mirror of
https://git.FreeBSD.org/src.git
synced 2024-12-23 11:18:54 +00:00
0bff6a5af8
It contains many fixes, including bounds checking, buffer overflows (in SLIP and bittok2str_internal), buffer over-reads, and infinite loops. One other notable change: Do not use getprotobynumber() for protocol name resolution. Do not do any protocol name resolution if -n is specified. Submitted by: gordon Reviewed by: delphij, emaste, glebius MFC after: 1 week Relnotes: Yes Security: CVE-2017-11108, CVE-2017-11541, CVE-2017-11542 Security: CVE-2017-11543, CVE-2017-12893, CVE-2017-12894 Security: CVE-2017-12895, CVE-2017-12896, CVE-2017-12897 Security: CVE-2017-12898, CVE-2017-12899, CVE-2017-12900 Security: CVE-2017-12901, CVE-2017-12902, CVE-2017-12985 Security: CVE-2017-12986, CVE-2017-12987, CVE-2017-12988 Security: CVE-2017-12989, CVE-2017-12990, CVE-2017-12991 Security: CVE-2017-12992, CVE-2017-12993, CVE-2017-12994 Security: CVE-2017-12995, CVE-2017-12996, CVE-2017-12997 Security: CVE-2017-12998, CVE-2017-12999, CVE-2017-13000 Security: CVE-2017-13001, CVE-2017-13002, CVE-2017-13003 Security: CVE-2017-13004, CVE-2017-13005, CVE-2017-13006 Security: CVE-2017-13007, CVE-2017-13008, CVE-2017-13009 Security: CVE-2017-13010, CVE-2017-13011, CVE-2017-13012 Security: CVE-2017-13013, CVE-2017-13014, CVE-2017-13015 Security: CVE-2017-13016, CVE-2017-13017, CVE-2017-13018 Security: CVE-2017-13019, CVE-2017-13020, CVE-2017-13021 Security: CVE-2017-13022, CVE-2017-13023, CVE-2017-13024 Security: CVE-2017-13025, CVE-2017-13026, CVE-2017-13027 Security: CVE-2017-13028, CVE-2017-13029, CVE-2017-13030 Security: CVE-2017-13031, CVE-2017-13032, CVE-2017-13033 Security: CVE-2017-13034, CVE-2017-13035, CVE-2017-13036 Security: CVE-2017-13037, CVE-2017-13038, CVE-2017-13039 Security: CVE-2017-13040, CVE-2017-13041, CVE-2017-13042 Security: CVE-2017-13043, CVE-2017-13044, CVE-2017-13045 Security: CVE-2017-13046, CVE-2017-13047, CVE-2017-13048 Security: CVE-2017-13049, CVE-2017-13050, CVE-2017-13051 Security: CVE-2017-13052, CVE-2017-13053, CVE-2017-13054 Security: CVE-2017-13055, CVE-2017-13687, CVE-2017-13688 Security: CVE-2017-13689, CVE-2017-13690, CVE-2017-13725 Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12404
409 lines
11 KiB
C
409 lines
11 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The TCPDUMP project
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that: (1) source code
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* distributions retain the above copyright notice and this paragraph
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* in its entirety, and (2) distributions including binary code include
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* the above copyright notice and this paragraph in its entirety in
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* the documentation or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND
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* WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT
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* LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
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* FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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*
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* Original code by Hannes Gredler (hannes@gredler.at)
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*/
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/* \summary: Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol printer */
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/* specification: RFC 6810 */
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#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
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#include "config.h"
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#endif
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#include <netdissect-stdinc.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include "netdissect.h"
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#include "extract.h"
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#include "addrtoname.h"
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static const char tstr[] = "[|RPKI-RTR]";
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/*
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* RPKI/Router PDU header
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*
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* Here's what the PDU header looks like.
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* The length does include the version and length fields.
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*/
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typedef struct rpki_rtr_pdu_ {
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u_char version; /* Version number */
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u_char pdu_type; /* PDU type */
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union {
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u_char session_id[2]; /* Session id */
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u_char error_code[2]; /* Error code */
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} u;
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u_char length[4];
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} rpki_rtr_pdu;
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#define RPKI_RTR_PDU_OVERHEAD (offsetof(rpki_rtr_pdu, rpki_rtr_pdu_msg))
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/*
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* IPv4 Prefix PDU.
