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930 lines
20 KiB
C
930 lines
20 KiB
C
/*
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* authkeys.c - routines to manage the storage of authentication keys
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*/
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#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
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# include <config.h>
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#endif
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#include <math.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "ntp.h"
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#include "ntp_fp.h"
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#include "ntpd.h"
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#include "ntp_lists.h"
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#include "ntp_string.h"
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#include "ntp_malloc.h"
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#include "ntp_stdlib.h"
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#include "ntp_keyacc.h"
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/*
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* Structure to store keys in in the hash table.
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*/
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typedef struct savekey symkey;
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struct savekey {
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symkey * hlink; /* next in hash bucket */
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DECL_DLIST_LINK(symkey, llink); /* for overall & free lists */
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u_char * secret; /* shared secret */
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KeyAccT * keyacclist; /* Private key access list */
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u_long lifetime; /* remaining lifetime */
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keyid_t keyid; /* key identifier */
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u_short type; /* OpenSSL digest NID */
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size_t secretsize; /* secret octets */
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u_short flags; /* KEY_ flags that wave */
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};
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/* define the payload region of symkey beyond the list pointers */
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#define symkey_payload secret
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#define KEY_TRUSTED 0x001 /* this key is trusted */
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#ifdef DEBUG
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typedef struct symkey_alloc_tag symkey_alloc;
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struct symkey_alloc_tag {
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symkey_alloc * link;
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void * mem; /* enable free() atexit */
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};
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symkey_alloc * authallocs;
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#endif /* DEBUG */
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static u_short auth_log2(size_t);
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static void auth_resize_hashtable(void);
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static void allocsymkey(keyid_t, u_short,
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u_short, u_long, size_t, u_char *, KeyAccT *);
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static void freesymkey(symkey *);
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#ifdef DEBUG
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static void free_auth_mem(void);
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#endif
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symkey key_listhead; /* list of all in-use keys */;
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/*
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* The hash table. This is indexed by the low order bits of the
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* keyid. We make this fairly big for potentially busy servers.
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*/
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#define DEF_AUTHHASHSIZE 64
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/*#define HASHMASK ((HASHSIZE)-1)*/
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#define KEYHASH(keyid) ((keyid) & authhashmask)
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int authhashdisabled;
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u_short authhashbuckets = DEF_AUTHHASHSIZE;
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u_short authhashmask = DEF_AUTHHASHSIZE - 1;
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symkey **key_hash;
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u_long authkeynotfound; /* keys not found */
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u_long authkeylookups; /* calls to lookup keys */
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u_long authnumkeys; /* number of active keys */
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u_long authkeyexpired; /* key lifetime expirations */
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u_long authkeyuncached; /* cache misses */
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u_long authnokey; /* calls to encrypt with no key */
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u_long authencryptions; /* calls to encrypt */
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u_long authdecryptions; /* calls to decrypt */
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/*
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* Storage for free symkey structures. We malloc() such things but
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* never free them.
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*/
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symkey *authfreekeys;
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int authnumfreekeys;
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#define MEMINC 16 /* number of new free ones to get */
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/*
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* The key cache. We cache the last key we looked at here.
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* Note: this should hold the last *trusted* key. Also the
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* cache is only loaded when the digest type / MAC algorithm
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* is valid.
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*/
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keyid_t cache_keyid; /* key identifier */
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u_char *cache_secret; /* secret */
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size_t cache_secretsize; /* secret length */
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int cache_type; /* OpenSSL digest NID */
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u_short cache_flags; /* flags that wave */
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KeyAccT *cache_keyacclist; /* key access list */
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/* --------------------------------------------------------------------
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* manage key access lists
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* --------------------------------------------------------------------
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*/
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/* allocate and populate new access node and pushes it on the list.
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* Returns the new head.
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*/
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KeyAccT*
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keyacc_new_push(
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KeyAccT * head,
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const sockaddr_u * addr,
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unsigned int subnetbits
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)
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{
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KeyAccT * node = emalloc(sizeof(KeyAccT));
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memcpy(&node->addr, addr, sizeof(sockaddr_u));
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node->subnetbits = subnetbits;
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node->next = head;
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return node;
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}
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/* ----------------------------------------------------------------- */
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/* pop and deallocate the first node of a list of access nodes, if
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* the list is not empty. Returns the tail of the list.
