without root privileges. o The client is customizable in system-wide and per-user configuration files. Most aspects of the client's operation can be configured. Different options can be specified on a per-host basis. o Automatically executes conventional rsh (after displaying a warning) if the server machine is not running sshd. o Optional compression of all data with gzip (including forwarded X11 and TCP/IP port data), which may result in significant speedups on slow connections. o Complete replacement for rlogin, rsh, and rcp. WHY TO USE SECURE SHELL Currently, almost all communications in computer networks are done without encryption. As a consequence, anyone who has access to any machine connected to the network can listen in on any communication. This is being done by hackers, curious administrators, employers, criminals, industrial spies, and governments. Some networks leak off enough electromagnetic radiation that data may be captured even from a distance. When you log in, your password goes in the network in plain text. Thus, any listener can then use your account to do any evil he likes. Many incidents have been encountered worldwide where crackers have started programs on workstations without the owners knowledge just to listen to the network and collect passwords. Programs for doing this are available on the Internet, or can be built by a competent programmer in a few hours. Any information that you type or is printed on your screen can be monitored, recorded, and analyzed. For example, an intruder who has penetrated a host connected to a major network can start a program that listens to all data flowing in the network, and whenever it encounters a 16-digit string, it checks if it is a valid credit card number (using the check digit), and saves the number plus any surrounding text (to catch expiration date and holder) in a file. When the intruder has collected a few thousand credit card numbers, he makes smallish mail-order purchases from a few thousand stores around the world, and disappears when the goods arrive but before anyone suspects anything. Businesses have trade secrets, patent applications in preparation, pricing information, subcontractor information, client data, personnel data, financial information, etc. Currently, anyone with access to the network (any machine on the network) can listen to anything that goes in the network, without any regard to normal access restrictions. Many companies are not aware that information can so easily be recovered from the network. They trust that their data is safe since nobody is supposed to know that there is sensitive information in the network, or because so much other data is transferred in the network. This is not a safe policy. Individual persons also have confidential information, such as diaries, love letters, health care documents, information about their personal interests and habits, professional data, job applications, tax reports, political documents, unpublished manuscripts, etc. One should also be aware that economical intelligence and industrial espionage has recently become a major priority of the intelligence agencies of major governments. President Clinton recently assigned economical espionage as the primary task of the CIA, and the French have repeatedly been publicly boasting about their achievements on this field. There is also another frightening aspect about the poor security of communications. Computer storage and analysis capability has increased so much that it is feasible for governments, major companies, and criminal organizations to automatically analyze, identify, classify, and file information about millions of people over the years. Because most of the work can be automated, the cost of collecting this information is getting very low. Government agencies may be able to monitor major communication systems, telephones, fax, computer networks, etc., and passively collect huge amounts of information about all people with any significant position in the society. Most of this information is not sensitive, and many people would say there is no harm in someone getting that information. However, the information starts to get sensitive when someone has enough of it. You may not mind someone knowing what you bought from the shop one random day, but you might not like someone knowing every small thing you have bought in the last ten years. If the government some day starts to move into a more totalitarian direction (one should remember that Nazi Germany was created by democratic elections), there is considerable danger of an ultimate totalitarian state. With enough information (the automatically collected records of an individual can be manually analyzed when the person becomes interesting), one can form a very detailed picture of the individual's interests, opinions, beliefs, habits, friends, lovers, weaknesses, etc. This information can be used to 1) locate any persons who might oppose the new system 2) use deception to disturb any organizations which might rise against the government 3) eliminate difficult individuals without anyone understanding what happened. Additionally, if the government can monitor communications too effectively, it becomes too easy to locate and eliminate any persons distributing information contrary to the official truth. Fighting crime and terrorism are often used as grounds for domestic surveillance and restricting encryption. These are