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freebsd/usr.sbin/pwd_mkdb/pwd_mkdb.c
Matthew Dillon be648216c6 PR: bin/3478
Have pwd_mkdb lock the source file while rebuilding the database.  When
    called by programs such as vipw, the source file is a temporary file and
    this does not conflict with the lock on /etc/master.passwd already held
    by vipw.  When run manually, however, master.passwd is typically specified
    as the argument and the locking prevents other programs from messing with
    master.passwd during the database rebuild.

    Also pwd_mkdb uses a blocking exclusive lock as it may be called from
    a script.  The -N option was added to cause pwd_mkdb to get the lock
    non-blocking and exit with an error if the attempt fails, again useful
    for scripts.
1998-12-13 01:53:50 +00:00

620 lines
16 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 1991, 1993, 1994
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* This product includes software developed by the University of
* California, Berkeley and its contributors.
* 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef lint
static const char copyright[] =
"@(#) Copyright (c) 1991, 1993, 1994\n\
The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.\n";
#endif /* not lint */
#ifndef lint
#if 0
static char sccsid[] = "@(#)pwd_mkdb.c 8.5 (Berkeley) 4/20/94";
#endif
static const char rcsid[] =
"$Id: pwd_mkdb.c,v 1.28 1998/12/12 16:08:41 foxfair Exp $";
#endif /* not lint */
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <db.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "pw_scan.h"
#define INSECURE 1
#define SECURE 2
#define PERM_INSECURE (S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IROTH)
#define PERM_SECURE (S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR)
HASHINFO openinfo = {
4096, /* bsize */
32, /* ffactor */
256, /* nelem */
2048 * 1024, /* cachesize */
NULL, /* hash() */
0 /* lorder */
};
static enum state { FILE_INSECURE, FILE_SECURE, FILE_ORIG } clean;
static struct passwd pwd; /* password structure */
static char *pname; /* password file name */
static char prefix[MAXPATHLEN];
static int is_comment; /* flag for comments */
static char line[LINE_MAX];
void cleanup __P((void));
void error __P((char *));
void cp __P((char *, char *, mode_t mode));
void mv __P((char *, char *));
int scan __P((FILE *, struct passwd *));
static void usage __P((void));
int
main(argc, argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
DB *dp, *sdp, *pw_db;
DBT data, sdata, key;
FILE *fp, *oldfp;
sigset_t set;
int ch, cnt, ypcnt, len, makeold, tfd, yp_enabled = 0;
char *p, *t;
char buf[MAX(MAXPATHLEN, LINE_MAX * 2)], tbuf[1024];
char sbuf[MAX(MAXPATHLEN, LINE_MAX * 2)];
char buf2[MAXPATHLEN];
char sbuf2[MAXPATHLEN];
char *username;
u_int method, methoduid;
int Cflag;
int nblock = 0;
Cflag = 0;
strcpy(prefix, _PATH_PWD);
makeold = 0;
username = NULL;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "Cd:ps:u:v")) != -1)
switch(ch) {
case 'C': /* verify only */
Cflag = 1;
break;
case 'd':
strncpy(prefix, optarg, sizeof prefix - 1);
break;
case 'p': /* create V7 "file.orig" */
makeold = 1;
break;
case 's': /* change default cachesize */
openinfo.cachesize = atoi(optarg) * 1024 * 1024;
break;
case 'u': /* only update this record */
username = optarg;
break;
case 'v': /* backward compatible */
break;
case 'N': /* do not wait for lock */
nblock = LOCK_NB;
break;
default:
usage();
}
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
if (argc != 1 || (username && (*username == '+' || *username == '-')))
usage();
/*
* This could be changed to allow the user to interrupt.
* Probably not worth the effort.
*/
sigemptyset(&set);
sigaddset(&set, SIGTSTP);
sigaddset(&set, SIGHUP);
sigaddset(&set, SIGINT);
sigaddset(&set, SIGQUIT);
sigaddset(&set, SIGTERM);
(void)sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &set, (sigset_t *)NULL);
/* We don't care what the user wants. */
(void)umask(0);
pname = *argv;
/*
* Open and lock the original password file. We have to check
* the hardlink count after we get the lock to handle any potential
* unlink/rename race.
*
* This lock is necessary when someone runs pwd_mkdb manually, directly
* on master.passwd, to handle the case where a user might try to
* change his password while pwd_mkdb is running.
