mirror of
https://git.FreeBSD.org/src.git
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0bff6a5af8
It contains many fixes, including bounds checking, buffer overflows (in SLIP and bittok2str_internal), buffer over-reads, and infinite loops. One other notable change: Do not use getprotobynumber() for protocol name resolution. Do not do any protocol name resolution if -n is specified. Submitted by: gordon Reviewed by: delphij, emaste, glebius MFC after: 1 week Relnotes: Yes Security: CVE-2017-11108, CVE-2017-11541, CVE-2017-11542 Security: CVE-2017-11543, CVE-2017-12893, CVE-2017-12894 Security: CVE-2017-12895, CVE-2017-12896, CVE-2017-12897 Security: CVE-2017-12898, CVE-2017-12899, CVE-2017-12900 Security: CVE-2017-12901, CVE-2017-12902, CVE-2017-12985 Security: CVE-2017-12986, CVE-2017-12987, CVE-2017-12988 Security: CVE-2017-12989, CVE-2017-12990, CVE-2017-12991 Security: CVE-2017-12992, CVE-2017-12993, CVE-2017-12994 Security: CVE-2017-12995, CVE-2017-12996, CVE-2017-12997 Security: CVE-2017-12998, CVE-2017-12999, CVE-2017-13000 Security: CVE-2017-13001, CVE-2017-13002, CVE-2017-13003 Security: CVE-2017-13004, CVE-2017-13005, CVE-2017-13006 Security: CVE-2017-13007, CVE-2017-13008, CVE-2017-13009 Security: CVE-2017-13010, CVE-2017-13011, CVE-2017-13012 Security: CVE-2017-13013, CVE-2017-13014, CVE-2017-13015 Security: CVE-2017-13016, CVE-2017-13017, CVE-2017-13018 Security: CVE-2017-13019, CVE-2017-13020, CVE-2017-13021 Security: CVE-2017-13022, CVE-2017-13023, CVE-2017-13024 Security: CVE-2017-13025, CVE-2017-13026, CVE-2017-13027 Security: CVE-2017-13028, CVE-2017-13029, CVE-2017-13030 Security: CVE-2017-13031, CVE-2017-13032, CVE-2017-13033 Security: CVE-2017-13034, CVE-2017-13035, CVE-2017-13036 Security: CVE-2017-13037, CVE-2017-13038, CVE-2017-13039 Security: CVE-2017-13040, CVE-2017-13041, CVE-2017-13042 Security: CVE-2017-13043, CVE-2017-13044, CVE-2017-13045 Security: CVE-2017-13046, CVE-2017-13047, CVE-2017-13048 Security: CVE-2017-13049, CVE-2017-13050, CVE-2017-13051 Security: CVE-2017-13052, CVE-2017-13053, CVE-2017-13054 Security: CVE-2017-13055, CVE-2017-13687, CVE-2017-13688 Security: CVE-2017-13689, CVE-2017-13690, CVE-2017-13725 Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12404
215 lines
5.6 KiB
C
215 lines
5.6 KiB
C
/*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that: (1) source code
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* distributions retain the above copyright notice and this paragraph
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* in its entirety, and (2) distributions including binary code include
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* the above copyright notice and this paragraph in its entirety in
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* the documentation or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND
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* WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT
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* LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
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* FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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*
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* Functions for signature and digest verification.
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*
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* Original code by Hannes Gredler (hannes@gredler.at)
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*/
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#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
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#include "config.h"
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#endif
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#include <netdissect-stdinc.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include "netdissect.h"
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#include "signature.h"
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#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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#endif
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const struct tok signature_check_values[] = {
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{ SIGNATURE_VALID, "valid"},
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{ SIGNATURE_INVALID, "invalid"},
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{ CANT_ALLOCATE_COPY, "can't allocate memory"},
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{ CANT_CHECK_SIGNATURE, "unchecked"},
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{ 0, NULL }
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};
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#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO
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/*
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* Compute a HMAC MD5 sum.
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* Taken from rfc2104, Appendix.
