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freebsd/sys/fs/procfs/procfs_mem.c
Robert Watson a0f75161f9 o Replace calls to p_can(..., P_CAN_xxx) with calls to p_canxxx().
The p_can(...) construct was a premature (and, it turns out,
  awkward) abstraction.  The individual calls to p_canxxx() better
  reflect differences between the inter-process authorization checks,
  such as differing checks based on the type of signal.  This has
  a side effect of improving code readability.
o Replace direct credential authorization checks in ktrace() with
  invocation of p_candebug(), while maintaining the special case
  check of KTR_ROOT.  This allows ktrace() to "play more nicely"
  with new mandatory access control schemes, as well as making its
  authorization checks consistent with other "debugging class"
  checks.
o Eliminate "privused" construct for p_can*() calls which allowed the
  caller to determine if privilege was required for successful
  evaluation of the access control check.  This primitive is currently
  unused, and as such, serves only to complicate the API.

Approved by:	({procfs,linprocfs} changes) des
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2001-07-05 17:10:46 +00:00

324 lines
8.2 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (c) 1993 Jan-Simon Pendry
* Copyright (c) 1993 Sean Eric Fagan
* Copyright (c) 1993
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
* Jan-Simon Pendry and Sean Eric Fagan.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* This product includes software developed by the University of
* California, Berkeley and its contributors.
* 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* @(#)procfs_mem.c 8.5 (Berkeley) 6/15/94
*
* $FreeBSD$
*/
/*
* This is a lightly hacked and merged version
* of sef's pread/pwrite functions
*/
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/user.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <fs/procfs/procfs.h>
#include <vm/vm.h>
#include <vm/vm_param.h>
#include <vm/pmap.h>
#include <vm/vm_extern.h>
#include <vm/vm_map.h>
#include <vm/vm_kern.h>
#include <vm/vm_object.h>
#include <vm/vm_page.h>
static int procfs_rwmem __P((struct proc *curp,
struct proc *p, struct uio *uio));
static int
procfs_rwmem(curp, p, uio)
struct proc *curp;
struct proc *p;
struct uio *uio;
{
int error;
int writing;
struct vmspace *vm;
vm_map_t map;
vm_object_t object = NULL;
vm_offset_t pageno = 0; /* page number */
vm_prot_t reqprot;
vm_offset_t kva;
GIANT_REQUIRED;
/*
* if the vmspace is in the midst of being deallocated or the
* process is exiting, don't try to grab anything. The page table
* usage in that process can be messed up.
*/
vm = p->p_vmspace;
if ((p->p_flag & P_WEXIT))
return EFAULT;
if (vm->vm_refcnt < 1)
return EFAULT;
++vm->vm_refcnt;
/*
* The map we want...
*/
map = &vm->vm_map;
writing = uio->uio_rw == UIO_WRITE;
reqprot = writing ? (VM_PROT_WRITE | VM_PROT_OVERRIDE_WRITE) : VM_PROT_READ;
kva = kmem_alloc_pageable(kernel_map, PAGE_SIZE);
/*
* Only map in one page at a time. We don't have to, but it
* makes things easier. This way is trivial - right?
*/
do {
vm_map_t tmap;
vm_offset_t uva;
int page_offset; /* offset into page */
vm_map_entry_t out_entry;
vm_prot_t out_prot;
boolean_t wired;
vm_pindex_t pindex;
u_int len;
vm_page_t m;
object = NULL;
uva = (vm_offset_t) uio->uio_offset;
/*
* Get the page number of this segment.
*/
pageno = trunc_page(uva);
page_offset = uva - pageno;
/*
* How many bytes to copy
*/
len = min(PAGE_SIZE - page_offset, uio->uio_resid);
/*
* Fault the page on behalf of the process
*/
error = vm_fault(map, pageno, reqprot, VM_FAULT_NORMAL);
if (error) {
error = EFAULT;
break;
}
/*
* Now we need to get the page. out_entry, out_prot, wired,
* and single_use aren't used. One would think the vm code
* would be a *bit* nicer... We use tmap because
* vm_map_lookup() can change the map argument.
