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freebsd/sys/kern/sys_capability.c
Pawel Jakub Dawidek 297f11037f Style: move opt_*.h includes in the proper place.
MFC after:	1 month
2012-06-10 20:22:10 +00:00

566 lines
14 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 2008-2011 Robert N. M. Watson
* Copyright (c) 2010-2011 Jonathan Anderson
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed at the University of Cambridge Computer
* Laboratory with support from a grant from Google, Inc.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* FreeBSD kernel capability facility.
*
* Two kernel features are implemented here: capability mode, a sandboxed mode
* of execution for processes, and capabilities, a refinement on file
* descriptors that allows fine-grained control over operations on the file
* descriptor. Collectively, these allow processes to run in the style of a
* historic "capability system" in which they can use only resources
* explicitly delegated to them. This model is enforced by restricting access
* to global namespaces in capability mode.
*
* Capabilities wrap other file descriptor types, binding them to a constant
* rights mask set when the capability is created. New capabilities may be
* derived from existing capabilities, but only if they have the same or a
* strict subset of the rights on the original capability.
*
* System calls permitted in capability mode are defined in capabilities.conf;
* calls must be carefully audited for safety to ensure that they don't allow
* escape from a sandbox. Some calls permit only a subset of operations in
* capability mode -- for example, shm_open(2) is limited to creating
* anonymous, rather than named, POSIX shared memory objects.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "opt_capsicum.h"
#include "opt_ktrace.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/capability.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/filedesc.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/ucred.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/ktrace.h>
#include <security/audit/audit.h>
#include <vm/uma.h>
#include <vm/vm.h>
#ifdef CAPABILITY_MODE
FEATURE(security_capability_mode, "Capsicum Capability Mode");
/*
* System call to enter capability mode for the process.
*/
int
sys_cap_enter(struct thread *td, struct cap_enter_args *uap)
{
struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
struct proc *p;
if (IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td))
return (0);
newcred = crget();
p = td->td_proc;
PROC_LOCK(p);
oldcred = p->p_ucred;
crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
newcred->cr_flags |= CRED_FLAG_CAPMODE;
p->p_ucred = newcred;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
crfree(oldcred);
return (0);
}
/*
* System call to query whether the process is in capability mode.
*/
int
sys_cap_getmode(struct thread *td, struct cap_getmode_args *uap)
{
u_int i;
i = (IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td)) ? 1 : 0;
return (copyout(&i, uap->modep, sizeof(i)));
}
#else /* !CAPABILITY_MODE */
int
sys_cap_enter(struct thread *td, struct cap_enter_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
sys_cap_getmode(struct thread *td, struct cap_getmode_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
#endif /* CAPABILITY_MODE */
#ifdef CAPABILITIES
FEATURE(security_capabilities, "Capsicum Capabilities");
/*
* struct capability describes a capability, and is hung off of its struct
* file f_data field. cap_file and cap_rightss are static once hooked up, as
* neither the object it references nor the rights it encapsulates are
* permitted to change.
*/
struct capability {
struct file *cap_object; /* Underlying object's file. */
struct file *cap_file; /* Back-pointer to cap's file. */
cap_rights_t cap_rights; /* Mask of rights on object. */
};
/*
* Capabilities have a fileops vector, but in practice none should ever be
* called except for fo_close, as the capability will normally not be
* returned during a file descriptor lookup in the system call code.
*/
static fo_rdwr_t capability_read;
static fo_rdwr_t capability_write;
static fo_truncate_t capability_truncate;
static fo_ioctl_t capability_ioctl;
static fo_poll_t capability_poll;
static fo_kqfilter_t capability_kqfilter;
static fo_stat_t capability_stat;
static fo_close_t capability_close;
static fo_chmod_t capability_chmod;
static fo_chown_t capability_chown;
static struct fileops capability_ops = {
.fo_read = capability_read,
.fo_write = capability_write,
.fo_truncate = capability_truncate,
.fo_ioctl = capability_ioctl,
.fo_poll = capability_poll,
.fo_kqfilter = capability_kqfilter,
.fo_stat = capability_stat,
.fo_close = capability_close,
.fo_chmod = capability_chmod,
.fo_chown = capability_chown,
.fo_flags = DFLAG_PASSABLE,
};
static struct fileops capability_ops_unpassable = {
.fo_read = capability_read,
.fo_write = capability_write,
.fo_truncate = capability_truncate,
.fo_ioctl = capability_ioctl,
.fo_poll = capability_poll,
.fo_kqfilter = capability_kqfilter,
.fo_stat = capability_stat,
.fo_close = capability_close,
.fo_chmod = capability_chmod,
.fo_chown = capability_chown,
.fo_flags = 0,
};
static uma_zone_t capability_zone;
static void
capability_init(void *dummy __unused)
{
capability_zone = uma_zcreate("capability", sizeof(struct capability),
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, UMA_ALIGN_PTR, 0);
if (capability_zone == NULL)
panic("capability_init: capability_zone not initialized");
}
SYSINIT(vfs, SI_SUB_VFS, SI_ORDER_ANY, capability_init, NULL);
/*
* Test whether a capability grants the requested rights.