*/
for (;;) {
struct stat st;
if (!(fp = fopen(pname, "r")))
error(pname);
if (flock(fileno(fp), LOCK_EX|nblock) < 0)
error("flock");
if (fstat(fileno(fp), &st) < 0)
error(pname);
if (st.st_nlink != 0)
break;
fclose(fp);
fp = NULL;
}
/* check only if password database is valid */
if (Cflag) {
for (cnt = 1; scan(fp, &pwd); ++cnt);
exit(0);
}
/* Open the temporary insecure password database. */
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s.tmp", prefix, _MP_DB);
(void)snprintf(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf), "%s/%s.tmp", prefix, _SMP_DB);
if (username) {
(void)snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2), "%s/%s", prefix, _MP_DB);
(void)snprintf(sbuf2, sizeof(sbuf2), "%s/%s", prefix, _SMP_DB);
clean = FILE_INSECURE;
cp(buf2, buf, PERM_INSECURE);
dp = dbopen(buf,
O_RDWR|O_EXCL, PERM_INSECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo);
if (dp == NULL)
error(buf);
clean = FILE_SECURE;
cp(sbuf2, sbuf, PERM_SECURE);
sdp = dbopen(sbuf,
O_RDWR|O_EXCL, PERM_SECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo);
if (sdp == NULL)
error(sbuf);
/*
* Do some trouble to check if we should store this users
* uid. Don't use getpwnam/getpwuid as that interferes
* with NIS.
*/
pw_db = dbopen(_PATH_MP_DB, O_RDONLY, 0, DB_HASH, NULL);
if (!pw_db)
error(_MP_DB);
buf[0] = _PW_KEYBYNAME;
len = strlen(username);
/* Only check that username fits in buffer */
memmove(buf + 1, username, MIN(len, sizeof(buf) - 1));
key.data = (u_char *)buf;
key.size = len + 1;
if ((pw_db->get)(pw_db, &key, &data, 0) == 0) {
p = (char *)data.data;
/* jump over pw_name and pw_passwd, to get to pw_uid */
while (*p++)
;
while (*p++)
;
buf[0] = _PW_KEYBYUID;
memmove(buf + 1, p, sizeof(int));
key.data = (u_char *)buf;
key.size = sizeof(int) + 1;
if ((pw_db->get)(pw_db, &key, &data, 0) == 0) {
/* First field of data.data holds pw_pwname */
if (!strcmp(data.data, username))
methoduid = 0;
else
methoduid = R_NOOVERWRITE;
} else {
methoduid = R_NOOVERWRITE;
}
} else {
methoduid = R_NOOVERWRITE;
}
if ((pw_db->close)(pw_db))
error("close pw_db");
method = 0;
} else {
dp = dbopen(buf,
O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, PERM_INSECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo);
if (dp == NULL)
error(buf);
clean = FILE_INSECURE;
sdp = dbopen(sbuf,
O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, PERM_SECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo);
if (sdp == NULL)
error(sbuf);
clean = FILE_SECURE;
method = R_NOOVERWRITE;
methoduid = R_NOOVERWRITE;
}
/*
* Open file for old password file. Minor trickiness -- don't want to
* chance the file already existing, since someone (stupidly) might
* still be using this for permission checking. So, open it first and
* fdopen the resulting fd. The resulting file should be readable by
* everyone.
*/
if (makeold) {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.orig", pname);
if ((tfd = open(buf,
O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, PERM_INSECURE)) < 0)
error(buf);
if ((oldfp = fdopen(tfd, "w")) == NULL)
error(buf);
clean = FILE_ORIG;
}
/*
* The databases actually contain three copies of the original data.
* Each password file entry is converted into a rough approximation
* of a ``struct passwd'', with the strings placed inline. This
* object is then stored as the data for three separate keys. The
* first key * is the pw_name field prepended by the _PW_KEYBYNAME
* character. The second key is the pw_uid field prepended by the
* _PW_KEYBYUID character. The third key is the line number in the
* original file prepended by the _PW_KEYBYNUM character. (The special
* characters are prepended to ensure that the keys do not collide.)