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*/
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KeyAccT*
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keyacc_pop_free(
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KeyAccT *head
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)
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{
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KeyAccT * next = NULL;
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if (head) {
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next = head->next;
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free(head);
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}
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return next;
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}
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/* ----------------------------------------------------------------- */
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/* deallocate the list; returns an empty list. */
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KeyAccT*
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keyacc_all_free(
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KeyAccT * head
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)
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{
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while (head)
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head = keyacc_pop_free(head);
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return head;
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}
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/* ----------------------------------------------------------------- */
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/* scan a list to see if it contains a given address. Return the
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* default result value in case of an empty list.
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*/
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int /*BOOL*/
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keyacc_contains(
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const KeyAccT *head,
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const sockaddr_u *addr,
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int defv)
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{
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if (head) {
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do {
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if (keyacc_amatch(&head->addr, addr,
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head->subnetbits))
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return TRUE;
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} while (NULL != (head = head->next));
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return FALSE;
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} else {
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return !!defv;
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}
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}
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#if CHAR_BIT != 8
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# error "don't know how to handle bytes with that bit size"
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#endif
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/* ----------------------------------------------------------------- */
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/* check two addresses for a match, taking a prefix length into account
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* when doing the compare.
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*
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* The ISC lib contains a similar function with not entirely specified
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* semantics, so it seemed somewhat cleaner to do this from scratch.
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*
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* Note 1: It *is* assumed that the addresses are stored in network byte
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* order, that is, most significant byte first!
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*
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* Note 2: "no address" compares unequal to all other addresses, even to
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* itself. This has the same semantics as NaNs have for floats: *any*
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* relational or equality operation involving a NaN returns FALSE, even
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* equality with itself. "no address" is either a NULL pointer argument
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* or an address of type AF_UNSPEC.
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*/
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int/*BOOL*/
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keyacc_amatch(
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const sockaddr_u * a1,
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const sockaddr_u * a2,
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unsigned int mbits
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)
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{
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const uint8_t * pm1;
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const uint8_t * pm2;
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uint8_t msk;
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unsigned int len;
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/* 1st check: If any address is not an address, it's inequal. */
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if ( !a1 || (AF_UNSPEC == AF(a1)) ||
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!a2 || (AF_UNSPEC == AF(a2)) )
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return FALSE;
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/* We could check pointers for equality here and shortcut the
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* other checks if we find object identity. But that use case is
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* too rare to care for it.
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*/
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/* 2nd check: Address families must be the same. */
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if (AF(a1) != AF(a2))
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return FALSE;
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/* type check: address family determines buffer & size */
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switch (AF(a1)) {
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case AF_INET:
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/* IPv4 is easy: clamp size, get byte pointers */
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if (mbits > sizeof(NSRCADR(a1)) * 8)
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mbits = sizeof(NSRCADR(a1)) * 8;
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pm1 = (const void*)&NSRCADR(a1);
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pm2 = (const void*)&NSRCADR(a2);
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break;
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case AF_INET6:
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/* IPv6 is slightly different: Both scopes must match,
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* too, before we even consider doing a match!
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*/
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if ( ! SCOPE_EQ(a1, a2))
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return FALSE;
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if (mbits > sizeof(NSRCADR6(a1)) * 8)
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mbits = sizeof(NSRCADR6(a1)) * 8;
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pm1 = (const void*)&NSRCADR6(a1);
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pm2 = (const void*)&NSRCADR6(a2);
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break;
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default:
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/* don't know how to compare that!?! */
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return FALSE;
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}
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/* Split bit length into byte length and partial byte mask.
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* Note that the byte mask extends from the MSB of a byte down,
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* and that zero shift (--> mbits % 8 == 0) results in an
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* all-zero mask.
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*/
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msk = 0xFFu ^ (0xFFu >> (mbits & 7));
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len = mbits >> 3;
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/* 3rd check: Do memcmp() over full bytes, if any */
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if (len && memcmp(pm1, pm2, len))
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return FALSE;
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/* 4th check: compare last incomplete byte, if any */
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if (msk && ((pm1[len] ^ pm2[len]) & msk))
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return FALSE;
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/* If none of the above failed, we're successfully through. */
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return TRUE;
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}
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/*
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* init_auth - initialize internal data
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*/
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void
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init_auth(void)
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{
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size_t newalloc;
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/*
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* Initialize hash table and free list
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*/
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newalloc = authhashbuckets * sizeof(key_hash[0]);
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key_hash = erealloc(key_hash, newalloc);
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memset(key_hash, '\0', newalloc);
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INIT_DLIST(key_listhead, llink);
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#ifdef DEBUG
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atexit(&free_auth_mem);
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#endif
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}
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/*
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* free_auth_mem - assist in leak detection by freeing all dynamic
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* allocations from this module.