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*/
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typedef struct rpki_rtr_pdu_ipv4_prefix_ {
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rpki_rtr_pdu pdu_header;
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u_char flags;
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u_char prefix_length;
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u_char max_length;
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u_char zero;
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u_char prefix[4];
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u_char as[4];
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} rpki_rtr_pdu_ipv4_prefix;
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/*
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* IPv6 Prefix PDU.
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*/
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typedef struct rpki_rtr_pdu_ipv6_prefix_ {
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rpki_rtr_pdu pdu_header;
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u_char flags;
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u_char prefix_length;
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u_char max_length;
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u_char zero;
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u_char prefix[16];
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u_char as[4];
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} rpki_rtr_pdu_ipv6_prefix;
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/*
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* Error report PDU.
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*/
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typedef struct rpki_rtr_pdu_error_report_ {
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rpki_rtr_pdu pdu_header;
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u_char encapsulated_pdu_length[4]; /* Encapsulated PDU length */
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/* Copy of Erroneous PDU (variable, optional) */
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/* Length of Error Text (4 octets in network byte order) */
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/* Arbitrary Text of Error Diagnostic Message (variable, optional) */
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} rpki_rtr_pdu_error_report;
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/*
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* PDU type codes
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*/
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#define RPKI_RTR_SERIAL_NOTIFY_PDU 0
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#define RPKI_RTR_SERIAL_QUERY_PDU 1
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#define RPKI_RTR_RESET_QUERY_PDU 2
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#define RPKI_RTR_CACHE_RESPONSE_PDU 3
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#define RPKI_RTR_IPV4_PREFIX_PDU 4
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#define RPKI_RTR_IPV6_PREFIX_PDU 6
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#define RPKI_RTR_END_OF_DATA_PDU 7
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#define RPKI_RTR_CACHE_RESET_PDU 8
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#define RPKI_RTR_ERROR_REPORT_PDU 10
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static const struct tok rpki_rtr_pdu_values[] = {
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{ RPKI_RTR_SERIAL_NOTIFY_PDU, "Serial Notify" },
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{ RPKI_RTR_SERIAL_QUERY_PDU, "Serial Query" },
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{ RPKI_RTR_RESET_QUERY_PDU, "Reset Query" },
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{ RPKI_RTR_CACHE_RESPONSE_PDU, "Cache Response" },
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{ RPKI_RTR_IPV4_PREFIX_PDU, "IPV4 Prefix" },
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{ RPKI_RTR_IPV6_PREFIX_PDU, "IPV6 Prefix" },
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{ RPKI_RTR_END_OF_DATA_PDU, "End of Data" },
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{ RPKI_RTR_CACHE_RESET_PDU, "Cache Reset" },
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{ RPKI_RTR_ERROR_REPORT_PDU, "Error Report" },
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{ 0, NULL}
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};
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static const struct tok rpki_rtr_error_codes[] = {
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{ 0, "Corrupt Data" },
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{ 1, "Internal Error" },
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{ 2, "No Data Available" },
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{ 3, "Invalid Request" },
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{ 4, "Unsupported Protocol Version" },
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{ 5, "Unsupported PDU Type" },
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{ 6, "Withdrawal of Unknown Record" },
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{ 7, "Duplicate Announcement Received" },
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{ 0, NULL}
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};
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/*
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* Build a indentation string for a given indentation level.
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* XXX this should be really in util.c
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*/
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static char *
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indent_string (u_int indent)
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{
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static char buf[20];
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u_int idx;
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idx = 0;
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buf[idx] = '\0';
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/*
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* Does the static buffer fit ?
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*/
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if (sizeof(buf) < ((indent/8) + (indent %8) + 2)) {
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return buf;
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}
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/*
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* Heading newline.
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*/
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buf[idx] = '\n';
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idx++;
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while (indent >= 8) {
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buf[idx] = '\t';
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idx++;
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indent -= 8;
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}
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while (indent > 0) {
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buf[idx] = ' ';
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idx++;
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indent--;
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}
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/*
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* Trailing zero.
