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freebsd/contrib/openbsm/libbsm/bsm_wrappers.c
Robert Watson 506764c6f6 Vendor branch import of TrustedBSD OpenBSM 1.0 alpha 6: 
- Use AU_TO_WRITE and AU_NO_TO_WRITE for the 'keep' argument to au_close();
  previously we used hard-coded 0 and 1 values.
- Add man page for au_open(), au_write(), au_close(), and
  au_close_buffer().
- Support a more complete range of data types for the arbitrary data token:
  add AUR_CHAR (alias to AUR_BYTE), remove AUR_LONG, add AUR_INT32 (alias
  to AUR_INT), add AUR_INT64.
- Add au_close_token(), which allows writing a single token_t to a memory
  buffer.  Not likely to be used much by applications, but useful for
  writing test tools.
- Modify au_to_file() so that it accepts a timeval in user space, not just
  kernel -- this is not a Solaris BSM API so can be modified without
  causing compatibility issues.
- Define a new API, au_to_header32_tm(), which adds a struct timeval
  argument to the ordinary au_to_header32(), which is now implemented by
  wrapping au_to_header32_tm() and calling gettimeofday().  #ifndef KERNEL
  the APIs that invoke gettimeofday(), rather than having a variable
  definition.  Don't try to retrieve time zone information using
  gettimeofday(), as it's not needed, and introduces possible failure
  modes.
- Don't perform byte order transformations on the addr/machine fields of
  the terminal ID that appears in the process32/subject32 tokens.  These
  are assumed to be IP addresses, and as such, to be in network byte
  order.
- Universally, APIs now assume that IP addresses and ports are provided
  in network byte order.  APIs now generally provide these types in
  network byte order when decoding.
- Beginnings of an OpenBSM test framework can now be found in openbsm/test.
  This code is not built or installed by default.
- auditd now assigns more appropriate syslog levels to its debugging and
  error information.
- Support for audit filters introduced: audit filters are dynamically
  loaded shared objects that run in the context of a new daemon,
  auditfilterd.  The daemon reads from an audit pipe and feeds both BSM and
  parsed versions of records to shared objects using a module API.  This
  will provide a framework for the writing of intrusion detection services.
- New utility API, audit_submit(), added to capture common elements of audit
  record submission for many applications.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-06-05 10:52:12 +00:00

451 lines
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/*
* Copyright (c) 2004 Apple Computer, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of Apple Computer, Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of
* its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
* from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
* IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $P4: //depot/projects/trustedbsd/openbsm/libbsm/bsm_wrappers.c#23 $
*/
#ifdef __APPLE__
#define _SYS_AUDIT_H /* Prevent include of sys/audit.h. */
#endif
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#ifdef __APPLE__
#include <sys/queue.h> /* Our bsm/audit.h doesn't include queue.h. */
#endif
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <bsm/libbsm.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
/* These are not advertised in libbsm.h */
int audit_set_terminal_port(dev_t *p);
int audit_set_terminal_host(uint32_t *m);
/*
* General purpose audit submission mechanism for userspace.
*/
int
audit_submit(short au_event, au_id_t auid, char status,
int reterr, const char *fmt, ...)
{
char text[MAX_AUDITSTRING_LEN];
token_t *token;
long acond;
va_list ap;
pid_t pid;
int error, afd;
struct auditinfo ai;
if (auditon(A_GETCOND, &acond, sizeof(acond)) < 0) {
/*
* If auditon(2) returns ENOSYS, then audit has not been
* compiled into the kernel, so just return.