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*/
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#ifdef DEBUG
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static void
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free_auth_mem(void)
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{
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symkey * sk;
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symkey_alloc * alloc;
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symkey_alloc * next_alloc;
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while (NULL != (sk = HEAD_DLIST(key_listhead, llink))) {
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freesymkey(sk);
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}
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free(key_hash);
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key_hash = NULL;
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cache_keyid = 0;
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cache_flags = 0;
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cache_keyacclist = NULL;
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for (alloc = authallocs; alloc != NULL; alloc = next_alloc) {
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next_alloc = alloc->link;
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free(alloc->mem);
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}
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authfreekeys = NULL;
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authnumfreekeys = 0;
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}
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#endif /* DEBUG */
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/*
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* auth_moremem - get some more free key structures
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*/
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void
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auth_moremem(
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int keycount
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)
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{
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symkey * sk;
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int i;
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#ifdef DEBUG
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void * base;
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symkey_alloc * allocrec;
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# define MOREMEM_EXTRA_ALLOC (sizeof(*allocrec))
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#else
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# define MOREMEM_EXTRA_ALLOC (0)
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#endif
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i = (keycount > 0)
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? keycount
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: MEMINC;
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sk = eallocarrayxz(i, sizeof(*sk), MOREMEM_EXTRA_ALLOC);
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#ifdef DEBUG
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base = sk;
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#endif
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authnumfreekeys += i;
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for (; i > 0; i--, sk++) {
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LINK_SLIST(authfreekeys, sk, llink.f);
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}
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#ifdef DEBUG
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allocrec = (void *)sk;
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allocrec->mem = base;
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LINK_SLIST(authallocs, allocrec, link);
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#endif
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}
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/*
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* auth_prealloc_symkeys
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*/
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void
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auth_prealloc_symkeys(
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int keycount
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)
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{
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int allocated;
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int additional;
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allocated = authnumkeys + authnumfreekeys;
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additional = keycount - allocated;
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if (additional > 0)
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auth_moremem(additional);
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auth_resize_hashtable();
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}
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static u_short
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auth_log2(size_t x)
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{
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/*
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** bithack to calculate floor(log2(x))
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**
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** This assumes
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** - (sizeof(size_t) is a power of two
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** - CHAR_BITS is a power of two
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** - returning zero for arguments <= 0 is OK.
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**
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** Does only shifts, masks and sums in integer arithmetic in
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** log2(CHAR_BIT*sizeof(size_t)) steps. (that is, 5/6 steps for
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** 32bit/64bit size_t)
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*/
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int s;
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int r = 0;
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size_t m = ~(size_t)0;
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for (s = sizeof(size_t) / 2 * CHAR_BIT; s != 0; s >>= 1) {
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m <<= s;
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if (x & m)
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r += s;
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else
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x <<= s;
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}
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return (u_short)r;
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}
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int/*BOOL*/
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ipaddr_match_masked(const sockaddr_u *,const sockaddr_u *,
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unsigned int mbits);
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static void
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authcache_flush_id(
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keyid_t id
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)
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{
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if (cache_keyid == id) {
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cache_keyid = 0;
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cache_type = 0;
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cache_flags = 0;
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cache_secret = NULL;
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cache_secretsize = 0;
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cache_keyacclist = NULL;
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}
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}
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/*
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* auth_resize_hashtable
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*
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* Size hash table to average 4 or fewer entries per bucket initially,
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* within the bounds of at least 4 and no more than 15 bits for the hash
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* table index. Populate the hash table.