good goals, but there is considerable danger that the surveillance data starts to get used for questionable purposes. I find that it is better to tolerate a small amount of crime in the society than to let the society become fully controlled. I am in favor of a fairly strong state, but the state must never get so strong that people become unable to spread contra-offical information and unable to overturn the government if it is bad. The danger is that when you notice that the government is too powerful, it is too late. Also, the real power may not be where the official government is. For these reasons (privacy, protecting trade secrets, and making it more difficult to create a totalitarian state), I think that strong cryptography should be integrated to the tools we use every day. Using it causes no harm (except for those who wish to monitor everything), but not using it can cause huge problems. If the society changes in undesirable ways, then it will be to late to start encrypting. Encryption has had a "military" or "classified" flavor to it. There are no longer any grounds for this. The military can and will use its own encryption; that is no excuse to prevent the civilians from protecting their privacy and secrets. Information on strong encryption is available in every major bookstore, scientific library, and patent office around the world, and strong encryption software is available in every country on the Internet. Some people would like to make it illegal to use encryption, or to force people to use encryption that governments can break. This approach offers no protection if the government turns bad. Also, the "bad guys" will be using true strong encryption anyway. Good encryption techniques are too widely known to make them disappear. Thus, any "key escrow encryption" or other restrictions will only help monitor ordinary people and petty criminals. It does not help against powerful criminals, terrorists, or espionage, because they will know how to use strong encryption anyway. (One source for internationally available encryption software is http://www.cs.hut.fi/crypto.) OVERVIEW OF SECURE SHELL The software consists of a number of programs. sshd Server program run on the server machine. This listens for connections from client machines, and whenever it receives a connection, it performs authentication and starts serving the client. ssh This is the client program used to log into another machine or to execute commands on the other machine. "slogin" is another name for this program. scp Securely copies files from one machine to another. ssh-keygen Used to create RSA keys (host keys and user authentication keys). ssh-agent Authentication agent. This can be used to hold RSA keys for authentication. ssh-add Used to register new keys with the agent. make-ssh-known-hosts Used to create the /etc/ssh_known_hosts file. Ssh is the program users normally use. It is started as ssh host or ssh host command The first form opens a new shell on the remote machine (after authentication). The latter form executes the command on the remote machine. When started, the ssh connects sshd on the server machine, verifies that the server machine really is the machine it wanted to connect, exchanges encryption keys (in a manner which prevents an outside listener from getting the keys), performs authentication using .rhosts and /etc/hosts.equiv, RSA authentication, or conventional password based authentication. The server then (normally) allocates a pseudo-terminal and starts an interactive shell or user program. The TERM environment variable (describing the type of the user's terminal) is passed from the client side to the remote side. Also, terminal modes will be copied from the client side to the remote side to preserve user preferences (e.g., the erase character). If the DISPLAY variable is set on the client side, the server will create a dummy X server and set DISPLAY accordingly. Any connections to the dummy X server will be forwarded through the secure channel, and will be made to the real X server from the client side. An arbitrary number of X programs can be started during the session, and starting them does not require anything special from the user. (Note that the user must not manually set DISPLAY, because then it would connect directly to the real display instead of going through the encrypted channel). This behavior can be disabled in the configuration file or by giving the -x option to the client. Arbitrary IP ports can be forwarded over the secure channel. The program then creates a port on one side, and whenever a connection is opened to this port, it will be passed over the secure channel, and a connection will be made from the other side to a specified host:port pair. Arbitrary IP forwarding must always be explicitly requested, and cannot be used to forward privileged ports (unless the user is root). It is possible to specify automatic forwards in a per-user configuration file, for example to make electronic cash systems work securely. If there is an authentication agent on the client side, connection to it will be automatically forwarded to the server side. For more infomation, see the manual pages ssh(1), sshd(8), scp(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-add(1), and make-ssh-known-hosts(1) included in this distribution. X11 CONNECTION FORWARDING X11 forwarding serves two purposes: it is a convenience to the user because there