*/
if (errno == ENOSYS)
return (0);
error = errno;
syslog(LOG_AUTH | LOG_ERR, "audit: auditon failed: %s",
strerror(errno));
errno = error;
return (-1);
}
if (acond == AUC_NOAUDIT)
return (0);
afd = au_open();
if (afd < 0) {
error = errno;
syslog(LOG_AUTH | LOG_ERR, "audit: au_open failed: %s",
strerror(errno));
errno = error;
return (-1);
}
if (getaudit(&ai) < 0) {
error = errno;
syslog(LOG_AUTH | LOG_ERR, "audit: getaudit failed: %s",
strerror(errno));
errno = error;
return (-1);
}
pid = getpid();
token = au_to_subject32(auid, geteuid(), getegid(),
getuid(), getgid(), pid, pid, &ai.ai_termid);
if (token == NULL) {
syslog(LOG_AUTH | LOG_ERR,
"audit: unable to build subject token");
(void) au_close(afd, AU_TO_NO_WRITE, au_event);
errno = EPERM;
return (-1);
}
if (au_write(afd, token) < 0) {
error = errno;
syslog(LOG_AUTH | LOG_ERR,
"audit: au_write failed: %s", strerror(errno));
(void) au_close(afd, AU_TO_NO_WRITE, au_event);
errno = error;
return (-1);
}
if (fmt != NULL) {
va_start(ap, fmt);
(void) vsnprintf(text, MAX_AUDITSTRING_LEN, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
token = au_to_text(text);
if (token == NULL) {
syslog(LOG_AUTH | LOG_ERR,
"audit: failed to generate text token");
(void) au_close(afd, AU_TO_NO_WRITE, au_event);
errno = EPERM;
return (-1);
}
if (au_write(afd, token) < 0) {
error = errno;
syslog(LOG_AUTH | LOG_ERR,
"audit: au_write failed: %s", strerror(errno));
(void) au_close(afd, AU_TO_NO_WRITE, au_event);
errno = error;
return (-1);
}
}
token = au_to_return32(status, reterr);
if (token == NULL) {
syslog(LOG_AUTH | LOG_ERR,
"audit: enable to build return token");
(void) au_close(afd, AU_TO_NO_WRITE, au_event);
errno = EPERM;
return (-1);
}
if (au_write(afd, token) < 0) {
error = errno;
syslog(LOG_AUTH | LOG_ERR,
"audit: au_write failed: %s", strerror(errno));
(void) au_close(afd, AU_TO_NO_WRITE, au_event);
errno = error;
return (-1);
}
if (au_close(afd, AU_TO_WRITE, au_event) < 0) {
error = errno;
syslog(LOG_AUTH | LOG_ERR, "audit: record not committed");
errno = error;
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
int
audit_set_terminal_port(dev_t *p)
{
struct stat st;
if (p == NULL)
return (kAUBadParamErr);
#ifdef NODEV
*p = NODEV;
#else
*p = -1;
#endif
/* for /usr/bin/login, try fstat() first */
if (fstat(STDIN_FILENO, &st) != 0) {
if (errno != EBADF) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "fstat() failed (%s)",
strerror(errno));
return (kAUStatErr);
}
if (stat("/dev/console", &st) != 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "stat() failed (%s)",
strerror(errno));
return (kAUStatErr);
}
}
*p = st.st_rdev;
return (kAUNoErr);
}
int
audit_set_terminal_host(uint32_t *m)
{
#ifdef KERN_HOSTID
int name[2] = { CTL_KERN, KERN_HOSTID };
size_t len;
if (m == NULL)
return (kAUBadParamErr);
*m = 0;
len = sizeof(*m);
if (sysctl(name, 2, m, &len, NULL, 0) != 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "sysctl() failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
return (kAUSysctlErr);
}
return (kAUNoErr);
#else
*m = -1;
return (kAUNoErr);
#endif
}
int
audit_set_terminal_id(au_tid_t *tid)
{
int ret;
if (tid == NULL)
return (kAUBadParamErr);
if ((ret = audit_set_terminal_port(&tid->port)) != kAUNoErr)
return (ret);
return (audit_set_terminal_host(&tid->machine));
}
/*
* This is OK for those callers who have only one token to write. If you have
* multiple tokens that logically form part of the same audit record, you need
* to use the existing au_open()/au_write()/au_close() API:
*
* aufd = au_open();
* tok = au_to_random_token_1(...);
* au_write(aufd, tok);
* tok = au_to_random_token_2(...);
* au_write(aufd, tok);
* ...
* au_close(aufd, AU_TO_WRITE, AUE_your_event_type);
*
* Assumes, like all wrapper calls, that the caller has previously checked
* that auditing is enabled via the audit_get_state() call.
*
* XXX: Should be more robust against bad arguments.
*/
int
audit_write(short event_code, token_t *subject, token_t *misctok, char retval,
int errcode)
{
int aufd;
char *func = "audit_write()";
token_t *rettok;
if ((aufd = au_open()) == -1) {
au_free_token(subject);
au_free_token(misctok);
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: au_open() failed", func);
return (kAUOpenErr);
}
/* Save subject. */
if (subject && au_write(aufd, subject) == -1) {
au_free_token(subject);
au_free_token(misctok);
(void)au_close(aufd, AU_TO_WRITE, event_code);
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: write of subject failed", func);
return (kAUWriteSubjectTokErr);
}
/* Save the event-specific token. */
if (misctok && au_write(aufd, misctok) == -1) {
au_free_token(misctok);
(void)au_close(aufd, AU_TO_NO_WRITE, event_code);
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: write of caller token failed", func);
return (kAUWriteCallerTokErr);
}
/* Tokenize and save the return value. */
if ((rettok = au_to_return32(retval, errcode)) == NULL) {
(void)au_close(aufd, AU_TO_NO_WRITE, event_code);
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: au_to_return32() failed", func);
return (kAUMakeReturnTokErr);
}
if (au_write(aufd, rettok) == -1) {
au_free_token(rettok);
(void)au_close(aufd, AU_TO_NO_WRITE, event_code);
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: write of return code failed", func);
return (kAUWriteReturnTokErr);
}
/*
* We assume the caller wouldn't have bothered with this
* function if it hadn't already decided to keep the record.