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*/
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static void
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auth_resize_hashtable(void)
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{
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u_long totalkeys;
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u_short hashbits;
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u_short hash;
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size_t newalloc;
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symkey * sk;
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totalkeys = authnumkeys + authnumfreekeys;
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hashbits = auth_log2(totalkeys / 4) + 1;
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hashbits = max(4, hashbits);
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hashbits = min(15, hashbits);
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authhashbuckets = 1 << hashbits;
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authhashmask = authhashbuckets - 1;
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newalloc = authhashbuckets * sizeof(key_hash[0]);
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key_hash = erealloc(key_hash, newalloc);
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memset(key_hash, '\0', newalloc);
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ITER_DLIST_BEGIN(key_listhead, sk, llink, symkey)
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hash = KEYHASH(sk->keyid);
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LINK_SLIST(key_hash[hash], sk, hlink);
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ITER_DLIST_END()
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}
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/*
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* allocsymkey - common code to allocate and link in symkey
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*
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* secret must be allocated with a free-compatible allocator. It is
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* owned by the referring symkey structure, and will be free()d by
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* freesymkey().
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*/
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static void
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allocsymkey(
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keyid_t id,
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u_short flags,
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u_short type,
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u_long lifetime,
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size_t secretsize,
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u_char * secret,
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KeyAccT * ka
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)
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{
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symkey * sk;
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symkey ** bucket;
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bucket = &key_hash[KEYHASH(id)];
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if (authnumfreekeys < 1)
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auth_moremem(-1);
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UNLINK_HEAD_SLIST(sk, authfreekeys, llink.f);
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DEBUG_ENSURE(sk != NULL);
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sk->keyid = id;
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sk->flags = flags;
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sk->type = type;
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sk->secretsize = secretsize;
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sk->secret = secret;
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sk->keyacclist = ka;
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sk->lifetime = lifetime;
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LINK_SLIST(*bucket, sk, hlink);
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LINK_TAIL_DLIST(key_listhead, sk, llink);
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authnumfreekeys--;
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authnumkeys++;
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}
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/*
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* freesymkey - common code to remove a symkey and recycle its entry.
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*/
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static void
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freesymkey(
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symkey * sk
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)
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{
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symkey ** bucket;
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symkey * unlinked;
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if (NULL == sk)
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return;
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authcache_flush_id(sk->keyid);
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keyacc_all_free(sk->keyacclist);
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bucket = &key_hash[KEYHASH(sk->keyid)];
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if (sk->secret != NULL) {
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memset(sk->secret, '\0', sk->secretsize);
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free(sk->secret);
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}
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UNLINK_SLIST(unlinked, *bucket, sk, hlink, symkey);
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DEBUG_ENSURE(sk == unlinked);
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UNLINK_DLIST(sk, llink);
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memset((char *)sk + offsetof(symkey, symkey_payload), '\0',
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sizeof(*sk) - offsetof(symkey, symkey_payload));
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LINK_SLIST(authfreekeys, sk, llink.f);
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authnumkeys--;
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authnumfreekeys++;
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}
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/*
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* auth_findkey - find a key in the hash table
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*/
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struct savekey *
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auth_findkey(
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keyid_t id
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)
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{
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symkey * sk;
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for (sk = key_hash[KEYHASH(id)]; sk != NULL; sk = sk->hlink)
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if (id == sk->keyid)
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return sk;
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return NULL;
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}
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/*
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* auth_havekey - return TRUE if the key id is zero or known. The
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* key needs not to be trusted.
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*/
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int
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auth_havekey(
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keyid_t id
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)
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{
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|
return
|
|
(0 == id) ||
|
|
(cache_keyid == id) ||
|
|
(NULL != auth_findkey(id));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* authhavekey - return TRUE and cache the key, if zero or both known
|
|
* and trusted.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
authhavekey(
|
|
keyid_t id
|
|
)
|
|
{
|
|
symkey * sk;
|
|
|
|
authkeylookups++;
|
|
if (0 == id || cache_keyid == id)
|
|
return !!(KEY_TRUSTED & cache_flags);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Search the bin for the key. If not found, or found but the key
|
|
* type is zero, somebody marked it trusted without specifying a
|
|
* key or key type. In this case consider the key missing.
|
|
*/
|
|
authkeyuncached++;
|
|
sk = auth_findkey(id);
|
|
if ((sk == NULL) || (sk->type == 0)) {
|
|
authkeynotfound++;
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the key is not trusted, the key is not considered found.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ( ! (KEY_TRUSTED & sk->flags)) {
|
|
authnokey++;
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The key is found and trusted. Initialize the key cache.