is no need to set the DISPLAY variable, and it provides encrypted X11 connections. I cannot think of any other easy way to make X11 connections encrypted; modifying the X server, clients or libraries would require special work for each machine, vendor and application. Widely used IP-level encryption does not seem likely for several years. Thus what we have left is faking an X server on the same machine where the clients are run, and forwarding the connections to a real X server over the secure channel. X11 forwarding works as follows. The client extracts Xauthority information for the server. It then creates random authorization data, and sends the random data to the server. The server allocates an X11 display number, and stores the (fake) Xauthority data for this display. Whenever an X11 connection is opened, the server forwards the connection over the secure channel to the client, and the client parses the first packet of the X11 protocol, substitutes real authentication data for the fake data (if the fake data matched), and forwards the connection to the real X server. If the display does not have Xauthority data, the server will create a unix domain socket in /tmp/.X11-unix, and use the unix domain socket as the display. No authentication information is forwarded in this case. X11 connections are again forwarded over the secure channel. To the X server the connections appear to come from the client machine, and the server must have connections allowed from the local machine. Using authentication data is always recommended because not using it makes the display insecure. If XDM is used, it automatically generates the authentication data. One should be careful not to use "xin" or "xstart" or other similar scripts that explicitly set DISPLAY to start X sessions in a remote machine, because the connection will then not go over the secure channel. The recommended way to start a shell in a remote machine is xterm -e ssh host & and the recommended way to execute an X11 application in a remote machine is ssh -n host emacs & If you need to type a password/passphrase for the remote machine, ssh -f host emacs may be useful. RSA AUTHENTICATION RSA authentication is based on public key cryptograpy. The idea is that there are two encryption keys, one for encryption and another for decryption. It is not possible (on human timescale) to derive the decryption key from the encryption key. The encryption key is called the public key, because it can be given to anyone and it is not secret. The decryption key, on the other hand, is secret, and is called the private key. RSA authentication is based on the impossibility of deriving the private key from the public key. The public key is stored on the server machine in the user's $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys file. The private key is only kept on the user's local machine, laptop, or other secure storage. Then the user tries to log in, the client tells the server the public key that the user wishes to use for authentication. The server then checks if this public key is admissible. If so, it generates a 256 bit random number, encrypts it with the public key, and sends the value to the client. The client then decrypts the number with its private key, computes a 128 bit MD5 checksum from the resulting data, and sends the checksum back to the server. (Only a checksum is sent to prevent chosen-plaintext attacks against RSA.) The server checks computes a checksum from the correct data, and compares the checksums. Authentication is accepted if the checksums match. (Theoretically this indicates that the client only probably knows the correct key, but for all practical purposes there is no doubt.) The RSA private key can be protected with a passphrase. The passphrase can be any string; it is hashed with MD5 to produce an encryption key for IDEA, which is used to encrypt the private part of the key file. With passphrase, authorization requires access to the key file and the passphrase. Without passphrase, authorization only depends on possession of the key file. RSA authentication is the most secure form of authentication supported by this software. It does not rely on the network, routers, domain name servers, or the client machine. The only thing that matters is access to the private key. All this, of course, depends on the security of the RSA algorithm itself. RSA has been widely known since about 1978, and no effective methods for breaking it are known if it is used properly. Care has been taken to avoid the well-known pitfalls. Breaking RSA is widely believed to be equivalent to factoring, which is a very hard mathematical problem that has received considerable public research. So far, no effective methods are known for numbers bigger than about 512 bits. However, as computer speeds and factoring methods are increasing, 512 bits can no longer be considered secure. The factoring work is exponential, and 768 or 1024 bits are widely considered to be secure in the near future. RHOSTS AUTHENTICATION Conventional .rhosts and hosts.equiv based authentication mechanisms are fundamentally insecure due to IP, DNS (domain name server) and routing spoofing attacks. Additionally this authentication method relies on the integrity of the client machine. These weaknesses is tolerable, and been known and exploited for a long time. Ssh provides an improved version of these types of authentication, because they are