*/
ypcnt = 1;
data.data = (u_char *)buf;
sdata.data = (u_char *)sbuf;
key.data = (u_char *)tbuf;
for (cnt = 1; scan(fp, &pwd); ++cnt) {
if (!is_comment &&
(pwd.pw_name[0] == '+' || pwd.pw_name[0] == '-'))
yp_enabled = 1;
#define COMPACT(e) t = e; while ((*p++ = *t++));
#ifdef PASSWD_IGNORE_COMMENTS
if(is_comment)
--cnt;
#endif
if (!is_comment &&
(!username || (strcmp(username, pwd.pw_name) == 0))) {
/* Create insecure data. */
p = buf;
COMPACT(pwd.pw_name);
COMPACT("*");
memmove(p, &pwd.pw_uid, sizeof(int));
p += sizeof(int);
memmove(p, &pwd.pw_gid, sizeof(int));
p += sizeof(int);
memmove(p, &pwd.pw_change, sizeof(time_t));
p += sizeof(time_t);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_class);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_gecos);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_dir);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_shell);
memmove(p, &pwd.pw_expire, sizeof(time_t));
p += sizeof(time_t);
memmove(p, &pwd.pw_fields, sizeof pwd.pw_fields);
p += sizeof pwd.pw_fields;
data.size = p - buf;
/* Create secure data. */
p = sbuf;
COMPACT(pwd.pw_name);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_passwd);
memmove(p, &pwd.pw_uid, sizeof(int));
p += sizeof(int);
memmove(p, &pwd.pw_gid, sizeof(int));
p += sizeof(int);
memmove(p, &pwd.pw_change, sizeof(time_t));
p += sizeof(time_t);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_class);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_gecos);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_dir);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_shell);
memmove(p, &pwd.pw_expire, sizeof(time_t));
p += sizeof(time_t);
memmove(p, &pwd.pw_fields, sizeof pwd.pw_fields);
p += sizeof pwd.pw_fields;
sdata.size = p - sbuf;
/* Store insecure by name. */
tbuf[0] = _PW_KEYBYNAME;
len = strlen(pwd.pw_name);
memmove(tbuf + 1, pwd.pw_name, len);
key.size = len + 1;
if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, method) == -1)
error("put");
/* Store insecure by number. */
tbuf[0] = _PW_KEYBYNUM;
memmove(tbuf + 1, &cnt, sizeof(cnt));
key.size = sizeof(cnt) + 1;
if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, method) == -1)
error("put");
/* Store insecure by uid. */
tbuf[0] = _PW_KEYBYUID;
memmove(tbuf + 1, &pwd.pw_uid, sizeof(pwd.pw_uid));
key.size = sizeof(pwd.pw_uid) + 1;
if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, methoduid) == -1)
error("put");
/* Store secure by name. */
tbuf[0] = _PW_KEYBYNAME;
len = strlen(pwd.pw_name);
memmove(tbuf + 1, pwd.pw_name, len);
key.size = len + 1;
if ((sdp->put)(sdp, &key, &sdata, method) == -1)
error("put");
/* Store secure by number. */
tbuf[0] = _PW_KEYBYNUM;
memmove(tbuf + 1, &cnt, sizeof(cnt));
key.size = sizeof(cnt) + 1;
if ((sdp->put)(sdp, &key, &sdata, method) == -1)
error("put");
/* Store secure by uid. */
tbuf[0] = _PW_KEYBYUID;
memmove(tbuf + 1, &pwd.pw_uid, sizeof(pwd.pw_uid));
key.size = sizeof(pwd.pw_uid) + 1;
if ((sdp->put)(sdp, &key, &sdata, methoduid) == -1)
error("put");
/* Store insecure and secure special plus and special minus */
if (pwd.pw_name[0] == '+' || pwd.pw_name[0] == '-') {
tbuf[0] = _PW_KEYYPBYNUM;
memmove(tbuf + 1, &ypcnt, sizeof(cnt));
ypcnt++;
key.size = sizeof(cnt) + 1;
if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, method) == -1)
error("put");
if ((sdp->put)(sdp, &key, &sdata, method) == -1)
error("put");
}
}
/* Create original format password file entry */
if (is_comment && makeold){ /* copy comments */
if (fprintf(oldfp, "%s\n", line) < 0)
error("write old");
} else if (makeold) {
char uidstr[20];
char gidstr[20];
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%d", pwd.pw_uid);
snprintf(gidstr, sizeof(gidstr), "%d", pwd.pw_gid);
if (fprintf(oldfp, "%s:*:%s:%s:%s:%s:%s\n",
pwd.pw_name, pwd.pw_fields & _PWF_UID ? uidstr : "",
pwd.pw_fields & _PWF_GID ? gidstr : "",
pwd.pw_gecos, pwd.pw_dir, pwd.pw_shell) < 0)
error("write old");
}
}
/* If YP enabled, set flag. */
if (yp_enabled) {