|
|
*/
|
|
cache_keyid = sk->keyid;
|
|
cache_type = sk->type;
|
|
cache_flags = sk->flags;
|
|
cache_secret = sk->secret;
|
|
cache_secretsize = sk->secretsize;
|
|
cache_keyacclist = sk->keyacclist;
|
|
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* authtrust - declare a key to be trusted/untrusted
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
authtrust(
|
|
keyid_t id,
|
|
u_long trust
|
|
)
|
|
{
|
|
symkey * sk;
|
|
u_long lifetime;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Search bin for key; if it does not exist and is untrusted,
|
|
* forget it.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
sk = auth_findkey(id);
|
|
if (!trust && sk == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* There are two conditions remaining. Either it does not
|
|
* exist and is to be trusted or it does exist and is or is
|
|
* not to be trusted.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sk != NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Key exists. If it is to be trusted, say so and update
|
|
* its lifetime. If no longer trusted, return it to the
|
|
* free list. Flush the cache first to be sure there are
|
|
* no discrepancies.
|
|
*/
|
|
authcache_flush_id(id);
|
|
if (trust > 0) {
|
|
sk->flags |= KEY_TRUSTED;
|
|
if (trust > 1)
|
|
sk->lifetime = current_time + trust;
|
|
else
|
|
sk->lifetime = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
freesymkey(sk);
|
|
}
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* keyid is not present, but the is to be trusted. We allocate
|
|
* a new key, but do not specify a key type or secret.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (trust > 1) {
|
|
lifetime = current_time + trust;
|
|
} else {
|
|
lifetime = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
allocsymkey(id, KEY_TRUSTED, 0, lifetime, 0, NULL, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* authistrusted - determine whether a key is trusted
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
authistrusted(
|
|
keyid_t id
|
|
)
|
|
{
|
|
symkey * sk;
|
|
|
|
if (id == cache_keyid)
|
|
return !!(KEY_TRUSTED & cache_flags);
|
|
|
|
authkeyuncached++;
|
|
sk = auth_findkey(id);
|
|
if (sk == NULL || !(KEY_TRUSTED & sk->flags)) {
|
|
authkeynotfound++;
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* authistrustedip - determine if the IP is OK for the keyid
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
authistrustedip(
|
|
keyid_t keyno,
|
|
sockaddr_u * sau
|
|
)
|
|
{
|
|
symkey * sk;
|
|
|
|
if (keyno == cache_keyid) {
|
|
return (KEY_TRUSTED & cache_flags) &&
|
|
keyacc_contains(cache_keyacclist, sau, TRUE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != (sk = auth_findkey(keyno))) {
|
|
authkeyuncached++;
|
|
return (KEY_TRUSTED & sk->flags) &&
|
|
keyacc_contains(sk->keyacclist, sau, TRUE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
authkeynotfound++;
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Note: There are two locations below where 'strncpy()' is used. While
|
|
* this function is a hazard by itself, it's essential that it is used
|
|
* here. Bug 1243 involved that the secret was filled with NUL bytes
|
|
* after the first NUL encountered, and 'strlcpy()' simply does NOT have
|
|
* this behaviour. So disabling the fix and reverting to the buggy
|
|
* behaviour due to compatibility issues MUST also fill with NUL and
|
|
* this needs 'strncpy'. Also, the secret is managed as a byte blob of a
|
|
* given size, and eventually truncating it and replacing the last byte
|
|
* with a NUL would be a bug.
|
|
* perlinger@ntp.org 2015-10-10
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
MD5auth_setkey(
|
|
keyid_t keyno,
|
|
int keytype,
|
|
const u_char *key,
|
|
size_t secretsize,
|
|
KeyAccT *ka
|
|
)
|
|
{
|
|
symkey * sk;
|
|
u_char * secret;
|
|
|
|
DEBUG_ENSURE(keytype <= USHRT_MAX);
|
|
DEBUG_ENSURE(secretsize < 4 * 1024);
|
|
/*
|
|
* See if we already have the key. If so just stick in the
|
|
* new value.
|
|
*/
|
|
sk = auth_findkey(keyno);
|
|
if (sk != NULL && keyno == sk->keyid) {
|
|
/* TALOS-CAN-0054: make sure we have a new buffer! */
|
|
if (NULL != sk->secret) {
|
|
memset(sk->secret, 0, sk->secretsize);
|
|
free(sk->secret);
|
|
}
|
|
sk->secret = emalloc(secretsize + 1);
|
|
sk->type = (u_short)keytype;
|
|
sk->secretsize = secretsize;
|
|
/* make sure access lists don't leak here! */
|
|
if (ka != sk->keyacclist) {
|
|
keyacc_all_free(sk->keyacclist);
|
|
sk->keyacclist = ka;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef DISABLE_BUG1243_FIX
|
|
memcpy(sk->secret, key, secretsize);
|
|
#else
|
|
/* >MUST< use 'strncpy()' here! See above! */
|
|
strncpy((char *)sk->secret, (const char *)key,
|
|
secretsize);
|
|
#endif
|
|
authcache_flush_id(keyno);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Need to allocate new structure. Do it.