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*/
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buf[idx] = '\0';
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return buf;
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}
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/*
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* Print a single PDU.
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*/
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static u_int
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rpki_rtr_pdu_print (netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *tptr, const u_int len,
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const u_char recurse, const u_int indent)
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{
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const rpki_rtr_pdu *pdu_header;
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u_int pdu_type, pdu_len, hexdump;
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const u_char *msg;
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/* Protocol Version */
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ND_TCHECK_8BITS(tptr);
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if (*tptr != 0) {
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/* Skip the rest of the input buffer because even if this is
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* a well-formed PDU of a future RPKI-Router protocol version
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* followed by a well-formed PDU of RPKI-Router protocol
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* version 0, there is no way to know exactly how to skip the
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* current PDU.
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*/
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ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sRPKI-RTRv%u (unknown)", indent_string(8), *tptr));
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return len;
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}
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if (len < sizeof(rpki_rtr_pdu)) {
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ND_PRINT((ndo, "(%u bytes is too few to decode)", len));
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goto invalid;
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}
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ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(rpki_rtr_pdu));
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pdu_header = (const rpki_rtr_pdu *)tptr;
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pdu_type = pdu_header->pdu_type;
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pdu_len = EXTRACT_32BITS(pdu_header->length);
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/* Do not check bounds with pdu_len yet, do it in the case blocks
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* below to make it possible to decode at least the beginning of
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* a truncated Error Report PDU or a truncated encapsulated PDU.
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*/
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hexdump = FALSE;
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ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sRPKI-RTRv%u, %s PDU (%u), length: %u",
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indent_string(8),
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pdu_header->version,
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tok2str(rpki_rtr_pdu_values, "Unknown", pdu_type),
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pdu_type, pdu_len));
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if (pdu_len < sizeof(rpki_rtr_pdu) || pdu_len > len)
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goto invalid;
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switch (pdu_type) {
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/*
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* The following PDUs share the message format.
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*/
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case RPKI_RTR_SERIAL_NOTIFY_PDU:
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case RPKI_RTR_SERIAL_QUERY_PDU:
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case RPKI_RTR_END_OF_DATA_PDU:
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if (pdu_len != sizeof(rpki_rtr_pdu) + 4)
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goto invalid;
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ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, pdu_len);
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msg = (const u_char *)(pdu_header + 1);
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ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sSession ID: 0x%04x, Serial: %u",
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indent_string(indent+2),
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EXTRACT_16BITS(pdu_header->u.session_id),
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EXTRACT_32BITS(msg)));
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break;
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/*
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* The following PDUs share the message format.
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*/
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case RPKI_RTR_RESET_QUERY_PDU:
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case RPKI_RTR_CACHE_RESET_PDU:
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if (pdu_len != sizeof(rpki_rtr_pdu))
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goto invalid;
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/* no additional boundary to check */
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/*
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* Zero payload PDUs.
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*/
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break;
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case RPKI_RTR_CACHE_RESPONSE_PDU:
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if (pdu_len != sizeof(rpki_rtr_pdu))
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goto invalid;
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/* no additional boundary to check */
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ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sSession ID: 0x%04x",
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indent_string(indent+2),
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EXTRACT_16BITS(pdu_header->u.session_id)));
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break;
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case RPKI_RTR_IPV4_PREFIX_PDU:
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{
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const rpki_rtr_pdu_ipv4_prefix *pdu;
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if (pdu_len != sizeof(rpki_rtr_pdu) + 12)
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goto invalid;
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ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, pdu_len);
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pdu = (const rpki_rtr_pdu_ipv4_prefix *)tptr;
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ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sIPv4 Prefix %s/%u-%u, origin-as %u, flags 0x%02x",
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indent_string(indent+2),
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ipaddr_string(ndo, pdu->prefix),
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pdu->prefix_length, pdu->max_length,
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EXTRACT_32BITS(pdu->as), pdu->flags));
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}
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break;
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case RPKI_RTR_IPV6_PREFIX_PDU:
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{
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const rpki_rtr_pdu_ipv6_prefix *pdu;
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if (pdu_len != sizeof(rpki_rtr_pdu) + 24)
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goto invalid;
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ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, pdu_len);
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pdu = (const rpki_rtr_pdu_ipv6_prefix *)tptr;
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ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sIPv6 Prefix %s/%u-%u, origin-as %u, flags 0x%02x",
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indent_string(indent+2),
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ip6addr_string(ndo, pdu->prefix),
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pdu->prefix_length, pdu->max_length,
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EXTRACT_32BITS(pdu->as), pdu->flags));
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}
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break;
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case RPKI_RTR_ERROR_REPORT_PDU:
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{
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const rpki_rtr_pdu_error_report *pdu;
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u_int encapsulated_pdu_length, text_length, tlen, error_code;
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tlen = sizeof(rpki_rtr_pdu);
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/* Do not test for the "Length of Error Text" data element yet. */
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if (pdu_len < tlen + 4)
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goto invalid;
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ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, tlen + 4);
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/* Safe up to and including the "Length of Encapsulated PDU"
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* data element, more data elements may be present.