*/
static int
cap_check(struct capability *c, cap_rights_t rights)
{
if ((c->cap_rights | rights) != c->cap_rights) {
#ifdef KTRACE
if (KTRPOINT(curthread, KTR_CAPFAIL))
ktrcapfail(CAPFAIL_NOTCAPABLE, rights, c->cap_rights);
#endif
return (ENOTCAPABLE);
}
return (0);
}
/*
* Extract rights from a capability for monitoring purposes -- not for use in
* any other way, as we want to keep all capability permission evaluation in
* this one file.
*/
cap_rights_t
cap_rights(struct file *fp_cap)
{
struct capability *c;
KASSERT(fp_cap->f_type == DTYPE_CAPABILITY,
("cap_rights: !capability"));
c = fp_cap->f_data;
return (c->cap_rights);
}
/*
* System call to create a new capability reference to either an existing
* file object or an an existing capability.
*/
int
sys_cap_new(struct thread *td, struct cap_new_args *uap)
{
int error, capfd;
int fd = uap->fd;
struct file *fp;
cap_rights_t rights = uap->rights;
AUDIT_ARG_FD(fd);
AUDIT_ARG_RIGHTS(rights);
error = fget(td, fd, rights, &fp);
if (error)
return (error);
AUDIT_ARG_FILE(td->td_proc, fp);
error = kern_capwrap(td, fp, rights, &capfd);
/*
* Release our reference to the file (kern_capwrap has held a reference
* for the filedesc array).
*/
fdrop(fp, td);
if (error == 0)
td->td_retval[0] = capfd;
return (error);
}
/*
* System call to query the rights mask associated with a capability.
*/
int
sys_cap_getrights(struct thread *td, struct cap_getrights_args *uap)
{
struct capability *cp;
struct file *fp;
int error;
AUDIT_ARG_FD(uap->fd);
error = fgetcap(td, uap->fd, &fp);
if (error)
return (error);
cp = fp->f_data;
error = copyout(&cp->cap_rights, uap->rightsp, sizeof(*uap->rightsp));
fdrop(fp, td);
return (error);
}
/*
* Create a capability to wrap around an existing file.
*/
int
kern_capwrap(struct thread *td, struct file *fp, cap_rights_t rights,
int *capfdp)
{
struct capability *cp, *cp_old;
struct file *fp_object, *fcapp;
int error;
if ((rights | CAP_MASK_VALID) != CAP_MASK_VALID)
return (EINVAL);
/*
* If a new capability is being derived from an existing capability,
* then the new capability rights must be a subset of the existing
* rights.
*/
if (fp->f_type == DTYPE_CAPABILITY) {
cp_old = fp->f_data;
if ((cp_old->cap_rights | rights) != cp_old->cap_rights) {
#ifdef KTRACE
if (KTRPOINT(curthread, KTR_CAPFAIL))
ktrcapfail(CAPFAIL_INCREASE,
rights, cp_old->cap_rights);
#endif
return (ENOTCAPABLE);
}
}
/*
* Allocate a new file descriptor to hang the capability off of.
*/
error = falloc(td, &fcapp, capfdp, fp->f_flag);
if (error)
return (error);
/*
* Rather than nesting capabilities, directly reference the object an
* existing capability references. There's nothing else interesting
* to preserve for future use, as we've incorporated the previous
* rights mask into the new one. This prevents us from having to
* deal with capability chains.
*/
if (fp->f_type == DTYPE_CAPABILITY)
fp_object = ((struct capability *)fp->f_data)->cap_object;
else
fp_object = fp;
fhold(fp_object);
cp = uma_zalloc(capability_zone, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
cp->cap_rights = rights;
cp->cap_object = fp_object;
cp->cap_file = fcapp;
if (fp->f_flag & DFLAG_PASSABLE)
finit(fcapp, fp->f_flag, DTYPE_CAPABILITY, cp,
&capability_ops);
else
finit(fcapp, fp->f_flag, DTYPE_CAPABILITY, cp,
&capability_ops_unpassable);
/*
* Release our private reference (the proc filedesc still has one).