very convenient for the user (and allow easy transition from rsh and rlogin). It permits these types of authentication, but additionally requires that the client host be authenticated using RSA. The server has a list of host keys stored in /etc/ssh_known_host, and additionally each user has host keys in $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts. Ssh uses the name servers to obtain the canonical name of the client host, looks for its public key in its known host files, and requires the client to prove that it knows the private host key. This prevents IP and routing spoofing attacks (as long as the client machine private host key has not been compromized), but is still vulnerable to DNS attacks (to a limited extent), and relies on the integrity of the client machine as to who is requesting to log in. This prevents outsiders from attacking, but does not protect against very powerful attackers. If maximal security is desired, only RSA authentication should be used. It is possible to enable conventional .rhosts and /etc/hosts.equiv authentication (without host authentication) at compile time by giving the option --with-rhosts to configure. However, this is not recommended, and is not done by default. These weaknesses are present in rsh and rlogin. No improvement in security will be obtained unless rlogin and rsh are completely disabled (commented out in /etc/inetd.conf). This is highly recommended. WEAKEST LINKS IN SECURITY One should understand that while this software may provide cryptographically secure communications, it may be easy to monitor the communications at their endpoints. Basically, anyone with root access on the local machine on which you are running the software may be able to do anything. Anyone with root access on the server machine may be able to monitor your communications, and a very talented root user might even be able to send his/her own requests to your authentication agent. One should also be aware that computers send out electromagnetic radition that can sometimes be picked up hundreds of meters away. Your keyboard is particularly easy to listen to. The image on your monitor might also be seen on another monitor in a van parked behind your house. Beware that unwanted visitors might come to your home or office and use your machine while you are away. They might also make modifications or install bugs in your hardware or software. Beware that the most effective way for someone to decrypt your data may be with a rubber hose. LEGAL ISSUES As far as I am concerned, anyone is permitted to use this software freely. However, see the file COPYING for detailed copying, licensing, and distribution information. In some countries, particularly France, Russia, Iraq, and Pakistan, it may be illegal to use any encryption at all without a special permit, and the rumor has it that you cannot get a permit for any strong encryption. This software may be freely imported into the United States; however, the United States Government may consider re-exporting it a criminal offence. Note that any information and cryptographic algorithms used in this software are publicly available on the Internet and at any major bookstore, scientific library, or patent office worldwide. THERE IS NO WARRANTY FOR THIS PROGRAM. Please consult the file COPYING for more information. MAILING LISTS AND OTHER INFORMATION There is a mailing list for ossh. It is ossh@sics.se. If you would like to join, send a message to majordomo@sics.se with "subscribe ssh" in body. The WWW home page for ssh is http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh. It contains an archive of the mailing list, and detailed information about new releases, mailing lists, and other relevant issues. Bug reports should be sent to ossh-bugs@sics.se. ABOUT THE AUTHOR This software was written by Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>. I work as a researcher at Helsinki University of Technology, Finland. For more information, see http://www.cs.hut.fi/~ylo/. My PGP public key is available via finger from ylo@cs.hut.fi and from the key servers. I prefer PGP encrypted mail. The author can be contacted via ordinary mail at Tatu Ylonen Helsinki University of Technology Otakaari 1 FIN-02150 ESPOO Finland Fax. +358-0-4513293 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I thank Tero Kivinen, Timo Rinne, Janne Snabb, and Heikki Suonsivu for their help and comments in the design, implementation and porting of this software. I also thank numerous contributors, including but not limited to Walker Aumann, Jurgen Botz, Hans-Werner Braun, Stephane Bortzmeyer, Adrian Colley, Michael Cooper, David Dombek, Jerome Etienne, Bill Fithen, Mark Fullmer, Bert Gijsbers, Andreas Gustafsson, Michael Henits, Steve Johnson, Thomas Koenig, Felix Leitner, Gunnar Lindberg, Andrew Macpherson, Marc Martinec, Paul Mauvais, Donald McKillican, Leon Mlakar, Robert Muchsel, Mark Treacy, Bryan O'Sullivan, Mikael Suokas, Ollivier Robert, Jakob Schlyter, Tomasz Surmacz, Alvar Vinacua, Petri Virkkula, Michael Warfield, and Cristophe Wolfhugel. Thanks also go to Philip Zimmermann, whose PGP software and the associated legal battle provided inspiration, motivation, and many useful techniques, and to Bruce Schneier whose book Applied Cryptography has done a great service in widely distributing knowledge about cryptographic methods. Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen, Espoo, Finland.