|
|
*/
|
|
secret = emalloc(secretsize + 1);
|
|
#ifndef DISABLE_BUG1243_FIX
|
|
memcpy(secret, key, secretsize);
|
|
#else
|
|
/* >MUST< use 'strncpy()' here! See above! */
|
|
strncpy((char *)secret, (const char *)key, secretsize);
|
|
#endif
|
|
allocsymkey(keyno, 0, (u_short)keytype, 0,
|
|
secretsize, secret, ka);
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
if (debug >= 4) {
|
|
size_t j;
|
|
|
|
printf("auth_setkey: key %d type %d len %d ", (int)keyno,
|
|
keytype, (int)secretsize);
|
|
for (j = 0; j < secretsize; j++) {
|
|
printf("%02x", secret[j]);
|
|
}
|
|
printf("\n");
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* auth_delkeys - delete non-autokey untrusted keys, and clear all info
|
|
* except the trusted bit of non-autokey trusted keys, in
|
|
* preparation for rereading the keys file.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
auth_delkeys(void)
|
|
{
|
|
symkey * sk;
|
|
|
|
ITER_DLIST_BEGIN(key_listhead, sk, llink, symkey)
|
|
if (sk->keyid > NTP_MAXKEY) { /* autokey */
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Don't lose info as to which keys are trusted. Make
|
|
* sure there are no dangling pointers!
|
|
*/
|
|
if (KEY_TRUSTED & sk->flags) {
|
|
if (sk->secret != NULL) {
|
|
memset(sk->secret, 0, sk->secretsize);
|
|
free(sk->secret);
|
|
sk->secret = NULL; /* TALOS-CAN-0054 */
|
|
}
|
|
sk->keyacclist = keyacc_all_free(sk->keyacclist);
|
|
sk->secretsize = 0;
|
|
sk->lifetime = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
freesymkey(sk);
|
|
}
|
|
ITER_DLIST_END()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* auth_agekeys - delete keys whose lifetimes have expired
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
auth_agekeys(void)
|
|
{
|
|
symkey * sk;
|
|
|
|
ITER_DLIST_BEGIN(key_listhead, sk, llink, symkey)
|
|
if (sk->lifetime > 0 && current_time > sk->lifetime) {
|
|
freesymkey(sk);
|
|
authkeyexpired++;
|
|
}
|
|
ITER_DLIST_END()
|
|
DPRINTF(1, ("auth_agekeys: at %lu keys %lu expired %lu\n",
|
|
current_time, authnumkeys, authkeyexpired));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* authencrypt - generate message authenticator
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns length of authenticator field, zero if key not found.
|
|
*/
|
|
size_t
|
|
authencrypt(
|
|
keyid_t keyno,
|
|
u_int32 * pkt,
|
|
size_t length
|
|
)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* A zero key identifier means the sender has not verified
|
|
* the last message was correctly authenticated. The MAC
|
|
* consists of a single word with value zero.
|
|
*/
|
|
authencryptions++;
|
|
pkt[length / 4] = htonl(keyno);
|
|
if (0 == keyno) {
|
|
return 4;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!authhavekey(keyno)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return MD5authencrypt(cache_type,
|
|
cache_secret, cache_secretsize,
|
|
pkt, length);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* authdecrypt - verify message authenticator
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns TRUE if authenticator valid, FALSE if invalid or not found.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
authdecrypt(
|
|
keyid_t keyno,
|
|
u_int32 * pkt,
|
|
size_t length,
|
|
size_t size
|
|
)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* A zero key identifier means the sender has not verified
|
|
* the last message was correctly authenticated. For our
|
|
* purpose this is an invalid authenticator.
|
|
*/
|
|
authdecryptions++;
|
|
if (0 == keyno || !authhavekey(keyno) || size < 4) {
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return MD5authdecrypt(cache_type,
|
|
cache_secret, cache_secretsize,
|
|
pkt, length, size);
|
|
}
|