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*/
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pdu = (const rpki_rtr_pdu_error_report *)tptr;
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encapsulated_pdu_length = EXTRACT_32BITS(pdu->encapsulated_pdu_length);
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tlen += 4;
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error_code = EXTRACT_16BITS(pdu->pdu_header.u.error_code);
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ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sError code: %s (%u), Encapsulated PDU length: %u",
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indent_string(indent+2),
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tok2str(rpki_rtr_error_codes, "Unknown", error_code),
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error_code, encapsulated_pdu_length));
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if (encapsulated_pdu_length) {
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/* Section 5.10 of RFC 6810 says:
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* "An Error Report PDU MUST NOT be sent for an Error Report PDU."
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*
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* However, as far as the protocol encoding goes Error Report PDUs can
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* happen to be nested in each other, however many times, in which case
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* the decoder should still print such semantically incorrect PDUs.
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*
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* That said, "the Erroneous PDU field MAY be truncated" (ibid), thus
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* to keep things simple this implementation decodes only the two
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* outermost layers of PDUs and makes bounds checks in the outer and
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* the inner PDU independently.
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*/
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if (pdu_len < tlen + encapsulated_pdu_length)
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goto invalid;
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if (! recurse) {
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ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, tlen + encapsulated_pdu_length);
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}
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else {
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ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s-----encapsulated PDU-----", indent_string(indent+4)));
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rpki_rtr_pdu_print(ndo, tptr + tlen,
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encapsulated_pdu_length, 0, indent + 2);
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}
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tlen += encapsulated_pdu_length;
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}
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if (pdu_len < tlen + 4)
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goto invalid;
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ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, tlen + 4);
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/* Safe up to and including the "Length of Error Text" data element,
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* one more data element may be present.
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*/
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/*
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* Extract, trail-zero and print the Error message.
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*/
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text_length = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + tlen);
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tlen += 4;
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if (text_length) {
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if (pdu_len < tlen + text_length)
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goto invalid;
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/* fn_printn() makes the bounds check */
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ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sError text: ", indent_string(indent+2)));
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if (fn_printn(ndo, tptr + tlen, text_length, ndo->ndo_snapend))
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goto trunc;
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}
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}
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break;
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default:
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ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, pdu_len);
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/*
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* Unknown data, please hexdump.
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*/
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hexdump = TRUE;
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}
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/* do we also want to see a hex dump ? */
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if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 || (ndo->ndo_vflag && hexdump)) {
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print_unknown_data(ndo,tptr,"\n\t ", pdu_len);
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}
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return pdu_len;
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invalid:
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ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", istr));
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ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, len);
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return len;
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trunc:
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ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t%s", tstr));
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return len;
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}
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void
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rpki_rtr_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *pptr, register u_int len)
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{
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if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) {
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ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RPKI-RTR"));
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return;
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}
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while (len) {
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u_int pdu_len = rpki_rtr_pdu_print(ndo, pptr, len, 1, 8);
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len -= pdu_len;
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pptr += pdu_len;
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}
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}
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/*
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* Local Variables:
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* c-style: whitesmith
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* c-basic-offset: 4
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* End:
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*/
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