*/
tmap = map;
error = vm_map_lookup(&tmap, pageno, reqprot,
&out_entry, &object, &pindex, &out_prot,
&wired);
if (error) {
error = EFAULT;
/*
* Make sure that there is no residue in 'object' from
* an error return on vm_map_lookup.
*/
object = NULL;
break;
}
m = vm_page_lookup(object, pindex);
/* Allow fallback to backing objects if we are reading */
while (m == NULL && !writing && object->backing_object) {
pindex += OFF_TO_IDX(object->backing_object_offset);
object = object->backing_object;
m = vm_page_lookup(object, pindex);
}
if (m == NULL) {
error = EFAULT;
/*
* Make sure that there is no residue in 'object' from
* an error return on vm_map_lookup.
*/
object = NULL;
vm_map_lookup_done(tmap, out_entry);
break;
}
/*
* Wire the page into memory
*/
vm_page_wire(m);
/*
* We're done with tmap now.
* But reference the object first, so that we won't loose
* it.
*/
vm_object_reference(object);
vm_map_lookup_done(tmap, out_entry);
pmap_kenter(kva, VM_PAGE_TO_PHYS(m));
/*
* Now do the i/o move.
*/
error = uiomove((caddr_t)(kva + page_offset), len, uio);
pmap_kremove(kva);
/*
* release the page and the object
*/
vm_page_unwire(m, 1);
vm_object_deallocate(object);
object = NULL;
} while (error == 0 && uio->uio_resid > 0);
if (object)
vm_object_deallocate(object);
kmem_free(kernel_map, kva, PAGE_SIZE);
vmspace_free(vm);
return (error);
}
/*
* Copy data in and out of the target process.
* We do this by mapping the process's page into
* the kernel and then doing a uiomove direct
* from the kernel address space.
*/
int
procfs_domem(curp, p, pfs, uio)
struct proc *curp;
struct proc *p;
struct pfsnode *pfs;
struct uio *uio;
{
if (uio->uio_resid == 0)
return (0);
/*
* XXX
* We need to check for KMEM_GROUP because ps is sgid kmem;
* not allowing it here causes ps to not work properly. Arguably,
* this is a bug with what ps does. We only need to do this
* for Pmem nodes, and only if it's reading. This is still not
* good, as it may still be possible to grab illicit data if
* a process somehow gets to be KMEM_GROUP. Note that this also
* means that KMEM_GROUP can't change without editing procfs.h!
* All in all, quite yucky.
*/
if (p_candebug(curp, p) &&
!(uio->uio_rw == UIO_READ &&
procfs_kmemaccess(curp)))
return EPERM;
return (procfs_rwmem(curp, p, uio));
}
/*
* Given process (p), find the vnode from which
* its text segment is being executed.
*
* It would be nice to grab this information from
* the VM system, however, there is no sure-fire
* way of doing that. Instead, fork(), exec() and
* wait() all maintain the p_textvp field in the
* process proc structure which contains a held
* reference to the exec'ed vnode.
*
* XXX - Currently, this is not not used, as the
* /proc/pid/file object exposes an information leak
* that shouldn't happen. Using a mount option would
* make it configurable on a per-system (or, at least,
* per-mount) basis; however, that's not really best.
* The best way to do it, I think, would be as an
* ioctl; this would restrict it to the uid running
* program, or root, which seems a reasonable compromise.
* However, the number of applications for this is
* minimal, if it can't be seen in the filesytem space,
* and doint it as an ioctl makes it somewhat less
* useful due to the, well, inelegance.
*
*/
struct vnode *
procfs_findtextvp(p)
struct proc *p;
{
return (p->p_textvp);
}
int procfs_kmemaccess(curp)
struct proc *curp;
{
int i;
struct ucred *cred;
cred = curp->p_ucred;
if (suser(curp))
return 1;
/* XXX: Why isn't this done with file-perms ??? */
for (i = 0; i < cred->cr_ngroups; i++)
if (cred->cr_groups[i] == KMEM_GROUP)
return 1;
return 0;
}