*/
fdrop(fcapp, td);
return (0);
}
/*
* Given a file descriptor, test it against a capability rights mask and then
* return the file descriptor on which to actually perform the requested
* operation. As long as the reference to fp_cap remains valid, the returned
* pointer in *fp will remain valid, so no extra reference management is
* required, and the caller should fdrop() fp_cap as normal when done with
* both.
*/
int
cap_funwrap(struct file *fp_cap, cap_rights_t rights, struct file **fpp)
{
struct capability *c;
int error;
if (fp_cap->f_type != DTYPE_CAPABILITY) {
*fpp = fp_cap;
return (0);
}
c = fp_cap->f_data;
error = cap_check(c, rights);
if (error)
return (error);
*fpp = c->cap_object;
return (0);
}
/*
* Slightly different routine for memory mapping file descriptors: unwrap the
* capability and check CAP_MMAP, but also return a bitmask representing the
* maximum mapping rights the capability allows on the object.
*/
int
cap_funwrap_mmap(struct file *fp_cap, cap_rights_t rights, u_char *maxprotp,
struct file **fpp)
{
struct capability *c;
u_char maxprot;
int error;
if (fp_cap->f_type != DTYPE_CAPABILITY) {
*fpp = fp_cap;
*maxprotp = VM_PROT_ALL;
return (0);
}
c = fp_cap->f_data;
error = cap_check(c, rights | CAP_MMAP);
if (error)
return (error);
*fpp = c->cap_object;
maxprot = 0;
if (c->cap_rights & CAP_READ)
maxprot |= VM_PROT_READ;
if (c->cap_rights & CAP_WRITE)
maxprot |= VM_PROT_WRITE;
if (c->cap_rights & CAP_MAPEXEC)
maxprot |= VM_PROT_EXECUTE;
*maxprotp = maxprot;
return (0);
}
/*
* When a capability is closed, simply drop the reference on the underlying
* object and free the capability. fdrop() will handle the case where the
* underlying object also needs to close, and the caller will have already
* performed any object-specific lock or mqueue handling.
*/
static int
capability_close(struct file *fp, struct thread *td)
{
struct capability *c;
struct file *fp_object;
KASSERT(fp->f_type == DTYPE_CAPABILITY,
("capability_close: !capability"));
c = fp->f_data;
fp->f_ops = &badfileops;
fp->f_data = NULL;
fp_object = c->cap_object;
uma_zfree(capability_zone, c);
return (fdrop(fp_object, td));
}
/*
* In general, file descriptor operations should never make it to the
* capability, only the underlying file descriptor operation vector, so panic
* if we do turn up here.
*/
static int
capability_read(struct file *fp, struct uio *uio, struct ucred *active_cred,
int flags, struct thread *td)
{
panic("capability_read");
}
static int
capability_write(struct file *fp, struct uio *uio, struct ucred *active_cred,
int flags, struct thread *td)
{
panic("capability_write");
}
static int
capability_truncate(struct file *fp, off_t length, struct ucred *active_cred,
struct thread *td)
{
panic("capability_truncate");
}
static int
capability_ioctl(struct file *fp, u_long com, void *data,
struct ucred *active_cred, struct thread *td)
{
panic("capability_ioctl");
}
static int
capability_poll(struct file *fp, int events, struct ucred *active_cred,
struct thread *td)
{
panic("capability_poll");
}
static int
capability_kqfilter(struct file *fp, struct knote *kn)
{
panic("capability_kqfilter");
}
static int
capability_stat(struct file *fp, struct stat *sb, struct ucred *active_cred,
struct thread *td)
{
panic("capability_stat");
}
int
capability_chmod(struct file *fp, mode_t mode, struct ucred *active_cred,
struct thread *td)
{
panic("capability_chmod");
}
int
capability_chown(struct file *fp, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
struct ucred *active_cred, struct thread *td)
{
panic("capability_chown");
}
#else /* !CAPABILITIES */
/*
* Stub Capability functions for when options CAPABILITIES isn't compiled
* into the kernel.
*/
int
sys_cap_new(struct thread *td, struct cap_new_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
sys_cap_getrights(struct thread *td, struct cap_getrights_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
cap_funwrap(struct file *fp_cap, cap_rights_t rights, struct file **fpp)
{
KASSERT(fp_cap->f_type != DTYPE_CAPABILITY,
("cap_funwrap: saw capability"));
*fpp = fp_cap;
return (0);
}
int
cap_funwrap_mmap(struct file *fp_cap, cap_rights_t rights, u_char *maxprotp,
struct file **fpp)
{
KASSERT(fp_cap->f_type != DTYPE_CAPABILITY,
("cap_funwrap_mmap: saw capability"));
*fpp = fp_cap;
*maxprotp = VM_PROT_ALL;
return (0);
}
#endif /* CAPABILITIES */