kernel access control.
Provide ugidfw, a utility to manage the ruleset provided by
mac_bsdextended. Similar to ipfw, only for uids/gids and files.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Provide a library to manage user file system firewall-like rules
supported by the mac_bsdextended.ko security model. The kernel
module exports the current rule set using sysctl, and this
library provides a front end that includes support for retrieving
and setting rules, as well as printing and parsing them.
Note: as with other userland components, this is a WIP. However,
when used in combination with the soon-to-be-committed ugidfw,
it can actually be quite useful in multi-user environments to
allow the administrator to limit inter-user file operations without
resorting to heavier weight labeled security policies.
Obtained form: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Teach mount(8) to understand the MNT_MULTILABEL flag, which is used
to determine whether a file system operates with individual per-vnode
labels, or treats the entire file system as a single object with a
single (mount) label. The behavior here will probably evolve some
now that nmount(2) is available and can more flexibly support mount
options.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
embedded into their file_entry descriptor. This is more for
correctness, since these files cannot be bmap'ed/mmap'ed anyways.
Enforce this restriction.
Submitted by: tes@sgi.com
kernel access control.
Teach devfs how to respond to pathconf() _POSIX_MAC_PRESENT queries,
allowing it to indicate to user processes that individual vnode labels
are available.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC entry points for a number of VFS-related
operations in the Linux ABI module. In particular, handle uselib
in a manner similar to open() (more work is probably needed here),
as well as handle statfs(), and linux readdir()-like calls.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Add MAC support for the UDP protocol. Invoke appropriate MAC entry
points to label packets that are generated by local UDP sockets,
and to authorize delivery of mbufs to local sockets both in the
multicast/broadcast case and the unicast case.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Introduce two ioctls, SIOCGIFMAC, SIOCSIFMAC, which permit user
processes to manage the MAC labels on network interfaces. Note
that this is part of the user process API/ABI that will be revised
prior to 5.0-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Add MAC support for if_ppp. Label packets as they are removed from
the raw PPP mbuf queue. Preserve the mbuf MAC label across various
PPP data-munging and reconstitution operations. Perform access
control checks on mbufs to be transmitted via the interface.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Label packets generated by the gif virtual interface.
Perform access control on packets delivered to gif virtual interfaces.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC framework entry points to authorize readdir()
operations in the native ABI.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
Make idle process state more consistant.
Add an assert on thread state.
Clean up idleproc/mi_switch() interaction.
Use a local instead of referencing curthread 7 times in a row
(I've been told curthread can be expensive on some architectures)
Remove some commented out code.
Add a little commented out code (completion coming soon)
Reviewed by: jhb@freebsd.org
kernel access control.
Hook up various policy modules to the kernel build.
Note that a number of these modules require futher entry point commits
in the remainder of the kernel to become fully functional, but enough
of the pieces are in place to allow experimentation.
Note also that it would be desirable to not build the mac_*.ko modules
if 'options MAC' is not defined in the kernel configuration, because
the resulting modules are not useful without the kernel option. There
doesn't appear to be precedent for a way to do this -- for example,
we allow ipfw.ko to be built even if 'options NETINET' isn't defined.
Suggests welcomed on the "best" way to do this.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
modes of extracted files. This effectively disables special threating
of uid 0 for mode-preserving purposes and should fix problems with
pkg_add(1) and probably other things when extracting files/dirs with
sticky mode bits set.
Pointed out by: bde
MFC in: 2 weeks
structure. This prevents a boatload of warnings in the MAC modules,
so we can hook them up to the build.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control
Invoke appropriate MAC framework entry points to authorize a number
of vnode operations, including read, write, stat, poll. This permits
MAC policies to revoke access to files following label changes,
and to limit information spread about the file to user processes.
Note: currently the file cached credential is used for some of
these authorization check. We will need to expand some of the
MAC entry point APIs to permit multiple creds to be passed to
the access control check to allow diverse policy behavior.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Restructure the vn_open_cred() access control checks to invoke
the MAC entry point for open authorization. Note that MAC can
reject open requests where existing DAC code skips the open
authorization check due to O_CREAT. However, the failure mode
here is the same as other failure modes following creation,
wherein an empty file may be left behind.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke an appropriate MAC entry point to authorize execution of
a file by a process. The check is placed slightly differently
than it appears in the trustedbsd_mac tree so that it prevents
a little more information leakage about the target of the execve()
operation.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
the inits/destroys are done without the cache locks held even in the
persistent-lock calls. I may be cheating a little by using the MAC
"already initialized" flag for now.