*/
if (au_close(aufd, AU_TO_WRITE, event_code) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: au_close() failed", func);
return (kAUCloseErr);
}
return (kAUNoErr);
}
/*
* Same caveats as audit_write(). In addition, this function explicitly
* assumes success; use audit_write_failure() on error.
*/
int
audit_write_success(short event_code, token_t *tok, au_id_t auid, uid_t euid,
gid_t egid, uid_t ruid, gid_t rgid, pid_t pid, au_asid_t sid,
au_tid_t *tid)
{
char *func = "audit_write_success()";
token_t *subject = NULL;
/* Tokenize and save subject. */
subject = au_to_subject32(auid, euid, egid, ruid, rgid, pid, sid,
tid);
if (subject == NULL) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: au_to_subject32() failed", func);
return kAUMakeSubjectTokErr;
}
return (audit_write(event_code, subject, tok, 0, 0));
}
/*
* Same caveats as audit_write(). In addition, this function explicitly
* assumes success; use audit_write_failure_self() on error.
*/
int
audit_write_success_self(short event_code, token_t *tok)
{
token_t *subject;
char *func = "audit_write_success_self()";
if ((subject = au_to_me()) == NULL) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: au_to_me() failed", func);
return (kAUMakeSubjectTokErr);
}
return (audit_write(event_code, subject, tok, 0, 0));
}
/*
* Same caveats as audit_write(). In addition, this function explicitly
* assumes failure; use audit_write_success() otherwise.
*
* XXX This should let the caller pass an error return value rather than
* hard-coding -1.
*/
int
audit_write_failure(short event_code, char *errmsg, int errcode, au_id_t auid,
uid_t euid, gid_t egid, uid_t ruid, gid_t rgid, pid_t pid, au_asid_t sid,
au_tid_t *tid)
{
char *func = "audit_write_failure()";
token_t *subject, *errtok;
subject = au_to_subject32(auid, euid, egid, ruid, rgid, pid, sid, tid);
if (subject == NULL) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: au_to_subject32() failed", func);
return (kAUMakeSubjectTokErr);
}
/* tokenize and save the error message */
if ((errtok = au_to_text(errmsg)) == NULL) {
au_free_token(subject);
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: au_to_text() failed", func);
return (kAUMakeTextTokErr);
}
return (audit_write(event_code, subject, errtok, -1, errcode));
}
/*
* Same caveats as audit_write(). In addition, this function explicitly
* assumes failure; use audit_write_success_self() otherwise.
*
* XXX This should let the caller pass an error return value rather than
* hard-coding -1.
*/
int
audit_write_failure_self(short event_code, char *errmsg, int errret)
{
char *func = "audit_write_failure_self()";
token_t *subject, *errtok;
if ((subject = au_to_me()) == NULL) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: au_to_me() failed", func);
return (kAUMakeSubjectTokErr);
}
/* tokenize and save the error message */
if ((errtok = au_to_text(errmsg)) == NULL) {
au_free_token(subject);
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: au_to_text() failed", func);
return (kAUMakeTextTokErr);
}
return (audit_write(event_code, subject, errtok, -1, errret));
}
/*
* For auditing errors during login. Such errors are implicitly
* non-attributable (i.e., not ascribable to any user).
*
* Assumes, like all wrapper calls, that the caller has previously checked
* that auditing is enabled via the audit_get_state() call.
*/
int
audit_write_failure_na(short event_code, char *errmsg, int errret, uid_t euid,
uid_t egid, pid_t pid, au_tid_t *tid)
{
return (audit_write_failure(event_code, errmsg, errret, -1, euid,
egid, -1, -1, pid, -1, tid));
}
/* END OF au_write() WRAPPERS */
#ifdef __APPLE__
void
audit_token_to_au32(audit_token_t atoken, uid_t *auidp, uid_t *euidp,
gid_t *egidp, uid_t *ruidp, gid_t *rgidp, pid_t *pidp, au_asid_t *asidp,
au_tid_t *tidp)
{
if (auidp != NULL)
*auidp = (uid_t)atoken.val[0];
if (euidp != NULL)
*euidp = (uid_t)atoken.val[1];
if (egidp != NULL)
*egidp = (gid_t)atoken.val[2];
if (ruidp != NULL)
*ruidp = (uid_t)atoken.val[3];
if (rgidp != NULL)
*rgidp = (gid_t)atoken.val[4];
if (pidp != NULL)
*pidp = (pid_t)atoken.val[5];
if (asidp != NULL)
*asidp = (au_asid_t)atoken.val[6];
if (tidp != NULL) {
audit_set_terminal_host(&tidp->machine);
tidp->port = (dev_t)atoken.val[7];
}
}
#endif /* !__APPLE__ */
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