buf[0] = yp_enabled + 2;
data.size = 1;
tbuf[0] = _PW_KEYYPENABLED;
key.size = 1;
if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, method) == -1)
error("put");
if ((sdp->put)(sdp, &key, &data, method) == -1)
error("put");
}
if ((dp->close)(dp) == -1)
error("close");
if ((sdp->close)(sdp) == -1)
error("close");
if (makeold) {
(void)fflush(oldfp);
if (fclose(oldfp) == EOF)
error("close old");
}
/* Set master.passwd permissions, in case caller forgot. */
(void)fchmod(fileno(fp), S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
/* Install as the real password files. */
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s.tmp", prefix, _MP_DB);
(void)snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2), "%s/%s", prefix, _MP_DB);
mv(buf, buf2);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s.tmp", prefix, _SMP_DB);
(void)snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2), "%s/%s", prefix, _SMP_DB);
mv(buf, buf2);
if (makeold) {
(void)snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2), "%s/%s", prefix, _PASSWD);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.orig", pname);
mv(buf, buf2);
}
/*
* Move the master password LAST -- chpass(1), passwd(1) and vipw(8)
* all use flock(2) on it to block other incarnations of themselves.
* The rename means that everything is unlocked, as the original file
* can no longer be accessed.
*/
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", prefix, _MASTERPASSWD);
mv(pname, buf);
/*
* Close locked password file after rename()
*/
if (fclose(fp) == EOF)
error("close fp");
exit(0);
}
int
scan(fp, pw)
FILE *fp;
struct passwd *pw;
{
static int lcnt;
char *p;
if (!fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp))
return (0);
++lcnt;
/*
* ``... if I swallow anything evil, put your fingers down my
* throat...''
* -- The Who
*/
if (!(p = strchr(line, '\n'))) {
warnx("line too long");
goto fmt;
}
*p = '\0';
#ifdef PASSWD_IGNORE_COMMENTS
/*
* Ignore comments: ^[ \t]*#
*/
for (p = line; *p != '\0'; p++)
if (*p != ' ' && *p != '\t')
break;
if (*p == '#' || *p == '\0') {
is_comment = 1;
return(1);
} else
is_comment = 0;
#endif
if (!pw_scan(line, pw)) {
warnx("at line #%d", lcnt);
fmt: errno = EFTYPE; /* XXX */
error(pname);
}
return (1);
}
void
cp(from, to, mode)
char *from, *to;
mode_t mode;
{
static char buf[MAXBSIZE];
int from_fd, rcount, to_fd, wcount;
if ((from_fd = open(from, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0)
error(from);
if ((to_fd = open(to, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, mode)) < 0)
error(to);
while ((rcount = read(from_fd, buf, MAXBSIZE)) > 0) {
wcount = write(to_fd, buf, rcount);
if (rcount != wcount || wcount == -1) {
int sverrno = errno;
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s to %s", from, to);
errno = sverrno;
error(buf);
}
}
if (rcount < 0) {
int sverrno = errno;
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s to %s", from, to);
errno = sverrno;
error(buf);
}
}
void
mv(from, to)
char *from, *to;
{
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
if (rename(from, to)) {
int sverrno = errno;
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s to %s", from, to);
errno = sverrno;
error(buf);
}
}
void
error(name)
char *name;
{
warn("%s", name);
cleanup();
exit(1);
}
void
cleanup()
{
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
switch(clean) {
case FILE_ORIG:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.orig", pname);
(void)unlink(buf);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case FILE_SECURE:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s.tmp", prefix, _SMP_DB);
(void)unlink(buf);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case FILE_INSECURE:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s.tmp", prefix, _MP_DB);
(void)unlink(buf);
}
}
static void
usage()
{
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"usage: pwd_mkdb [-C] [-p] [-d <dest dir>] [-s <cachesize>] [-u <local username>] file\n");
exit(1);
}