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*/
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USES_APPLE_DEPRECATED_API
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static void
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signature_compute_hmac_md5(const uint8_t *text, int text_len, unsigned char *key,
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unsigned int key_len, uint8_t *digest)
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{
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MD5_CTX context;
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unsigned char k_ipad[65]; /* inner padding - key XORd with ipad */
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unsigned char k_opad[65]; /* outer padding - key XORd with opad */
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unsigned char tk[16];
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int i;
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/* if key is longer than 64 bytes reset it to key=MD5(key) */
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if (key_len > 64) {
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MD5_CTX tctx;
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MD5_Init(&tctx);
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MD5_Update(&tctx, key, key_len);
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MD5_Final(tk, &tctx);
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key = tk;
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key_len = 16;
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}
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/*
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* the HMAC_MD5 transform looks like:
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*
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* MD5(K XOR opad, MD5(K XOR ipad, text))
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*
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* where K is an n byte key
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* ipad is the byte 0x36 repeated 64 times
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* opad is the byte 0x5c repeated 64 times
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* and text is the data being protected
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*/
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/* start out by storing key in pads */
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memset(k_ipad, 0, sizeof k_ipad);
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memset(k_opad, 0, sizeof k_opad);
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memcpy(k_ipad, key, key_len);
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memcpy(k_opad, key, key_len);
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/* XOR key with ipad and opad values */
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for (i=0; i<64; i++) {
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k_ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
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k_opad[i] ^= 0x5c;
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}
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/*
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* perform inner MD5
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*/
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MD5_Init(&context); /* init context for 1st pass */
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MD5_Update(&context, k_ipad, 64); /* start with inner pad */
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MD5_Update(&context, text, text_len); /* then text of datagram */
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MD5_Final(digest, &context); /* finish up 1st pass */
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/*
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* perform outer MD5
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*/
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MD5_Init(&context); /* init context for 2nd pass */
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MD5_Update(&context, k_opad, 64); /* start with outer pad */
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MD5_Update(&context, digest, 16); /* then results of 1st hash */
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MD5_Final(digest, &context); /* finish up 2nd pass */
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}
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USES_APPLE_RST
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/*
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* Verify a cryptographic signature of the packet.
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* Currently only MD5 is supported.
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*/
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int
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signature_verify(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *pptr, u_int plen,
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const u_char *sig_ptr, void (*clear_rtn)(void *),
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const void *clear_arg)
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{
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uint8_t *packet_copy, *sig_copy;
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uint8_t sig[16];
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unsigned int i;
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if (!ndo->ndo_sigsecret) {
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return (CANT_CHECK_SIGNATURE);
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}
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/*
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* Do we have all the packet data to be checked?
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*/
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if (!ND_TTEST2(pptr, plen)) {
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/* No. */
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return (CANT_CHECK_SIGNATURE);
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}
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/*
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* Do we have the entire signature to check?
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*/
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if (!ND_TTEST2(sig_ptr, sizeof(sig))) {
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/* No. */
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return (CANT_CHECK_SIGNATURE);
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}
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if (sig_ptr + sizeof(sig) > pptr + plen) {
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/* No. */
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return (CANT_CHECK_SIGNATURE);
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}
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/*
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* Make a copy of the packet, so we don't overwrite the original.
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*/
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packet_copy = malloc(plen);
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if (packet_copy == NULL) {
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return (CANT_ALLOCATE_COPY);
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}
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memcpy(packet_copy, pptr, plen);
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/*
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* Clear the signature in the copy.
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*/
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sig_copy = packet_copy + (sig_ptr - pptr);
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memset(sig_copy, 0, sizeof(sig));
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/*
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* Clear anything else that needs to be cleared in the copy.
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* Our caller is assumed to have vetted the clear_arg pointer.
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*/
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(*clear_rtn)((void *)(packet_copy + ((const uint8_t *)clear_arg - pptr)));
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/*
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* Compute the signature.
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*/
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signature_compute_hmac_md5(packet_copy, plen,
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(unsigned char *)ndo->ndo_sigsecret,
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strlen(ndo->ndo_sigsecret), sig);
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/*
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* Free the copy.
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*/
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free(packet_copy);
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/*
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* Does the computed signature match the signature in the packet?
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*/
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if (memcmp(sig_ptr, sig, sizeof(sig)) == 0) {
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/* Yes. */
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return (SIGNATURE_VALID);
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} else {
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/* No - print the computed signature. */
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for (i = 0; i < sizeof(sig); ++i) {
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ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", sig[i]));
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}
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return (SIGNATURE_INVALID);
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}
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}
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#else
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int
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signature_verify(netdissect_options *ndo _U_, const u_char *pptr _U_,
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u_int plen _U_, const u_char *sig_ptr _U_,
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void (*clear_rtn)(void *) _U_, const void *clear_arg _U_)
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{
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return (CANT_CHECK_SIGNATURE);
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}
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#endif
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/*
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* Local Variables:
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* c-style: whitesmith
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* c-basic-offset: 4
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* End:
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*/
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